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PART XXIX.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

January to March 1912.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

Part XXIX.

[91] No. 1.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

(No. 387.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December* 26, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that when, as already reported, Mr. O'Beirne, owing to my indisposition, had a conversation with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 18th instant, he asked M. Sazonow how matters stood with regard to the question of Russian troops escorting caravans from Khoi through country actually occupied by the Turks, a question which from Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 351 of the 14th instant seemed to have become acute. M. Sazonow on that occasion stated that the Turkish Ambassador had, by instructions from his Government, been to see him, and had pointed out that if Russian troops escorted caravans over roads which were patrolled by the Turks, there was evident danger of unfortunate incidents occurring. The Ambassador had suggested that caravans going from Khoi to Urmia with Russian escorts might follow a certain road which skirted Urmia lake, and avoided the region in which there were Turkish troops. The Russian Government were, M. Sazonow said, considering whether it was practicable to adopt this suggestion.

Yesterday the Minister of Foreign Affairs told Mr. O'Beirne that the route of which Turkhan Pasha had spoken proved on enquiry to be altogether impracticable, and that it would therefore be necessary for caravans with Russian escorts to proceed from Khoi to Urmia viâ Dilman, which would bring them through a comparatively small section of the country in which there were Turkish troops. On Mr. O'Beirne remarking that this created a very dangerous situation, his Excellency said that orders had been given to the Russian officers to be careful to avoid any conflict, and added that the Russian escorts would not actually pass posts occupied by the Turks, though they would pass not far from them.

In the course of the conversation M. Sazonow mentioned that the Russian force at Khoi numbered 1,200 men, and said that Russia had also occupied a place which I have been unable to identify on the map, but which Mr. O'Beirne understood to be called Kuchunsi, and which the Minister described as an important strategical point on or near Urmia lake. In reply to a question from Mr. O'Beirne, his Excellency said that no additional troops had been sent by the Turks lately to the contested region.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[94] No. 2.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

(No. 390.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 27, 1911.*

WITH the exception of the "Retch," a paper which is run largely in the Jewish interest and is consistently against the Government on all issues, the entire St. Petersburgh press cries loudly for strong measures in Persia and for vengeance for the Russian lives lost in the recent incidents at Tabreez and Resht.

The "Novoe Vremya" of 24th December published an interview with M. Persiani, the official in charge of the Persian department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who gave the following account of the incidents. He stated that at Resht the Fedais, after vainly trying to provoke an incident by insulting behaviour to the troops, opened fire on the Russian Cossacks and attacked the consulate. The leaders were arrested and punished, and this led to a whole series of scuffles, in which one Russian officer was wounded and another hurt. On the 21st and 22nd December further attacks were made on the Russian troops at Enzeli, but there were no casualties on the Russian side.

At Tabreez, M. Persiani said, the incident was more serious. The Russian Foreign Office believed that the Persian Government were in no way implicated in the outbreak, which was due solely to secret plots of the revolutionaries. In all three incidents (Tabreez, Resht, and Enzeli) the revolutionary bands were the enemy, and not the Persian Government. "There can be no question of pardon," M. Persiani concluded; "when the offenders have been punished, Russia will endeavour to establish a régime under which such incidents will be impossible, and will strive to guarantee the establishment of order at Tabreez. Troops have already left Julfa for that place."

In the same issue of the "Novoe Vremya," no fewer than three leading articles are published on the subject. All three articles are violent in tone, and contain such phrases as—"all men found carrying arms should be shot on the spot," "all who took part in the attack should be exterminated," and "the entire population of Tabreez must be held responsible as passive accomplices and secret instigators, and must be made to contribute to pensions for the families of the Russian victims."

In its issue of the following day (25th December) the "Novoe Vremya" published a further communication from official sources with regard to the Tabreez incident. It stated that the incident began with the cutting of the telephone wires by the Persians, and an attack on the Russian soldier sent to repair them.

The same issue also published an interview with "a high official of the Ministry of Finance and a great expert in Persian matters, having served for many years in Persia." (This is possibly M. Grube, late manager of the Russian Bank at Tehran.) He attributes the whole trouble at Tabreez to the Anjuman and the so-called Stamboul party, who take their orders from Constantinople, and says that it is an organised movement against Russia, calculated to produce an effect in the Caucasus and in Turkey. The Persian Government has nothing to do with it, and is indeed a pure fiction, governed in its turn by political committees and Anjumans.

He criticises sharply the unpreparedness of the Russian Government as shown by the weakness of the force at Tabreez, and declares that those on the spot had long known that a plot was hatching and that the consuls had warned St. Petersburgh.

The "Official Messenger" of to-day's date publishes the text of a telegram received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Russian consul-general at Tabreez, protesting against the "vile slander" of the Reuter telegram which reported a rumour of the slaughter of women and children at Tabreez by Russian troops. The consul-general states that though the troops received great provocation owing to the mutilation of the Russian wounded and the indignities offered to the Russian dead, yet the women, children, and other non-combatants were removed from the houses immediately adjoining the Russian camp, were sheltered in the Russian camp, and eventually sent into the town under escort, an officer of the escort being treacherously killed on the way. If there were isolated casualties among women and children, these occurred during the bombardment of the adjoining houses, from which a fire was being directed on the Russian troops.

Papers of every shade of opinion, such as the "Novoe Vremya," "Rossia," "Bourse Gazette," and "Sviet," continue to publish articles calling for a speedy

reckoning. The more moderate organs, and those in touch with official circles, expressly exclude the Central Persian Government from all blame, but one and all declare that the local Anjumans and revoluntionary societies must be suppressed with a ruthless hand.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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[96] No. 3.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

(No. 392.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 27, 1911.*

I CALLED on the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 23rd instant, and expressed the hope that, now that the Persian Government had announced their intention of complying with the Russian demands, the Russian expeditionary force would be recalled, in spite of the regrettable outburst at Resht and Tabreez.

M. Sazonow replied that so far the Persian Government had only given M. Poklewsky a verbal assurance, but that, when this assurance had been confirmed by a formal written engagement, and when Mr. Shuster's dismissal from the Persian service was an accomplished fact, the troops, which were at present stationed at Kazvin, would be at once recalled. There was, his Excellency proceeded to say, no connection between the question of the recall of these troops and the very serious incidents that had just occurred in the north. The attitude of the Persian Government with regard to the latter had been most correct, and, in dealing with the former question, the Russian Government would not allow themselves to be influenced by the attacks made on their troops at Resht and Tabreez. On my remarking that in conflicts of this kind it was not always easy to fix the responsibility for their origin, his Excellency declared that the Russian troops had given no provocation whatsoever, and that they had been attacked in the most treacherous manner. Two officers had, he believed, been killed, and this was a very serious matter. A detachment of some 500 or 600 troops were being hurried up to Tabreez from Julfa, and severe retribution would have to be taken on the fedais. Those of them who turned out to be Russian subjects would probably be hanged, but he could not say what would be done with the rest. He would, he added, let me know as soon as he had any definite news to give me.

Meanwhile, the loss which the Russian troops have sustained during the fighting at Tabreez has deeply moved public opinion here, and the Government is being taken severely to task for its want of foresight in not having dispatched to Persia a force strong enough to render the occurrence of such incidents impossible. The Government is also blamed for having pursued what is termed a vacillating policy in its recent dealings with the Persian Government, and, though that Government is acquitted of all responsibility for the attacks made on the Russian troops, it will, I fear, be very difficult under present circumstances for the Imperial Government to recall the expeditionary force from Kazvin.

M. Sazonow has been too busy to receive me for the last two days, but in a short conversation which I had with him yesterday through the telephone, he once more assured me that he would treat the Tabreez incident as entirely distinct from that of the recall of the expeditionary force. He added, however, that that force could not be recalled till the engagements taken by the Persian Government had assumed a more binding character than they have at present. He also told me, in reply to an enquiry which I had addressed him, that the question of the punishment to be meted out to the fedais, who were still holding out against the Russian troops at Tabreez, would be left to the military authorities on the spot; and I gathered from the way he said this that it will be an exemplary one.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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[52] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

(No. 958.)
Constantinople, December 27, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the military attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, reporting on the military measures taken by the Ottoman Government in connection with the passage of Russian troops through the Persian territory now occupied by Turkey.

I understand from my Russian colleague that he has been discussing the matter in a friendly spirit with Assim Bey, in the hopes that some arrangement for a joint convoy or some other solution agreeable to both parties may be arrived at.

The latter seems only to fear that the convoying of caravans over points claimed by Turkey might prejudice their claims before the Joint Commission or The Hague Tribunal, and M. Tcharykow has made it clear that his Government does not desire that this convoying should prejudice the question in any way, but considers that they have a duty to perform which they will in no case relinquish.

I am informed at the Sublime Porte that the protocol establishing the basis of the discussion for the Joint Commission which is to sit here has now been signed at Tehran.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 65.)
Constantinople, December 26, 1911.

Sir,

IN connection with the question of the passage of Russian troops through the Persian territory now occupied by the Turks, I have the honour to inform you that orders have been issued to complete all battalions on the frontier to a strength of 800 men by summoning the Ihtiyat classes of the years 1298 to 1301 from the districts of Van, Bashkala, and Gevver.

It is also reported that one of the Erzinjan divisions has been ordered to hold itself in readiness.

In spite of these orders excitement over this question seems to have subsided, and nothing more is heard of it. The Turkish attitude was uncompromising, and the question appears to have been dropped for the present.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

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[236] No. 5.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 1, 1912.*

SHUSTER'S successor.

A provisional committee has been appointed by the Persian Government to take over from Shuster. This committee consists of five persons, and includes Mornard.

I had an opportunity last night of sounding my Russian colleague as to the abandoning of the candidature of Mornard as Shuster's successor in view of the objections raised by the Persian Government. M. Poklewsky is determined to press it, and under the circumstances I must, I presume, continue to act in concert with him.

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[272] No. 6.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 1, 1912.*

ESCORT incident.

The Persian Government have addressed two notes to me on the subject of the attack on the party escorting Smart to Shiraz. While complaining of the landing of troops at Bushire as unnecessary and likely to provoke further difficulties, they promise to do their utmost to secure the punishment of the offenders. They quote their note of the 30th October, in which they foresaw that the arrival of the Indian troops would create difficulties, and also my note of the 24th October, in which I stated that the troops would neither make expeditions nor patrol the roads.

I have told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that unless it is absolutely necessary for the safety of the party at Kazerun that the troops now landed shall proceed inland, they will remain at Bushire. The notes might, I think, remain unanswered until His Majesty's Government decide as to the action to be taken.

The "chef de Cabinet" of the Minister for Foreign Affairs has also given me an *aide-mémoire* which goes over much the same ground, and pleads as extenuation for the attack the recent Russian ultimatum "to which Great Britain was also a party. A widespread anti-foreign feeling has been thereby created in the country which will be difficult to modify, and which has intensified the agitation which the increase of the consular guards had already fostered." Mention is made in the *aide-mémoire* of the heavy Persian casualties by the "improper use of Maxim guns." The Persian Government consider these to be more than sufficient reparation. The *aide-mémoire* concludes by appealing to His Majesty's Government to leave the Persian Government to deal effectively with the situation, and not to take any drastic measures themselves.

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[281] No. 7.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 1, 1912.*

TABREEZ.

Please see my telegram No. 768 of the 29th December.

I have received the following telegram (No. 73) from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, dated the 31st December :—

"I have to report that General Voredonoff arrived in Tabreez yesterday afternoon. Two more regiments arrived shortly afterwards. With the reinforcements which had already arrived, the Russian force should now consist of at the least 4,000 men. In consequence of a proclamation signed by my Russian colleague, certain of the shops in the bazaars were opened to-day. Certain of the Russian soldiers, principally Cossacks, have been committing thefts of watches and other articles from individuals, and robberies from shops, a certain number of which were broken into. In spite of this, confidence is, I think, being slowly restored. Miller has been doing everything in his power to stop these robberies, and the recently arrived general has confirmed, in a more stringent form, the orders to this effect which had already been issued by the commanding officers.

"The only visible sign now of Persian authority here is the fifty or sixty Persian Cossacks under their Russian commander. The town is completely occupied by the Russians, who have posted detachments at the public offices, the Customs, and the post office. All measures concerning public order and the government of the town are necessarily in their hands.

"The population, however, seem to be only desirous of peace, and I do not anticipate any trouble. They are helping the Russians, as before, in the search for arms. They have also handed Sheikh Salim over to the Russians : he is one of the leading agitators, and it appears that they attibute their present misfortunes to his teaching. Miller tells me that he is to be court-martialled : it will go hard for him if the court find him guilty.

"Search parties have recovered the missing bodies of fourteen Russian soldiers. My Russian colleague informs me that they had been shockingly mutilated. They were buried to-day in the camp."

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[287] No. 8.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 1, 1912.*

AMENDED list of casualties in fighting near Kazerun is as follows: Killed, 2 followers; missing, 1 follower; wounded, consul, 7 sowars, 1 hospital assistant, and 1 follower.

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[292] No. 9.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 1, 1912.*

TWO regiments of Russian troops left Kazvin to-day for Resht.
(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[52305/11] No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 771 of 30th December: Attack on Mr. Smart.
I concur.

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[2] No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Lord Kilmarnock.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 345 of 30th December: Swedish officers for Persia].

When your Russian colleague receives similar instructions you should express to Swedish Government hope of His Majesty's Government that no obstacle will be placed in the way of these three officers.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1, and Tehran, No. 3.)

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[8] No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 774 of 31st December.

I hope that Russian Government will convey an intimation to Shuja-ed-Dowleh that, if he becomes Governor of Tabreez, he must not proclaim the ex-Shah.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 6.)

[52312/11] No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.*

MR. SHUSTER'S successor.

Your telegram No. 770 of the 30th December.

In view of my telegram No. 436 of the 9th ultimo, you have every justification for going as far as you have done with your Russian and Belgian colleagues and the

Persian Government. The question will be discussed at St. Petersburgh, and I will also talk to Count Benckendorff about it.

As regards M. Oudendyck, we are trying to obtain further information as to his suitability.

In the meanwhile, you should do nothing in any way inconsistent with my telegram above referred to.

[52053/11] No. 14.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, relative to the situation in Southern Persia.*

It will be seen that in the opinion of His Majesty's acting consul, in which Sir G. Barclay concurs, it will be necessary for the protection of His Majesty's consulate at Shiraz that at least one battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain guns should be despatched to that place before the migration of the tribes in March, when some 15,000 armed men may be ready to engage in hostilities, while to undertake any punitive expedition and to keep open the Bushire Shiraz road, a force of four battalions of infantry and mountain guns would be required.

It thus appears that a choice must be made between the policy of holding Shiraz in force, and keeping open the means of communication with the sea-coast, which would involve the employment of a very considerable force, and that of evacuating Shiraz and withdrawing His Majesty's consul and British subjects from Fars.

In view of the necessity of arriving at a decision on the subject as soon as possible, I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be furnished with an early expression of Lord Crewe's views on the subject.

A similar letter has been addressed to the director of military operations.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[52050/11] No. 15.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,† proposing to authorise His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, in case of real necessity, to inform the Kawami and the Ilkhani of the Kashgais, that n certain conditions they may count on the full diplomatic support of His Majesty's Government.

In view of the circumstances set forth in the accompanying telegram, Sir E. Grey proposes, subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, to approve Sir G. Barclay's suggestion.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Part XXVIII, No. 709.

† Part XXVIII, No. 710.

[344] No. 16.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th December, 1911, relative to an attack on a Persian caravan.

India Office, January 1, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 16.

First Assistant to Resident, Persian Gulf, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 2, 1911.

OFFICER in command of Ispahan squadron telegraphs 1st instant from Koomishah to Colonel Douglas to following effect:—

"Started yesterday at 7·15 A.M. from Yezd-i-Khost, being preceded by caravan, which was one hour in front of me. Near Borj Gardigir tribesmen attacked caravan. I moved forward with two troops on information being sent back, and made a mounted attack on the tribesmen, whom I saw 500 yards south of tower, so as to cut them off from the tower, but, before I could get into them, they ran back and got inside. Risaldar Major Gholam Muhammad was wounded in the thigh by a bullet while carrying out this movement. All caravan, to the number of 900, were now massed together; I diverted them by route west of tower ahead of transport, while my squadron covered them. They arrived safely at Aminabad. Double tier of fire was kept up by tribesmen from tower, which all of them were now inside; they numbered thirty to forty. Circumstances did not seem to me to justify heavy loss, without which tower [?] could not have been taken by assault. Casualties among tribesmen are uncertain, but we saw two wounded men being assisted to the tower. Risaldar Major Muhammad Gholam is progressing most favourably and is quite out of danger; he was the only casualty on our side."

(Addressed to Delhi; repeated to Calcutta.)

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[325] No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 2.)

Sir, *India Office, January* 1, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India regarding the situation created in Southern Persia by the attack on Mr. Vice-Consul Smart, and the measures necessitated thereby.

It would seem that matters have now reached a point at which it is impossible to take action in any direction without raising the whole question of British policy in Persia. This is a question primarily for His Majesty's Government, and it is subject to this consideration that the following remarks are offered:—

I am first to observe that what appears to be of pressing importance is the situation at Shiraz. Whatever may be done at Bushire in the way of landing troops and seizing the customs, what has to be faced is the probability that before the end of March Shiraz will be surrounded by 15,000 tribesmen in a fighting temper. The immediate objective of our policy must, therefore, be to prevent a contingency that might threaten Shiraz, Ispahan, and Yezd with a common disaster. The Government of India are rightly opposed to the dispatch to Shiraz of a battalion of infantry and a mountain battery. The policy of sending small bodies of men through highly disturbed country—to the danger of which attention has more than once been called

by this Office—has already been shown to be futile, and is largely responsible for the present situation.

The alternative proposed by the Government of India is to hold Bushire with a battalion until redress has been received from the Persian Government; to send 5,000 men to Shiraz, in the event of its isolation; and to bring away the detachments already there, the British consul, and any British subjects who may wish to come. Assuming that the policy of His Majesty's Government is still to maintain a strong and independent Persia, this proposal has much that at first sight is attractive and that might seem to counterbalance the grave disadvantages that must necessarily attend any withdrawal. But on examination it appears itself to be attended by disadvantages no less grave. In the first place it involves postponing until Shiraz is actually in danger a measure which it will probably take two months to carry out. In the second place, it involves the occupation and partial administration of Bushire for an indefinite time. It would be impossible to send the British consul back to Shiraz and to evacuate Bushire until the Persian Government had inflicted upon the tribesmen that condign punishment which the Government of India regard as a difficult and dangerous operation for 5,000 men of the Indian army. The Persian Government, even if they had a free hand, have not the means of carrying this out within any reasonable time; it is impossible to foresee what complications in the north might hinder them even in well-meant attempts to do so; and it is more than possible that they might, as on previous occasions, make the presence of foreign troops on Persian soil an excuse for not attempting the task, while the presence of a single battalion at a town on the coast, even coupled with control of the customs, would afford us a minimum of leverage for moving them to efficient action. Moreover, the eventual evacuation of Bushire on any terms short of complete satisfaction from the Persian Government would itself bear the appearance of a defeat. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the question is not between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government alone. There are at Shiraz, Ispahan, and Yezd consular representatives and subjects of other Powers, including Russia; it is improbable that all of these would elect to withdraw with the British force; and it is inconceivable that, if Great Britain showed herself unwilling or unable to protect them, Russia would fail to do so; His Majesty's Government would be in no position to protest; and with the appearance of Russian troops in a region which though nominally neutral, has, in fact, been accustomed only to British troops in the past, the whole policy of the understanding would be very gravely affected.

The alternative would appear to be the immediate occupation in force of Shiras, and the effective control of the road to Bushire. How strongly the Secretary of State for India feels the objections to any such course is sufficiently indicated in this Office letter of the 16th October last. But the situation has entirely changed since that date. It is no longer a question of escorting caravans along the roads, but of ensuring the safety of British troops and subjects in Shiraz against overwhelming numbers, and of maintaining the prestige of this country in a sphere in which its influence has hitherto been predominant. With a brigade of infantry and a battery of mountain artillery at Shiraz, together with other troops sufficient to keep open their communications with Bushire, we should presumably be in a position to dictate both to the Persian Government and to the tribes the terms on which we would withdraw, and it would be worth their while not only to secure our withdrawal with the least possible delay, but to take such measures as would ensure that no similar occupation would ever be necessary again.

It is not suggested that this course is free from disadvantages. It would not be popular in this country or in India; it would be very expensive, though the cost of sending 5,000 men to Shiraz must in any case be great; there is the risk that so large a force at Shiraz might find itself drawn into punitive operations, which should lie altogether outside its programme; and it is always possible that, as indicated above, in connection with the occupation of Bushire, the Persian Government might profess to regard its presence as a reason for not negotiating at all.

As regards the question of cost, I am to say that whichever course is adopted the consent of both Houses of Parliament will be necessary (under 21 & 22 Vict., c. 106, s. 55) before any part of the cost of "military operations," whether at Bushire or Shiraz, can be charged to Indian revenues; and I am to suggest that in view of the obvious unpopularity of such a charge, and of the consideration that the maintenance of the understanding with Russia has become a matter of European rather than of purely Asiatic importance, the whole of the cost should be borne by the Imperial exchequer.

I am to add, for Sir E. Grey's information, that the substance of the above observations have been telegraphed to the Viceroy and to the Marquess of Crewe. The further views they may express will be communicated to you in due course.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

December 30, 1911.

(Telegraphic.) P.

INCIDENT at Shiraz.

Government of India have received telegrams from Bushire and Shiraz which show that contingency has now occurred which was foreseen as not unlikely, and that attack has been made by tribesmen on Indian cavalry detachments sent to Ispahan and Shiraz, with some loss, and that a cavalry force of some 100 are at Kazerun in a precarious position. We note with satisfaction that Consul Smart has been wounded only, and that he appears to be in a caravanserai in safety. The question as to what action is to be taken now arises. Landing of a battalion of infantry at Bushire to hold town in pledge until effective measures for infliction of condign punishment on tribesmen who attacked the British cavalry have been taken by Persian Government, is first obvious suggestion. Troops should seize and retain customs, and should keep, as a contribution towards claim to be made on Persian Government, the surplus over what is due for the service of loans. If infantry were disembarked, the ship now guarding the port would be freed, and a blockade of the coast, which would prevent tribesmen renewing their ammunition supplies, and would place them in an uncomfortable situation, would be rendered possible. If measures are to be taken, this is very essential, and dispatch of infantry battalion should, in our opinion, be at once proceeded with.

There then arises the question whether any punitive measures against the offending tribes should be undertaken. Owing to precipitous nature of country and elusive character of tribes, measures would, in Government of India's opinion, be extremely hazardous and difficult. Only a large field force, with transport on a considerable scale, could, moreover, undertake the measures. It is necessary, however, to foresee a a further contingency, namely, that main force at Shiraz may possibly find itself in an entirely isolated position, involving a certain amount of danger, even after the Kazerun detachment has succeeded in returning to Shiraz. Relief of detachment would then become necessary, and at least 5,000 men, consisting of four infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and two mountain batteries would be required in order to effect this without running new risks. Should force of circumstances, and pursuit of a policy to which they have been opposed from the outset, compel Government of India reluctantly to send a force of this size for the relief of the cavalry detachment of Shiraz, they hold the view strongly that force should return with least possible delay from Shiraz to the coast, bringing away with them members of consulate, Shiraz and Ispahan cavalry detachments, and any British subjects who might desire to avail themselves of escort of British troops in leaving Shiraz. Battalion of infantry could then hold Bushire until Persian Government have given satisfactory redress, the main body of troops returning to India.

Dispatch to Shiraz of an infantry regiment and a battery of artillery is not favoured by us, as risks, which it is desirable to avoid, would be involved in sending this inadequate force. Early orders are solicited if a battalion of infantry is to be sent to Bushire as we have proposed.

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[389] No. 18.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January* 2, 1912.

MY telegram No. 694.

Manager of Persian Transport Company tells me that his negotiations for extension of the road concession have reached a deadlock, and he invokes my support.

Am I authorised to give it?

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[393] No. 19.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January* 2, 1912.

ESCORT incident.

His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz in his following telegram, dated the 1st December, reports Smart's account of the commencement of the incident:—

"Mohamed Ali Khan informs me that two of the ringleaders who were in the Rahdar caravanserai have been arrested. He adds that it will be easy to arrest one of the culprits of the Dukhter attack. There are two other culprits whose guilt he denies, and about whom there is some difficulty. Amir-ul-Mulk has just arrived; he is endeavouring to rope in all the other culprits by means of the Kadkhodas, all of whom he has sent for. I was the first to reach the caravanserai; Birdwood's party arrived a few minutes later accompanied by a mamur from Mohamed Ali Khan. The mamur said that we could halt at the river below for lunch and for watering the horses; he assured me that we had nothing to fear from the caravanserai. While we lunched, mamur went into the caravanserai. When we were on the point of starting again, mamur came up and said he had heard that our caravan would be stopped by force by the caravanserai tofangchis. A message was to be sent to Mohamed Ali Khan at Shahpur for permission for us to proceed; mamur insisted that we should await the reply to this message. Our caravan was already in progress; I asked Birdwood to proceed with it to a less exposed place, while I remained behind with mamur and Persian sowars to argue with the caravanserai riflemen and endeavour to pacify them. Caravanserai tofangchis opened fire, however, before I could do anything; of course our men had to reply. Persian casualties, according to Mohamed Ali, were one killed and seven wounded; I think this is an exaggeration, for Mohamed Ali would, for obvious reasons, endeavour to exaggerate the Persian casualties. Whatever these latter were—if, indeed, there were any at all—they must have been very slight. This account is confirmed by Birdwood."

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[396] No. 20.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January* 2, 1912.

TABREEZ.

Please see my telegram No. 3 of yesterday.

I have received the following telegram, dated yesterday, from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez:—

"I have the honour to report that about 4 P.M. to-day the Russians executed in Serbaz Khane eight persons, including Sheikh Salim (see my immediately preceding telegram) and the Sikat-el-Islam. My Russian colleague states that the execution was carried out "in accordance with the decision of the court-martial established by order from superior quarters."

"Confidential. The arrest of the sikat was effected last night. My Russian colleague, whom I saw at 10 o'clock this morning, made no mention either of his arrest or that he was to be tried. I had, therefore, no reason, when I received the news later, to anticipate such summary procedure. I asked Miller for information early in the afternoon, but received no answer. I repeated my message, but was informed that he was not at the consulate. I again communicated with Miller as soon as I learned that the execution had taken place. He confirmed the news.

"I was not consulted by the Russians before the execution, nor was I informed that it was about to take place. I do not know what reasons they had for this hurried and drastic measure."

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[395] No. 21.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 2, 1912.*

I HAVE addressed the following telegram to-day to His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz :—

"I have repeated Smart's report, as telegraphed by you on the 31st December, to the Secretary of State.

"I must have a full and comprehensive report on both the incident at Kotal Dokhtar and fighting near Kazerun before I can make any definite recommendation to His Majesty's Government.

"Your previous telegrams, as also those of Douglas, were of a most disquieting nature ; the views which I derived from them and which I expressed to the Foreign Office were very grave, but your telegram of the 31st ultimo contains nothing to warrant those views.

"Your telegram is inadequate, and I should wish to be furnished with two full telegraphic reports dealing comprehensively with each incident respectively. These should be sent as soon as Birdwood and Smart reach Shiraz."

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[399] No. 22.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tehran, January 2, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, dated to-day :—

"Kazerun party has joined up with Colonel Douglas's force at Kotal Dakhter without incident."

(Repeated to India.)

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[400] No. 23.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 2, 1912.*

TABREEZ.

The Sikat-el-Islam mentioned in my telegram No. 8 of this morning was the leading ecclesiastic at Tabreez ; he was revered by everyone.

His execution is a blunder of the first magnitude. It would have been difficult to have found any measure calculated to exasperate public feeling to a greater extent.

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[401] No. 24.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 2, 1912.*

TABREEZ.

I have just received a visit from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who came to speak to me about the execution of Sikat-el-Islam, which formed the subject of my telegram No. 11 of the 2nd instant.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs had just come from a Cabinet Council at the Palace. He said that the population of Tehran was not yet aware of this execution, but that as soon as the news of this "irreparable crime" spread there would be so strong an outburst of general indignation that it would in all probability be impossible for the Cabinet, which had gone so far in its efforts to conciliate Russia, to remain in office.

The telegram from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, which I repeated to you this morning, shows fairly clearly that the Russian consul was not ignorant of the pending

execution of this great ecclesiastic. While it is possible that the Russian military authorities did not realise the nature of their action, it must have been evident to the consul that it would excite great indignation in Persia ; in my opinion no more provocative step could have been devised at this time of Muharem, which corresponds to our Holy Week, and it is difficult to believe that the consul would have permitted the execution to take place unless it had been his actual intention to provoke widespread resentment.

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[292] No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 2, 1912.*

MR. MALLET saw Count Benckendorff, by my direction, and expressed my satisfaction at the withdrawal of 1,000 men from Kazvin, and my hope that it would now be found possible to proceed with the recall of the Russian troops.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 7.)

[52206/11] No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, upon the receipt of the memorandum which you communicated to this department on the 25th ultimo, respecting reported massacres by Russian troops at Tabreez, I made enquires on the subject from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

Sir G. Barclay has informed me, in reply, that according to reports from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, the story mentioned in your memorandum is not borne out by the facts. So far, indeed, does the rumour of a massacre lack foundation, that as a matter of fact some twelve or fifteen Persian women and children went to the Russian camp, where they were received and well treated ; moreover, other Persian families are reported to have applied for similar protection. On the other hand, a Russian officer was shot dead by the fedai while he was engaged in superintending the departure of the Persian women and children.

Further, His Majesty's consul states that, though some women and children may have perished while certain houses were being bombarded, the charge of general inhumanity made against the Russians has been supported by no evidence, and is, in Mr. Shipley's opinion, unfounded.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

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[474] No. 27.

Mirza Mehdi Khan to Mr. Mallet.—(Received January 3, 1912.)

Dear Mr. Mallet, *Persian Legation, London, December 25, 1911.*

WITH reference to my conversation with you this morning, as the matter is of the greatest importance, I thought it best to let you have the chief points of the telegrams I have received from my Government. I hope you have already taken measures, and I shall be glad if you will be so very kind as to cause me to be informed at your earliest convenience what has been done. As the telegram speaks for itself, it is unnecessary for me to add anything. My Government are amazed at these acts perpetrated immediately after the acceptance of the ultimatum, and when they expressed their desire to establish cordial relations with Russia, and to do everything possible towards that end. These atrocities are bound to produce the very worst impression on the people of Persia, which it will be impossible to remove. We depend upon His Britannic Majesty's Government to take immediate action. As you know, I called at the Foreign Office on Saturday, 23rd instant, when I was informed that the matter was receiving the attention of Sir Edward Grey, who was away.

Yours sincerely,
MEHDI.

Enclosure in No. 27.

Purport of Telegrams received from the Persian Government.

THE Russian military measures are being pursued in Tabreez. They are massacring women and children and innocent people and who ever they can lay their hands on. Five hundred people have been massacred in this manner in one day.

The Karguzar (Persian Foreign Office agent) at Tabreez saw the British consul-general; the latter states that the Russian consul-general says that he is powerless, and that the commander of the forces has assumed full authority. The people have become quiet, but the Russians are pursuing their cruel and ferocious measures. In the Armenian quarter they met four unarmed Mahommedans, whom they have killed. In one instance they put to the sword nineteen people. The Governor of Tabreez has proposed to the consuls that as these acts of the Russians produces great excitement a court of enquiry should be instituted. The Mahommedans do not desire to fight with the Russians, but the latter do not desist from killing the people and bombarding the buildings. What is to be done under the circumstances when, on the one hand, the measures taken by Russians are so harsh, and, on the other, the commander of the forces pays no attention to instructions from the Russian Minister.

On the other hand, the Russian Minister had instructed the Russian consul at Resht to act with the governor of that town and the Karguzar and settle the affairs. But the Russian consul refused to see the Karguzar and is still pursuing severe measures. This consul has been for a long time causing a great deal of mischief, and has not refrained from any provocative act.

This attitude of the Russian authorities and their simultaneous action in Tabreez and at Resht is most amazing, especially at a moment when the Persian Government had done everything possible to conciliate and to resume friendly relations and had accepted the terms of the ultimatum.

It is of utmost urgency that immediate steps be taken to stop the action of the Russians, both at Tabreez and at Resht, and to have an enquiry instituted. Every moment of delay means the loss of life of hundreds of harmless women and children.

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[428] No. 28.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 28th December, 1911, relative to the position at Shiraz.

India Office, January 2, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, December 28, 1911.*

REFERENCE is invited to telegram No. 757 of to-day's date from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Your views as to proposed dispatch of battery and battalion to Shiraz and the alternative should be communicated as soon as possible by telegraph.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, December 28, 1911.*

FOLLOWING telegram received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the 28th instant:—

[Here follows repetition of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 758, dated the 27th December, 1911.]

We are replying to Foreign Office, expressing concurrence with proviso that, as with small improvised force at considerable distance from base, it seems impracticable to make sufficient demonstration to draw off tribesmen; force, if landed, should not leave neighbourhood, unless, in opinion of Colonel Douglas, military operations from Bushire, at whatever risk, are necessitated by gravity of situation at Kazerun or elsewhere on road.

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[468] No. 29.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 3 of 1st January.
Shuja-ed-Dowleh entered Tabreez with 200 men yesterday.
(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

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[473] No. 30.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 8 of 2nd January.
Following from consul at Tabreez, dated 2nd January, No. 2:—

"My immediately preceding telegram.

"Miller confirmed to me this morning that the court-martial had been constituted under direct orders from St. Petersburgh. The charges against the persons executed were in some cases instigation to, and in others of taking part in, recent rising against the Russian troops. There were still some eighteen prisoners in the camp, but I could not ascertain from him what would be done with these, or whether, as reported in the town, further executions were to take place to-day.

"I told Miller that, while in view of direct orders from St. Petersburgh above referred to the responsibility must be on those whose duty it was to carry them out, I must express to him my opinion that the proceedings had been conducted with undue haste, and I urged that with regard to the remaining prisoners all possible clemency should be shown. In reply, Miller, who did not dissent from my observations, stated that no efforts would be wanting on his part in the direction indicated by me, and begged me to believe that such as they had taken had been imposed upon them by the necessity of the situation."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh. Neither this nor three previous telegrams about Tabreez were repeated to India.)

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[480] No. 31.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 749 of 26th December. Resht and Enzeli.

British vice-consul at Resht reports that Russian consul has deported a number of mullahs and notables to Russia. Administration of the town appears to be entirely in Russian hands.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

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[477] No. 32.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, January 3, 1912.*

EX-SHAH.

Your telegram No. 3 of 1st January.

I wrote privately yesterday to M. Sazonow in the sense of your telegram referred to above, adding that His Majesty's Government could not in any circumstances recognise the ex-Shah, and that his proclamation at Tabreez would therefore gravely complicate the situation.

In a conversation which I had with his Excellency to-day, he said that the Russian assurances already given with regard to Tehran applied with equal force to Tabreez, and that no proclamation of Mohammad Ali would be permitted in that town so long as the Russian troops were in occupation there.

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[478] No. 33.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, January 3, 1912.*

TABREEZ.

Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 12 of 2nd January.

In a conversation which I had to-day with M. Sazonow, I told him that in my opinion the military authorities at Tabreez had committed a great blunder in executing Sikat-el-Islam, and that the affair was most regrettable. The present Persian Government, which had adopted such a conciliatory attitude towards Russia, would probably be led to resign by the indignation which the execution would arouse in the country, and the execution itself was likely to be represented as having been carried out for the express purpose of rousing such a manifestation of popular feeling as would justify the Russian troops in advancing on the capital.

To this M. Sazonow replied that this mujtahid had been one of the ringleaders of the movement against the Russians, and that his execution was the only course open to the military authorities. He remarked that Europe had had nothing to say when the Turks had killed a Greek bishop in Macedonia by torture. The troops at Tabreez were incensed by the cruelties practised by the Persians on the Russian prisoners and wounded, and the military authorities had had to take this sentiment into consideration. He had received telegrams giving details of the tortures and mutilations inflicted, and reporting that one or more soldiers had even been buried alive, but he had purposely suppressed this intelligence.

I said that I still held that it would have been good policy to except this ecclesiastic. I reminded his Excellency that, like Great Britain, Russia had a vast number of subjects of the Mussulman faith who would regard this execution as an outrage. I was still more preoccupied, however, by its possible consequences in another direction. The Anglo-Russian understanding would be strained almost to breaking point if Russia were to occupy Tehran in consequence of the outbreak of fresh disorders. I hoped, therefore, that the Central Government would use their influence on the military authorities at Tabreez in the direction of moderation.

M. Sazonow said that this would not be easy to do from a distance, and that they had to reckon with public opinion. He trusted that no incident would occur which would necessitate an advance on Tehran. At the same time, in referring to Mr. Mallet's language to Count Benckendorff reported in your telegram No. 5, he said that the immediate recall of the troops from Kazvin was out of the question, and observed that the force of 1,000 men sent from that place to Resht had only been transferred in order to strengthen the garrison of the latter place.

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[236] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 1st January: Persian treasurer-general.

If enquiries about Oudendijk are satisfactory, it might be possible to arrange with Russian Government to give Persian Government the choice between Mornard and Oudendijk.

Now that a committee has been appointed urgency is not so great.

I may mention that it has been suggested here to put the treasurer-generalship into permanent commission by the appointment of an Englishman, a Russian, and a nominee of a minor Power.

The execution of the Sikat-el-Islam makes it important to be as conciliatory as possible.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 7.)

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[272] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 1st January: Attack on Mr. Smart.

I concur in view that no answer is required at present to Persian Government's communications.

Persian Minister here has now used similar language, and has been told that, as regards Shiraz, we had been obliged to send additional guards on account of disorders prevailing there, and that it was notorious that roads had been impassable for months past. We were awaiting with anxiety the march from Kazerun to Shiraz, and everything depended on whether Mr. Smart and his party arrived safely. Persian Government were responsible, and we intended to hold them so.

Minister was asked to telegraph this to Persian Government.

[52156/11] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1912.*

MR. MALLET, by my instructions, spoke to the Russian Ambassador on the 1st instant in the sense of the second paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 761 of the 28th ultimo, saying that, as the Persian Government had complied with the Russian demands, it seemed to be very desirable, as well as reasonable, that a beginning of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin should be made without delay in accordance with the assurance given to your Excellency by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Mallet said that I quite saw the difficulty of an immediate and total withdrawal, but that it was most desirable to do something to encourage the Persian Government after their compliance, especially since recent ocurrences at Tabreez had apparently forced Russia to take strong action there, although the present Persian Government were not to blame for what had happened.

In the light, however, of the more recent information contained in your Excellency's telegram No. 346 of the 30th ultimo, that about 1,000 men had already been transferred from Kazvin to Resht, Count Benckendorff, in reporting this conversation to his Government, modified his telegram, saying that I had been glad to hear that this step had been taken and hoped that the process of withdrawal would continue.

Mr. Mallet further expressed the hope that discrimination would be used at Tabreez, and Count Benckendorff replied that the Viceroy of the Caucasus was a man

of extreme moderation and intelligence and of a humane disposition, so that, if the policy adopted depended on him no excesses would be committed.

Count Benckendorff expressed gratitude for the publication in the press here of a denial of the reported Russian atrocities at Tabreez, which, he said, would have an excellent effect.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52300/11] No. 37.

Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 3, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo respecting the question of the appointment of M. Mornard to succeed Mr. Morgan Shuster as treasurer-general of Persia.

I am to state, in reply, that the whole question is now under consideration by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[571] No. 38.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 31st December, 1911, relative to Shiraz affairs.

India Office, January 3, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 38.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Downing Street, December* 31, 1911.

INCIDENT at Shiraz.

Please see your telegrams dated the 30th instant. Letter has been sent to Foreign Office, making observations for consideration, of which substance is to following effect :—

"1. Situation at Shiraz, which by end of March may probably be surrounded by tribesmen to number of 15,000, with corresponding danger to Ispahan and Yezd, governs the question. Taking over customs at Bushire and holding that place with battalion would not meet this danger. Dispatch to Shiraz of so small a force as mountain battery and battalion of infantry is rightly objected to by Government of India.

"2. Alternative proposal of Government of India, which is attractive, is to send to Shiraz, in event of its being isolated, 5,000 men, with a view to complete withdrawal being effected, and to hold Bushire until Persian Government gives redress. This involves, however, the postponement of operations, execution of which may occupy two months, until Shiraz is actually in danger. Occupation and partial administration of Bushire for indefinite period are also involved, since, even if they are willing, Persian Government may not be able to restore order within any reasonable time, and a pretext for not attempting task may possibly be made by them out of presence of foreign troops in Persian territory. Sufficient leverage to move Persian Government to efficient action may not be afforded by occupation of Bushire by a single battalion, even if loss by Persian Government of the control of the customs were coupled with it; and there would be an appearance of defeat if we were eventually to withdraw from Bushire on any terms short of complete satisfaction.

"3. There are, moreover, representatives and subjects of other Powers, including

Russia, at Yezd, Shiraz, and Ispahan. We must contemplate contingency that Russia will take steps to protect any of these who may be unwilling to withdraw to Bushire under our protection. Policy of Anglo-Russian Convention as to Persia would be gravely affected by appearance of Russian troops in sphere which has always been under influence of Great Britain, although it is nominally neutral.

"4. The alternative seems to be that Shiraz should be immediately occupied in force and road to Bushire effectively controlled. Letter dated the 16th October from India Office to Foreign Office indicated sufficiently the objections to any such action. Situation has, however, changed entirely since then. Question is now one of ensuring safety of British troops and subjects at Shiraz against overwhelming numbers, and no longer one of escorting caravans on trade routes. If we maintain at Shiraz mountain battery and infantry brigade, with other troops to keep open the communications with Bushire, it is a question whether result may not be to overawe tribes and to produce a real effort on part of Persian Government to lose as little time as possible in complying with conditions laid down by us as essential for withdrawal of troops, and to cause them to take measures at the same time with a view to ensuring non-recurrence ever afterwards of necessity for similar occupation.

"5. There are following considerations on the other hand :—

"(*a.*) As indicated above in connection with occupation of Bushire, it is possible that an excuse for doing nothing will be made by Persian Government out of presence of our troops;

"(*b.*) Programme should altogether exclude punitive operations, into which, however, so large a force may easily be drawn;

"(*c.*) Occupation for prolonged period will involve great expense, and will be very unpopular in this country; heavy expense must, however, be involved in any case by dispatch of 5,000 men.

"6. Payment from Indian revenues of cost of any military operations, whether at Shiraz or Bushire, will require consent of Parliament, under Government of India Act. In view of unpopularity of placing such a charge on Indian revenues, and of consideration that maintenance of Russian *entente* has become a matter of European rather than Asiatic importance, it is suggested that British revenues should bear the whole cost.

"7. Above observations have been communicated in substance to Secretary of State and Viceroy by telegraph. Foreign Office will be informed when further expression of their views has been received."

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[651] No. 39.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 4.)

Sir, *India Office, January* 3, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant regarding the attack on Mr. Consul Smart and his escort on the Shiraz road. In reply, I am to say that Sir E. Grey's proposal that the question of compensation for the wounded sowar should be postponed for the present is concurred in, and it is for consideration whether that for compensation in respect of the dead should not also be deferred until His Majesty's Government have decided what further action, if any, is necessitated by this grave occurrence. It might be sufficient in the meantime if His Majesty's Minister informed the Persian Government of his intention to present a claim. It seems desirable that that Government should have no occasion for thinking that a money payment will be regarded as sufficient.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

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[548] No. 40.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 12 of 2nd January, Tabreez.

Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday again emphasised the difficult position of the Cabinet in the face of the execution of Sikat-el-Islam, and urged upon my Russian colleague and myself that, in order to help the Cabinet, Russian Government should (1) give the Persian Government assurances as to the duration and nature of Russian administration of Tabreez, Resht, Enzeli; (2) expel Shuja from Tabreez; and (3) consent to an enquiry to establish responsibility for court-martialling of Sikat-el-Islam, who, Minister for Foreign Affairs declared, was innocent of all offence.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he was confident that Persian Government would have my offices to obtain this assistance from the Russian Government.

Third point is of course out of the question, as inconsistent with dignity of Russia, but the first and second points would seem reasonable.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Shuja was received by his friends in Tabreez with acclamations for ex-Shah; he could hardly have entered Tabreez except for the presence of Russian troops.

Present Cabinet deserves support, as it has made submission to Russia in the face of great difficulty and grave risk of assassination. Moreover, it would be difficult to find anything to take its place, and its resignation could not but further aggravate situation.

I saw Russian Minister last night, but he has not decided what to telegraph.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to St. Petersburgh and Tabreez.)

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[597] No. 41.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received January 4.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 15 of 3rd January. Resht.

Deportation by Russian consul at Resht of mullah was in disobedience to instructions from Russian Minister, who had directed him not to meddle with ecclesiastics. He appears to have acted on general authorisation from St. Petersburgh to deport agitators.

Caucasian authorities refuse to take these undesirables, and they are being sent back to Resht. It is to be hoped that these mullahs will not be court-martialled, but anything is possible with a man of such provocative proclivities as the Russian consul. British vice-consul states that his Russian colleague entirely ignores his colleagues. That he should not consult his British colleague at such a time and that Russian consul at Tabreez should have allowed chief priest to be brought before a court-martial, a step consequences of which might be expected to be felt far beyond Russian sphere, without informing the British consul, are facts which afford an instructive demonstration of manner in which Russian consul interprets Anglo-Russian *Entente* in Persia.

(Addressed to Foreign Office, Tabreez, and Resht.)

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[671] No. 42.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 14 of 3rd January.

Following from consul at Tabreez, No. 4:—

"Your telegram No. 1.

"(Confidential.)

"Miller stated to me yesterday, in the course of conversation reported in my telegram No. 75, that the Sikat-el-Islam had recommenced to intrigue with the revolutionaries, and that he had warned him accordingly. As regards execution, he,

Miller, had [?] nevertheless not anticipated such sudden action. This may have been so with regard to warning, but as to the latter part of my Russian colleague's statement all the circumstances are against it.

"As far as Tabreez is concerned the execution of Sikat-el-Islam hardly appears to have had the effect I expected. The feeling of the majority of the population, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has been in fact one of indifference rather than otherwise, and I have been told by eyewitnesses that his dead body, with the others which had been left lying all yesterday, was even reviled and treated with contumely by the populace. All accounts agree further that there is, so far, no evidence tending to show that the manner in which a personage of his ecclesiastical standing had been dealt with has been considered by the population as an affront to their religion. The explanation given to me is that people are thoroughly weary of disorganisation of past few years and the consequent suffering to themselves, for which, rightly or wrongly, he, with the others, is held responsible by them. But whatever the evidence against him may have been, and of this I have no means of judging, I can [?] find no grounds for haste with which he was condemned and executed."

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

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[681] No. 43.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 3rd January: Treasurer-general.

I fear that committee's prospects of getting to work are somewhat remote. One member has already resigned, and Mornard is unwilling to serve, as the Persian Government appointed as its president not Mornard but a Persian.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

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[682] No. 44.

Lord Kilmarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Stockholm, January 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 1st January: Swedish officers for gendarmerie.

Russian chargé d'affaires only received his instructions to-day, and we went together this afternoon and made communication to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Russian chargé d'affaires was instructed to add that this step was to be regarded as the first result of acceptance by Persia of the Russian ultimatum. I said that this point was not mentioned in my instructions.

Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me, in the course of conversation the day before yesterday, whether I thought that point 2 of ultimatum applied to foreigners already in Persian service. I said that I did not think so, but that I had no definite information on the subject. His Excellency said that Swedish susceptibilities would be much hurt if any demand were made on this ground for withdrawal of officers who are already there, before whose engagement the Russian and British Governments were consulted. I did not immediately enquire by telegram because my Russian colleague was hourly expecting his instructions, and I thought our action in the present instance would dissipate any apprehension which his Excellency might entertain. I think, however, that a definite assurance would be much appreciated by Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, especially as Russian chargé d'affaires specifically mentioned ultimatum.

[52307/11] No. 45.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 4, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, forwarding copy of a telegram from the Government of India, containing certain resolutions recently passed by a Mussulman meeting under the

auspices of the Madras Presidency Muslim League, and of the terms of the reply which the Government of India would propose to return thereto.

I am to state, in reply, that subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, Sir E. Grey would suggest that in the reply all the words after "in which case" should be omitted, and in their place there should be inserted the words "as soon as order is re-established the situation in Persia will revert to a more normal state. His Majesty's Government are unable to intervene in particular disputes that concern only Russia and Persia; but their general policy is to secure that Russian influence, which has for a long time existed in the north of Persia, should not be extended in directions prejudicial to India."

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[724] No. 46.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 5.)

Sir, *India Office, January 4, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 52050 of the 1st instant, and, in reply, to say that if and when it becomes a matter of absolute necessity, in order to assure the immediate safety of Shiraz before a relieving force can reach it, it seems that it may not be possible to avoid giving some assurances to the Kawam and the Ilkhani of the Kashgais. But I am to suggest that, until His Majesty's Government have decided upon the policy which they intend to pursue, it is most desirable to avoid any such diplomatic entanglements which might hinder their freedom of action.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

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[798] No. 47.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 9 of 2nd January: Situation in South Persia.

Following is the reply of the acting consul at Shiraz:—

"I fear that, in my opinion, Smart's telegram in no way lessens the gravity of position. It deals with only two subjects—the commencement of an attack which was afterwards taken up generally by numbers of armed men from every tower and village along 8 miles of road as well as others on the hill-sides, and Persian casualties, which were undoubtedly small.

"As regards attack, I would point out that the country in which this occurred is most advantageous to our troops between Bushire plain and Shiraz, and, in spite of this, they suffered very severely, and their Maxim, from which at least moral effect might have been expected, was found, when used for first 3 miles of rear-guard action, more of an encumbrance than a help. We are thus faced with the conclusion that when attack in plain can be so serious it would undoubtedly be fatal in the hills. It is now also certain that in every armed man on or near the road we have a potential enemy. I am not at present in close enough communication with Douglas to say how his views have matured, but to me it still appears frankly impossible that we should again move escort on the road until punitive measures have been taken.

"As it is, in both these affairs and, in a less degree, in that at Aminabad we have come off very noticeably second best, so that it can hardly be possible now that tribesman realises that he can score off us in this manner that he will stop there.

"There are, so far as I can compute, from 50,000 to 60,000 tribesmen in Fars, whose rapidly increasing truculence and freedom from restraint I have dwelt on strongly in all my fuller reports. These have already acquired experience that European travellers can be attacked on the roads with the same liberty as Persian muleteers, and if they are left under the impression that considerable bodies of British troops can be attacked with similar impunity and success I do not think that we need wait for long for result. You of course know as well as I how entirely impotent the Persian Government is in Fars, and even if local magnates can by fair words get

something out of Mohammed Ali Khan, this is likely to be little more than the execution of a couple of scapegoats acceptable to himself, and will not go far towards repairing the very necessary reputation of our troops.

"Thus it is not, in my opinion, blood-feuds that we have to fear. Had there been any truth in Minister for Foreign Affairs' 100 killed (and I am at a loss to imagine whence he got his information, since from 26th December to 30th December wire was not working, and certainly no report of this colour has come through the departmental office), I think that our position would have been better, since the tribesmen, who are after all Persians, would not have, I am sure, cared to risk such loss again."

I postpone comment until I have talked with Smart and Douglas by telegraph.

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[799] No. 48.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 5, 1912.*

FOLLOWING sent to consul at Tabreez:—

"Your telegram No. 5.

"You had better call on Russian general unofficially, but you should receive no call from Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who, as I understand, is in rebellion against the Persian Government, and is not even *de facto* governor.

"(Confidential.)

"Has the Russian general officially notified to you that he has taken over administration of the town? Your relations must of course be purely unofficial with the Russian general until further instructions."

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[325] No 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 5, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 5th January: Viceroy's telegram of 29th December.

Following are the views of India Office on the above:—

"Disadvantages attending withdrawal proposed by Lord Hardinge are grave. Firstly, it involves postponing until Shiraz is actually in danger measure which would probably take two months to carry out. Secondly, it involves occupation and partial administration of Bushire indefinitely. His Majesty's consul could not return to Shiraz nor Bushire be evacuated till Persian Government had inflicted on the tribesmen condign punishment, which Government of India admits would be difficult and dangerous for 5,000 men of the Indian army.

"Persian Government have no means of carrying this out at once, and complications in the north might defer or hinder them; to occupy Bushire would afford but little lever, and we could only evacuate Bushire after complete satisfaction, or appear to have been defeated. Finally, the Russians might occupy position hitherto held by Great Britain in region which, though nominally neutral, has in the past been accustomed to only British troops, and whole policy of understanding would be very gravely affected.

"Alternative advocated by India Office is immediate occupation in force of Shiraz and effective control of the road to Bushire, in order to ensure the safety of British troops and subjects in Shiraz against overwhelming numbers and of maintaining prestige in a sphere where British influence has been predominant. With a brigade of infantry and a battery of mountain artillery at Shiraz with other troops to keep Bushire road open, presumably His Majesty's Government could dictate to Persian Government and the tribes our terms for withdrawal, while they on their part would find it worth their while to secure our withdrawal with least possible delay, and to take measures to ensure that no similar occupation would again be necessary."

There are very grave objections to this alternative, and I think that the wisest course would be the immediate dispatch of sufficient force to ensure the safe evacuation of Shiraz, and, if necessary, other places inland, holding Bushire and Bunder Abbas, and obtaining from Russia meanwhile an agreement not to intervene in the neutral zone, but I should be glad to receive your views on the question.

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[389] No. 50.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 6 of 2nd January: Lynch's road concession.

Yes, if after consultation with company's manager you are satisfied that such action would be to their advantage.

Railways should not be mentioned.

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[682] No. 51.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 5, 1912.*

STOCKHOLM telegram No. 1 of 4th January: Swedish officers.

Propose that the two legations should inform the Swedish Government that point 2 of the Russian demands does not bear on the case.

(Repeated to Stockholm, No. 3, and Tehran, No. 14.)

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[281] No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 5, 1912.*

THE Persian Minister complained to Mr. Mallet on the 1st instant of the measures taken by the Russian Government in handing over Tabreez and Resht to military government. He especially mentioned the arrest of ecclesiastical dignitaries and other important persons as likely to cause much ill-feeling in Persia.

Mr. Mallet promised that enquiry would be made of you on this point.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[845] No. 53.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tehran, January 6, 1911.*

SMART'S party reached Shiraz safely last evening.

[49868/11] No. 54.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 679 of 12th December: Hormuz oxide.

My telegram No. 435 of 9th December was, perhaps, not sufficiently explicit.

There is not now any question of fraud on Muin's part in signing original contract with Weir, but terms on which new concession has been offered to him preclude his carrying out his contract with Weir, and it is his action in accepting the concession on those terms, and so making it impossible for him to ship oxide to Weir during currency of latter's contract, which, in my opinion, would give rise to cause of action against him.

Under clause 3 of first agreement with Weir, Muin undertook that till 1st April, 1912, no oxide should be sold or shipped by him to Europe or America except that sold to Weir. Oxide sold to Strick during that period is a breach by Muin of that agreement, and I do not think that provision in second supplemental agreement could afford a defence, since it cannot be argued that Persian Government are "raising hindrance to shipment of oxide" or "in any way preventing shipping of oxide" when shipments are being made regularly to Strick.

Question whether just decision would be obtained against Muin in a Persian court is another matter.

As to proposed consultation of Law Officers as to what procedure could be followed in order to subordinate claim against Muin to decision of British tribunal, it must be observed that Strick's liability arises out of his contract with Persian Government, and, assuming that Muin has succeeded to these rights under that contract, only possible parties to suggested action are Strick and Muin, and we have no means of causing it to be brought. Moreover, Strick's liability does not arise till Weir has substantiated claim against Muin, which it is practically certain can only be done in Persian court. Weir cannot sue Strick, and no form of action exists by which those two, Muin and Ellinger, could be joined as parties to suit so as to enable British court to ascertain their respective rights.

Law Officers might be consulted on general question of whether Weir and Ellinger have claims which can be enforced against anyone, but as there may be objections of policy to pressing claims against Persian Government (see my telegram No. 435, paragraph 1), a report by Law Officers that such claims were good would not make our position easier.

I still think that the suggestion made in my telegram No. 435 offers the best chance of a solution.

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[548] No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 4th January: Russo-Persian relations.

Sir G. Buchanan has already, on my instructions, urged the Russian Government to prevent Shuja-ed-Dowleh from proclaiming the ex-Shah, and has received satisfactory assurances. His Majesty's consul reports that Shuja was not ill received by the inhabitants of Tabreez, and does not think that he will be a bad governor (see your telegram No. 774 of 31st December).

He has also mentioned to the Russian Government His Majesty's Government's great regret at the execution of Sikat-el-Islam, and has been assured, in reply, that the Sikat was one of the prime instigators of an anti-Russian movement, and that the military authorities had no choice but to inflict capital punishment. Sir G. Buchanan has also expressed the hope of His Majesty's Government that a moderating influence would be brought to bear on the military authorities. You may express to the Persian Government my earnest hope that they will remain in office and continue to pursue a conciliatory policy.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 16.)

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[934] No. 56.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 7, 1912.*

FOLLOWING sent to consul at Tabreez:—

"As Shuja-ed-Dowleh appears to be *de facto* governor, you should receive and return his call, but, until the Persian Government recognise him as governor, your relations with him cannot be official."

(Sent to Tabreez; repeated to Foreign Office.)

[1105] No. 57.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 19 of 4th January: Treasurer-general.

Persian Government have appointed Mornard to act as treasurer-general.

They have also appointed committee of three Persians to take over the accounts from Shuster.

Mornard is satisfied with this arrangement, as the three members of the committee are suitable men, and will, he thinks, submit to his supervision.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1106] No. 58.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 688 of 13th December: Situation at Meshed.

Following from His Majesty's representative at Meshed, dated 6th January:—

"Russian mixed force, about 800 strong, due at Kuchan to-day. Meshed quiet.
"(Sent to India.)"

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1113] No. 59.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 8, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah:—

"*January* 5.—Leading mujtehids of Nejef sent a telegram to Sheikh of Mohammerah to be communicated to telegraph office, and addressed a threat to mullahs of Persia proclaiming a holy war against Russians and English. Sheikh, who was away in district, withheld telegram until Mazanderan mujtehid of [?] town of Nejef telegraphed asking why it had not been promulgated. Sheikh informs me through his vizier that it was impossible for him any longer to keep back the telegram from his religious heads, but that he removed the name of English; telegram was accordingly forwarded about four days ago, after three weeks' delay, and viâ Behbehan, where line is down."

Russian consul at Bagdad reports that two Nejef ulemas have started for Persia.

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[724] No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 759 of 28th December: Assurance to Kawam and Kashgai.

Such assurance should only be given if and when it becomes a matter of absolute necessity in order to assure immediate safety of Shiraz before a relieving force can reach it. It is, however, most desirable to avoid any such diplomatic entanglements, which might hinder the freedom of action of His Majesty's Government.

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[651] No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 746 and 748 of 26th December: Attack on Mr. Smart.

You can use your discretion as to intimating to Persian Government that some claim will be presented, but that we defer doing so till we have full information. Money compensation will be restricted within smallest possible limit, but we may have to demand other forms of satisfaction.

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[681] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.*

BARCLAY'S telegram No. 19 of 4th January: Treasurer-general.

Persian Government have represented to me their strong objection to Mornard as treasurer-general, and their hope that we and the Russian Government will not insist on the appointment.

The appointment of Mornard would, moreover, be unpopular here, and in these circumstances I should be very glad if someone else could be found. Oudendijk, Netherlands Minister at Tehran, has been mentioned to me as a capable man, and I am endeavouring to obtain further information concerning him. Suggest to the Russian Government that if, after making enquiries at The Hague, they consider him suitable, they should give Persian Government the choice between him and Mornard, or that a commission consisting of an Englishman, a Russian, and the subject of a minor Power should be appointed.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 23.)

[1103] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul Shipley.

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador has asked me to enquire what are the facts in regard to outrages alleged to have been committed against Russian soldiers, and their losses in killed and wounded. Russian Government have received such serious reports that they have been suppressed, as their publication would excite public opinion.

Please report.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 21.)

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[915] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.*

THE Persian Minister called at this department on the 2nd instant to represent the serious effect which the summary execution of the Sikat-el-Islam at Tabreez would have throughout Persia. The execution had been most unfortunately timed for the 10th day of Moharreen, which was an additional provocation to religious feeling.

Mr. Mallet enquired whether the Sikat-el-Islam had taken part in politics, and he said that he was a strong nationalist, and that no doubt the Russian Government had marked him down as well as many others in Resht and Tabreez.

Mehdi Khan asked whether I could do anything. Mr. Mallet replied that Sir G. Buchanan had begged the Russian Government to exercise discrimination in the punishment which they meted out at Tabreez, and that he had himself spoken in the same sense to the Russian ambassador on the 1st instant.

Mr. Mallet had also mentioned to his Excellency the unfortunate effect which this execution would have.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52008/11] No. 65.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.

Gentlemen,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 27th ultimo, relative to the question of the shipment of red oxide from Hormuz.

With reference to the letter written in defence of Muin-ut-Tujjar's interests, in your capacity as his agents, in which complaint is made that assurances of protection given him by His Majesty's Government have not been fulfilled, and that the letter from this Office of the 9th ultimo intimates the decision not to extend to Muin this protection till the Persian Government have compelled him to accept such conditions as he can obtain without it, I am to observe that, so far as Sir E. Grey is aware, Muin has not, since the beginning of the dispute originated by the action of the Persian Government in depriving him of his concession, approached His Majesty's Legation at Tehran with any request for the intervention of His Majesty's Government on his behalf.

You will, moreover, observe from a perusal of the translation of the Bill, handed to Mr. Martin Ellinger on the 3rd instant, which has been passed by the Persian Medjliss, and confers on Muin a new concession for the exploitation of the oxide in Hormuz, and especially from its second article, whereby Muin receives compensation for the oxide sold while he was deprived of the concession, that Muin would appear to have obtained from the Persian Government by his own unaided efforts terms far more advantageous than any which the intervention of His Majesty's Government could have secured for him, and that this result has been achieved by the sacrifice of Messrs. Weir's interests and very likely of your own.

It therefore appears to Sir E. Grey that the facts of the case as now made clear preclude the view adopted in your letter that Muin had been forced by the failure of His Majesty's Government to fulfil their undertakings to conclude a disastrous bargain with the Persian Government.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey has no objection to the communication to Muin of the correspondence, copies of which are enclosed in your letter, but that all statements as to the action of His Majesty's Government on hypothetical circumstances must be made on your own responsibility.

With reference to the other letter, relative to your own interests and those of Messrs. Weir in this matter, I am to draw attention to the third paragraph, expressing surprise that "His Majesty's Government has not found it possible to ascertain the facts of the situation," and to explain that the facts referred to, as to which they are awaiting further information, are those connected with the decision of Muin as to entering into the agreement with the Persian Minister of Public Works, to which allusion is made above.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[1277] No. 66.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 9, 1912.

MY telegram No. 17 of 4th January: Situation in North Persia.

Russian Minister tells me that the Russian consul at Resht has been instructed that no mullahs are to be court-martialled unless they actually took part in the fighting.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1912] No. 67.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 9, 1912.

MY telegrams Nos. 9 of 2nd January and 20 of 5th January: Attack on Smart's escort.

Following from consul at Shiraz:—

"Following from Colonel Douglas:—

"'As regards fight on 24th December at Kotal Dukhter, I have nothing to add to my telegram No. 459 (repeated in legation telegram No. 743 of 25th December). Casualties were almost all caused by the treacherous attack on advance scouts.

"'Commencement of the fight on 26th December has already been reported by Smart, and for the first mile and a-half was not serious. At this stage more men, presumably Kashgais, joined in on Birdwood's right flank, and the fire became hotter.

"'As the retirement continued every village and tower, of which there are several along the road, turned out numbers of riflemen and opened fire on our party, and this continued until within 2 miles of Kazerun, the detachment being followed up and attacked from both flanks for about 8 miles. Our casualties in this fight amount to 2 followers killed, 6 sowars, 3 followers, and hospital assistant wounded, 10 horses killed or died of wounds, 10 regimental mules either killed or stampeded with loads. Birdwood can form no accurate estimate of numbers opposed to him, but they amounted to several hundreds, including villagers. As to enemy's losses, he can vouch for 5 seen to be hit. I can give no opinion as to who instigated the attack, but it seems probable that the road guards at caravanserai would not have commenced firing unless assured of support of the villagers along the road. The men who first joined in on the right flank might have been those said to have been sent by Mohammed Ali to stop the fight, and who, being fired on by our men, joined in it. Smart, who unfortunately fell behind and was wounded early in the fight, saw nothing of the subsequent proceedings. I cannot sufficiently express my regret that he was left behind, but none of the men appear to have seen him fall, and Birdwood was under the impression that he was ahead.'"

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[1335] No. 68.

Lord Kilmarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Stockholm, January* 9, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 14 of 5th January to St. Petersburgh: Swedish officers and Russian demands.

Russian chargé d'affaires received his instructions to-day, and, as he leaves Stockholm to-night with unofficial consent of his Government for a week, Russian Legation will be in charge of a junior secretary not empowered to make official communications to the Swedish Government. In these circumstances I have ventured to join chargé d'affaires in action proposed by His Majesty's Government in above-mentioned telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked us, and added that Swedish Government were determined to take no steps in connection with Persia without previously consulting the two Governments.

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[389] No. 69.

Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo respecting the extension of your road concession in Persia, and am to inform you, in reply, that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been authorised to assist your local manager in his negotiations with the Persian Government if, after consultation with Mr. Wilson, Sir G. Barclay is satisfied that such action on his part would be to the advantage of your company.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[1421] No. 70.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 467 of 19th December.

I have discussed the situation with my Russian colleague, and we now submit the following identic suggestions :—

We regard prompt termination of insurrection as indispensable preliminary to any useful attempt on the part of the Persian Government to deal with general disorder. Insurrection has already cost the Persian Government 300,000*l.* in actual money, and has resulted in pillage and in destruction of cultivation and of means of transport involving, if not something approaching to famine—wheat and barley have risen 100 per cent. since the summer—at any rate incalculable loss to the country, which must react also on foreign trade. It is of utmost importance that the insurrection should cease, not only because of direct expenses and loss which it is causing, but also because it absorbs the attention of the Persian Government to the exclusion of the chronic disorders which so urgently demand a remedy.

While the two Powers maintain their attitude of non-interference prospect of a termination seems remote, for while the Persian Government are strong enough to prevent the ex-Shah from unaided entering the capital, they are powerless to crush him in the provinces.

Possibly things will continue to drift, and the Persian Government will lose such vestige of authority as still remains.

Result of recent pourparlers of the two Governments seems to preclude recognition of ex-Shah. If, therefore, they intervene it must be on the side of the present Government, and we would suggest that we should offer the Persian Government, on certain conditions, to inform the ex-Shah that the two Powers will not recognise him and to advise him to return to Europe. Conditions would be granted to him of a suitable pension, proclamation of a general amnesty, and, the more important one, some form of engagement binding Persian Government to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The present Cabinet shows no disposition other than to conform to those principles, but it may resign, and, moreover, we shall have to count with the Medjliss. An express engagement, therefore, that Persian Government will do nothing injurious to our respective interests, or some formula, would be very desirable. At the same time, Persian Government should be urged to dismiss their irregular forces (fedais) which, when ex-Shah is gone, will be no longer needed, and will be only a constant source of trouble.

We believe that in the present condition of affairs it would be possible to obtain the above conditions in exchange for our active support.

It is of urgent importance that the Persian Government should obtain money and arms for gendarmerie, and as with the dismissal of Shuster loan negotiations have stopped, the easiest financial operation would be the conversion by the Russian Bank of the Persian Government's debt to it, or some operation by this bank on the same security. The proceeds of this operation would not be large enough to render it advisable to deduct from it our claims. Payment of these should be made from a later loan which might possibly be specially arranged for settlement of foreign claims. The need of money is so urgent that, pending conclusion of the proposed Russian Bank's

loan, the two Governments might make advances to be repaid from the loan on condition that proceeds will be spent under supervision of treasurer-general, and a large portion be earmarked for gendarmerie, which now promises well under Swedish officers. (Latter have now taken over treasury gendarmerie.)

Besides the gendarmerie Persian Government will need a small army to garrison the bigger towns. A scheme for such an army could be discussed with the Persian Government by legations according to politico-geographical exigéncies.

We can reasonably expect that a Government assured of our moral support and activity, backed on the lines above indicated, will be strong enough to arrange future elections in such manner as will enable them to effect the changes in the constitution which are so much needed—Royal prerogative of dissolution and veto, and the limitation of the interference of the Medjliss in administration. It would then be the moment, if the two Governments so desire, to raise the question of the creation of a Senate.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1414] No. 71.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January* 10, 1912.

MY telegram No. 5 of 1st January.

British vice-consul at Resht reports that 400 Cossacks left Resht for Kazvin yesterday, and that 1,600 infantry have arrived at Resht from Kazvin.

(Addressed to Foreign Office ; sent to India.)

[1424] No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, January* 10, 1912.

RUSSIANS at Tabreez.

Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 21.

In reply to my enquiry as to whether the Russians were taking over the administration of Tabreez, M. Sazonow told me this afternoon that he did not think that such a step would be necessary. Punitive jurisdiction would, however, continue to be exercised by the Russian military authorities. The main objects of the Russian Government were to maintain order and protect the caravan routes.

M. Sazonow then referred in somewhat bitter terms to the attacks which were being made on Russia in England, and especially to the meeting to be held in London under the auspices of the Persian Committee. He pointed out that, in comparison with the losses which the Russians had suffered, the number of executions had been very small. The intervention of the Russian consul had, moreover, saved the lives of many who had been condemned by the court-martial. The execution of Sikat-ul-Islam had occasioned no disorders either at Tabreez or at Tehran and had been taken quite calmly by the people.

I asked whether the troops could not be withdrawn from Kazvin now that the situation, according to his own account, showed so much improvement and that everything was quiet at Tehran. He said that for the present the Russian Government would hardly be justified in taking such a step.

[1425] No. 73.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 19 of 8th January, Treasurer-General.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I had written privately yesterday, told me to-day that now that Mornard had been appointed temporarily he thought it was too late to act as you had proposed. Russia had not insisted on his appointment, nor had she imposed it on the Persian Government.

He was, his Excellency believed, the best man for the post, and had far greater knowledge of Persia than the Netherlands Minister, who was supported by Seligman and others because they, like him, had been on intimate terms with Shuster. His Excellency had never heard any imputations cast on his honesty, though he believed he was reproached with being pro-Russian.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it would, in his opinion, be best to give him a trial, but that if the Persian Government had later on any strong reasons for objecting to him Russia would not insist on retaining him. His Excellency said that it was urgently necessary that we should now approach question of a loan, as the best support we could give Persian Government was to help them to put their finances in order.

My Belgian colleague, who was received yesterday by the Emperor, tells me that His Majesty spoke warmly in favour of Mornard's appointment.

[1113] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 26 of 8th January: Holy war.

You should express appreciation of action of Sheikh of Mohammerah in using his influence to discourage inflammatory telegrams.

[1554] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1912.

NOW that Financial Commission has been appointed, you should stipulate that some suitable appointment be given to Mr. Lecoffre in the south of Persia.

[1570] No. 76.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 13 of 5th January: Situation in Southern Persia.

I yesterday enquired of Smart and Douglas whether, in view of very serious consequences involved by the alternative proposals advocated by Government of India and the India Office, they did not think it would be safe to take no fresh military measures and to maintain the consulate with its present guard.

I made this enquiry believing that attack on our escort was the result of inflammatory telegrams from Nejef and extremists in Tehran in consequence of Russian ultimatum and in the hope that hostile feeling produced by this agitation might subside, in which case I thought we might have confined our action to a demand for a moderate monetary compensation and for punishment of those responsible for attack.

Following is substance of their replies:—

Douglas says: "Recent events have shown that we cannot move small bodies of troops about the country without the possibility of their being attacked. This is especially the case on the Bushire road at present, where an attack may be looked upon as almost certain. The same will be the case on the Ispahan road when the tribes move, if it is not so already. We are therefore entirely isolated, and later shall be practically unable to move from Shiraz. I am unable to say what chance there is of our being attacked or having our supplies cut off, but there seems a possibility of it. Only sound military solution is to open up Bushire road, and I think an expedition for this purpose indispensable."

Smart says: "It is generally recognised by Persians here that very serious disorders among Kashgais in the spring are practically inevitable, and it is quite possible that Kawamis tribes may be drawn into the medley. Natural battle-field is the

immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz, and the expulsion of foreigners will be a very likely war-cry for one of the parties. I cannot prophesy as to likelihood of attack, but above and the strong feeling of the tribesmen against our troops [?] certainly cannot be ignored; anyhow, the interruption of our supplies by hostile tribal combination would be effected without difficulty. The absence of any action on our part after the recent incidents would render such a contingency more likely."

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to India.)

[1575] No. 77.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 11, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I had hoped until yesterday to be able to suggest some course less drastic than either of those indicated in your telegram No. 13 [of 5th January], but, after conferring over wire with Smart and Douglas, I am compelled to conclude that there is no other course open to us but either occupation of Shiraz and the road or evacuation.

I find it very difficult to reconcile myself to the evacuation of Fars, as it seems to me that it must include withdrawal of Indo-European telegraphic department officers in Fars, for we could hardly ask them to face dangers to which we were unwilling to expose our consuls and troops, and it would presumably lead to the withdrawal of Imperial Bank of Persia.

Moreover, though the Swedish officers will probably in time produce a valuable gendarmerie, there is no certainty that they will be able to deal with so difficult a problem as Fars, and it is therefore very uncertain whether the consulate and other British institutions, if now withdrawn, could even be re-established without British forces, and it would be rash to assume that the task of these forces would ever be less difficult than it would be to-day.

As regards an agreement with Russia not to interfere with the neutral zone, Russia is not the only Power whose intrusion we have to fear. Our evacuation would leave the field open to commercial enterprise of any nation.

On the other hand, the objections to the course advocated by the India Office are of course very great. Even if measures they advocate could be restricted to a temporary occupation of Shiraz and the road, they would still have an unfortunate effect on Russian policy in the north; but I foresee that it may be very difficult to terminate such an occupation, and even to avoid extending it, since the clearance of robbers from the Bushire–Shiraz road would reinforce the elements of disorder elsewhere, particularly on the Kerman road.

I am diffident as to expressing an opinion on the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two courses open to us. I should have been, on the whole, in favour of evacuation of Shiraz were it not for the size of the force required for the purpose. It would seem a pity to make so great a military display merely to result in the abandonment of our interests in Fars.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to India.)

[1566] No. 78.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, January* 11, 1912.

SHUSTER left this morning.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1576] No. 79.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 13 of 5th January. Situation in Southern Persia.

Acting consul at Shiraz thinks that the immediate occupation of Bushire by only one battalion would have a dangerous reaction among tribes, and further imperil position of our troops at Shiraz.

(Sent to India.)

[1577] No. 80.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 25 [of 10th January]. M. Lecoffre.

Lecoffre only left Tabreez 5th January, and has not yet reached Tehran.

He is under suspicion of having helped in fomenting the recent disorders in Tabreez. I should like, therefore, to see him before applying to Mornard for an appointment for him. If his nationalist sympathies are as strong as are alleged, he might be undesirable in such places as Shiraz and Mohammerah. Mornard, and not the commission, would be proper person to apply to.

[1572] No. 81.

Consul Shipley to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tabreez, January* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 8th January: Outrages on Russian troops.

(Confidential.)

Russian losses given me by Russian colleague are: killed, one officer and thirty-nine privates; wounded, five officers and forty-five privates; the wounded, he states, having been mostly from dumdum bullets. Of the killed, seventeen bodies only have been recovered.

Some of the photographs which I have seen of these bodies would certainly show that they had been subjected to savage mishandling, especially about the head, and in the one case it is asserted that genitals had been cut off. The fact that mutilation has been practised has been a subject of comment among Persians themselves, while unique confirmation is afforded by the statement made to my dragoman by a Persian that near his house the body of a Russian soldier had been decapitated.

It is further believed by the Russians that on the night of 21st December, whilst Persian music was being played, four Russian soldiers were tortured before death. This, however, at present seems to rest only on the appearance of corpses when found.

No accusation is made against the population of participating in these mutilations, which seem to have been committed solely by those Persians engaged in actual fighting.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to Tehran.)

[1335] No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Lord Kilmarnock.

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 9th January: Swedish officers in Persia.

Your action approved.

[1636] No. 83.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 11th January, 1912, relative to the attack on Mr. Smart near Kazerun.

India Office, January 11, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 11, 1912.

NO further information as to details or responsibility for attack upon Smart, and composition of force concerned, has reached us from Minister at Tehran. It would appear in the meanwhile from papers which resident, Persian Gulf, who is here, has received that the attack was partly due to appeals addressed to Fars chiefs by Mesopotamian clergy referring to action of Russia in north, and calling on them to oppose similar British action in south, and was thus more than a local ebullition of resentment on part of discontented road guards.

It is also reported by resident that tribal chiefs accorded Mr. Chick, who has just returned through Kashgai tribe's winter quarters to Bushire after commercial researches at Shiraz, extremely friendly treatment as an officer of the residency. Mr. Chick states, however, that, as a result of the atitude which, in connection with Nizam-es-Sultaneh's vagaries and support of Kawam, consulate at Shiraz has of late been driven into adopting towards Kashgais, the conviction is entertained by Kashgai tribal chiefs that the crushing of their tribe will be the first objective of any British troops that may enter Fars, and that consequently the Kashgais, who could probably put into the field 7,000 or 8,000 well-armed men, will certainly fight. Basing his view on a suggestion from Bill, now in charge at Bushire, and having regard to urgent necessity that very extensive military operations, which might clearly be forced upon us, should be avoided, resident expresses the opinion that a reversion to the former idea of entering into direct relations with tribal chiefs for preservation of order on the road might conceivably still afford a solution of the present difficulty. A native infantry regiment would be sent to Bushire, and chiefs concerned would then have it explained to them that we are extremely anxious to avoid intervention and have no designs against any of them, that these outrages cannot be tolerated by us, but that we offer them an opportunity, before military operations on extensive scale are resorted to, of giving us satisfaction for recent outrages, and of concluding with us a direct compact to provide for security being maintained on the road, a matter in which we are not more interested than they themselves. The suggestion is that we should subsidise the chiefs concerned, who would in their turn keep up guards on regular pay and on a regular roster, and that a special assistant to the resident, something on the lines of the political officer in the Khyber, should be appointed to supervise arrangements.

There has not been time for details of scheme, and all its pros and cons, to be thought out ether by resident or ourselves; but we consider that *primâ facie* a possible means of satisfying our interests without extensive military operations is offered by the proposal, and that at the same time the *bona fides* of our desire to do all we can to avoid intervention would be thereby demonstrated to the public in Southern Persia and India.

After scheme has been fully examined a further communication will be addressed to you.

[1718] No. 84.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 12, 1912.*

I OMITTED from my telegram No. 31 of 11th January following statement of Smart, which is of interest.

He says: "Tribesmen are quite out of hand through continued impunity, and I found everywhere on the road [? fanatical] belief that they can defeat our troops. We cannot therefore depend on bluff as in past."

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[1421] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 12, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 29 of 10th January: Action by two Powers in Persia.

I should be glad to have M. Sazonoff's views on the proposals of the two Ministers as soon as possible. It is essential to give support to Persian Government without delay, and I am prepared to co-operate on lines proposed by the two Ministers to meet immediate requirements of the situation.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 29.)

[1723] No. 86.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 13.)

(Secret.)
Sir, *Board of Trade, January 12, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to refer to your letter of the 23rd December, forwarding copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, respecting a projected change in the *tracé* of the Bagdad Railway between Mosul and Bagdad, and to offer the following observations thereon for Sir E. Grey's consideration:—

The proposed change involves the substitution of a trunk line from Mosul viâ Suleimanieh and Khanikin to Bagdad for a trunk line direct from Mosul to Bagdad, with a branch from Sadijeh to Khanikin. Whichever arrangement be adopted, the railway system north of Bagdad would be entirely under German control; and the Board are accordingly disposed to doubt whether, so far as purely commercial considerations are concerned, the acceptance by the Turkish Government of the proposed modification would seriously change the present situation from the point of view of British interests. Having regard to the nature of the country to be traversed, it appears not impossible (though on this point the Board are not in a position to express a definite opinion) that the alteration of *tracé* would delay the date at which the railway would reach Bagdad from the north. If, on the other hand, the Bagdad–Khanikin section were built before the remainder of the line, British trade from the south would naturally be benefited.

In this connection I am to point out that His Majesty's Ambassador appears to be under some misapprehension as to the views of this department with regard to the possibility of discrimination against British goods on the German lines. The Board have never imagined that it would be possible by means of any written agreements entirely to do away with all risk of such discrimination; but they fail to see how such risk would be increased, so far as the Bagdad–Khanikin route is concerned, if that route were served by a main line instead of a branch line.

With regard to the proposed Mohammerah–Khoremabad line, the Board have previously expressed the opinion that such a line, though doubtless of advantage to British trade, could not become financially self-supporting for a very considerable period; and that a financial guarantee of some kind would therefore be essential. They have no information as to the present position in regard to the application of the

Persian Railways Syndicate for a concession including the Mohammerah–Khoremabad line, but in view of the existing condition of affairs in Persia they think it unlikely that British capital would be available except on condition of a definite guarantee from His Majesty's Government, and such a guarantee would, in their opinion, require to be justified on other than purely commercial grounds.

Unless, therefore, His Majesty's Government is for political reasons prepared to guarantee the proposed line, the Board doubt the advisability of pressing the Persian Government for a concession which might prove difficult to carry out. In any case this proposed concession does not appear to have any obvious connection with the suggested change of *tracé* of the Bagdad Railway.

I am to suggest, however, that it might be desirable to endeavour to ascertain whether there are any British interests in the petroleum deposits understood to exist in the neighbourhood of Suleimanieh, with a view to taking such steps as may be desirable to safeguard them.

I am to add that the Board earnestly trust that all possible means will be adopted to expedite the completion of the proposed arrangement with the Turkish Government for the construction of the Bagdad–Bussorah Railway by a new company, on which British interests will be adequately represented.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[1860] No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 13.)

Sir, *India Office, January 13, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India regarding the convoy from Bunder Abbas to Kerman of a parcel of arms and ammunition ordered by His Majesty's consul at the latter place on behalf of the governor.

Provided that the governor pays for the arms, and formally takes delivery of them at Bunder Abbas, there would appear to be no objection to compliance with the wish of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran; and present circumstances appear to this Office to justify the proposal to attach the condition suggested by the Government of India, viz., that the arms should not be allowed to proceed unless the governor is prepared to accept responsibility for the safe-conduct of a caravan of British goods at the same time.

Copies of a telegram reporting the complaint of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce were furnished to your department on the 10th January, but in the light of recent experience on the Shiraz road any suggestion for the convoy of goods by British escorts is obviously impracticable. In this connection I am to say that the effect on the position of the British consul at Kerman of withdrawal from Shiraz will no doubt be borne in mind.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[Enclosure in No. 87.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January 10, 1912.*

A HUNDRED rifles, with 1,000 rounds per rifle, were recently ordered for Governor-General of Kerman through political agent, Muscat, by Kerman consulate. A telegram, dated the 30th ultimo, was received from political agent, Muscat, saying that he hesitated to send the arms in the present condition of Southern Persia. We directed, after consultation with Sir P. Cox, that dispatch of arms to Bunder Abbas should, for the present, be suspended, and that, when the general situation had cleared, the question should be raised again. Sir G. Barclay has now telegraphed, the 8th instant, asking that these orders may be reconsidered, as a promise to arrange for the purchase of rifles for personal body-guard of governor had, with the sanction of the Minister, of which we were not aware, been made to the governor by the consul. Sir

G. Barclay adds that the arms are not, in consul's opinion, likely to be stolen, and that governor's own camels have been sent to Bunder Abbas for them with a strong escort.

Bitter complaints of existing insecurity on Bunder Abbas–Kerman route, declaring all trade to be at a standstill, have reached us recently from chamber of commerce at Karachi and Indian merchants. We think it desirable in the circumstances that, unless governor is prepared to accept responsibility for a caravan of British goods, which should be allowed to accompany his escort, arms should not be allowed to proceed under governor's escort.

As we are precluded from corresponding direct with Minister at Tehran on subjects of this nature, will you, if you agree, please inform Sir G. Barclay to the above effect.

[1824] No. 88.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 13, 1912.*

PERSIAN Government hear that extensive recruiting for the ex-Shah's forces is proceeding in the neighbourhood of Vladikavkaz. A certain M. Bouroff, who is described as former commissioner of Ashkabad, is said to be active in this work and to have already enrolled 300 members of a tribe called Incouch.

Persian Government hear also that other Caucasian adventurers are also leaving for Persia to aid the ex-Shah without any attempt of the Russian authorities to stop them, and that recently a considerable sum has been remitted to ex-Shah from the Russian Bank at Baku.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1839] No. 89.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 13, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 7 of 10th January: Treasurer-General.

I do not believe that the Netherlands Minister was ever intimate with Shuster. At the same time I agree with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that matters have gone too far for the proposal of the Netherlands Minister's candidature, unless, indeed, the Imperial Bank of Persia were to substantiate some specific charge against Mornard, and it would seem unwise to attempt to do this unless they were quite sure of success.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1888] No. 90.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 13, 1912.*

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 11th January.

I have nothing to add, except the following, to the telegrams which I have repeated to India respecting details of, or responsibility for, attack upon Smart, or regarding composition of the force concerned.

In reply to my enquiries as to how Smart came to be wounded and how he was treated afterwards, I received following from Smart:—

"I was deliberately fired at by a young Kashgai, who with several others had crept to within 30 yards of our retreating rear-guard, with which I was riding. Of course he could not have known who I was. I was more or less winded by the fall from my horse which was wounded through the neck by the same bullet. Assailants passed over me in pursuit of our rear-guard, and one hurriedly put his hand into my pocket and pulled out a few worthless objects. I rolled myself down hill to avoid our maxim bullets which were then whistling over me and waited for our assailants to return. I introduced myself to the first two returning assailants with only result that one covered me with his rifle while the other cleared my pockets, after which they

both went on their way rejoicing. I waited for the next batch which included Ardeshir Khan, young Kashgai chief, who seemed very like the man who shot at me. However, I cannot be certain, and he, when chaffed by me on the subject, earnestly denied it and affirmed that he had [begged] of Mohammed Ali Khan to stop attack. He was most amiable, put me on his horse and took me back to the caravanserai where Mohammed Ali, who, according to his own story, had arrived from Shahpur with the object of stopping the attack, received me with every expression of regret, &c. He bandaged my wound in somewhat primitive manner, and then, as there was no decent accommodation at the caravanserai, carried me to his camp at Shahpur whilst a Persian surgeon at his command came to tend me. Mohammed Ali treated me during my stay there with almost embarrassing kindness. He said that common people were much excited by the priests against our troops and were no longer under restraint, hence attack, although tufangchis had received orders from him to let me through."

In reply to my enquiry as to the reasons for immunity from incident on the road from Kazerun to Shiraz after the attack, Smart gives the following reasons:—

1. "Mohammed Ali Khan wanted to get me through safely to advocate his cause, and escorted me and party until we reached Douglas.
2. "Bad weather.
3. "Khan in charge of that section of the road and another emissary were both sent by Kawam and the ilkhani to accompany me, and cleared all the road guards off the road. We had information that a party of Kashgais from Firuzabad were going to attack us. Possibly weather prevented them."

As regards instigation by inflammatory telegrams, Sardar Assad has read me a telegram from Mohammed Ali Khan to the Kawam, stating that he could do nothing in face of inflammatory telegrams received from clergy both at Nejef and in Persia, and from different societies in provinces, inciting the tribes and inhabitants to rise against foreign invasion. Even the women of Tehran had, he said, telegraphed to Kashgai women asking them to encourage men to repel foreign aggression.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to India.)

[1869] No. 91.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 13, 1912.*

MY consular telegram of 8th January.

Knox should soon be leaving Shiraz on leave or proceeding to post. It would be wiser for him to travel viâ Tehran in view of recent events on the Bushire road.

Knox thinks it quite likely that a small Indian escort would be attacked between Shiraz and Abadeh, and a large escort is precluded at this season for want of accommodation in villages. He feels fairly confident that he can get through to Abadeh safely under native escort. I propose to sanction this, and beg leave to use my discretion about sending escort from Ispahan to bring him on from Abadeh, beyond which reliable Persian sowars may not be obtainable.

Repeated to India.

[1577] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 35 of the 11th January: Mr. Lecoffre.

I concur.

[51681/11] No. 93.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* in which is enclosed a report from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, dealing with the closing phase of the acute disorders which occurred there in the course of last summer.

I am to point out that in the opinion of Sir. E. Grey the situation as depicted by Mr. Knox completely justifies the conclusion arrived at by His Majesty's Government from the telegrams received in the autumn that some increase of the consular guards was necessary for the safety of His Majesty's consulate and British subjects in the town of Shiraz itself. It shows, moreover, that the trouble which has now arisen is in no way due to the increase in the escort recently dispatched to Shiraz, and that, even if a rescue of the British colony there has now to be effected, it would certainly have had to be effected, possibly even before now and under greater difficulties, if the increase of guards had not been sent three months ago.

As regards Mr. Knox's appreciation of the services of Mr. Smith, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, of the sepoys and sowars attached to His Majesty's consulate, and of the consulate munshi, I am to express Sir E. Grey's earnest hope that their excellent conduct may be brought to the notice of the proper authorities in India, and to enquire whether, in Lord Crewe's opinion, the case is not one in which something more substantial than a mere commendation may fittingly be bestowed on the gentlemen and troops in question.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[1870] No. 94.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January* 14, 1912.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 29 of the 10th instant.

M. Poklewsky yesterday addressed a further telegram to his Government, supplementing his identic telegram of the 10th January, urging that the Russian Government should put a stop to this "orgy of indiscipline" amongst Russian consular officers in Persia.

We could not, of course, mention this matter in our identic telegram, but it is of the utmost importance that the evil should be removed.

Russo-Persian relations are at present liable at any moment to be embittered provocative action of Russian consuls, who will not obey the orders of their Government. How, then, can we expect those relations to remain friendly and normal?

[1865] No. 95.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 27 of 12th January.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposals of two Ministers seemed to him to offer a good basis for co-operation between the two Governments, and that the only points on which he had any criticism to make were those which had referred to ex-Shah and to proposed financial operations.

As regarded the first, Russian Government could not, after all their declarations of non-intervention, now declare that they would never recognise him, though they would willingly join us in giving him friendly advice to return to Europe.

I pointed out that situation was now changed, and that they could without any

* Part XXVIII, No. 692.

inconsistency tell him that they could not allow present state of anarchy to be prolonged indefinitely by his presence in Persia after that the attempt had failed; that if he followed the advice of the two Governments they would endeavour to secure pension for him; but that if he refused to go he must renounce any idea of ever receiving one. I added that if we met wishes of Russian Government as regarded proposed constitutional changes they must meet ours with regard to ex-Shah, more especially as His Majesty's Government were firmly resolved never to recognise him.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that telegram from Russian Minister made no mention of a pension and that this greatly facilitated matters. He would therefore be prepared to tell ex-Shah that there was no use his remaining any more in Persia, and to support this statement by the argument that as His Majesty's Government had declared that they would never recognise him he had no chance of ever regaining the throne, and that if he remained he would forfeit all claim to a pension. As regarded second point he could say nothing definite until he had consulted the Minister of Finance; but he was, personally, averse to the idea of making small advance to Persian Government. What we ought to do was to arrange at once for a large loan. Russian Government would not press for immediate payment of the indemnity which they had demanded, but public opinion would require immediate payment of a sum to indemnify families of soldiers who had been killed or maimed for life. This would probably amount to about 100,000*l*. Their old outstanding claims for losses of Russian subjects, which amounted to about 3,000,000 roubles, might stand over.

I remarked that it would be very difficult to get financiers to float a large loan at a moment when complete anarchy reigned in Persia, more especially as English men of business had no confidence in M. Mornard as treasurer-general. Some temporary financial assistance seemed to me necessary to enable Persian Government to restore order, and a large loan might then be negotiated on more reasonable terms. If it was necessary for the Russian Government to ask for indemnity for their killed and wounded an engagement might be obtained that it would be paid out of future loan, and the Russian Treasury might advance money necessary to pay individual claims.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, whether the loan was to be raised now or later, two Governments would have to reassure financiers interested that Russia and England, without giving an actual guarantee, stood behind Persia. He would talk over what I had said with the Minister of Finance.

He had no observations to make with regard to the other points.

[1868] No. 96.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, January* 14, 1912.

MY telegram No. 10 of the 14th January.

At the new year reception to-day I was honoured by a conversation with His Majesty the Emperor, which, although of short duration, was quite satisfactory. I said that just before his departure for India the King had commanded me to assure His Imperial Majesty of his earnest desire to maintain the closest possible relations with Russia. I then spoke to His Majesty about the ex-Shah, making use of the same language as I had held yesterday to M. Sazonof.

In speaking of the Anglo-Russian *entente* the Emperor was most cordial, both in what he said and in his manner of saying it. He said that he quite understood the position in which you found yourself with regard to the ex-Shah; that he approved of the programme drawn up by the British and Russian Ministers at Tehran; and that he agreed to the action which M. Sazonof had on the 13th instant told me that he would take.

His Majesty then went on to observe that the two Governments ought to assist Persia to the fullest extent by furnishing her with properly qualified foreign advisers, but said that the Persian Government could not possibly preserve order by themselves at present, and must be helped to do so in the north by Russian and in the south by British troops. He then referred to the attitude of the Persian Committee and to the articles attacking Russia which had appeared in the "Daily Graphic," and said that we might be sure that, since his word had been given that no portion of Persian territory would be annexed, that promise would be kept.

I assured the Emperor that no doubt had ever been felt by His Majesty's

Government on this point, and that you had full confidence in the assurances given to me by M. Kokovtsof. The extreme right in Russia and the extreme left in England, I added, both showed an inclination to find fault with our understanding, and the articles which had appeared in the press controlled by the reactionaries in this country had been characterised by greater violence than that of our own Radical press. The Emperor cordially agreed to my observation that the most important desideratum was that the two Governments should stand firmly by the Anglo-Russian agreement, and that it should have the support of the general body of public opinion in both countries.

[1904] No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, January* 14, 1912.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I have received *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government drawing attention to the fact that Russian and British frontier delegates in their identic communication report that local authorities sent by Turkey force villagers of district to give documents expressing their devotion to the Porte and recognising the supremacy of Turkish Government. Native population, though undoubtedly Persian, cannot do otherwise than submit to orders of the Turkish authorities, for if they did not their villages would be sacked by Kurds.

Russian Government state that manifest intention of Porte is to produce these documents in due course in support of their pretensions to disputed territory, and suggest that steps should be at once taken to defeat this ruse, which might create great difficulties when moment comes for definitely settling Turco-Persian dispute. They consider that protest should be addressed to Porte against proceedings of its agents in disputed area, and that Ottoman Government should be warned in advance that two Governments are aware of these proceedings, and refuse to recognise that documents obtained in this fashion have any value.

If His Majesty's Government share these views, and will instruct Sir G. Lowther in the sense suggested, Russian Ambassador will be instructed to join him in taking common action with the Porte.

[1871] No. 98.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 14, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 11th January to Secretary of State for India, repeated to me 12th January.

In my telegram No. 32 of 11th January I did not touch on the question of subsidies as last autumn, when the question was raised, Cox thought subsidisation would be unworkable except as part of a road scheme under a British officer, to which, with the Medjliss sitting, we could not have obtained the Persian Government's assent. Moreover, danger foreseen by Smart and Douglas to the consulate and escort from warring tribes in spring would hardly be met by any scheme of subsidy.

As to the practicability and efficacy of the scheme from the local point of view, Cox is a better judge than I, and I await matured views of Government of India before commenting on its aspect in relation to Central Government.

(Addressed to Foreign Office ; repeated to India.)

[1951] No. 99.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

(No. 245.)
Sir, *Tehran, December* 16, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 229 of the 28th November respecting the joint verbal communication made by my Russian colleague and myself to the Bakhtiari khans on the 27th ultimo in accordance with the authorisation contained in your telegram No. 378 of the 24th November, I have now the honour to transmit a

copy of the identic communication as made by us separately, but in writing, on the 15th December, with the added words "whoever is in power" after "This friendly sympathy should ensure for the Bakhtiaris fair treatment."

In drawing up the first verbal communication with M. Poklewsky a slight misunderstanding occurred on the subject, and while the words "whoever is in power" appeared in the copy taken away by my Russian colleague, I was under the impression that he had wanted them deleted. The Persian text read to the khans by Mr. Churchill did not contain these words, but my Russian colleague included them in the text telegraphed to his Government. I therefore ventured to ask your authority by telegraph for their insertion in the written communication, and your telegram No. 445 of the 12th instant gave me permission to insert them.

My Russian colleague and I did not sign the same paper when sending the khans the written copy of the communication on the 15th instant, but supplied the khans with separate identic copies, as my Russian colleague, in accordance with the instructions of his Government, had to add verbally that his Government would view with disfavour any eventual change of dynasty in Persia.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Identic Note communicated to Persian Government.

THE two Powers do not see their way to giving advice to the Bakhtiaris in this matter, which is one of a purely internal nature, but they can tell the Bakhtiaris that they do not contemplate any interference so long as their interests are respected.

As regards guarantees, the two Ministers can only assure the khans again of the friendly sympathy of their two Governments so long as the Bakhtiaris act in a manner friendly to the two Powers. This friendly sympathy should ensure for the Bakhtiaris fair treatment whoever is in power.

G. BARCLAY.

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

[1953] No. 100.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

(No. 247.)
Sir, *Tehran, December* 21, 1911.

OWING to the interruption of telegraphic communication between Tehran and both Astrabad and Kermanshah I have no very precise news as to how the insurrection is proceeding either in the east or west. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram No. 717, stated in the Medjliss on the 18th instant that the ex-Shah's followers had advanced as far as Semnan. I have no confirmation of this from the telegraph department. At all events no rebel force has yet penetrated into the town. Both Shahrud and Damghan appear, however, to be in the hands of the ex-Shah's forces. Beyond Semnan the telegraph line is cut, and the ex-Shah's Turcomans are doubtless not far from that town. The ex-Shah himself is reported to be still in the neighbourhood of Gumish Teppé at Khoja Nefes.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs also stated on the 18th instant that Salar-ed-Dowleh had reoccupied Kermanshah. Reports from His Majesty's consul at that place, dated the 9th December, showed that there was fighting in the town between some Government forces and the insurgents, but I have so far not learned from him that the town has been taken by Salar-ed-Dowleh.

From Tabreez there is no change in the military situation to report. Early this month an attempt was made by the Tabreezis to come to terms with the Shuja-ed-Dowleh, telegrams having been received by the Anjuman from the Extremists in the Medjliss urging them to make peace, as it behoved all Persians to unite in defence of their country and religion in view of the Russian ultimatum. An influential deputation waited upon Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and urged him to return with them to the town,

but the latter declined these overtures, suspecting a trap. The Minister for Foreign Affairs announced in the Medjliss on the 18th instant that Shuja-ed-Dowleh had sent a force to Ardebil, whence it was threatening Resht, but I have no confirmation of this from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[1954] No. 101.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 15, 1912.)

(No. 248.)
Sir, *Tehran, December* 19, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 236 of the 1st December, forwarding the last of the diaries of the tour of Mr. Shipley and M. Minorsky in the Turco-Persian frontier districts, I have the honour to forward a copy of Mr. Shipley's despatch forwarding the joint report of the two delegates prepared on the lines indicated in the instructions with which they were furnished (see my despatch No. 69 of the 15th May).

The report is accompanied by a valuable sketch map prepared by Captain Kissly, the commander of M. Minorsky's Cossack escort, which shows at a glance the extent of the Turkish occupation.

It will be noticed that the Turkish encroachments verified by the commissioners extend not only far beyond the neutral zone, but also in some cases beyond the limit claimed by Dervish Pasha.

From the Persian point of view the practical isolation of the Dilman district and the total isolation by land of the Urmia and Dol districts, constitute a great hardship, while from the Russian point of view the facilities afforded by the occupation of Ushnu and Solduz for a conjunction of the 4th and 5th Army Corps threatening the southern approaches of Tabreez as well as those of the north-west aimed at by the advance towards Khoi are no doubt matters of concern to Russia. Indeed the impression left on the commissioners was there is no reasonable room for doubt that the two considerations which determined the Turkish occupation were strategical, and that the advance itself is directed not so much against a weak Persia as against the latter's northern neighbour, especially since the completion of the railway to Julfa and the road to Tabreez.

In conclusion, I would draw attention to the tribute paid by Mr. Shipley in his covering despatch to his Russian colleague and to Captain Kissly, and his commendation of the conduct of the sowars of his escort. I would add that the successful accomplishment of the work of the commission without incident reflects such credit on Mr. Shipley as would, I venture to suggest, merit a warm expression of your approval.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Tabreez, November* 16, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith the copies in duplicate, duly signed by my Russian colleague, M. Minorsky, and myself, of the joint report, with annexes, which, in accordance with the instructions from our respective legations, we have drawn up on the state of affairs on the Turco-Persian frontier.

With the exception of the pass of Kélé-shin, the reasons for the omission of which were explained by us at the time, we have, as your Excellency will notice, visited all the districts laid down for us in the despatch forwarded to me by your Excellency of the 12th May last. The extent of the present Turkish occupation has been personally verified by us, and will be found clearly marked on the map accompanying our report, while we have endeavoured to the best of our ability to establish what was the *de facto* frontier in 1905. In connection with this latter subject the data furnished in Khurshid Effendi's book, brought to my notice by my Russian colleague, respecting the state of affairs previous to 1869, will, we trust, not be without a certain value in any future examination of Turkish claims. The extent to which the occupied districts may be said



SKETCH MAP
— OF THE —
TURCO-PERSIAN FRONTIER

SHEWING DISTRICTS VISITED BY THE

BRITISH & RUSSIAN DELEGATES

8th June – 16th Septm

1911.

Routes followed by the Delegates
Halting places for the night
Frontier before 1905
Neutral Zone according to identic map of 1870
Boundary of the territory now occupied by the Turks as ascertained by the Delegates
Line of Military communications

(The Graticule has been added from existing War Office Maps)

DISTRIBUTION — OF — TURKISH TROOPS

Head quarters of a regiment
. . . . battalion
. . . . company
Military post
Cavalry station
Battery
Mitrailleuses

S. of Bané Turkish encroachments go up to the Village of Khaluzé (in Persian district of Merivan)

Geographical Section, General Staff, N° 2603.

War Office January 1912.

SCALE 1 inch = 13·26 Miles
or
1 mile = ·075 inches

MILES 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 20 40 MILES

or 20 Versts = 1 inch

to have been brought under Turkish administration has also been fully dealt with by us; and though the question of the feeling of the local population towards the Turks and of the ultimate object of the encroachments of the latter is one which offers greater difficulties, we have in this respect, as in regard to the whole of our report, been entirely in accord in the conclusions arrived at, and have made every effort to avoid overstating the case against the Turkish authorities.

It only remains for me to bear the fullest testimony to the sincere and unselfish co-operation with myself of my Russian colleague, M. Minorsky, and to the harmony which prevailed between us during the whole of our journey. I would further wish to state that it is to his great knowledge of frontier matters and acquaintance with Kurdish affairs that such results as we may have been able to achieve have been mainly due. I would also venture to call your Excellency's notice to the services rendered by Captain Kissly in the production of the map above referred to, and to the assistance afforded by him to the sowars of my escort when, owing to the exigencies of the situation, they were temporarily not under my own superintendence. A word of commendation is, I feel, due to the excellent discipline and conduct shown throughout the journey by both the Cossacks and sowars of our escort, which contributed not a little to the absence of incidents to which we have referred in the concluding diary of our itinerary.

I beg to add that the copies of the map accompanying our report, of which two have been drawn up with the place-names in English characters and two in Russian, are being transmitted by M. Minorsky.

I have, &c.
H. S. SHIPLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

Joint Report by Messrs. Shipley and Minorsky, British and Russian Delegates, on the State of Affairs on the Turco-Persian Frontier, June 8–September 16, 1911.

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1. *Status quo ante* 1905.

Kotur.—The Turks, while continually endeavouring to represent their advance since 1905 as a mere resumption of territory historically theirs by right, do not openly at least put forward any claim on Kotur, on the ground that this district was ceded to Persia in pursuance of the 60th article of the Treaty of Berlin.

We ascertained, however, that a part of the territory of Kotur, as marked on the map annexed to the protocol signed on the 15th (27th) July, 1880, by Colonels Hamley and Zelenoy at Sarykamysh, has been retained by the Turks (viz., the lands of the villages of Beledjik (recte Biledjik), Razi, Gharatil (Haratil), Ghellik (Djellik)-Youkary, Ghellik (Djellik)-Aschaga, and Panamerik—all to the west of Kotur).

We subjoin, as bearing on the latter question, a report by the Persian Governor-General of Urmia containing an account of the alleged intrigues carried on by Mohamed Zeki, the Kaïmakam of Serai (Mahmudi), with the object of procuring the submission to Turkey of Simko, the present Governor of Kotur (see Diary No. 2). During our stay in the latter place we received full confirmation from Simko himself of the facts mentioned in the report in question.

Chehrik.—Turkish encroachments properly so called may be said to begin south of the mountain of Surava, where the frontier, previous to 1905, passed by the watershed between Turkish Khanyga and the gorge of Dushvan (Deirik), which latter was at that time in the hands of the Persians. Further frontier points behind Chehrik from north to south were the pass of Boroosh-Khoran (Id. Map: Boroosh-Koura), that of Balakoo between Khaneberi (Persian, Id. Map: Hassaberi) and Khane-Soor (Turkish), the villages of Sary-Chichek (not marked on Id. Map) and Djander (Id. Map: Djan-Dara), and the spring of Kani-Ziaret, lying above the village of Ourtanys (in the Shepiran district).

Somai.—The limit of Persian territory to the west of Somai seems never to have been clearly defined, but it certainly extended along the valley of the northern stream (the Somai or Berduk River), which, after its confluence with the Bazhirga and Arzin Rivers, forms the Nazlu-chai, as far as the ruins of the Berduk-kala built by the old Somai-Begs.

Baradost.—In Baradost the boundary was formed by the Kotur Mountain and the offshoots of Seri-Baydost overlooking the Baradost Plain. It should be mentioned

that the villages of Sero and Sartyk, situated in the latter plain, were some time previous to 1905 governed by the Turks. We were informed that some twenty years ago a culprit, having made his escape from a Turkish prison, took up his residence in Sero. The Turkish authorities, having applied to the Governor of Urmia for his extradition, received a reply from the latter to the effect that the matter was not within his jurisdiction, as the village in question belonged to the Sheikh of Shemdinan, and was consequently under Turkish administration. It was this confusion of the rights of the State with those of the land-owner, of which there are many instances in the frontier dispute, which led up, we were informed, to the occupation of the two above-mentioned villages. All the remaining part of the Baradost Valley belonged to Persia, which possessed a customs post in Behik.

Tergever.—South of Baradost, in Arzin (forming part of Tergever), a Persian custom-house existed at which dues were levied until the month of Djaddy of the Ilan Il (January 1905), the frontier stretching to the south of this being formed by the watershed of the high frontier range broken only by the Kialoo River, in the district of Alan, and the latter's tributary, the small river of Vazné.

Tergever is divided from Turkey by the range of Sitaver. Derbend, situated at the mouth of the gorge from which the Rowzé-chai issues, is inhabited by Kurds (under Beder Khan Beg's brother), who even now are unwilling to acknowledge Turkish supremacy.

Desht.—A Persian custom-house existed in Desht (at the village of Djermi, situated at the source of the Berdé-Soor), and both this district and Tergever were occupied by the Turks only after the memorable defeat of Madjdus-Saltané by Yaver Pasha on the 1st August, 1907.

Mergever.—At Mergever the seat of the Persian Customs was at Nergui. In this district we were ourselves allowed to travel with our escorts up to Binar, the most outlying gorge in the frontier range, and were informed that the caravanserai of Zini-Khan represented until the recent Turkish advance the boundary between the two States.

Ushnu.—In the Ushnu district the well-known Kélé-shin pass was always considered as the frontier, which fact is confirmed by all those travellers who have visited the ancient monument on its summit (*vide* De Morgan, "Mission scientifique," tome 4, vol. i, p. 277, P. 1896). A Persian custom-house existed in the town of Ushnu itself, of which latter town the governor, Suleiman Khan, was subordinate to the Persian Governor of Urmia.

As stated in the various diaries of our itinerary, none of the inhabitants, whether of Djaldian or of the other villages on the road visited by us, could deny that they had lived under a Persian governor who had, previous to the Turkish advance, ruled the country up to the frontier range of Kandil.

Lahidjan.—In Old Lahidjan there was a Persian custom-house in Khané, and taxes were levied by the Persians from the frontier villages of Tamarchian, Komtara, and Kyz-kapan, the amount of the yearly revenue from the whole of Lahidjan being 1,030 tomans. The ruins of Persian forts are to be seen both in Shinava and on the Mootava-tépé.

Tirkesh, &c.—Though Baiz Pasha, of the Mangurs, endeavoured to prove that he had always lived in Tirkesh under Turkish jurisdiction, we had positive assurances that Soujboulak used to levy taxes from Mergan (its district). Further, Hamzé Agha himself, the former chief of the Mangurs, was treacherously murdered in 1881 by the Amir Nizam on coming to Soujboulak to make his submission to the Persians. Moreover, Hamzé Agha's son, Bapir Agha, the recognised representative of the elder line, supplanted since the Turkish advance by Baiz Pasha, belonging to the junior branch (*vide* Diary No. 5), has since the recent events taken up his abode near Soujboulak.

Vazné.—Somewhat more uncertain are Persian rights on Vazné, which is occupied by those Mangur tribes who have their winter quarters in Turkish Pishder, and who for generations past have considered themselves to be Turkish subjects; on the other hand, it is contended by the Persians that the personal status as Turkish subjects of these nomads cannot establish a Turkish title to the yailas (summer pastures) situated on the eastern, *i.e.*, Persian, side of the Kandil range. There are no villages on the Vazné Plateau, which is uninhabitable in winter owing to the severity of the cold, and it may be said that the long series of negotiations between Persia and Turkey on this subject, protracted until a quite recent date, only served to show that no settlement of the question has been arrived at.

Serdesht.—The last Persian Governor of Serdesht (1907) was Izam-ul-Mulk,

custom-houses being established at Köhné-Mishka and Beuran, the directors of which were Mirza Saïd and Mirza Ali respectively, and at Beytoosh. The Beradji and Alan districts, in which the three last-mentioned customs were situated, were undoubtedly Persian frontier districts. The village of Alsho, situated on the western slopes of the Kandil range, was pointed out to us as being in Turkey. The boundary between Serdesht and the Turkish fort of Kala-Dizé (Hamidié) is formed by the pass of Kani-Resh. The southern frontier of Alani-Adjem (*i.e.*, Persian Alan) is constituted by the Kialoo River from the Teyyet bridge up to its confluence with the Kiveroo, which latter stream is the north-west boundary of the Bané lands.

Bané.—Bané itself is composed of eight districts, viz., Doli-Khurriava, Balwaw-Bnakhwé, Shwé, Namashir, Deshté-Tal, Kiveroo, Tazhan, Pash-Arbeba, the whole of which, we ascertained by local enquiry, was occupied by the Turks only four to five years ago.

"New" Districts.—It should be mentioned that no Turkish official, whether civil or military, with whom we came into contact during our journey, ever ventured upon the assertion that the Persian frontier districts were in Turkish possession previous to 1905. The very name "nevahié djedidé" (new districts) by which they are now officially called implies that they have been recently acquired.

Status quo, 1639.—We would further draw particular attention to the fact that Turks, when speaking to us of the new frontier, invariably alluded to it as the "*status quo* frontier." But this latter expression, as they were obviously not referring to the year 1905, can have no meaning at all, unless we understand by it the year 1639 A.D., the date of the well-known treaty, on the omissions in which the Turkish claims are mainly based (*vide* British Foreign Office memorandum on the Turco-Persian frontier question).

2. *Status quo previous to* 1869.

Whatever the *status quo* previous to 1905 may have been, it is, we venture to think, of equal and perhaps greater importance as having a direct bearing on the present frontier dispute, to ascertain the condition of affairs obtaining previously to 1869, the year, it will be remembered, in which a special convention was entered into by Turkey and Persia in which it was agreed that the two States should keep within their respective limits pending a final settlement of the question.

*Khurshid Effendi's Book.**—In this connection an exceptional importance attaches to the data given in a book entitled "Siahet-namé-i-hudud," and published in Constantinople in 1862, the author of which—Mehmed Khurshid Effendi—acted as secretary to Dervish Pasha, well known as the Turkish frontier commissioner in 1849–52. The value of the book from an official point of view is evident from the fact that only 150 copies were published, and that even these were only procurable by special permission of the "Medjlisi-vala-i-Ahky-am-i-adliyé." The author, it is to be noted, acknowledges that his own share merely consisted in putting in order the information collected by Dervish Pasha himself.

In addition to the claims which had already been put forward by Dervish Pasha, and which formed the principal subject of another book published in Constantinople in 1286 A.H., Khurshid Effendi, in the work in question, gives full lists of the villages in the frontier districts governed by Persia in the years 1848–52.

Bané and Serdesht.—Speaking of Bané (our excerpts are taken from the Russian translation by Gamazow, St. Petersburgh, 1877) Khurshid Effendi (p. 324) says: "It was not possible for me to ascertain the number of houses in the villages of the Bané district belonging to the province of Senné, now in the possession of Persia . . ." He says further (p. 243) that the right of levying taxes in Serdesht was in 1852 ceded by the Persian Government to a certain Ali Khan for 3,000 tomans yearly, the territory in question being composed of the following districts: Kialoo, Gowrik Naaleini-Faki-Isa, Melkari, Beradji, Murad-begui, and Alani-Adjem (or Beytoosh), the villages of which are all quoted by name (pp. 237–40).

Lahidjan.—According to Khurshid Effendi a governor had been appointed by the Persians to Pasvé (p. 256), and though he asserts that all the Bilbas tribes with their subdivisions mentioned by him are under Turkish rule (p. 256) he states, nevertheless, that "the Mamash clan no longer recognises the Turkish authority, and is considered

* Sir Arnold Kemball, British Delegate on the Frontier Commission of 1875, stated (*vide* Foreign Office memorandum, dated the 14th October, 1907) that Dervish Pasha wrote a pamphlet about 1873 illustrating the claims of Turkey. Sir A. Kemball's translation of this pamphlet was mislaid but possibly Khurshid Effendi's book was the one Sir A. Kemball referred to.—A. P.

to be subject to Persia" (p. 257). Twenty-seven villages of the Mangur clan are enumerated as being situated in the territory of Soujboulak, a Persian possession (pp. 254–55).

Ushnu.—Speaking with some reserve of Lahidjan, Khurshid Effendi fully acknowledges that Ushnu at his time was governed by the Persians (pp. 259–60), the frontier between it and Revanduz being the mountain of Kélé-shin (p. 250).

Urmia Frontier.—Having spoken of Van and Hekkiari, the author passes over to the description of "the neighbouring Persian localities and their population" (p. 294) and enumerates thirty-six villages of Mergever (p. 295); twelve of Berdé-Soor (*i.e.*, Desht, p. 297); thirteen of Tergever (p. 299); thirty-five of Baradost (p. 300); thirty-three of Somai, "governed from Urmia"; twenty-four of Shepiran "belonging to Somai"; fourteen of Anzali-bala "belonging to Somai" (p. 303). Anzali-zir (*i.e.*, the villages of Djemalova, Gowlan, Kulundji, and Kahrizé now occupied by the Turks), is separately mentioned by the author as depending directly on Urmia (p. 304).

Salmas Frontier.—It should be mentioned that even the nine villages of the Shepiran district which, according to Khurshid Effendi (*ibid.* 304), were occupied by the Turks and annexed to Albak seemed to have been regained later on by the Persian Kurds. Such at least were the assurances given us by Simko, whose brother, Djafer-Agha, was some ten years ago Persian serheddar in Chehrik and the adjoining districts.

Khurshid Effendi lastly explains the process by which, in his opinion, Chehrik came to be under Persian jurisdiction (p. 306) and enumerates (p. 305) its villages, eighteen in number, as well as those of its sub-districts, viz., Shinetal (eleven), Guerdian (nine), Deirik (ten), and Hoder (sixteen).

3. *The Limits of the present Occupation.*

The limits of the present Turkish occupation have been fully explained in our diaries and, as far as they were ascertained by us, have been marked on the map annexed to our report. It only remains to us therefore to give a résumé in brief of the limits in question.

Khoi.—The most northerly point now in Turkish hands is the village of Yezdikan situated on the Khoi side of the range which divides the latter district from Salmas. Two more villages which from old times have been dependent on Khoi, but which are situated in the Salmas plain, viz., Mafi-kendi and Kenyani, are occupied by the Turks. The last two are outside the neutral zone, as represented on the identic map.

Salmas.—Salmas itself is left to Persia but is surrounded to the north, west, and south by the occupied districts, viz.:—

1. Hoder, or the Küresinly valley, the nearest Persian villages being: Chichek, Seramerik, and Ayan (the latter abandoned by the inhabitants some two or three years ago).
2. Deirik and the high table-land between Deirik and Chehrik with the villages of Hambanova (belonging to the Pishnamaz of Salmas), Akhveran (belonging to Kerbelai Abdulla and Hadji Hussein of Köhnéshehr), &c.; the town of Köhnéshehr, immediately to the east of this table-land, being in Persian possession.
3. Chehrik and the northern slopes of the mountains Se-guird and Karny-yarykh with the villages of Adjivadj, Zevedjik, &c. The villages of Guluzan, Malham, Kabakh-tépé, Temer and Khan-takhty are left to Persia.

Anzal.—The peninsula of Karabagh is still in Persian hands, but communication on the road from Tabreez and Dilman to Urmia is intercepted by the fields of the village of Isti-su in Turkish occupation, which stretch across the northern approach to the pass of Kooshchi.

The pass itself and the village of Kooshchi are still held by the Persians, but these again are cut off from Urmia by lands belonging to the occupied villages of Djemalova and Gowlan, which extend as far as the lake. Of the district called Anzali-zir, only Djebel-kendi, Imam-kendi, and Maku-kendi are left to Persia. The frontier passing along the summit of the mountains which overlook the latter villages turns to the west above Kerim-abad and is then said to follow the range above Persian Khanyghia and Askerabad and, after skirting the valley of Persian Hissar and Sindji, situated on a northern affluent of the Nazlu-chai, to reach the pass of Khan-guedigui which divides Sindji (Persian) from Inchké-su (Turkish). From Khan-guedigui the boundary, after passing by the summit of certain peaks, descends into the gorge of the Nazlu-chai, which is crossed below Kyr-neisa, proceeding thence along the hills dividing the Urmia plain

from the up-land districts of Tergever and Desht. On the map shown us in Chehrik the boundary across the Nazlu passes through a point called Talik. Although certain of the people whom we questioned as to this latter place informed us that they remembered the name, no one was able to give details as to its exact locality. But, however this may be, the first Persian village in the gorge of the Nazlu-chai is that of Kalé i-Ismaïl-Agha; in the gorge of the Rowzé-chai—that of Kelhur; in the gorge of the Berdé-Soor—that of Bend.

Baranduz.—From this latter place the boundary ascends the Sir mountain and, descending into the Baranduz plain, leaves to Turkey the village of Dizé situated at the eastern side of the gorge. The latter village was pointed out to us by the Turks as the only one in their occupation on the left bank of the Baranduz, but, as was mentioned in our Diary No. 3, we were informed in Serdarud that the Ottomans also administered the villages of Khataylu, Didan and Saatlu lying lower down than Dizé, and the documents alluded to by us under the heading "Turkish administration" (*vide infra*) seem to prove this latter statement. From Dizé the frontier then follows the right (or southern) bank of the Baranduz River down to where the latter enters the lake, thus cutting off—this time to the south—Urmia not only from Soujboulak but even from the Dol district, which still depends on Urmia and which has been always admitted by the Turks to be Persian territory.

Dol.—The frontier begins again at a point on the lake south of Djebel-kendi and, going westwards by the hills between Sarasanly (Turkish) and Sultanabad (Persian), turns southwards, following the range dividing Dol from the Deshtebil district. At the time of our visit to the village of Balistan it was the extreme point still held by the Persians in Dol, but on our return to Urmia we learned that the Turkish partisan Mamed Emin, mentioned in our Diary No. 3, had been reinstalled by the agency of Sheikh Abdul Kadir and the Turks; Persian rule over the village thus becoming merely nominal.

The Frontier south of Sulduz.—Dol, which is isolated from other Persian possessions, is separated from Soujboulak by the large and rich district of Sulduz stretching up to the lake. The frontier between these latter districts has been fully described in Appendix I to our Diary No. 4. We need only add that, since the occupation of Bané by the Turks, Persian territory south of the districts of Sakkiz (shorn of Mirédé) and Khorkhora consists of the districts of Merivan, of which Khaluze is considered to be the frontier point. Merivan (Mehreban) belongs to the province of Persian Kurdistan (Senné) and is expressly mentioned in the Turco-Persian treaty of 1049 A.H. (1639 A.D.) as being a Persian possession.

Permanence of Frontier.—We should not omit to mention that the Turks whom we encountered on our journey invariably and as a matter of course spoke of the new frontier as being firmly established and which they on their side were bound to respect. At Chehrik the kaïmakam showed us a map on which the frontier limit of his district was clearly marked out. Behdjet Bey, the Turkish frontier commissioner, declined our invitation to visit us at Urmia on the grounds that he had strict orders from the Turkish War Office not to cross the frontier, while our Turkish escort always took leave of us on the outskirts of the territory still considered to be Persian. There is of course much uncertainty with regard to outlying villages, such as Balistan (*vide supra*), &c., and the Turks are not so scrupulous in the matter of crossing the frontier as they were desirous of making us believe. An instance of this was afforded us during our stay in Soujboulak when a party of Turkish artillerymen with several guns passed through that town on their way from Serdesht to Sulduz.

The northern part of the new frontier, viz., from Khoi to Dol, may nevertheless be considered to be much more fixed than is the case in the south, especially in the Serdesht region, where, owing to the great distances from the Government centres and the existence of a population exclusively Kurdish, further encroachments may be in progress, instances of which will be found in our Diary No. 4.

Geographical Importance of the Frontier.—There cannot be two opinions as to the value to be attached to the new frontier from a geographical point of view; whatever the historical justification for the Turkish occupation of one village or another may be, it is in glaring contradiction with every reasonable principle of frontier delimitation. There are no marks whatever, natural or otherwise, dividing Rikava from Seramerik, Djemalova from Kooshchi, Kahrizé from Imam-kendi, Dizé from other villages on the northern bank of the Baranduz, &c., to say nothing of the confusion and arbitrary method followed in the Mukri country, where villages are to be found of which parts only are administered by the Turks. The latter themselves in fact openly admit that the frontier, as at present constituted, will have to be rectified, a process which the

majority of them appear inclined to think can be done by means of a further advance (*vide* our Diary No. 7 under heading of the 10th September).

Strategical Value of the Frontier.—Special attention should be called to the strategical value of that part of the new frontier which divides Western Azerbaidjan into several separate sections. The Turkish occupation of Silaw and Kenyani bars the two principal roads from Salmas to Khoi; that of Isti-su north of the Vergeviz Pass and Djemalova, Gowlan, &c., south of it intercepts, as already explained, the communication between Salmas and Urmia. Further, the possession by the Turks of the right bank of the Baranduz prevents Urmia from communicating with Dol, while the occupation of Ushnu and Sulduz completely cuts off the western shore of the lake from Persian Kurdistan, the Persian possessions in the region in question being thus reduced to the condition of mere separate units lacking the cohesion and force which might enable them to resist any action which Turkey may choose to take. Further, the advance by the latter Power since 1905 has given it the command of all the principal passes (the position of which is marked on the map accompanying our report) giving access to Persia through the great Kandil frontier range, while the possession of districts so rich as Ushnu, Sulduz, and others above enumerated ensures to it in case of necessity ample supplies for the maintenance of a large military force.

Finally, the districts lying within the zone between the old and new frontier and actually in the occupation of the Turks are thirty-one in number, viz., in Salmas, Hoder, Kezan, Chehrik, Guerdian, Shinetal, and Shepiran; in Somai, Upper and Lower Anzal (in part); Baradost and Kenar-ba-rozh (Inchké-su); Tergever, Desht, Mergever, Baranduz (in part), Deshtebil, Ushnu, Sulduz; Old and New Lahidjan, Manguri-Mornakena Yel-Tamur, Turdjan, Mergan, Naaleini Mangur, Naaleini-Faki-Isa, Vazné, Serdesht (with Gowrik, Beradji and Melkari), Alan, Bané and Mirédé, to say nothing of the various villages in Khoi, Soujboulak, Sakkiz, &c., while the extent of the districts thus occupied has a length from north to south of about 300 kilom. with a breadth varying from 20 to 80 kilom., the whole forming an area which, roughly estimated, may be put down as some 12,000 square kilom.*

4. *Military Forces.*

Except the small posts north of Salmas, viz., Verdan and Yezdikan, we visited personally all the places on the neutral zone where Turkish soldiers are stationed. As the numbers of the latter at the minor posts (*e.g.*, 22 at Isti-su, 44 at Kahrizé, &c.), fluctuate considerably, we give particulars (*vide infra*), respecting the detachments at head-quarters only, with a list of the stations depending on the latter. Further details with be found in our diaries.

Barracks, as we ourselves saw, exist in Bané, Serdesht, Pasvé, Djemalova, and Inchké-su. New ones, it is said, are being built in Mavana (see Diary No. 6), and Kani-spi (*ibid.*). In other places the soldiers are quartered in the houses of the villagers.

The block-house in Binar (built by Seyyid Taha) and that at the pass of Khanguedigui (belonging to Hasan Henaré), were mentioned in our Diary No. 6.

(A.)—Infantry.

No. of Regiment.	Detachment.	Head-quarters.	Sub-stations.
101st Infantry (IVth Corps) ..	2 battalions ..	Chehrik ..	1. Silaw, with smaller posts at Yezdikan and Verdan. 2. Kahrizé, together with Isti-su. 3. Kulundji, together with Djemalova.
98th Infantry (IVth Corps) ..	2 „ .	Mavana ..	1. Inchké-su. 2. Dizé, together with Shaaban. 3. Kukié, together with Balsarud. 4. Ushnu.
107th Infantry (VIth Corps) ..	1 battalion ..	Rahdané .	Pasvé.
	1 „ ..	Serdesht ..	Eski-Baghdad.
	1 "kadro" (company) ..	Nahadé ..	
108th Infantry (VIth Corps) ..	1 battalion ..	Bané	Kabaghloo.

* Area of Belgium, 29,500 square kilom.

(B.)—Cavalry.

40 horses of 23rd Cavalry Regiment in Verdan.

(C.)—Artillery.

5 mountain guns in Nahadé.
2 quick-firing guns in Djemalova.

The military posts are principally stationed on the roads and at the gorges leading to the districts still in Persian hands. Thus, Yezdikan commands Kotur and Khoi; Silaw, the road from Salmas to Khoi over the Mughandjik Pass; Kenyani, the roads going over the Lak Pass and the Kiaw Pass (through Sheker-yazy). The posts at Isti-su and in Anzal, from the north and south respectively, overlook the Vergeviz Pass on the road from Urmia to Salmas; Kukié bars the entrance to Deshtebil; Dizé and Shaaban are situated at the south-western end of the Urmia plain, while Inchké-su commands the pass leading to the latter from the north-west.

The Turkish troops in the occupied districts (some 3,000 men in all) cannot be said to be very numerous at the present moment, especially if compared with the time (1907) when eighteen battalions under Ferik Muhammed Fazil Pasha were stationed in Pasvé (now held by two companies only), while Yaver Pasha was in command of the northern detachment with head-quarters in Mavana. It should, however, be borne in mind that the Turks having, as above stated, the command of the passes behind them rely on their reserves in Turkey on which they can draw at will, rather than on the men actually stationed in the neutral zone.

Towards the end of our journey we learned that the distribution of Turkish forces on the frontier was about to undergo a considerable change. We were informed that most of the soldiers belonging to the "number" regiments (*i.e.*, 101st, 98th, 107th, and 108th) would be recalled to Turkey and replaced by special frontier guards (Serhedd-bulukati) who would be placed under the immediate orders of the frontier commissioners, the new system to be accompanied by a rearrangement in the present stations themselves. We were informed, *e.g.*, that a company will be placed in Quni (Somai), where up to the present no Turkish post has existed. Several battalions, however, were to be left in the more important centres as a reserve for the new frontier guards, *e.g.*, of the two battalions now stationed in Chehrik, the first will still remain there.

The reform in question may possibly have been dictated by the wish to take away from these districts the appearance of being merely "occupied," and to incorporate them with the rest within the general frontier of the Empire.

5. *Turkish Administration.*

Frontier Commissioners.—The "new districts," as a whole, are divided into two parts under the superintendence of two staff officers ("erkiani-harb"), viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Behdjet Bey and Colonel Ahmed Refik Bey, styled frontier commissioners, of whom the former lives in Van and the latter in Mossul. Behdjet Bey's jurisdiction comprises the districts from Chehrik to Ushnu, that of Refik Bey extending from Sulduz to Bané.

Kaïmakams.—The northern half of the frontier is occupied by the troops of the IVth Army Corps, and is subdivided into three kaïmakamliks: Chehrik, Mavana, and Ushnu. The southern half (held by the VIth Army Corps) consists of the Kaïmakamliks of Sulduz, Serdesht, and Bané. Serdesht at the time of our visit was the only place where the kaïmakam had not yet taken up his post, his duties being discharged by the kazi; all the others were entrusted to officials who, though they now hold the rank of kaïmakam (civil), had been officers previous to their present employment.

As these kaïmakamliks have no staff of Turkish clerks or properly qualified subordinates the work is carried on with the assistance of local Kurds. Kerim Khan Karki, for instance, is the honorary Mudir of Baranduz, Tirkesh is governed by Baiz Pasha, Vasné by Agha Baiz, &c. In case of absence from any cause of the kaïmakams the latter are replaced by Turkish commanding officers, who, independently of this temporary duty, enjoy certain administrative rights in the districts where their detachments are stationed, *e.g.*, the captain in Kulindji is Mudir of Anzal, while the commanders of Eski-Bagdad, Kabaghloo, and other similar outlying posts take, we were told, a leading part in the promotion of a forward policy, and it is to them chiefly that "dekhalets" are now handed in

According to the statement made to us by the various Turkish officials neither the general Ottoman Code was in force in the occupied districts nor, except in Sulduz (*vide infra*), had any laws especially applicable to the latter been promulgated. Civil cases are judged according to the Shariat, and we saw many mullahs, muftis (in Baradost and elsewhere), and two kazis (in Serdesht and Bané) who had been sent from Turkish Kurdistan (principally Gaver and Suleimanié) to arrange disputes between the Kurds and incidentally to aid in the propagation of Turkish ideas. In serious criminal or political cases the accused are sent either to Van or Kerkuk.

Public Works and Schools.—With the exception, perhaps, of two very rickety wooden bridges on the Arzin and Baranduz Rivers and the commencement of the building of two school-houses in Ushnu and Mavana respectively, for which latter the funds had been collected by public subscription, we saw no signs of any works of public utility having been set on foot since the Turkish occupation.

The Ushnu school is managed by an agent of the Ottoman Union and Progress Society, of which two members (Abdul Kadir Effendi and Hilmi Effendi) are attached to the Ottoman consulate in Soujboulak with the object of founding schools in that town and in the Mukri district. In Somai we saw several "khodjas," sent, we understood, from Gaver to give instruction to the Kurds.

Posts and Telegraphs.—There is no postal service in the occupied districts, but a telegraph line, of which we ourselves made use on one or two occasions, has been constructed between Pasvé and Rayat (Revanduz district), at which latter place it forms connection with the general Ottoman system.

Customs.—A custom-house, under the management of two Turkish officials (Ali Effendi and Meyyidil [?] Effendi), existed for some time in Djebel-Kendi, on the Baranduz, but has since been abolished owing to the protests of foreign subjects in Urmia and Tabreez. A second attempt to set up a custom-house in Kukié proved equally unsuccessful (see Diary No. 6), but we were informed that customs officials were shortly to arrive in Bané and Serdesht.

Taxes.—Though the tithe has been officially acknowledged as the land tax legally due to the State in the occupied districts, the Turkish authorities have issued a proclamation exempting the population from the payment of all taxes for a period of seven years. There is no doubt, however, that in certain of the occupied districts taxes were formerly levied on behalf of the Turkish authorities, as is shown by the following documents in our possession dating some three to four years back (1325–6 A.H.):—*

1. Receipt for £ T. 7 paid by a certain Guiverguiz of Bayat as a tithe on vineyards to Hasan-bin-Khuda, a native of Erzeroum, farmer of the tithes of the village of Bayat, dated 4th Teshrini-Evel, 1325.

2. Receipt for 22 piastres paid by Guiverguiz, the tithe farmer of Kaladjik, to Kerim-bin-Aziz (*i.e.*, Kerim Khan Harki, see Diary No. 6), the Mudir of Baranduz. Date 13th Kanuni-Evel, 1325.

3. Certificate issued by Ahmed-bin-Husein (?) a tithe official to Guiverguiz of Bayat, and Sertib Ghulam Khan Urumili, to whom collection of the tithes in Kaladjik and Khiyarek (Baranduz) was entrusted. Date 25th Tammuz, 1325.

4. Three certificates dated 1326, written on paper bearing the stamp of the Hedjaz railway committee with the register number, signed by Mehmed Tevfik, and certifying the number of the sheep owned by three inhabitants of the village of Kahrize in Sulduz. It is worthy of note that in the certificate in question, the latter district is called a "kaza" of the Turkish Kekkiari sanjak.

5. Three receipts (1326) for the taxes levied on the sheep specified in the above-mentioned certificates, the amount of the tax being 4 piastres per sheep.

We were, moreover, shown similar documents in many places, *e.g.*, in Kenyani (Khoi), Surmenova (Somai), &c., and were informed further that collections, both in money and grain, were occasionally made by the Turkish authorities for the construction of school-houses, barracks (*vide* Diary No. 6), for the Turkish fleet, and more recently for sufferers from the fire at Constantinople.

Inadequacy of the existing Turkish Administration.—The feature which chiefly impressed itself on us in connection with the administration of the newly occupied

* Incidentally these documents may serve to show how elastic are the limits set to their encroachments by the Turks, as the latter, who now state that Dizé is the only point occupied by them on the left (northern) bank of the Baranduz River, have yet levied taxes in the adjacent villages of Bayat (near Saatlu), &c., on the same side of the river in question.

districts was its entire inadequacy to deal with the numerous questions affecting the welfare of the population, a fact which the Turkish officials themselves in their various conversations with us were the first to admit. (*Vide* Diary No. 7.)

Except for the kaïmakams, who are frequently absent from their posts, we found the work entrusted to men with no previous experience of administration, and in any case entirely incompetent to unravel intricate questions affecting the tenure of land. Certain of these officials (as at Isti-su) were even ignorant of the extent of territory under their jurisdiction, while large districts, such as Mergever, Baradost, and Somai were left without any government at all. We heard complaints of the expense entailed upon Turkey by the occupation of the country, and it is possible that the inadequacy of the administrative staff above referred to may, perhaps, be due to motives of economy. We may mention as an instance of the confusion arising from the above state of affairs that we both saw and frequently heard of certificates which had been issued in contradiction with others of an earlier date, or with those emanating from other officials (Kara-gwez, Agha Khan's villages, &c.). Charges of venality against certain of the latter were not entirely wanting, and it was, in fact, stated to us by the population that, from an administrative point of view, there was very little difference between the present régime and that formerly in force under the Persians.

It is, however, an incontestable merit of the Turkish administration that it has introduced a certain amount of order among the Kurds, but it should not be forgotten that the predatory instincts of the latter still find an outlet on the neighbouring Persian territory (*cf.* our telegram respecting Mafi-Kendi, and the evidence obtained by us in Kengerlu, Kyzyldja, &c.).

Moreover, even within the neutral zone, we saw certain villages (Gaplasan, Khané, Binar) which had undoubtedly been destroyed since the time of the Turkish occupation, and were ourselves witnesses to the fact that a petty warfare was going on between certain of the Mergever landowners (Diary No. 6). It is true that villages such as Mavana and those of Baranduz have been delivered from the fear of Kurdish raids, but they still run the risk of being appropriated by some new-comer or other from outside (*vide* Diary No. 6), and in Baranduz are even governed by a notorious Kurdish brigand.

Turkish Policy in the Occupied Districts.—The inadequacy of the existing administrative staff together with the exceptional nature of the present position of the Turks has necessitated the adoption by them of a special policy in the occupied territory. In this respect, however, a distinction must be made between the districts belonging to Persian landowners or inhabited by Shiahs (Sulduz, Baranduz, Salmas) and those held by the Ashiret Kurds (Shekkaks, Bilbasses, Mukris, &c.).

Undermining the Power of the Aghas.—In the former of these two categories the agrarian policy of the Turks is mainly directed towards the undermining of the power enjoyed by the landowners while under the Persians, and the emancipation of the "rayets," the intention evidently being to create a new class of population to which the idea of a return to the old régime should be repugnant. We have mentioned the regulations introduced by Ahmed Refik Bey in Sulduz, abolishing the privileges of the Aghas, and establishing equality of treatment between the Agha and the "rayet"—an idea which, however, equitable in itself, and in accord with modern tendencies—is most revolutionary to a people accustomed to the ancient patriarchal system.

The Shiah Karapapakh Aghas of Sulduz are, in fact, the only body still remaining with the necessary cohesion to oppose, with any chance of success, the final incorporation of the country by the Turkish Government, as the latter, in other districts, such as Baranduz and Salmas, have had no difficulty in displacing those of the Aghas who were of Persian nationality or of Persian proclivities, while every effort is still being made to exclude from the occupied districts any influence which might be exerted by the proprietors, past or present, now living on Persian soil.

Uncertainty and Confusion in the Tenure of Land.—It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that owing to the arbitrary methods adopted by the Turks in summarily dispossessing such of the landed proprietors as may be obnoxious to them, the greatest uncertainty and confusion has been introduced into the question of land tenure, in one case a whole district (Deshtebil) having been handed over by them to persons who have no right whatever to it. Even in cases where the former proprietors have been left in possession of their villages the inhabitants—though the dues have everywhere been reduced to one-tenth of the crop—have been placed in a position to pay to the former as much or as little as they choose (*vide sub* Anzal and Salmas) while the pretensions and encroachments of Turkish partisans increased to such an extent

that Ahmed Refik Bey, sent subsequently on a mission of inspection, found himself obliged to restore many of these villages to their former owners, though, it is perhaps hardly necessary to say, no compensation was offered to the latter for the losses entailed upon them by the illegal seizure of their property to which certain of the petty Turkish officers had undoubtedly been a party (*vide sub* Golga Tepé, Kazi-Göl, &c.).

Sheikh Abdul-Kadir.—Very different is the treatment accorded by the Turkish authorities to the men on whose attachment to their cause they feel they can rely. Among these latter a typical instance is furnished by the exceptional position enjoyed by the Sheikh Abdul-Kadir of Shemdinan (or Nawchia), who has been permitted to take possession of numerous villages in Mergever, Desht, Tergever, and Baradost held until recently by Persian landowners such as Salaré Afkham and Mejdus-Saltané. The sheikh himself is fully aware that the estates confiscated by the Persian Government as compensation for the losses caused to Western Persia by the invasion of the Kurds under his father, Sheikh Obeidullah (in 1881), could not have been regained by him except for the Turkish advance, of which he is a strong partisan and to the promotion of which, owing to his influence among the surrounding Kurds, he is rendering important service.

The nephew of Sheikh Abdul-Kadir, Seyyid Taha, who, notwithstanding Persian protests (see Annexe No. 2), was for several months an inmate of the Turkish consulate at Urmia, engaged in negotiations for the purchase or lease from the local khans of certain villages belonging to them in the zone now occupied by the Turks. In this connection it may be mentioned that certain other Turkish subjects, such as Peter Ellow and his brother, together with a certain Dursun Effendi and Mehmed Effendi (Diary No. 3), are also endeavouring to obtain leases (especially in the Baranduz district), which, if their efforts should prove successful, might, in addition to the gain accruing to themselves, prove to be the forerunner of further Turkish penetration.

Policy towards the Ashiret Kurds.—In the districts coming under the latter of the two categories to which we have referred above, viz., those inhabited by an exclusively Kurdish and Sunni population, a policy of an entirely different nature has been adopted by the Turks. The allegiance of all Kurds having been seriously claimed by Tahir Pasha on behalf of the Ottoman Government at the last frontier commission sitting in Urmia, the Turks viewing the former—even those living in Persian territory—in the light of future subjects, apply somewhat more conciliatory methods, especially in the case of the more powerful clans, but, as the semi-independence enjoyed by the latter under the Persians is wholly incompatible with the Turkish tendency to centralisation, and as the Turkish authorities are well aware of the preference of these chiefs for the weaker rule of the Persians, as ensuring to them their ancient privileges, it has been the effort of the former to replace the latter by men who owe their rise to the new order of things, and who may be expected to prove more subservient.

In our diaries we had occasion to speak in detail of the substitution of Riza Khan Zerza for Suleiman Khan, Baiz Pasha Mangur for Bapir Agha, and of the rivalry kept on foot between Hamzé Seman and Karani Agha Mamash, which, we have since been informed, has ended in a fight between the two parties concerned. In all this there is, of course, no question of the "rights of the rayets."

Much less ceremonious is the attitude adopted with regard to the chiefs of minor ashirets, leading to the exclamation of a Kurd which we have already quoted ("There are no more Aghas left.") A ready pretext for intervention is always at hand in the dissensions which are never wanting in Kurdish families possessing numerous members, and we ourselves were witnesses in Turdjan (Mukri) of the use made by the Turks of the opportunity thus afforded them.

"*Dekhalets.*"—Special mention must be made of "dekhalet," an institution of which it would be difficult to find a parallel in any other country, and which consists of a declaration made by single persons, or by a community, to the effect that, being dissatisfied with their present condition, they request Turkey to accept them as subjects and to afford them protection. In most cases these "dekhalets" preceded the Turkish advance, the Ottoman soldiers almost always appearing in the rôle of protectors of a population crying for assistance. On the other hand, villages such as Kooschchi, which had steadily refused to give "dekhalet," very often succeeded in maintaining their independence. In Mukri (Kurdistan) we were ourselves witnesses of the readiness with which these "dekhalets" were handed in by single persons and accepted with equal facility by the Turkish authorities, in some cases, as at Turdjan, for the purpose of obtaining assistance against other members of the family, or as at

Karagwez, Beyram, &c., to get possession of a village. Whole districts, such as Bané, were offered to the Turks by the local khans, solely in the hope of procuring certain advantages and privileges for themselves. It was by means such as these that enterprising subordinates at a very early period succeeded in curtailing Persian territory, and it is to their activity that the well-informed person whom we met in Urmia (Diary No. 7) was referring.

Perhaps the most striking proof of the indiscriminate way in which these "dekhalets" were collected is furnished by the vast number (exceeding 350) of these documents belonging to the notorious Peter Ellow, which we had an opportunity of inspecting in Urmia. Many of them are written in good Ottoman Turkish, which is quite unknown to the Urmia population; others are drawn up in stereotyped Persian form, where only the signatures vary, the "dekhalets" themselves being given by representatives of the leading families, clergy, and merchants of Urmia, by Persian ladies and by Sunni villages, &c. Copies certified by ourselves are now in our possession. Among other villages visited by us in the plain of Urmia was that of Miava, which has a certain importance, as being situated close to the landing-place on the lake where passengers take the steamer on their way from Urmia to Tabreez, and which, it was reported to us, had given "dekhalet," the details concerning which will be found in Diary No. 3. Another village which, though not in the occupied zone, is said to be enjoying Ottoman protection in Balow (north of Urmia) where Sheikh Abdul-Kadir stayed on his way from Constantinople to his village of Razhan (in Desht).

It is not unreasonable to suppose that these "dekhalets" and subscription lists may at some later date be produced by them as serving to establish their rights over certain localities, as has already happened in the case of similar documents obtained by Dervish Pasha, who, in his book, even quotes as proofs "mazbatas" obtained by him from the districts under Turkish administration. (Dervish Pasha's book, pp. 50, 134, 144, &c.)

"*Mazbatas.*"—Immediately before our own passage through Somai, Behdjet Bey, the frontier commissioner, had been on a visit to the local Kurdish chiefs, during which he had requested them to sign a "mazbata" of allegiance to Turkey, which, they assured us, they declined to do. Later on during our stay in Serdesht, Behdjet Bey was endeavouring, but without success, to obtain a similar document from the Karapapakhs in Sulduz (see Diary No. 4). Further, very shortly after our return to Tabreez, Ahmed Refik Bey, the commissioner for the southern part of the frontier, went, we were informed, to Serdesht and obtained a "mazbata" of allegiance from the chiefs of the districts which had been visited by us. In Desht we were informed that a telegram to the Sultan had been transmitted to Constantinople by Behdjet Bey, who insisted on its being signed by the local Kurds.

It would certainly seem as if all these documents have been prepared for the express purpose of serving as a means of refutation of any report which should be furnished by us.

6. *The Sentiments of the Population.*

Unpopularity of the Turks.—The fact that the many conversations we had with the people whom we met on the line of our route were carried on without the aid of an interpreter enabled us to take direct observations for ourselves as to the sentiments entertained by the population generally towards the Turks. The result of these observations has been to convince us that the rule of the latter does not on the whole enjoy any popularity with their newly acquired subjects.

Of the sentiments of the various Persian khans, who bitterly complained to us in Urmia and Salmas of the harshness of the treatment experienced by them at the hands of the Turkish authorities (Diary No. 7), and of those of the Karapapakhs of Sulduz, whose grievances were laid before us in the petition annexed to our Diary No. 3, it would be superfluous to speak. We may, however, add that the correspondence of the Aghas of Bané, and of those of the Gowrik clan, with the Persian authorities in Soujboulak, coupled with that between the chiefs in Ushnu, Desht, and Somai with the Governor of Urmia—our own personal observations in the above-mentioned districts, as well as in those of Alan, Lahidjan, &c., and the messages secretly conveyed to us during our journey—leave no room for doubt on our part that the predominant feeling with regard to the new régime, especially among the feudal Aghas and their retainers, is one of general discontent. As we have already pointed out, the reason of this discontent is to be found in the levelling tendency of the Turkish system of administration, which is obviously hostile to the existence of a powerful class, such as

the ashirets, as opposed to the peasants ("rayets"). Moreover, the very summary methods, such as those applied in our presence by one of the officers of our escort to the proprietor of Narziva (Diary No. 6) tend to alienate still more the sympathies of the Aghas from the Turks.

Turkish Partisans.—With the exception of the Turkish emissaries (mullas, Sheikh Abdul-Kadir's men, the teachers, &c.), and possibly of the crowds who greeted us at various points with cries of "Long live the Sultan!" and who, it seemed evident to us, had been brought there under outside pressure (*cf.* the remark of the kaïmakan in Bané (Diary No. 4), the Karapapakhs' petition, &c.), we met very few people who expressed themselves as fully satisfied with the Turks; chief among these were Baiz Pasha Mangur and the brothers Riza Khan and Mustapha Khan Zerza, of whom the former had received a pension, decoration, and the headship over the Mangurs, while the latter, as already stated, had been allowed to seize Deshtebil. Hamzé Seman, of the Mamashes, whom we ourselves did not meet, may, according to what was reported to us, also be added to the list of strong Turkish partisans. All other Kurdish chiefs seemed to us to adopt an attitude of resignation towards the new régime, and at best to accept it with considerable reserve.

The Sentiments of the "Rayets."—With regard to the sentiments of the "rayets" it is somewhat more difficult to speak, for it is hardly possible that a propaganda which promises to emancipate them from the aghas, and, what they are still more able to appreciate, to free them from the payment of taxes for seven years, should not find a certain amount of favour in their eyes, and we found in Sulduz accordingly that a certain success had been achieved by Turkish activity, the khans complaining to us of the discontent against them which had been aroused among the peasants. In the Sunni villages of Anzal and Baranduz the prestige of the Ottoman name is not without a certain attraction for the population, and it must be remembered that it was the local Sunni mullas (*e.g.*, in Ushnu) who prepared the famous "mazbatas" of Dervish Pasha (*vide* latter's book, p. 84), to which we have above alluded. We further heard several villagers whom we met on the road express the opinion that it was better for them under Turkish rule for the reasons above given, viz., exemption from taxation and diminution of the power of the aghas. With all this, nevertheless, the conservative instinct is so strong in the Kurdish "rayet" as to make it a question whether, if left to himself, he would not give his preference to the old patriarchal system. Broadly speaking, moreover, whatever opinion may be held as to the Turkish administration, there can be no doubt that the presence of the Ottoman troops, of which the burden falls principally on the peasants, is the cause of many grievances, of which numerous instances have been given in our diaries. At all the places where Turkish troops were stationed we noticed a certain sullenness on the part of the inhabitants, and we ourselves could occasionally perceive that we were much more welcome to the latter than our Turkish companions. Insufficient payment, occasional requisitions, the perpetual sending on errands, together with compulsory employment as guides, &c., and especially the summary methods of treatment adopted are not calculated to gain the good-will of the population.

The Christians.—The general result of our observations with regard to the Christian population is that, notwithstanding the comparative immunity now enjoyed by the latter from Kurdish raids, the Nestorians, could a continuance of this immunity be guaranteed to them, would prefer by far the rule of the Persians to that of the Turks. They had, they said, been able to accustom themselves to the habits and ways of the former, who, according to them, were less fanatical.

We can from personal observation testify to the fact that those of the villages in the Salmas and Urmia plains which are out of reach of Kurdish depredations, whether belonging to Armenians or Nestorians, have attained a high degree of prosperity.

7. *Ultimate object of the Turkish Encroachments.*

Realisation of Historical Rights.—The frontier question has now been in existence for nearly 100 years, the object of the repeated aggressions of the Turks being, as has always been openly avowed by them, to make good their asserted rights, which they would give out as historical, to the districts in dispute. The limits of their present occupation coincide in general lines with the claims put forward in Dervish Pasha's political report printed in Constantinople in 1286 A.H., though even these have been considerably exceeded by the recent advance (*vide* map annexed). Actually Central Mukri Kurdistan, the villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Soujboulak, and the whole of Sulduz are in Turkish occupation, while, even according to Dervish Pasha,

the boundary would pass by the mountains (Kurtek, &c.) overlooking the left bank of the Kialoo and by the Meidan Pass, dividing Soujboulak from Pasvé, Sulduz being recognised to be a Persian possession (*op. cit.*, p. 83). The claims advanced by Zeki Pasha did not exceed these limits, but Tahir Pasha, by whom he was succeeded, enlarged the borders of Turkish pretensions by the inclusion of the whole of the territory lying west of the Djaghatu River, *i.e.*, Soujboulak, as well as the districts of Sakkiz and Khorkhoré, together with the outlet of the Baranduz into the lake (the Turkish Memorandum of 2nd Tammuz, 1908, Urmia).

We have already given the line of the Turkish occupation as it now exists, but it should be added that, in addition to Soujboulak, Sakkiz, and Kkorkhoré, a claim on the whole of Lower Anzal (including Kooshchi, &c.), the realisation of which is still being awaited, has, since the time of Dervish Pasha, never ceased to be made.

Such are the admitted limits of the territorial expansion set before themselves by the Turks, which, should they be realised, would effect a total change in the position, both strategic and economic, of the Azerbaijan province.

Assistance to Persia.—The Turks are wont to represent their advance in Western Azerbaijan as a friendly act to the Persians, who would otherwise be unable to keep the Kurds in bounds during the internal crisis through which their country is now passing. This explanation, however, leaves entirely out of sight the fact that the first appearance of the Ottoman troops in Pasvé, closely following on the Russo-Japanese war, preceded by a considerable interval the beginning of the national movement in Persia.

Protection to the Kurds.—We have had occasion to allude to the pretension that all Kurds belonged to Turkey—a theory supported by Tahir Pasha at the Urmia Commission, and it may be added that Yaver Pasha, on his first arrival in Tergever, explained in a letter addressed to the Russian vice-consul in Urmia that his presence in that district was due to the necessity of affording protection to the Kurds, who had been obliged to fly to the mountains for fear of Persian persecution. It is, however, singular that Turkish intervention in the mountainous districts of Urmia should begin exactly at the moment when an expedition under Medjdus-Saltané was being sent by the Persian Government to establish some sort of order on the frontier and to punish those Kurds for the depredations committed by them in the plains. As a curiosity, the answer, said to have been given by Yaver Pasha to the Nestorian doctor sent by Medjdus-Saltané to parley with the Turkish commander, may, perhaps, be quoted. The latter—Abdul Hamid being then Sultan—informed the messenger that he could not regard Medjdus-Saltané as a properly qualified representative of the Persian Government, his expedition having been dispatched by an anjuman representing tendencies opposed to the Shah.

Base against Russia.—Whatever may be the explanation given by the Turks to account for their original advance, the direct statements made to us by the Persians and Kurds, who are in frequent contact with Ottoman officials, and the impression left on us by our conversations with the more outspoken of the latter, leave no reasonable room for doubt that the true considerations which determined the occupation were strategical, and that the advance itself is directed, not so much against a weak Persia, as against the latter's northern neighbour—especially since the completion of the railway to Djoulfa and the road to Tabreez. Though it was not denied that the Russian detachment had been dispatched to Tabreez long after the Turkish advance had begun, and that the latter city was still being administered by the Persians, it was maintained at least by one prominent Turkish official that, were it even possible for the Turks to withdraw from the neutral zone, they would refuse to do so until the Russian troops had been recalled.

Advantages acquired by the Turks.—The Turks, as a result of their present advance, have obtained a free access to Khoi (through Yezdikan, &c.), and, if the proposed frontier on the Djagatu be reached, will command the roads leading to Tabreez from the south. It is true that the two rich and extensive Urmia and Salmas plains are still left to Persia, but being situated, as they are, between portions of the newly occupied territory thrust forward as wedges, are now entirely at the mercy of the Ottomans. Moreover, in addition to the line of communication by Sert, the Turks have now acquired a second one, bringing the IVth and the VIth Army Corps into touch with each other.* There are no natural difficulties in the unbroken valley of the Gadir-chai, the upper part of which, Ushnu, is occupied by a detachment of the former corps, while the forces drawn from the latter (the VIth) are quartered

* Over Kani-resh Pass and Serdesht or over Zinvi-Sheikh Pass and Lahidjan.

in Sulduz, situated lower down the stream. From Lahidjan northwards the country consists of numerous plains running into each other, united by easy passes now in Turkish possession. We have already alluded to the great importance of the new districts (especially Sulduz and Baranduz) viewed as a base for supplies, which, we were informed, were scarce in the adjoining Turkish districts (*e.g.*, Gaver), and the fact that all the salt for the Turkish frontier is provided by the villages on the Urmia Lake is not entirely without significance.

Infringement of the Convention of 1869.—It is no doubt true to a certain extent that the construction by the Persians of a new custom-house in Lahidjan (see Annexes to Diary No. 6), and some few similar incidents, may have been regarded by the Ottomans as an infringement of article 4 of the *status quo* convention of 1869, but, if this is so, and if the convention in question is still in force, how much less justification is there for the proceedings of the Turks, who, by building barracks and levying taxes, even in the districts outside the neutral zone, have completely disregarded its provisions in their endeavour to secure a frontier corresponding only to the arbitrary views enunciated by successive Turkish commissioners.

H. S. SHIPLEY.
V. MINORSKY.

Tabreez November 3 (16), 1911.

Annexe 1 to Joint Report.

Translation of the Report of the Governor-General of Urmia to the Persian Foreign Office, dated 24 *Shavval*, 1328 A.H. (*October* 15 (28), 1910), *No.* 313.

I received your telegram. The telegram I have sent in answer to Ismaïl Agha's letter is inserted herewith :—

" I read the letter of the Kaïmakam of the Mahmudi kaza, you have sent me. In answer you have to warn him that he will meet with a severe repulse should he trespass on Persian territory, as the Persian Government are giving you their support as a frontier guard, and are maintaining all these forces for such an eventuality. He knows very well that he has to evacuate Chehrik and to deliver it up to the Persian authorities; he therefore promises you the governorship of that district in order to detach you from Persian allegiance. Also please tell him that, if any one of his subjects has a claim against Kotur people, you yourself will make the necessary enquiries and, in case of finding it just, will recover and hand the amount over, but if the claim be not just you will not let him step in on this pretext. Such claims can be settled by frontier commissioners and not by improper means. If he does not listen to you resist him. Reinforcements will be sent as soon as you ask for them."

Since the despatch of this telegram Ismail Agha has sent another letter written to him by Mehmed Zeki, Kaïmakam of Mahmudi, to Salmas, whence they have transmitted it to me by telegram which I give herewith :—

"*To Ismail Agha, Chief of the Shekkak Tribe.*

" (After compliments.)

" I have taken into consideration the letter you have sent through Dervish Agha and Hamal Effendi. Firstly, I am steadily keeping in view the faithful promise which like a brother I first made to you, and I am firm in my sincerity. Do not listen to the words of this man and that man, please come here and see me. After having had a talk together go, if you find it advisable, to the Vali Pasha and obtain a robe of honour and the governorship of Somai; Kotur, too, will remain under your chieftainship. If there be claims against you on the part of any of the inhabitants I undertake to be responsible. Except the surrender of Kotur I ask nothing else from you. If you like I will swear by the Koran and by the Prophet that nothing will happen to you. By the name of God, which is a solemn oath, my first wish is to promote you in rank and governorship. If you wish it I will give you the Koran and the Prophet as witness that I shall keep resolutely to my word and that, in spite of the other tribes, I will exalt and make you eminent. Otherwise you must know that orders from both Governments are now in my hands, and that I shall destroy you in four hours, even if you should fly to the gates of Tabreez. It is always possible to

seize you. Being a Mussulman you should not bring a tribe to ruin. Notwithstanding all past crimes or acousations I undertake that nothing shall happen to you. You shall be exalted from the beginning but you must surrender Kotur. In addition to what I have promised I have given you as a security the unity of God and his sacred book. It is advisable for you to come and see me. May you not believe the words of enemies. I am waiting that you should soon inform me in writing of your coming; if you do not it will be no fault of mine. I have written by way of friendship and sincerity. I am awaiting your reply and I need insist no further. If you do not trust me I shall seal the Koran; if you do, write an answer."

Annexe 2 to Joint Report.

Translation of the Letter of the Urmia Kargusar to the Ottoman Consulate in that Town, dated 27 *Djemadius-sani*, 1329 (*June* 25, 1911), *No.* 396.

Until now my letter respecting the prolonged stay of Seyyid Taha in Urmia has remained unanswered. According to rumours current among the population Seyyid Taha has the intention of leasing lands and villages, occupied and unoccupied.* These proceedings of his have no validity, and, unless he has a permission from Persia, all his acts in connection with such leases will be null and void. If he enters into any contract with Persian landowners and proprietors, these contracts will be devoid of credit.

[1955] No. 102.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey—(*Received January* 15, 1912.)

(No. 249.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 21, 1911.

MY telegram No. 254 of the 16th July last reported that Mr. Shuster was about to engage three Americans with constabulary experience to assist in the formation of a treasury gendarmerie. These gentlemen have now all arrived at Tehran. Colonel Merrill was the first to reach here, and took part in the incidents connected with the seizure of Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property last October. The other two arrived a few weeks ago, and are Majors Preuss and Lowry. I am told that they both have had considerable experience of active service, chiefly in the Philippines, but that Major Preuss also fought on the Boer side in the South African war.

They are all said by the American Legation to be admirably suited for the task they were intended to carry out, but the departure of Mr. Shuster will no doubt make it difficult for them and the other Americans, of whom there are now altogether fifteen in Tehran at present, to stay.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[1956] No. 103.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 250.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

IT would serve no useful purpose for me to attempt to give a detailed account of the somewhat bewildering phases of the situation since the presentation of the second Russian ultimatum on the 29th November, but a brief review may be of interest.

From the first the Regent and the Cabinet were unsparing in their efforts to induce the Medjliss to realise the wisdom of submitting, but for three weeks these efforts, counteracted as they were by great clerical and popular agitation, encouraged by the Democrat party, seemed doomed to failure. In the hope of gaining the confidence of the Medjliss sufficiently for it to give the Cabinet full powers to settle with Russia,

* *I.e.*, by the Turks.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh had introduced into his Ministry as Ministers of Finance and Interior respectively Hakim-ul-Mulk and Kawam-es-Sultaneh, men of pronounced democratic sympathies; but on the 11th instant, and again on the 18th instant, when the Cabinet sought to obtain the full powers desired, they found the Medjliss as recalcitrant as ever. The *coup d'État* for the closing of the Medjliss, at one time contemplated by the Bakhtiaris, showed no signs of materialising, and another device for getting rid of that refractory assembly had proved abortive. This device was, I believed, conceived by Sardar Assad, who had returned from Europe on the 5th instant, and at once, contrary to the expectations of the Extremists, had thrown his influence into the scales on the side of submission. The idea was to induce a sufficient number of the Cabinet's supporters in the Medjliss to resign, thus leaving that Assembly without a quorum. Some twenty members—a sufficient number for the purpose—had consented to resign, but for some reason—possibly from fear of the consequences to themselves if they persisted in their resignations—they continued to attend the sittings.

Meanwhile, the Russian troops, after stopping for a few days at Resht, had advanced to Kazvin, where between 3,000 and 4,000 were concentrated. The day (the 21st December) on which they were to begin their advance on Tehran, if the Persian Government had not by then submitted, was approaching. On the 19th the Russian chief of the staff had come to Tehran to make arrangements with the Russian Minister for the arrival of the troops.

On the 20th, however, things took a more favourable turn. On that day it became evident that the Medjliss had come to a more reasonable way of thinking. A large majority were for shelving the responsibility of settling with Russia on to the shoulders of the Regent. His Highness, hearing of this project, summoned the leading deputies to the Palace, and told them that it was altogether inacceptable. He lectured them severely as to the necessity of submission, and late in the evening the Medjliss accepted a proposal which had been put forward by the Cabinet on the 18th as an alternative to the grant of full powers, and which on that occasion had failed to pass owing to the abstention from voting of the greater part of the deputies, who were evidently afraid to put their names to a proposal which they felt was bound to lead to the acceptance of the three Russian demands. These deputies, however, by the 20th seemed to have plucked up their courage, and the Medjliss voted by a majority of 39 to 19 that a committee of five should be appointed and empowered in consultation with the Cabinet to come to a settlement with Russia. The committee was appointed, the principal member being Sardar Assad, and at a meeting with the Cabinet on the 21st instant at the Palace, under the presidency of the Regent, the committee, under the strongest pressure from Sardar Assad—as Yeprem in conversation with a member of the Russian Legation described it, "with Mauser pistols at their heads"—gave their consent to the Government's accepting the Russian demands. M. Poklewski was informed of this verbally on the 22nd.

Some delay occurred in recording the Persian Government's submission in a note. It will be remembered that M. Poklewski had on the 15th instant told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that subject to there being no fresh incident or provocation the withdrawal of the troops would begin as soon as the Persian Government had given way. In the discussions with M. Poklewski as regards the drafting of the note, which extended over two days, the Minister for Foreign Affairs pressed him very hard to consent to its recording a Russian undertaking in unequivocal terms that the troops would be immediately withdrawn and no fresh demands put forward. This M. Poklewski firmly refused to permit, explaining that he was not empowered to say more than he had already said. Finally, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Poklewski were agreed upon the terms of the note, and it was handed to the Russian Legation this afternoon. M. Poklewski immediately replied, declaring his Government satisfied. Translations of the two notes are enclosed herewith.

It will be noticed that the second demand, as recorded in these two notes, is worded as proposed by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 12th December, with the amendment suggested by Sir G. Buchanan and agreed to by M. Sazonow.

Simultaneously with the exchange of notes the Government have taken what is hoped may prove effectual steps to prevent the outburst of indignation which was to be expected from the Democrat party in the Medjliss. At the moment of writing I learn that a large meeting of all classes was convened at the Palace this afternoon, where the Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking, as I understand, for the Regent, urged the dissolution of the Medjliss, which, he said, had impeded the task of Government both in foreign relations and in internal administration. No opposition was offered. The

Regent immediately issued a decree, declaring the present session closed, and I hear that Yeprem, chief of police, has sent a force to occupy the Medjliss. Those in the building were invited to leave. No resistance was offered, and the gates are now closed.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 103.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to M. Poklewski.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *Tehran, December* 24, 1911.

IN answer to your Excellency's note of the 29th November, I have the honour to say that the Persian Government have always been desirous of safeguarding their good relations and friendly intercourse with the Russian Government, and have on many occasions proved their good intentions in the prevention of difficulties and incidents which might injure the friendly relations between the two Governments. On this occasion also in order that their former policy and line of conduct should in no way be modified; in order that the historical friendly relations between the two Governments, which date from long years back, and are much prized by both sides, should not be shaken; and so that every kind of cause of complaint and indifference on the part of the Russian Government should be removed as indicated at the end of the note, the Persian Government consequently have accepted the three demands laid down in the note above referred to, and have dismissed Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre from the Persian service.

With regard, however, to the second demand in your note, which required that the Persian Government should undertake "not to invite foreigners to take service under the Persian Government without having previously obtained the consent of the British and Russian Legations," the Persian Government hopes that the Imperial Russian Legation will accept the following wording in place of the above, *i.e.*: "That in view of the sincere desire at all times for maintenance of cordial relations with the Russian and British Governments, the Persian Government in future, when engaging foreign employés and officers whom they consider necessary for the organisation of Government administrations, will take care that their choice will not be such as to injure the just interests of the two Governments in Persia. Consequently, regarding the engagement of foreign employés and officers, the Persian Government will be prepared to effect an exchange of views beforehand with the Russian and British Legations at Tehran in order that an agreement should be arrived at."

It is clear that, as stated in your note, after the acceptance of these demands of the Russian Government, the Persian Government are justified in their certitude that the causes of the principal differences between the two Governments have been removed, and that a basis has been formed upon which to build up cordial relations and a firm friendship. They are also justified in the certainty that, after the acceptance of the above demands, the relations between the two Governments will return to conditions more favourable than heretofore, and before the conditions had been considered. And the result of the steps which the Russian Government thought it necessary to take in order to bring about the fulfilment of those demands will immediately be put an end to, and that the hopes of the Persian Government in regard to the absolute good-will of the Imperial Government will be completely confirmed.

I avail, &c.
VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 103.

M. Poklewski to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *December* 24, 1911.

I HAVE noted with great satisfaction the contents of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, that the Persian Government, in view of their friendly sentiments towards the Imperial Russian Government, have decided to accept the demands of the Russian Government made in my note.

The Imperial Government are desirous of proving their good-will towards the

The arrival of Russian troops at Enzeli was as follows:—

November	21	240 infantry (including some engineers).
"	22	400 infantry.
"	22	100 Cossacks.
"	22	100 artillery, 4 guns, 6 machine guns.
"	23	100 Cossacks.
"	23	100 artillery, 4 guns.
"	26	700 infantry.
"	27	1,500 infantry.
"	29	100 Cossacks.
December	14	150 infantry.

In addition, several small parties landed on dates His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht has not been able to ascertain, bringing the total to 4.500, with 8 guns and 10 machine-guns.

The infantry belonged to the 2nd Caucasian Shemakhinski and Salianski Regiments, and the Cossacks to the Labineski Regiment.

The departures for Kazvin were as under:—

	Men.	
December 3	1,200	With 8 guns and 10 machine-guns.
" 4	1,200	
" 5	900	
Date not reported	700	
Total troops at Kazvin	4,000	
Total troops at Resht and Enzeli	500	

At Resht, on the 21st December, an affray broke out between the Russian troops and the Persians, and on the following day fighting occurred at Enzeli. His Majesty's vice-consul reports a Russian officer wounded, three Cossacks killed, ten Persians killed, and about forty wounded.

Meshed.

Rukn-ed-Dowleh, the new Governor-General of Khorassan, arrived on the 15th November, and was given a very good reception by all classes.

The condition of the district is becoming worse. Mohammed Ali's following and nondescript sowars, sent against them from Tehran, have been looting and pillaging the country as they go, and robberies are of frequent occurrence.

On the 23rd November 400 of the ex-Shah's followers took Shahrud, and on the 16th December Damghan was also occupied.

Ninety time-expired men of the Russian consular guard were relieved by a similar number on the 17th November.

The Central Government has decidod to separate Nishapur from Khorassan, to which the British and Russian Legations have agreed.

On the 28th December His Majesty's consul-general telegraphed that, owing to the approach of the Moharrem, and to the rumour that Salar-ed-Dowleh had taken Tehran, the population was arming and the situation becoming serious.

The Russian consul-general, after consulting his British colleague, asked for reinforcements. The matter was referred to the Russian Minister at Tehran, who advised the dispatch of 100 Cossacks.

On the 12th December His Majesty's consul-general reported that the situation was better, and a sotnia of Cossacks was due shortly.

Ispahan.

The discontent and distress in the town and environs continue to increase.

The environs are subject to petty raids, which tend to check the transport of grain into the town. The governor is selling his own produce at the highest possible rate, and it is not to his interest to put a stop to the raiding.

Sardar Ashja's administration is most unsatisfactory, trade is almost at a standstill owing to the increasing insecurity of the roads, and the condition of the province is rapidly becoming worse. His Majesty's consul-general reports that Sardar Ashja's withdrawal is imminent, and the Bakhtiaris say at Tehran that they intend to replace him by his cousin, Sardar Zafar.

A squadron of Indian cavalry under Captain Eckford arrived at Ispahan on the 4th December.

On the 29th November a caravan preceding the squadron of Indian cavalry, *en route* to Ispahan, was attacked by robbers. The robbers were repulsed by the cavalry, the Resaldar Major being wounded.

Yezd.

Reports of general insecurity in the district and ill-treatment of Parsees in the town continue. The state of trade in the district is very unsatisfactory.

Amir Azam, the new Governor of Kerman, made no attempt while at Yezd to improve the condition of the town or district.

Shiraz.

Owing to the presence of the Indian cavalry at Shiraz the Mullahs attempted to stir up anti-foreign feeling, and instigated a boycott of Russian and British goods. They also induced the merchants in the bazaars to refrain from selling food-stuffs to the troops. On the 18th December, the supply officer was met with a definite refusal to sell. The matter was referred to Tehran and the Foreign Office. In pursuance of the instructions of His Majesty's Government the supply officer was directed to use force, if necessary, in order to obtain such provisions as he required. This was done and no incident resulted. The boycott was shortly afterwards put an end to, and since then there has been no trouble in obtaining provisions for the troops.

On the 24th December, news arrived from Shiraz that the Indian cavalry escort going to meet Mr. Smart was fired on by road-guards near Kazeroun. One sowar was killed.

Seistan.

His Majesty's consul reports that the advent of the cavalry reinforcements for the southern consulates has had an excellent effect on the local officials, and that the state of the province is quiet.

Kerman.

The new governor, Amir Azam, has arrived at Kerman.

Baluchis are still in the neighbourhood of Bam.

The ex-Shah's adherents being in the majority at Kermanshah, Mohtashem-ed-Dowleh, the governor, left for Bagdad towards the end of October. Salar-ed-Dowleh appointed Ferrukh Khan to succeed him.

Ferrukh Khan was not able to maintain order, and on the 27th November, His Majesty's consul reported that general pillaging in the town was probable.

Early in December, Azam-ed-Dowleh, the representative of the Persian Government, arrived, and fighting commenced between his followers and those of Ferrukh Khan. On the 14th December, His Majesty's consul reported that the town was quiet.

Salar-ed-Dowleh arrived on the 15th December, with a small force.

Mohammerah.

The sheikh is attempting to bring Nizam-es-Sultaneh to Mohammerah by sea, and is reported to be succeeding in his object.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh was formerly Governor-General of Fars. His estates were confiscated by the Persian Government on his dismissal last September.

The sheikh has invoked the good offices of His Majesty's Minister for Nizam-es-Sultaneh to obtain mitigation. His Majesty's Minister is doing what he can.

W. M. FORDHAM, *Captain*,
Military Attaché.

[1958] No. 105.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

(No. 252.)

Sir, *Tehran, December 24, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 232 of the 27th November respecting the state of the southern roads, I have the honour to state that the usual weekly reports from His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan have not reached me this month, owing no doubt to the disorganised state of the postal service. The Indo-European Telegraph Department received an intimation dated the 8th October from their agent at Shiraz, to the effect that the Dehbid section of the road to Isfahan was being held by robbers, and that the muleteers refused to accompany inspectors of the line. There was little prospect of the condition of the road becoming more satisfactory in the near future.

A robbery on the Ahwaz road of twelve cases of opium was reported as having taken place on the 3rd December, and His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas telegraphed on the 22nd December that a caravan was robbed about sixteen miles from Bunder Abbas, and that about 200*l.* worth of British property was carried off.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[1960] No. 106.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

(No. 254.)

Sir, *Tehran, December 27, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 737 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a protocol signed here by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador for the composition of a commission for the settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier question.

It will be noticed that recourse is to be had to arbitration should the work of the commission not result in agreement within six months. The commission thus has three months longer for its work than was suggested in September.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY

Enclosure in No. 106.

Protocol respecting Turco-Persian Frontier Question.

LES Gouvernements persan et ottoman, mus par un égal désir d'écarter désormais tout sujet de controverse à l'endroit de leurs frontières communes, ayant chargé, d'une part, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Perse, et d'autre part, l'Ambassadeur de Turquie à Téhéran, d'établir les bases de négociations et la procédure à suivre pour la délimitation desdites frontières, les soussignés, après délibérations, sont tombés d'accord sur les points suivants:—

1. Une commission composée d'un nombre égal de délégués de part et d'autre devra se réunir dans le plus bref délai possible à Constantinople.

2. Les délégués des deux Gouvernements, munis de tous les documents et preuves à l'appui de leurs réclamations, seront chargés d'établir dans un esprit de sincère impartialité, la ligne frontière séparant les deux pays; après quoi une commission technique aura simplement à appliquer sur place la délimitation définitive sur les bases arrêtées par les travaux de la première commission.

3. Les travaux de la Commission mixte qui se réunira à Constantinople auront pour bases les clauses du traité dit d'Erzeroum conclu en 1263.

4. Dans le cas où les délégués des deux parties ne tomberaient pas d'accord sur l'interprétation et l'application de certaines clauses de ce traité, au bout d'une période de six mois de négociations, pour solutionner complètement la question de la délimitation des frontières, il est entendu que tous les points sur lesquels il y aurait divergence seront soumis ensemble à la Cour arbitrale de La Haye afin que la question entière soit ainsi définitivement tranchée.

5. Il va sans dire qu'aucune des deux parties ne pourra se prévaloir de l'occupation militaire des territoires en litige pour s'en servir comme argument de droit.

Fait en double et échangé en original entre les soussignés, agissant au nom de leurs Gouvernements.

VOSSOUGH-ED-DOWLEH.
H. HASSIB.

Ambassade ottomane, Téhéran,
le 21 décembre, 1911.

[1961] No. 107.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

(No. 255.)

Sir, *Tehran, December 30, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 728 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht, reporting on the recent incidents which have occurred at that place and at Enzeli between the Russian troops and the Persians.

Towards the end of Mr. Rabino's despatch he states that the Russians were said to have lost two men killed at Resht. He has subsequently corrected this statement, and now reports that no Russians were killed.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *January* 3.—Since writing the above His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht has furnished me with another despatch on the same subject, copy of which I have the honour to forward herewith.

G. B.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Vice-Consul Rabino to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Resht, December 23, 1911.*

ON Thursday, the 21st December, a Mohammadan Russian officer with some men was sent from Kazian to Enzeli to induce the people to open the bazaars. He reached the Masjid Jameh where the people had congregated, and there also began to advise them to open the bazaars. Some one in the crowd made an insulting remark, but a Tabreezi came forward and quieted the people. The officer, however, started insulting the people (the usual insults current among Mussulmans) when he was struck and slightly wounded in the face by a tile.

He immediately ordered his men to fire on the crowd, nine men fell dead and five or six were wounded. On hearing the shots, large numbers of Russian soldiers crossed over to Enzeli and occupied the city.

The Russian consul at Resht was informed by telephone that a Russian officer had been killed at Enzeli.

An incident of minor importance had also taken place at Resht where Russian Cossacks, who were parading through the city, encountered the Talish sowars of Seyyid Ashraf, and the latter, refusing to give way, broke through the Cossack ranks.

To the ferment caused among the Russians by the two above-mentioned incidents may safely be attributed the subsequent deplorable incident.

In the afternoon Cossacks were again sent to parade the city of Resht. The Russian consul with an escort of about twenty-five men entered the city by a different route, and going straight to the native printing office (the other one is Russian) not only closed it, but also had the type thrown on the ground and trampled on by his Cossacks, and with his own hands destroyed some formes belonging to a bibliography of Gilan which I was having printed.

He then drove towards the British vice-consulate.

In the meanwhile, the Cossacks, who were parading the city, reached Government House, where, it is said, they dismounted. A shot is said to have been fired, by whom or whether at them or in the air, I have as yet been unable to ascertain. Some say the Cossacks wanted to disarm a policeman, who refused to hand over his rifle, and fired in

the air; and others that the Talish sowars, who were near Government House, under the impression that they were on the point of being attacked by the Russians, fired a shot. However this may be, the Cossacks searched the Government stable, where the Talish were quartered, then the telegraph and post-offices, and on their leaving these offices the firing became general.

The Russian consul, leaving the British vice-consulate, reached the Sebz Maiden, where his escort, hearing the firing, dismounted and started shooting anyone passing the Maiden.

I was myself in the firing-line and did not hear a single bullet coming in our direction, nor could I the following day find traces of a single bullet on the neighbouring walls. It seems to me that the escort lost their heads and started shooting indiscriminately. An Armenian shoemaker, who was peaceably sitting in his shop, was shot dead point blank. The Russian consul is very much to blame for not restraining his men.

I understand that the affray near Government House lasted about ten minutes; that near the British consulate continued for some time.

The cease fire call was finally sounded, and the Russian consul and his escort left for their consulate.

Russian Cossacks patrolled the streets throughout the night, and searched all passers by for fire-arms, robbing many of the people in addition.

Dr. Frame, of the Presbyterian Mission, who, accompanied by the chief of police, was returning from Enzeli, where he had gone to attend the Zahir-i-Huzur (deputy governor of Enzeli, and son of the Zahir-ed-Dowleh, who was shot the day before by revenge by some ruffians whom he had occasion to punish two or three years ago during his former tenure of office), was searched by two Cossacks, who, finding that neither he nor his companion carried arms, robbed his companion of his watch.

It is said by some that the Cossacks fired in the air. This is not the case. Those I saw took deliberate aim at passers by, and the bullet marks on the walls are nearly all at or below a man's height.

The casualties for the afternoon were fourteen to sixteen Persians killed, and about forty wounded, nearly all passers-by.

The Russians are said to have lost two men, but I have no confirmation of this. They lost one horse.

What was the real cause of these incidents it is difficult to say, but public feeling was roused by notices from Tehran and Nejef, and also by the action of the Russians, who seem to have done all in their power to hurt the feelings of the population.

We may mention four instances of their action:—

1. On the occasion of the Tsar's name-day (19th December), there were never illuminations by Russian subjects in the bazaar, but this year all Russian subjects were instructed to illuminate their shops, and this, notwithstanding the fact that at the time the country was in mourning for Aga Kazem Khorasani, the famous Mujtahid of Kerbela.

2. All Russian subjects were instructed to keep their flags flying after the feast until further notice. Why?

3. Russian Cossacks were frequently sent to parade the city. The inhabitants do not object to this, but the singing and tambourine playing are considered by t hemto be signs of contempt. This should certainly have been discontinued in view of the proximity of Muharram.

4. The closing of the printing office and wanton destruction of the type.

Some infantry and Cossacks have now been quartered near Government House and in other parts of the city, and the Russians have started searching houses for fire-arms and ammunition, but why this is done at night is more than I can understand.

There are many complaints of the Cossacks whilst on that duty or whilst they go about the bazaars, helping themselves to what does not belong to them or to what they have not paid for.

The general opinion here is that the Russians have themselves brought about these unfortunate incidents, which have been so timed as to put an end to negotiations in Tehran.

I am just informed that the Russian Tajir Bashi is going through the bazaars informing the people that if they do not open their shops and their shops are broken into the Russians can in no way be held responsible.

I have, &c.
H. L. RABINO.

Enclosure 2 in No. 107.

Vice-Consul Rabino to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Resht, December 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26 of the 23rd December, I have the honour to inform you that the regrettable incident which occurred at Resht, on Thursday, the 21st December, was entirely due to a party of Cossacks being sent to disarm the Talish sowars who had broken through their ranks in the morning.

Six Cossacks were ordered to enter the stables where the Talish were quartered, and began disarming the latter. In the scrimmage that ensued a shot was fired, and soon afterwards the firing became general.

Some Persians taking cover behind the gates of the Mesjid Jameh, where a preacher was at the time addressing the people, joined in the fight and fired on the Cossacks. Many shots were fired in the air from the neighbouring houses by the inhabitants who were panic-striken.

I am informed by a trustworthy witness that one Russian was killed and another wounded.

On the 24th December Russian soldiers occupied Government House and took over from the arsenal the arms and ammunition belonging to the Persian Government, which were later removed to Enzeli.

The Mesjid Jameh, the shrine of Seyyid Abu Jaffan, and many houses have been searched for firearms, and some people have been taken under arrest to the Russian consulate.

A good deal of friction has been caused by the action of the Russian consul in sending twice an escort of Cossacks to his Turkish colleague with a peremptory request for the surrender of certain persons who were reported to have taken refuge at the Turkish consulate, and amongst others, of Seyyid Ashraff, the chief of the Talish sowars. Seyyed Ashraff, however, had already left the Turkish consulate and no one else had taken refuge there.

Many people have sought to take refuge at this vice-consulate, but I informed them that they had nothing to fear, and discouraged them from coming.

Mirza Hussein Khan Kasmai, however, forced an entrance at night into the consulate, declaring that he would not leave. I induced him to leave half an hour later.

Many people have hired rooms in the immediate vicinity of the vice-consulate, and decided to take refuge in the vice-consulate, should they hear that Cossacks have been sent to apprehend them.

The Russian consul, in entirely ignoring his colleagues, has made it difficult for us to quiet and reassure the people, as we are ignorant of his intentions.

On the 25th December, M. Necrasof had a proclamation distributed to the people, in which he informs them that the incident of Thursday last was due to his Cossacks being attacked, and that it was therefore evident that there being firearms in the city was a source of danger. For this reason, arms found in the possession of the inhabitants, in the houses, and at the police station had been collected by the Russian soldiers. This was done on account of the necessities of the moment and in order to assure public security. He then assures the inhabitants of his protection, and requests them to resume their usual occupations, adding that the mosques and shrines would always be respected.

To this the Anjuman replied by a notice in which they reminded the people that, since the beginning of the constitutional movement they had always respected the persons and property of foreigners. They then strenuously repudiate the accusation brought against them, that they attacked the Russians, and finally declare that they cannot accept the Russian consul's protection.

On the 26th December the Anjuman sent a deputation to the Turkish, French, and British consuls, to hand them a statement of their grievances. I had at first decided to refuse to receive the deputation, but reconsidered my decision in order not to give the people further cause of complaint, and also, and principally, in the hopes of being able to prevail upon them to open the bazaars. The deputation expressed themselves as quite satisfied with my advice and promised to report immediately the gist of our conversation to the Anjuman.

The total number of troops at Resht and Enzeli is 600 men, and not 450 as previously reported.

I have, &c.
H. L. RABINO.

[1962] No. 108.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 15, 1912.)

(No. 256.)

Sir, *Tehran, December* 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 641 and 648 of the 3rd and 4th instant respectively, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a report addressed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire by Lieutenant Wilson, who, as you are aware, accompanied the Ispahan consular escort from Shiraz to Ispahan. This report gives the details of the incident which occurred on the 30th November, on the Shiraz–Ispahan road, near Yezdikhast, reported in my above-mentioned telegrams.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Diary from November 6 *to December* 4, 1911.

ON the 6th November I left again for Kazerun, there to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and two squadrons of the 39th Central India Horse. I took with me two sowars of the consulate escort, but no baggage at all. His Majesty's consul had asked for two Kashgai sowars to accompany me; they arrived late and would not go beyond Zinian; the road, which had been bristling with armed guards a week before was now entirely deserted, the road guards having fled after the perpetration of a robbery by a band of Surkhi Kashgai sent up by Soulet, it was said, for the purpose. Having ascertained that all supplies were ready at Zinian in charge of the local representative of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, I went on to Dashtarjan (40 miles) arriving after dark, and slept in the telegraph rest-house. Next morning at dawn I left for Kazerun by a short cut over the hills, accompanied by one sowar and four riflemen from Dashtarjan; one of them shot on the way a mountain sheep with the finest head I have ever seen in Persia. I am sending it to the Bombay Natural History Museum. I reached Kazerun at 4 P.M. On the 8th November I accompanied the two squadrons to Mian Kutal, a long march of 21 miles with two steep ascents, one of them the Kutal-i-Dukhtar, up a causeway paved with smooth boulders. The comparative ease with which the horses negotiated these ascents, the last of a very trying series, was remarkable. At Mian Kutal supplies had been laid in through the agency of the telegraph department (Ghulam), and no difficulty was encountered on this score either here or anywhere else on the road. Heavy rain fell during the night.

The next day we pushed on to Dashtarjan (14 miles), moving by two tracks across the Piri Zan Pass.

On the 10th we went on to Zinian (14 miles); some trouble was experienced here with the Kashkuli roadguards, who succeeded in extracting some money as rahdari from our muleteers, who as usual, gave it readily, fearing (not without good reason) reprisals on some subsequent occasion if they made our presence an excuse for refusing. Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas sent for Isfandiar Khan, a minor Kashkuli chief, and insisted on the money being refunded, which was done at once. Rain commenced to fall during the night and continued all next day. It was therefore decided to push on to Shiraz at once with one squadron as the next stage, Chinar Rahdar, afforded shelter for only one squadron at most. Shiraz was reached by the Sikh squadron after a long march, which the wet and cold made very trying for the followers, two of whom died a few days later.

For the next five days, till the 18th November, the force halted at Shiraz to refit, and the question of accommodation was gone into; a month's supplies had already been accumulated, and no anxiety was felt for the moment on this score.

The arrival of the force at Shiraz was marked by no demonstration or ceremony; the weather prevented all but a very few from leaving their houses; next day, however, large crowds visited the camps to gaze quietly on the unaccustomed spectacle. As far as I could gather from the remarks of the crowd, and from enquiries made in various directions, the attitude of the population on the subject of the arrival of the troops was one of general apathy, tempered, in the case of the landowning and commercial classes, with satisfaction at the guarantee of law and order that their presence affords. The only sign of dissatisfaction was the dissemination of a cyclostyled manifesto, in which the arrival of the troops was used by the anonymous scribe as a pretext to revile his political opponents.

On the Kazerun-Shiraz road I received several offers from leading villagers to provide men wherewith to form a local force of roadguards. The offers were made spontaneously, and deserve to be borne in mind, as there can be little doubt that the sedentary tribesmen inhabiting the villages between Kazerun and Shiraz form very promising material for such a purpose; tribesmen could never be relied on, even were their chiefs to permit them to serve, which is unlikely; I also believe that a locally raised force would be effective only as long as the men were employed in the neighbourhood of their homes.

On the 18th two squadrons left Shiraz. I was responsible for all arrangements for supply, &c., as far as Yezdikhast, *i.e.*, to the borders of Fars, in the same way as for the Kazerun-Shiraz road. I made all arrangements through the local staff of the telegraph department, with the best results. All provisions required had been laid in at each stage, and charged for at current rates, which the local knowledge of the staff enabled them to insist on, a matter in which I should otherwise have been to a large extent powerless.

Supplies were not collected without some difficulty owing to the unprecedented depredations of the nomad tribes. Half the villages of the Marvdasht plain had been looted, and 25 per cent. of them had been entirely deserted during the last two years—many of their villages which I had seen and recorded as flourishing five years ago. All along the road meat was scarce, and dairy produce practically unobtainable owing to the wholesale robbery of flocks and herds.

On the 25th Abadeh was reached, and a halt made; we had been accompanied up to this point by some 300 mules, carrying British goods for Ispahan, and 300 disbanded Persian soldiers, the last remnants of the Shiraz expeditionary force; also the assistant or "mawin" to the ex-Governor-General of Fars, whose bitter denunciations of his former master were amusing, though he apparently had little knowledge of the inner history of the intrigues of which the latter was past-master.

From Abadeh onwards we were accompanied by some 300 camels and a hundred or more mules and donkeys which had been waiting for our arrival. On the 26th the Sikh squadron returned to Shiraz with Miss Ross, the Muhammedan (Tiwana) squadron, under Captain Eckford, continuing northwards.

The cold from Dehbid onwards had been severe, particularly as at least one squadron had always to camp out at nights. Both men and horses, however, stood it very well; it was noteworthy that, though our caravan numbered over 1,000 animals between Abadeh and Ispahan, nowhere was the slightest difficulty experienced in obtaining fodder.

In Yezdikhast there were various rumours of robbers on the next stage, but these were contradicted by the arrival of a mail waggon, the driver of which had seen nothing, and of a local caravan. We left this place at 7·15 A.M., preceded by the merchants' caravan, numbering over 900 animals, a large donkey caravan at Yezdikhast having availed itself of our passage to go to Kumisheh. I was almost at the head of the merchants' caravan, in front of which were the Persian soldiers referred to above, driving along their donkeys, on which were tied most of their rifles.

They were attacked by some thirty tribesmen near a mud tower some 6 miles west of Yezdikhast, but within Fars, one was wounded.

The rest either sought safety in flight, or gave up their rifles and ammunition to the robbers, who thus secured six rifles.

The caravan promptly turned back, and I sent word to Captain Eckford, who at once brought up the squadrons, and charged down upon the tribesmen, who kept up a sharp but apparently ill-aimed fire. Captain Eckford and Lieutenant Wickham, who were a long way in front, were not hit, but Rissaldar-Major Ghulam Muhammad, Khan Bahadur, who was leading his troop, was shot in the thigh during the charge, and a bullet passed through the waist-cloth of Jamadar Muhammad Bahadur; a horse was also wounded. The robbers unfortunately got into the tower before the cavalry could reach them.

The caravan was meanwhile diverted to the east, covered by part of the squadron, whilst the remainder surrounded the fort and kept up a sharp fire on the loop-holes, and on any men who showed themselves; wounded men were seen being helped into the tower.

After a careful examination of the situation Captain Eckford came to the conclusion that to take the tower by assault would involve heavy loss of life, which the circumstances did not justify.

In this decision I fully concurred, particularly as, for the moment, the official rôle of this squadron does not extend to the protection of caravans.

Aminabad was reached in safety the same day, and on the 1st December a telegraphic report on the incident was made from Yezdikhast.

Ispahan was reached on the 4th, Mr. Grahame meeting us at Kaleh Shur on the previous day; most of the Europeans resident in Ispahan, but comparatively few Persians, witnessed our arrival.

Excellent quarters had been obtained for the squadron in a large serai adjoining the Bagh-i-Shah on the outskirts of the town, with very good stables and ample accommodation for four times as many men as we have.

A. T. WILSON, *Lieutenant I.A.*

[1963] No. 109.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received Jauuary* 15, 1912.)

(No. 257.)

Sir, *Tehran, December* 30, 1911.

AS I was about to close my despatch No. 250 of the 24th instant, news reached me of the meeting held the same day at the palace, the result of which was the issue by the Regent of a rescript ordering the closure of the Medjliss.

I now have the honour to transmit a translation of the substance of the letter addressed by the Cabinet to the Regent setting forth the reasons for which the Regent's sanction for the closure of the Medjliss was asked.

This statement, to which the Regent drew my particular attention, contains several points of special interest. It is an unequivocal indictment of the Medjliss and its consistent obstruction of the Government, and it states, moreover, that the deputies—and particularly the Democratic party—have incited the public to take up arms, to revolt, to boycott British and Russian goods, and to oppose the Government. It holds them responsible, in fact, for the outbreaks at Tabreez and Resht, which is curiously inconsistent with allegations made to me by the Persian Government, as reported in my telegram No. 728, that the troubles were due to Russian provocation.

This statement of the Government's case, which was read to the meeting by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, as the Regent tells me, read it in His Highness's name, was followed by the rescript of the Regent ordering the closure of the Medjliss, and by a further edict of the Regent's ordering that fresh elections should at once be held.

It is reported to me that elections are to be commenced forthwith at Tehran, and as soon as possible in the provinces. Copies of the enclosed document and the others referred to have been telegraphed to all the provinces, and I have not so far heard of any particular cases of special excitement in consequence. This is not due to any moderation on the part of the Democratic party, for the Democrats have done their utmost to work up excitement.

I am told that yesterday the Regent summoned some thirty members of the late Medjliss to the palace to urge them to give up their attempts to foment disturbances in the capital in protest against the closure of the Medjliss, and that a prominent ex-deputy of the Democratic party declared that he and his party did not consider the Regent's and the Cabinet's action to be legal, as the Regent had, some time before, tendered his resignation and was no longer in office. My informant adds that the meeting broke up when the new Bakhtiari War Minister, Sardar Muhtasham, excitedly asked the Regent's permission to arrest and string up a few of these disturbers of the peace.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Abstract Translation of Letter from the Cabinet to the Regent, dated December 24, 1911.

AS your Highness is aware, ever since the formation of the Cabinet by his Excellency Semsam-es-Sultaneh, the Ministers have used their utmost endeavours, just as your Highness has also constantly done, to impress upon the Medjliss the necessity of avoiding measures calculated to weaken the Government's authority, but that all these attempts have unfortunately failed owing to the intrigues of certain individuals.

On the 29th November a note was addressed to the Foreign Office by the Russian Legation containing three demands and announcing the dispatch of troops to enforce them. After a Cabinet Council had been held to consider the question and had formed their views as to the gravity of the situation and the seriousness of the advance of the Russian troops in view of the state of the country, the Ministers at once put their views before the Medjliss. The deputies rejected the views of the Cabinet, which replied to the Russian note in conformity with the decision of the Medjliss. The Ministers, foreseeing that under these unfortunate circumstances graver dangers were in store, handed in their resignations to your Highness, but they were not accepted, and at the same time a number of the deputies waited upon your Highness to express the confidence of the Medjliss in the Cabinet and to request that it should continue to hold office. In the hope that the Medjliss had realised the dangers of the situation the Cabinet consented to continue in office and engaged in a further consideration of the Russian ultimatum.

It is quite obvious that if, when on the first occasion the matter was put before the Medjliss by the Cabinet, the deputies had agreed with the Government the Russian troops would have returned from Resht, and that the subsequent misfortunes brought about by the agitation of particular individuals at Tehran who sent exaggerated telegrams to the provinces inciting the people to rise, would not have occurred, and the events at Resht and Tabreez would not have come about. Numerous telegrams were sent by the deputies and the Democratic party to all the provinces and even to foreign countries. The people of Persia were incited to take up arms, to revolt, to boycott British and Russian goods, and to oppose the Government, and instead of going with the Government at such a juncture in order to find a way out of the difficulties they did all they could to put obstacles in their way and the Government was confronted with fierce opposition from them at every turn whether at secret or private sittings. Though time was most valuable we found that they would not even assemble in the Medjliss in order to form a sufficient quorum, or if they did their opposition was not to be overcome.

Eventually on the 18th December the Minister for Foreign Affairs put the ultimatum proposals before the Medjliss; firstly, that the Medjliss should agree with the Cabinet regarding the Russian ultimatum; or secondly, that they should choose a commission to which they would give full powers to deal with the matter; or finally, that they should proceed according to the law with the formation of a new Cabinet. Unfortunately the debate on this occasion produced no result and no decision was reached. As the Medjliss could not form a new Cabinet the present Ministers were obliged to continue in office and to act in accordance with the dictates of their consciences in what they considered to be the truest interests of Persia.

When only two days remained before the advance of the Russians from Kazvin to the capital and a few of the deputies saw that danger was very near, it was decided in secret session by thirty-seven votes to form a committee of the House with full powers, but at the public sitting the childish spectacle was witnessed of this same committee voted for by only thirty-nine members, and after this step had been taken it was announced that not a single member of the Medjliss would consent to sit on the committee. There continued to be great difficulty in forming the committee until the news arrived on the night of the 21st December of the commencement of fighting at Tabreez and Resht, and of the arrival in Khorasan of a number of Russian troops. At the very last moment the committee was formed and decided to agree to the acceptance of the terms of the ultimatum, whereas, if in the beginning the views of the Cabinet had been agreed upon, the incidents at Tabreez and Resht would never have occurred, nor would the Russian troops have come to Kazvin, and the indemnity demanded by the Russian Government would have been unimportant.

Your Highness will observe from the above that the events at Tabreez and Resht are dangers which have been courted by the harmful dissensions and the opposition to the Government, and that these misfortunes have been caused by the telegrams and incitements from the capital. It is obvious that unless the Government is strong, whether constitutional or republican, it is impossible to carry on the affairs of the State satisfactorily, and the paralysis of the Government as witnessed of late can only result in chaos and confusion.

Furthermore, in view of the actual dissension and opposition of the present Medjliss, it is clear that good government and a cessation of the existing chaos is impossible.

Therefore the present Government consider it desirable—and, in order to deal with imminent dangers, even obligatory—that your Highness should issue without

delay a rescript ordering the closure of the Medjliss, though the fundamental law does not give the Government the direct right to close the Medjliss. On the other hand, the fundamental law does not empower the representatives of the people, after the lapse of the two years for which they were elected, to prolong their own session indefinitely.

In these circumstances we are forced to ask your Highness to issue a rescript ordering the closure of the Medjliss, and to order, by the same rescript, that fresh elections should be begun.

NEJEF KULI BAKHTIARI SEMSAM-ES-SULTANEH,
Prime Minister.
VOSSOUK-ED-DOWLEH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
KAVAN-ES-SULTANEH,
Minister of the Interior.
GHOLAM HUSAIN BAKHTIARI SARDAR MUHTASHAM,
Minister of War.
HAKIM-UL-MULK,
Minister of Finance.
ZOKA-UL-MULK,
Minister of Justice.
MOAZID-ES-SULTANEH,
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs

Rescript of His Highness the Regent.

As the Cabinet find necessary and have approved, it is legally signed. Let it be carried out as desirable, and let the firman and rescript for fresh elections be prepared and published.

ABUL KASSEM NASER-UL-MULK NAIB-ES-SULTANEH.

[1889] No. 110.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 3.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 4, 1912.*

IN a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 30th of last month I enquired whether he had any news to give me with regard to Persia, and expressed the hope that he would soon see his way to recalling the Russian troops from Kazvin.

M. Sazonow replied that he had no desire to retain them there longer than was necessary, more especially now that the Persian Government had formally complied with the three Russian demands in writing. He could not, however, give me any definite date for their withdrawal at present. Two rifle regiments had, indeed, already been transferred from Kazvin to Resht, but they would be sent back at once to the former place should the slightest indication be given of trouble or disorder at Tehran. Russia had been taken completely by surprise at Tabreez, and would not run this risk a second time. He could not, therefore, recall the Kazvin expeditionary force till all danger of any fresh outbreaks was passed.

The troops which had been sent to Resht and Tabreez would have to remain there till order had been thoroughly re-established, and until there was some prospect of its being maintained. This, his Excellency remarked, would be a work of time, but, in reply to a question which I had addressed to him, he disclaimed the idea of converting this temporary occupation into a permanent one. On my expressing the hope that, in the punitive measures which it was proposed to take, the innocent would not be punished with the guilty, his Excellency said that he sincerely trusted that this would be avoided, but that severe punishment would have to be meted out as an example and warning to others.

In view of the pressure which is being brought to bear upon them by public opinion, it will, I fear, be very difficult for the Government to recall their troops from Kazvin at the present juncture. The withdrawal of the two rifle regiments for the purpose of strengthening the garrison at Resht is strongly condemned by the "Novoe Vremya" in a leading article, which contends that the more judicious course would have been to strengthen the Kazvin contingent and to move it to within 40 versts from

Tehran, where there is a good bivouacking ground at the bridge across the River Karadj. Such a course would constitute a real menace to Tehran, whereas at present no provision exists for any sudden emergency requiring a strong force either at Kazvin or Tehran.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[1891] No. 111.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 5.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 4, 1912.*

I TOOK the opportunity of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd instant, to speak to his Excellency on the subject of the execution by the Russian military authorities at Tabreez of Sikat-el-Islam, on which Sir George Barclay had reported in his telegrams Nos 8, 11, and 12 of the 2nd January.

I said that the execution of this high-placed ecclesiastic struck me as being a most unfortunate occurrence as well as a grave blunder. It was almost certain to arouse intense indignation throughout Persia; and one of the first consequences would be that the present Government, who had done so much to conciliate Russia, would be unable to face the storm, and would have to resign. It also seemed probable that the Russian authorities would be represented as having caused Sikat-el-Islam to be executed for the express purpose of provoking popular resentment, and thus bringing about fresh disorders, which would furnish them with the necessary pretext for occupying Tehran.

M. Sazonow replied that the military authorities had had no choice but to inflict capital punishment on Sikat-el-Islam, who had been one of the chief instigators of the recent troubles and of the anti-Russian movement. The fact of his being an ecclesiastic could not shield him from the consequences of his acts. The military authorities moreover were obliged to take account of the temper of the troops, who were incensed at the tortures to which the Russian wounded had been subjected. One, if not more of them, had been actually buried alive, and he had been obliged to suppress the telegrams which he had received giving a detailed account of the horrible mutilations inflicted on others, for fear of the effect which they might have on public opinion here. His Excellency also reminded me of the fact that it was only last year that a Greek Bishop had been tortured to death by the Turks in Macedonia, without any outcry having been raised by Europe.

I said that I quite understood that acts, such as those which he had just mentioned must be severely punished, but that I still thought that it would have been more politic not to have inflicted the death penalty on Sikat-el-Islam. Russia was, like Great Britain, a great Mussulman Power, and I feared that his execution would shock the feelings of our Mahommedan subjects. What, however, preoccupied me most for the moment was the danger of its provoking an outbreak of fresh disorders in Persia, which might in their turn lead to the occupation of Tehran by the Russian troops. His Excellency was, no doubt, aware of the violent opposition which the dispatch of Russian troops to Persia had aroused in the House of Commons and of the very difficult position in which you had consequently been placed. I, therefore, trusted that he would do all that was possible to restrain the Russian military authorities in Persia, as the occupation of Tehran could not fail to put a severe strain on the Anglo-Russian understanding.

His Excellency replied that he trusted that nothing would happen to render such an occupation necessary. It was, he said, very difficult to control the action of the military authorities from a distance, more especially as regarded the trial and punishment of those who were responsible for the recent troubles. It was, moreover, impossible for the Government not to reckon with Russian public opinion; and, in view of the state of anarchy reigning in Persia, he could not meet the wishes which Mr. Mallet had expressed to Count Benckendorff in your name, with regard to the withdrawal of the Kazvin force.

As regarded, however, the possible proclamation of the ex-Shah by Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabreez, that formed the subject of your telegram No. 3 of the 1st instant, M. Sazonow said that the assurances which the Russian Government had given in

the event of His Majesty being proclaimed at Tehran held good with regard to Tabreez and that, so long as that town was in the occupation of Russian troops, they would not allow any such proclamation to be made.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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[982] No. 112.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 6.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" of the 4th January publishes a long article on the trans-Persian railway scheme. The article is founded on a telegram from London announcing that representatives of English, French, and Russian banking houses will shortly meet in Paris to arrange preliminaries for financing the railway. The writer disapproves strongly of the whole policy of the Potsdam interviews and the Russo-German agreement, declaring that the withdrawal of opposition to the Bagdad railway was equivalent to rendering direct financial assistance to the Germans, and that it sacrifices the economic advantages of Russia in the Persian market. "Thanks to the Potsdam interview, the railway, a German line, will reach Khanikin in the near future." But, not content with this, Russian diplomacy in binding itself to construct the Khanikin–Tehran railway has opened a way for German trade into the heart of Persia.

The writer says that there is no use in crying over the blunders committed in the past. They cannot be undone, but their evil effects may perhaps in some measure be mitigated, and the best antidote is the construction of Russian lines into Persia. There have been many schemes on paper, but none of them have come to anything, and pessimists have hitherto included the trans-Persian scheme among those which were predestined to failure for lack of the necessary financial support. The article claims that the news from London proves that the pessimists were wrong, and that the trans-Persian scheme is now materialising. It then dwells on its political significance. All Russia's enemies are endeavouring to make use of events in Persia in order to excite European public opinion against her. Their objects are: (1) to destroy the Anglo-Russian agreement, (2) to encourage an Anglo-German understanding directed against Russia, and (3) to attract France into the orbit of this combination. The destruction of the Triple *Entente* would render the realisation of the trans-Persian scheme impossible, and would pave the way for a continuation of the German Bagdad railway to the Indian Ocean, and even to the frontiers of India. The writer declares that the charge levelled against Russia of supporting anarchy in Persia is sufficiently refuted by the fact of Russia consenting to the construction of a trans-Persian railway, which pre-supposes the establishment of order and security in Persia.

Far from damaging Germany, the realisation of the trans-Persian railway scheme will give an immense impetus to German trade with India and the East, but this trade will pass through Russia, and therein lies the strongest inducement to the preservation of good relations between the two countries. The establishment of the trans-Persian route, concludes the article, will be one of the strongest buttresses of the general peace of Europe.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[1920] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 958 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van respecting the alleged concentration of Turkish troops on the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Vice-Consul Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Van, December* 18, 1911.

IN confirmation of my telegrams Nos. 10 and 11, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have just heard from an authoritative source that no concentration of troops at Salmas has as yet taken place. The distribution of troops on the frontier is as stated in my telegram No. 10. The battalions themselves have been concentrated at Bashkale, Tergavvar (Mawana), and Chari (marked on the map as Kala Cheirik), which concentration has been enabled by the establishment of the frontier guards. Jezdikhan is also occupied by Turkish troops, but I do not know their number. The Turkish troops are thus separated from the Russian troops at Khoi by only a few hours.

Recently two companies of 2nd battalion 97th regiment were dispatched nominally to Archag in pursuit of the brigand, Said Bey, and as they have not returned yet I have considered them as having reinforced the battalion already at Serai and Razi. The 2nd battalion 99th regiment recently moved from Bayazid to Serai, replacing the 2nd battalion 102nd regiment which was withdrawn to Boulanik. These movements, together with the assembling of battalions already mentioned, may have given rise to the reported concentration. In my telegram No. 10, I included the 2nd battalion 101st regiment at Bashkale among the frontier troops, as it is only a day's march from its link battalion at Chari.

The Ottoman authorities have news of the arrival of additional troops at Urmi.

The Russian troops at Khoi are commanded by a general who has with him an officer of the general staff.

It is natural that this Russian advance is a cause of much concern to the authorities here, which the military occupation of Urmi in addition would greatly increase.

The district between Salmas and Urmi is regarded by the Turks as of great strategical importance. It covers the only practicable military routes into Mesopotamia, viz., that from Ushnu to Rowanduz, and that from Ushnu viâ Peswe and the Wazna Pass to Kirkuk.

It appears also that under possible conditions the possession by Russia of access by these routes to Mesopotamia would be prejudicial to British interests.

On the other hand, Russia appears to have suggested that they fear a movement on the part of the Turks viâ north-west Persia into Transcaucasia. The Turkish authorities regard any such pretended fear by Russia (it obviously could not be a serious one at the present moment) as a pretext for seeking to dispossess the Turks of the Nevahi-i-Sharkie.

The Turkish authorities claim to have information of a projected advance on Urmia through the contested territory, in which case it seems that an effort to obtain the diplomatic support of England would be made, and this failing, I understand, it has practically been decided to offer opposition. The position of concentration of the Turkish troops would, probably, be in the neighbourhood of Chari. The Turks accuse the Russian Government of keeping the chiefs of Kotur supplied with arms, and also the brigands, Mir Mehne and others, whose base of operations is Kuhna Shehr (near Dilman). From the Turkish point of view the object then of a Russian force advancing on Urmi viâ the disputed territories would be to lend moral and material support to these turbulent chiefs and brigands and loosen the Turkish hold on these territories. As confirming this view importance is attached to the statements contained in my despatch No. 13.

I have, &c.
J. M. SEEL.

[1892] No. 114.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January* 10, 1912.

THE semi-official "Rossia" of to-day publishes an article protesting against the charges of undue severity brought by the foreign press, and especially the British press, against recent Russian action at Tabreez. It refers angrily to the meeting which is to be held in London on the 15th January by "local Persian democrats, with Lord Lamington, Professor Brown, and Messrs. Lynch and Co. at their head." It asks

why all this outcry is now being made about Sikat-ul-Islam, whereas no voice was raised in protest when foul outrages were committed on Russian soldiers by the Tabreez fedais, supported by the scum of the Caucasus, under the leadership of this very Sikat-ul-Islam. It states that, according to eyewitnesses, the outrages on the Russian troops were too horrible for description.

The writer declares that the moderation of the Russian court-martial is sufficiently established by the fact that only fifteen men were condemned, while no fewer than twenty-six were released and pardoned. He protests against the capital which is made by slanderers of Russia of the type of Lord Lamington, Professor Brown, and Mr. Lynch out of the fact that Sikat-ul-Islam was a leading ecclesiastic, and maintains that he and his associates, Sheikh Selim, Sadik-ul-Mulk, and Zia-ul-Ulema, were the chief leaders of the whole anarchist and anti-Russian movement in Tabreez, and were the centre round which the local fedais rallied.

The article goes on to state that the charge of having carried out the executions on the Moslem holy day of "Ashura" is as false as the charge of the slaughter of women and children. The festival ended at midday, and the executions did not take place till 5 o'clock in the evening, and were fully approved by the populace, who had long suffered at the hands of the fedais and their leaders. It closes with a warning to the Persians and to "their foolish European instigators" that no one can be allowed to raise a hand against a Russian soldier with impunity, and that Russia is determined to preserve order on her borders.

The above article is evidently inspired, as M. Sazonow held very similar language in the course of the conversation which I had with his Excellency this afternoon.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[1894] No. 115.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 11.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January* 11, 1912.

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 14 of the 5th instant I communicated to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs an *aide-mémoire* giving your views on the subject of the Swedish officers in Persia. I now have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the reply which I have received from the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by Russian Government.

(Translation.)

FULLY sharing the opinion expressed in the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy, that paragraph 2 of the Russian ultimatum to the Persian Government does not apply to Swedish officers who were invited previously to enter the Persian service with the preliminary assent of the Russian and British Governments, the Imperial Government instructed its representatives in Stockholm to notify the Swedish Government in this sense.

St. Petersburgh, December 28, 1911
(*January* 10, 1912).

[1897] No. 116.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 14.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January* 11, 1912.

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 19 of the 8th instant, I communicated to M. Sazonow, in a private letter, your views with regard to M. Mornard's appointment, and I reverted to the subject in a conversation which I had with his Excellency

yesterday, adding that that gentleman's reputation did not stand very high among Englishmen who had business relations in Persia.

M. Sazonow replied that he had never heard any imputations cast on his character, and that he was, he believed, the best man for the post. He was a good man of business, and, what was most important, had a thorough knowledge of Persian affairs. M. Oudendijk, on the other hand, had gained such experience as he possessed in China, and knew but little of Persia. The Russian Government had, however, never insisted on M. Mornard's appointment, nor had they imposed it on the Persian Government. M. Poklewski had discussed the matter with Sir George Barclay, and the two Ministers had recommended him as the most suitable candidate. Now that he had been appointed acting treasurer-general it was, he thought, too late for us to inform the Persian Government that they might either choose between him and M. Oudendijk or appoint a commission, consisting of an Englishman, a Russian, and a subject of one of the minor Powers. This latter course would, in his opinion, be most objectionable to the Persian Government, as it would probably be regarded in the light of an Anglo-Russian financial condominium. He therefore thought that it would be best to give M. Mornard a trial, and if, later on, the Persian Government could show any good grounds for objecting to him, Russia would not insist on retaining him.

M. Sazonow then proceeded to say that what we ought to do at once was to approach the question of a Persian loan. The best service which we could render the Persian Government was to help them to put their finances on a sound basis. Such material support would, he was convinced, be more appreciated by them than any amount of good words and friendly assurances.

In the course of our subsequent conversation I spoke to his Excellency about the situation at Tabreez, and was given to understand that the Russian Government do not propose—at any rate, at present—to take over the administration of the town. The military authorities would, however, his Excellency said, continue to exercise a punitive jurisdiction and to maintain order both in the town and along the caravan routes. His Excellency defended those authorities against the charges of undue severity that had been brought against them, and said that the execution of Sikat-el-Islam had not provoked the slightest disorders either at Tabreez or Tehran. He was, he said, a thoroughly bad character. He had acted, on the one hand, as head of the fedais, while, on the other, he was not an orthodox Persian, but the chief of a dissenting sect. This execution, therefore, had been taken quite calmly by the population. In conclusion, his Excellency said that the situation showed considerable signs of improvement.

I observed that, as this was the case, I trusted that the Imperial Government would now find it possible to withdraw their troops from Kazvin, but his Excellency replied that they would hardly be justified in taking this step at the present moment.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2116] No. 117.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 101 [of 30th March] of last year and previous correspondence.

Manager of Imperial Bank of Persia told me yesterday that during November he had obtained from Shuster contract for import of minting silver for ten years.

I informed Russian Minister of this yesterday.

It was of course most unwelcome news to him, and I fear that the Russian Government may oppose the contract on the ground that it had not the sanction of the Medjliss.

The manager did not tell me of the contract before because he thought that it would be awkward for me, but now that the treasury-general's archives have been handed to Mornard the matter could not remain secret.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[2150] No. 118.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 15, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that a certain Reshid-es-Sultan (erroneously described in my telegram No. 717 [of 19th December] as Reshid-ul-Mulk) has arrived by Russian boat at Enzeli with 150 armed Shahsevans in the interests of the ex-Shah.

[2139] No. 119.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from acting consul at Shiraz, 14th January:—

"Kawam, whose son has returned from Fesa, tells me that Sheikh Ali Dashti, a mullah, has gone to Borasjun, where he is making serious efforts to create an active anti-foreign league, and that the Sheikh Zakerieh of Laristan is collecting forces with the intention of advancing towards Bunder Abbas. He also tells me that very inflammatory telegrams have been sent from Tehran to Borasjun, as also to Mohammed Ali, lauding the behaviour of the Kaskulis in the recent affair. Kawam has ordered the Governor of Kazerun to send him a copy of these telegrams, and promises to show them to me when received.

"Retirement of Kawam's son from among the tribes seems to me somewhat disquieting. Kawam, however, states that it is only due to lack of money. His own force here is also dribbling away."

Persian Government have sent urgent instructions to the Governor of Bushire to do his utmost to stop Sheikh Ali's inflammatory activity.

[2151] No. 120.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 44 of 15th January: ex-Shah movement.

Russian Minister tells me that, in consequence of orders from St. Petersburgh, Russian consul at Resht is shipping Reshid-es-Sultan and his followers to Astara, whence they came.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[2152] No. 121.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 24 of 8th January: treasurer-general.

Mornard has taken over the offices of the treasury-general, and is now working harmoniously with American subordinates pending a settlement of the position of the latter.

Persian committee has been dissolved.

[1860] No. 122.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram to Viceroy of 8th January: Arms for Governor of Kerman.

His Majesty's Government have no objection to compliance with request, provided (i) the governor pays for the arms and formally takes delivery of them at Bunder Abbas; (ii) the arms should not be allowed to proceed unless the governor is prepared to accept responsibility for the safe conduct of a caravan of British goods at the same time.

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[96] No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1912.

I DULY received your Excellency's despatch No. 392 of the 27th ultimo, reporting a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd ultimo, in the course of which M. Sazonow informed you that when a formal written engagement respecting the Russian demands had been received from the Persian Government and Mr. Shuster's dismissal from the Persian service was an accomplished fact, the Russian troops, who were at that time stationed at Kazvin, would be at once recalled. His Excellency further stated that there was no connection between the question of the recall of these troops and the very serious incidents that had just occurred in the north.

In view of these remarks on the part of M. Sazonow, it was with some surprise and disappointment that I read in your telegram No. 2 of the 3rd instant that his Excellency stated that it was quite impossible at present to recall the force from Kazvin, and that the 1,000 men already withdrawn from that town had only been transferred to strengthen the garrison at Resht.

The reasons which have led the Russian Government to decide not to withdraw their troops are doubtless to be found in the disturbances which have occurred in the north and the strong public feeling in St. Petersburgh, but Tehran has remained perfectly quiet throughout, the Persian Government are admittedly not to blame, and order has now been restored in Tabreez, so that there does not appear to be any reason why the withdrawal of the troops from Kazvin should not now be proceeded with.

You should take an opportunity of speaking to M. Sazonow in this sense, but in doing so it is desirable that you should explain the considerations that influence His Majesty's Government in the matter. They have recognised that a Persian Government which pursues a policy hostile to Russian interests cannot be strong. Such a policy leads inevitably to friction and conflict with Russia that must weaken the Persian Government and impair or destroy its authority.

All the more is it necessary that a Persian Government, when friendly to Russian interests, should be supported and encouraged. The present Persian Government has complied with the Russian demands and has shown a genuine desire for friendly relations with Russia; unless there is some response to this attitude and some encouragement is given to the Persian Government, it will not be apparent to the latter or to their subjects that they have anything to gain. A withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin would give such encouragement; it would justify to the Persians what their present Government is doing, and would thereby strengthen its position, and enable it to regain the authority that is essential to the restoration of order in Persia.

One result of the weakness of the Central Government has been a state of anarchy in Southern Persia; the trade routes are now completely blocked; it is even doubtful whether inside Shiraz itself foreign lives and property will long be safe. This state of things is very prejudicial to British trade and interests, and makes the re-establishment of Persian authority a matter of great importance to His Majesty's Government. As long as the Persian Government were in conflict with the Russian

Government it was recognised that no improvement could be expected, but now that this unfortunate condition of affairs has ceased, His Majesty's Government are most anxious that the Russian Government should facilitate every measure necessary to enable the Persian Government to establish its authority and to restore order.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2184] No. 124.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 16.)

(Secret.)

THE Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, in reply to his memorandum of the 2nd instant, begs to forward the enclosed paper embodying an expression of the opinion asked for.

Whitehall, January 15, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Memorandum respecting Military Action in Southern Persia.

(Secret.)

1. THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs desires an early expression of military opinion as to—

(1.) The policy to be pursued in view of the present situation in Southern Persia; and

(2.) The military action required to give effect to the policy advocated.

2. It is presumed that the general policy of the British Government under the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 is to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, with due regard to the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of that country in which Great Britain and Russia respectively have special interests. It is further understood that, owing to the internal condition of Persia, it was lately found necessary to dispatch a native cavalry regiment from India to protect the British consulate at Shiraz; and that, owing to a recent attack on Mr. Smart and the detachment escorting him to Shiraz, and also having regard to the attitude of the tribesmen in Southern Persia and the weakness of the Persian Government, military action on our part may now be called for.

Bearing in mind that, though Shiraz lies in the "neutral zone" outside the British sphere of influence, British interests have always predominated there, and that the Persian Government are—and for some time to come may be—incapable of controlling the country or of exacting reparation for the attack on Mr. Smart and his escort, the following alternatives appear to be open to us:—

(*a.*) To maintain our position in Southern Persia by dispatching a force capable of occupying Shiraz, and of keeping our communications open between Shiraz and Bushire; or

(*b.*) Temporarily to abandon our position in the western part of Southern Persia, by closing the consulates at Shiraz and elsewhere, and withdrawing them, their escorts, and British subjects (including the officers of the Indo-European Telegraph Department) to the coast.

3. While the maintenance of our position in the west of Southern Persia must involve military difficulties and expenditure in addition to such political disadvantages as are inseparable from military intervention, these disadvantages may be outweighed by the political, commercial, and military disadvantages attendant on an abandonment—even of a temporary nature—of our position in that region.

The abandonment of our position in the west of Southern Persia—

(1.) Might mean a serious loss of prestige, both in Persia itself and the East generally;

(2.) Would entail a loss of trade and trade connection, possibly permanently;

(3.) Would give Russia an opportunity and a pretext for the military occupation of the neutral zone of Southern Persia to "protect" threatened interests and consulates. She would thus gain in prestige, and to a great extent in trade, what we should lose. She has considerable military forces already in Northern Persia, and could quickly seize her opportunity;

(4.) Might also give other Powers a similar opening, to our detriment;

(5.) Might give Russia an opportunity of obtaining an outlet on the Persian Gulf, which it has hitherto been our policy to deny her. The attainment of an outlet on the seaboard of South-west Persia might be of great political and military advantage to Russia hereafter;

(6.) Would result in its being very difficult, if not impossible, for Great Britain to regain her former commercial position in South-west Persia, if that part of the country were once dominated by another Power.

There is understood to be little likelihood of the Russian Government withdrawing its troops from Northern Persia till the country is settled and the Persian Government is itself able to maintain order. Even then it is not impossible that a variety of circumstances, fortuitous or otherwise, might indefinitely prolong the time deemed necessary by Russia for the retention of her troops in Persia.

If, in existing circumstances, Great Britain temporarily abandons her interests in the neutral zone, she would have but little, if any, voice subsequently in putting a limit to the period of the occupation of that region by the troops of other Powers. Nor could she well protest against any measures adopted by such Powers to protect their own interests in Southern Persia, however disadvantageous such action might be to her hereafter.

Having once withdrawn, it would be difficult for the British consulates to be re-established till reparation had been exacted for the late attacks, and order restored in the neutral zone; but it is possible that the Persian Government may not be in a position, or may refuse, to take the necessary action.

4. To maintain our position in South-western Persia it would seem necessary—

(*a.*) To ensure the immediate safety of the British consulates and their escorts, as well as British subjects at Shiraz and elsewhere in the neutral zone;

(*b.*) To take such action as may safeguard our interests and prestige in the disturbed area till such time as the Persian Government can itself maintain order.

It is stated on the authority of Mr. Acting Consul G. G. Knox, that in March there will be some 15,000 armed tribesmen in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, while in a later telegram the same officer estimates the number of tribesmen in Fars at from 50,000 to 60,000.

5. Recent events have shown the risks attendant upon the employment of small detachments of troops in the present disturbed state of the country.

Local Persians are themselves of opinion that serious disorders amongst the Kashgais, and possibly other tribes, are practically inevitable in the spring, whilst the reports received from our own representatives in Shiraz point to the necessity of our being prepared for a serious outbreak of hostile feeling amongst the tribesmen, which, even if it does not vent itself in an actual attack upon our troops, might render their position at Shiraz extremely precarious owing to the ease with which communication with the coast could be interrupted and supplies cut off.

Bearing in mind the nature and strength of the opposition that may possibly have to be encountered, the length of communications to be maintained (182 miles) in a mountainous country, and the question of supply and transport, it is estimated that a considerable force would be required in the event of its being decided to take military action. It is not yet known how many of the local tribes were concerned in the attack on Mr. Smart's escort, but from the fact that Major Birdwood has been able to join hands with Colonel Douglas without any further fighting taking place, it may be inferred that there is not as yet any organised tribal revolt.

It is not possible to forecast with any accuracy the force that may ultimately be required, but it would seem imprudent to attempt the task of safeguarding Shiraz, making good the lines of communication, and carrying out such punitive operations as may be found necessary with a smaller force than—

Two mixed brigades of infantry, each to include a pioneer battalion;
Two Indian cavalry regiments, including the one already in Southern Persia;
Two or more batteries of mountain artillery;
One field company of sappers and miners, with the necessary administrative services.

6. It would also seem advisable to prevent the import of arms and ammunition into Persia by the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.

7. Owing to the time necessary for preliminary arrangements, and for the dispatch and concentration of troops, transport, and supplies, and the likelihood of the country becoming increasingly disturbed in the spring, and in order to prevent the possibility of another Power forestalling us on the plea that their interests were not being safeguarded, it seems important that if military action is to be taken at all, it should be taken promptly.

8. Opportunity might perhaps be taken to improve the trade routes by military and hired labour, and even to train a local gendarmerie force. This would involve considerable expenditure. It might also be possible to carry out investigations in connection with railway routes.

9. Finally, it must be understood that from a military standpoint the permanent occupation by British or Indian troops of any part of the neutral zone is not recommended. The action now suggested would be of a purely temporary nature.

[2247] No 125.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th January, 1912, relative to Mr. Knox's leave.

India Office, January 16, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 125.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 15, 1912.

LEAVE for Major Knox. See telegram dated 13th instant from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran. Instructions to wait for the present where he is should, I consider, be given to Knox.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[2246] No. 126.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 16, 1912.

MY telegram No. 736 of 24th December: Recruiting for the ex-Shah at Ashkabad.

British consul-general at Meshed reports that the Russian authorities are now turning back recruits.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[1839] No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 38 of 13th January.

We would propose to acquiesce in appointment of Mornard as acting treasurer-general, keeping definite appointment in suspense.

Do Russian Government concur?

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 35.)

[2394] No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1912.

IN view of all the latest information as to what has happened and is likely to happen at Shiraz, such force as is necessary to enable our people now at Shiraz to withdraw to the coast should be prepared and sent without delay to carry out evacuation.

Will it not be necessary that Ispahan and Yezd should also be evacuated, and what do you consider will be the effect of evacuation on the position at Kerman?

Government of India are being instructed to consult you as to size and composition of force, and to submit their proposals to His Majesty's Government.

Details may be settled direct between you and Government of India.

[2414] No. 129.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 17.)

28, *Oxford Street, Manchester, January* 15, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th January, replying to our letter of the 27th ultimo, in which complaint was made that the assurances of protection given to the Muin-ut-Tujjar by His Majesty's Government have not been fulfilled, and that the letter from your office of the 9th ultimo intimated the decision not to extend to him this protection until the Persian Government had compelled him to accept such conditions as he can obtain without it, we note your reply that, as far as Sir Edward Grey is aware, the Muin-ut-Tujjar has not since the beginning of the dispute originated by the action of the Persian Government in depriving him of this concession approached His Majesty's Legation at Tehran with any request for the intervention of His Majesty's Government on his behalf.

With all respect, we submit that we cannot be expected to accept this answer to our complaint.

This reason for the withholding of the protection of His Majesty's Government, given now, twenty-one months after the event, is not the reason which was given at the time, when it was stated that the protection was withheld on the grounds that the Persian Government had declared the concession to have lapsed in 1906; that Mr. Marling has seen the documents upon which the statement was based, which seemed to afford good grounds for the contention; that the Muin-ut-Tujjar had produced what professed to be a copy of the alleged firman, but that the paper was obviously worthless, and that the inference was that the signatures thereto were forged.

As regards the statement, now made for the first time, that the Muin-ut-Tujjar has not approached His Majesty's Legation with any request for the intervention of His Majesty's Government on his behalf, we refer you to the contents of our letter of the 4th November and to the statements made therein, none of which have been disputed by your office as being contrary to fact, and we refer you also to the statement contained in your letter of the 8th July, 1910, to the effect that the Muin-ut-Tujjar came to the legation on the same day as Vekil-ul-Roaya, as well as twice subsequently, when he repeatedly asserted that he had documents to prove his rights, but declined to produce them; and that he was told that the legation had no wish to injure his interests, but was obliged to act in accordance with the balance of evidence, which appeared to be against him, but if he would produce proofs and not mere assertions due weight would be given to them.

Your letter also states that we will observe from a perusal of the translation of the Bill passed by the Persian Medjliss, conferring on the Muin-ut-Tujjar a new concession for the exploitation of the oxide at Hormuz, and especially from its second article, whereby the Muin-ut-Tujjar receives compensation for the oxide sold while he was deprived of the concession, that he would appear to have obtained from the Persian Government by his own unaided efforts terms far more advantageous than any which the intervention of His Majesty's Government could have secured for him.

We gather from this document that the Muin-ut-Tujjar is entitled to a sum altogether of 29,100*l.*, spread over the next five years, instead of a sum of 63,750*l.* spread over five years dating from April 1910.

If this be the correct interpretation of the document, and if these are better terms than any which the intervention of His Majesty's Government could have secured, the action of His Majesty's Government in inducing us, as the Muin-ut-Tujjar's agents, to procure from him the contract, on the grounds that it would afford him protection, would appear to be unjustifiable.

We note that Sir Edward Grey has no objection to the communication to the Muin-ut-Tujjar of correspondence, copies of which were enclosed in our last letter, and these have now gone forward; and we have been careful to draw the Muin-ut-Tujjar's attention to the fact that His Majesty's Government accept no responsibility for the expressions of opinion contained in our letters to him of the 30th October last.

We are also sending to the Muin-ut-Tujjar an extract from your letter of the 8th January, in as far as it applies to his interests, and a copy of this letter, to which we presume there will be no objection.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND Co.

[2412] No. 130.

Persian Railways Syndicate to Foreign Office.—(Received January 17.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, January 15, 1912.

Sir,

REFERRING to the numerous references in the press lately to the Trans-Persian Railway scheme and to the statements which have been made in this connection as to the favourable consideration and support which is being given to the scheme by His Majesty's Government, we are requested by the chairman to ask if there is any foundation for these statements, and as to whether His Majesty's Government has given any assurance of support to the promoters of this scheme or to any other syndicate or persons in connection with railway construction in Persia.

We are, &c.
W. L. W. BIRD.

[2266] No. 131.

Messrs. Lawrance, Webster, Messer, and Nicholls to Foreign Office.—(Received January 17.)

14, *Old Jewry Chambers, London, January* 15, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letters of 1910 and other correspondence on the subject of the purchase of growing timber in Persian territory on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, we now have the honour to inform you that, with the assistance of the information which you were good enough to obtain for us, a contract has now been entered into between parties entitled to the right to cut timber in a large number of forests on the south-western coast of the Caspian Sea and the Caspian Timber Syndicate (Limited), a company registered in London. This company was formed with a nominal capital of 8,000*l.* to provide the expense of sending out agents to inspect the forests and report upon the local conditions, which reports have been satisfactory. Under the conditions of the contract, a larger company must now be formed to prove the commercial value of the timber, and when this is demonstrated to the satisfaction of that company, arrangements will be made for developing the timber resources of the district on a considerable scale.

The reports obtained by our clients' agents in Persia confirmed the advice you were good enough to give them, and in particular the fact that the title to the particular forests which were offered to our clients at the time of our correspondence with you might be found defective. This proved to be the case, and no arrangements were made with the parties claiming at that time to be entitled to such forests. It was found that the right to these forests had been previously transferred to a Vienna syndicate, who have, however, been approached on the subject, and have ultimately joined with other parties in transferring their rights to the Caspian Timber Syndicate (Limited).

Our clients appreciate that, as advised by you, the business must ultimately be

conducted through a Russian company, and in due course they will no doubt arrange accordingly. In the meantime, however, we shall be greatly obliged if, in accordance with the first paragraph of your letter of the 13th July, 1910, you would be so kind as to inform the Russian Government that the Caspian Timber Syndicate (Limited) has entered into the contract above referred to, and that in due course the work of proving the commercial value of the timber will be undertaken by a larger company to be formed under terms agreed with the Caspian Timber Syndicate (Limited). We should also esteem it a favour if similar notification could be made to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tehran and to the British consul at Baku, from which centre we are informed that operations can most conveniently be directed.

We are, &c.
LAWRANCE, WEBSTER, MESSER,
AND NICHOLLS.

[2462] No. 132.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 17, 1912.*

MY despatches Nos. 248 and 251.

Persian Government are anxious to be furnished with copy of joint report of the two delegates and of the map accompanying it.

They also ask for copies of the reports of the sittings of the Erzeroum commission, having lost their own copies at the time of the bombardment of the Medjliss.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[2464] No. 133.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 33 of 16th January: Persian treasurer-general.

Russian Government concur. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that if the Persian Government in two or three months wanted to get rid of Mornard he would not raise difficulties, provided that a really good man could be found to take his place and that Cairns was not appointed treasurer-general.

[2454] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 38.)
(Telegrahic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 34 of the 16th January: Shiraz.

You will understand that we could not hold Shiraz and roads permanently by force, as a very large force would be required, and we might in effect be committed to occupation of Southern Persia. It is therefore clear that if, as we understand you to think, the situation at Shiraz is untenable, a sufficient force will have to be sent to enable consul, guards, and foreign residents now there to withdraw to the coast. In that event, we could occupy either Bushire or Bunder Abbas or both till satisfaction had been obtained for recent attack upon vice-consul and guards, and till a return to Shiraz could be undertaken with safety.

[1904] No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 14 of 14th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

When your Russian colleague receives similar instructions, you are authorised to make to the Ottoman Government a communication in the sense proposed.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 37, and Tehran, No. 40.)

[1865] No. 136.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 14th January: Persia.

Your language approved.

If the Shah's pension is renewed it must be on the understanding that, if he returns to Persia without the consent of the two Governments, they will support the Persian Government against him.

As to loan, the best plan will be to facilitate Seligman's proposals if he will renew them.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 36.)

[1870] No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 41 of 14th January: Russian consuls in Persia.

You can bear this in mind, to be used when opportune in conversation without compromising Russian Minister at Tehran.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 37.)

[1904] No. 138.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 20 of 17th January: Turco-Persian frontier to Constantinople. Inform Russian Government.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 41.)

[1860] No. 139.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant regarding the convoy from Bunder Abbas to Kerman of certain arms and ammunition for the governor of Kerman.

I am to state, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the opinion of the Marquess of Crewe, as set forth in the second paragraph of your letter, and has instructed His Majesty's Minister at Tehran accordingly.

Copy of a telegram addressed to Sir G. Barclay in this sense is enclosed.*

With regard to the effect on the position of His Majesty's consul at Kerman of the withdrawal from Shiraz, I am to add that Sir E. Grey has not lost sight of the possibility of having to evacuate Kerman in a similar manner.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[2472] No. 140.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 14 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regard to the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by Russian Government.

AINSI que l'ont constaté dans leurs comptes rendus identiques Mr. Shipley et M. Minorsky, les délégués des Gouvernements russe et anglais qui ont été chargés de faire dans le courant de l'été passé une tournée sur la partie du territoire persan occupée par des troupes turques, les autorités envoyées sur les lieux par la Porte forcent les habitants des villages situés sur ce territoire de leur délivrer des "mazbata," c'est-à-dire des documents témoignant de leur dévouement envers la Porte et reconnaissant la suprématie de cette dernière. La population indigène qui appartient incontestablement à la sujétion persane ne peut faire autrement que de se soumettre aux ordres des autorités turques, sachant que dans le cas contraire les villages récalcitrants seront mis à sac par les Kurdes. Si le Gouvernement ottoman tient à se munir d'un certain nombre de "mazbata" aussi considérable que possible, c'est qu'il a manifestement en vue de les produire en temps et lieu à l'appui de ses prétentions sur le territoire dont il s'agit. Le Gouvernement Impérial est d'avis qu'il faudrait prendre dès à présent des mesures pour déjouer cette manœuvre, qui pourra créer de grandes difficultés au moment où il sera procédé au règlement définitif du différend turco-persan. Il croirait nécessaire en conséquence de protester devant la Porte contre les menées de ses agents dans la zone en litige et de la prévenir d'avance que les procédés employés par les agents en question ne sont pas inconnus aux deux Gouvernements qui contestent toute valeur à des documents obtenus de cette façon.

Si le Cabinet de Londres partage cette manière de voir et consent à envoyer des instructions en ce sens à l'Ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne à Constantinople, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères ne manquera pas de son côté d'inviter M. Tcharykof de se joindre à Sir Gerard Lowther pour faire une démarche commune devant la Porte.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 31 décembre, 1911
(13 janvier, 1912).

[2531] No. 141.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 18.)

Sir, 28, *Oxford Street, Manchester, January 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to the last paragraph of your letter of the 8th instant relative to our interests and those of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. in the matter of Ormuz oxide, we note that the facts of the situation as to which you are awaiting further information are those connected with the decision of the Muin-ut-Tujjar as to entering into the agreement with the Persian Minister of Public Works.

* No. 122.

In view of this explanation, it would appear from your letter of the 9th ultimo that Sir Edward Grey is of opinion that nothing can be done in the matter of our claims and those of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. until you are in possession of this information.

We cannot see what connection there is between the position of our claims and those of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and the decision of the Muin-ut-Tujjar as to entering into the agreement with the Persian Minister of Public Works, nor what effect the latter can have upon the former, and we shall be pleased if you can explain the matter to us.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND Co.

[2577] No. 142.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 768 of 29th December.

Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

When suitable arrangements had been made for this man's safe-conduct through Russia to Tehran, I expressed hope to my Russian colleague that, on basti's arrival at Tehran, Russia would not demand any punishment affecting his life or liberty, and Russian Minister advised his Government merely to demand cancelling of his title, and informed them that I could not acquiesce without your authorisation in any punishment affecting the basti's life and liberty. Russian Government in their reply, tone of which shows some annoyance with my attitude, threaten if I persist in it to cancel safe-conduct already accorded to basti, so as to be free to deal with him as they like whenever he leaves the consulate. Such action would probably mean indefinite stay of the basti at the consulate.

My view is as follows: If basti, though knowing the attitude of Russian Government, is willing to avail himself of the conduct still open to him to leave consulate and taken his chances at Tehran he should not be discouraged, and in this case when he leaves the consulate our responsibility ceases, but that, unless we obtain assurances from Russia that no punishment affecting life or liberty will be demanded without a fair trial, we cannot encourage basti to leave. Do you concur? If cases were reversed, and we had a charge against a Russian basti, I am satisfied that Russia would not adopt a more amenable attitude than that I have indicated.

I believe that Russia's charge against deputy governor is that he falsely reported indiscriminate killing of women and children by Russian troops.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[2562] No. 143.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 26 of 8th January: Holy war.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Persian consul-general at Bagdad has succeeded in persuading two Ulemas not to enter Persia.

[2561] No. 144.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 52.) Very Urgent.

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 34 of 17th January to St. Petersburgh.

I trust that the Russian Government will not insist on the renewal of the ex-Shah's full pension. I think that, after what has happened, a suitable pension would be 50,000 tomans.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[2575] No. 145.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 38 of 17th January: Situation in Southern Persia.

My opinion was based on report of Colonel Douglas, repeated to you in my telegram No. 31 of 11th January, showing that military situation was, in his opinion, untenable, and I could scarcely override expert opinion. As indicated in my telegram No. 31 of 11th January, I was, until I received his report, supported as it was by acting consul's, in favour of maintaining things as they are; but I am not in a position to deny that such a course would involve risks indicated by Colonel Douglas and Smart.

[2551] No. 146.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 40 of 13th January.

In present circumstances Mr. Knox had better remain at Shiraz.

[2561] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 18, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 52 of 18th January: Ex-Shah's pension.

I share his view, and you should indicate this in conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I did not intend to propose restoring full amount of pension.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 42.)

[2603] No. 148.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Tehran, January 6, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 257 of the 30th December last, I now have the honour to transmit translation of the Regent's "firman" of the 23rd December, ordering a general election "as soon as possible."

It will be seen that the Regent refers in his firman to article 2 of the programme presented to the Medjliss by Samsam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet and passed by the House on the 2nd September (see my despatch No. 167 of the 5th September, 1911), in which the Cabinet urge that the deputies of the next Medjliss should be given a mandate by the country for the revision of the constitution. A species of "referendum" on this point is therefore being made, but it is hard to imagine how it will be possible, under existing conditions in this country, to determine whether the majority of the electors are for or against the proposed modification of the fundamental laws of 1906 and 1907.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 148.

Firman for the New Elections.

(Translation.)

IN the name of his Most Powerful and Exalted Majesty the King of Kings, Sultan Ahmad Shah Kajar (may God make luminous his State and kingdom).

Whereas the parliamentary session of the National Consultative Assembly terminated on the 23rd Zighedeh (15th November, 1911), in order that no lapse should occur between its expiration and the order for the new elections, with the issue of this firman we notify all those who are entitled to election rights, in accordance with the new law dated the 4th November, 1911, to be prepared to take steps for the election of new deputies. We have also, in conformity with our decree of the 23rd December, 1911, given ample instructions to the Ministry of the Interior to take all necessary steps for the good management and execution of the elections and compliance with the important legal points.

On this occasion, we deem it necessary to remind the people of the protected provinces that it is of the positive duties of those entitled to vote to thoroughly peruse and study the electoral law, and in giving assistance to each other in comprehending its meaning and points, to refer to their wisdom and conscience, and to know that by means of the votes they give they commit to the charge of their representatives for the two new parliamentary years the ease and welfare of their own persons as well as the fate and prosperity of the country.

Those who can be truly worthy of such important powers will have to be honest persons cognisant with the needs of the nation, competent to perform this ponderous duty, and whose political notions ought to have been made public to, and known by, the electors.

In view of the discussions which on the initiative of the Ministers took place in the National Consultative Assembly on the 2nd September, 1911, the Ministers and members deemed it necessary that, by a power to be vested in the members by the nation, they (members) should revise the constitution in the new Medjliss for the organisation of the country; we, therefore, having regard to this question, in accordance with the usage of the fundamental rule of a constitutional Government —namely, the referendum to the people—notify to all the individuals of the nation, and to those who are to be elected, to have this point in view, that for the deputies of this session this especial power is also observed, so that after the opening of the new Medjliss they should with freedom of decision and with exhaustive study of the question take what steps they may deem advisable.

Although in constitutional countries it is an ordinary custom that the date of the beginning of the elections and the date for the opening of the Medjliss are previously appointed and notified by the Government, yet as the elections for this session are in accordance with the law which has been passed by the Medjliss, and as there had been no time to arrange the necessary preliminaries, we have urgently commanded the Ministry of the Interior to take the necessary measures, so that in the electoral centres the preliminaries for the matter should be arranged as soon as possible, and the elections be begun; and that as soon as the result of the elections should become approximately known, to advise us accordingly of the appointment of the opening day of the new Medjliss. We also direct the deputies who will be elected to leave (may it please God) for Tehran as soon as possible.

On this occasion we beseech God Almighty and Most High to bestow beneficent concord and to enlighten the minds of the people by His inspiration.

ABEL GHASSEM, NASR-UL-MULK.

[2650] No. 149.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 435 of the 9th December, 1911, and your telegram No. 17 of the 6th January: Hormuz oxide.

Muin refuses to pay any compensation to Weir and Ellinger unless in pursuance of a judgment in some court of justice or of an arbitral award as provided for in article 14 of his contract with them, though in either of these cases he would, I gather, resist payment until he had recovered the amount from Strick.

He denies that a claim against him is not barred by supplementary agreement, as he contends that the terms of his concession absolutely preclude the shipment of oxide to Messrs. Weir during the currency of the Persian Government's contract with Strick, and constitute as effective a hindrance to it on the part of the Persian Government as his actual dispossession.

He professes his personal indifference as to whether he ships to the one firm or to the other.

As you have decided that the claim against the Persian Government cannot be pressed and that there is no procedure by which the matter might be referred to the British law courts in the first instance, I think that the only practical courses are that Messrs. Weir and Ellinger should submit this dispute with Muin to arbitration as provided for in article 14, or that some compromise should be arrived at. I might, for instance, endeavour to obtain an undertaking from Muin and the Persian Government that after the expiration of Messrs. Strick's contract Messrs. Weir and Ellinger should be given the option of a similar contract, while you might prevail on Strick to compensate in some degree for this delay in their profits by paying to them at least the value of the 1,000 tons of oxide which he has received gratis from the Persian Government in consideration for the indentures he has undertaken.

Case brought in a Persian court here would of course be a [?] farce and would involve Weir and Ellinger in useless expense.

[2681] No. 150

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 19, 1912*

YOUR telegram No. 38 of 17th January: Situation in Southern Persia.

I do not clearly understand the advantages of the proposed occupation of Bushire and Bunder Abbas, which, if they are to continue until the vice-consul and guards can return with safety to Shiraz, may be of very long duration. Unless the occupation is to be accompanied by a blockade of the coast, it would scarcely affect the real culprits. It would of course bring some stress to bear on the Persian Government, but the latter are only technically responsible for what has occurred, and there is no sign that they are not already doing their utmost towards restoring order on the road—four of the Swedish officers are about to start for Shiraz to organise a force. Until we put in our demand for satisfaction for the recent occurrences we shall not know whether an occupation of Bushire will be necessary in order to obtain it.

In these circumstances, and as I at present understand the case, I should be disposed at any rate to postpone occupation, especially while there is still hope that Russian occupation in the north may be merely temporary.

(Repeated to India.)

[50495/11] No. 151.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received January 19.)

(Unnumbered.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 19, 1912.*

SITUATION in Persia.

The Russian Government have instructed their Minister here to join me in a discussion of the situation and of measures that might be adopted for the establishment of better order in Persia.

I would remind you that I have not yet received your despatch No. 315 of the 2nd December to Sir G. Buchanan referred to in his telegram No. 331 of the 9th December, but I presume that I am authorised to confer with my Russian colleague.

I consider that the Russian Government should have consulted their representative earlier, before, in fact, in demanding Shuster's dismissal, they struck such a blow at the stability of the Persian Government.

My view of the situation as it stands at present makes it impossible for me to believe that subsequent demands by Russia can be compatible with parliamentary government, and it appears to me that no other form of government would be possible in the circumstances unless supported by foreign troops.

[2577] No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 19, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 50 of 18th January: Basti at Tabreez.

I concur in Sir G. Barclay's view, and you should point out to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the impossibility of encouraging the basti to leave, unless the requisite assurances respecting his life and liberty are given by the Russian Government.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 44.)

[2462] No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 19, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 49 of 17th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Please consult Russian Government as to first paragraph.

[2462] No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 49 of 17th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

We are consulting Russian Government about first paragraph. As to second, are we right in presuming that reference is to commission which sat at Erzeroum from 1843 to 1847, as no detailed report of the Frontier Commission appointed after the ratification in 1848 of the Treaty of Erzeroum was ever communicated to Persia or Turkey (see p. 10 of Foreign Office memorandum 8800)?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 42.)

[2790] No. 155.

Mr. Barry to Mr. Mallet.—(Received January 20.)

(Confidential.) *Dartmouth House, 2, Queen Anne's Gate,*
Dear Mr. Mallet, *London, January 17, 1912.*

IN the matter of the proposed Trans-Persian Railway scheme, when I had the pleasure of seeing you last, you said you would be glad to hear from time to time on the subject whenever there was anything of interest to communicate. It is, of course, common knowledge that a financial group has been formed in Paris to provide the necessary funds for the survey and the detailed study of the proposed railway, and thereafter to apply for the concession from the Persian Government. This committee has, I understand, now been formally organised, and it is expected that the first call will be made on the members in a very short time now.

The trend of events has suggested to the minds of some of the members of the committee on this side whether in the financial group formed in Paris, British interests are sufficiently represented, and there appear grounds for saying that there is undoubtedly a risk that these interests may suffer, if at this stage matters are allowed to drift without some more definite understanding being arrived at than at present exists, and as touching this subject I am taking the liberty to send you herewith an advance copy of a memorandum drawn up by Sir Walter Hughes and myself for the members of the English committee who have taken an interest in the scheme.*

Yours sincerely,
A. J. BARRY.

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* See Enclosure 2 in No. 196.

[2760] No. 156.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received January 20.)

Sir, 25, *Abchurch Lane, London, January* 19, 1912.

I BEG to enclose copies of telegrams exchanged with our chief manager in Tehran, dated the 17th and 18th instant.

The news that it was intended to withdraw His Britannic Majesty's consul from Shiraz came as a complete surprise, and it is now causing us great anxiety as to the future of our very important branch at that place. In the absence of any information concerning a step of such far-reaching effect, we are utterly unable to form any opinion as to whether it would be safe for the bank to continue the branch at Shiraz. I may add we would only close our branch there under the most severe pressure, as its importance to us is very great. Moreover, the branches at Ispahan and Yezd would suffer considerably by our withdrawal from Shiraz. If it is finally decided to withdraw, we trust that early information will be given us with a view to the best possible realisation of our banking securities. There is also the question of the disposal of our house property.

I have, &c.
T. JACKSON, *Chairman.*

Enclosure in No. 156.

Translation of Telegrams exchanged with Tehran.

(1.)

Received January 17, 1912.

PRIVATELY informed by British Minister that British Government decided withdraw at once British consul and Indian escort from Shiraz. We do not consider it necessary withdraw bank. What is your opinion?

(2.)

Dispatched January 17, 1912.

Your telegram of to-day.

Do you confirm it. If so, we must communicate with Foreign Office as to our action.

(3.)

Received January 18, 1912.

We confirm the news. According to instructions from Foreign Office withdrawal must be carried out as soon as possible.

[2805] No. 157.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 41 of the 19th January: Bast of deputy-governor at Tabreez.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that the Russian Government have no desire that the basti should be condemned to death, but cannot consent to his escaping without any punishment at all. He was one of the chief promoters of the recent troubles, and ought to be deprived of official rank and salary. His Excellency was not clear as to whether this could best be done by his trial or by an administrative act of the Persian Government.

[2806] No. 158.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 43 of the 19th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to communicating report, but says that the Persian Government have already got map.

[2807] No. 159.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 34, 35 of 17th January, and 40 of 18th January.

I had a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning on the general situation in Persia, and read to him your despatch No. 11. I dwelt on the serious position in which we were placed in South Persia, and urged the necessity of the two Governments uniting their efforts to restore order by giving the Persian Government effective support.

As regards the ex-Shah, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is ready to act in the manner reported in the fourth paragraph of my telegram No. 10 of 14th January. He agrees to the sum of 50,000 tomans as the amount of his pension, but begs that you will not ask him to give an undertaking that if the Shah returns without their consent the two Governments will support the Persian Government against him. This would commit the Russian Government too far; but he would always be ready to warn the Shah of the folly of attempting to regain the throne now that His Majesty's Government have declared that they will under no circumstances recognise him.

His Excellency repeated that it was necessary to procure a large loan at once, and suggested that it might be connected with the concession for the trans-Persian railway, and that the financial groups who were promoting that undertaking might interest themselves in it. I spoke to him of Seligman's proposals, and as he knew nothing of the negotiations which had taken place on the subject, or of Seligman's conversations with the Minister of Finance, I gave him a short account of them. He asked me whether I thought that Seligman would be prepared to renew his proposals. I replied that, if his Excellency concurred, we might approach him on the subject. His Excellency said that he must first speak to the Minister of Finance.

With regard to Kazvin troops, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would withdraw them as soon as he could, but some Russian soldiers had recently been fired at at Resht, and as long as there was the least danger of a fresh outbreak of disorders Russian public opinion would not condone their withdrawal. I suggested that they might at any rate be recalled from Kazvin to Resht or Tabreez as a first step to their complete withdrawal. He seemed to think this possible, but added that such a step would be better received here were the Persian Government to engage to pay, as soon as their financial position permitted it, an indemnity to the families of the Russian killed and wounded. He reduced the amount of this indemnity to-day from 1,000,000 to 200,000 or 250,000 roubles. He concluded by saying that he would consult the military authorities on the question.

I then remarked that if the two Governments were to work to any good purpose to establish a stable régime it was essential that they should be loyally supported by their agents in that country. The best relations existed between the two Ministers, but subaltern agents were inclined to take a line of their own. We had had the case of Major Stokes, but we had recalled him. I feared, however, that some of the Russian consular officers liked to create incidents, or, at all events, to exaggerate them, and even to play the part of *agents provocateurs.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he was not satisfied with some of his consuls; that the Russian Minister at Tehran had even complained of them; that he would probably have to make some changes, including, perhaps, the removal of the Russian consul-general at Tehran.

I carried away from this conversation the impression that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is most anxious to work loyally with us and to re-establish normal and correct

relations with Persia. His policy has, however, been recently attacked in the press, and his influence in the Government is no longer what it was when M. Stolypin was President of the Council. The attacks made on Russia by the Persian committee, which are bitterly resented here, render it more difficult for him to meet our wishes, as he will probably be accused of yielding to British dictation.

[2464] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 38 of 13th January and Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 33 of 16th January: Treasurer-general.

When your Russian colleague is similarly instructed, you should inform Persian Government that His Majesty's Government acquiesce in M. Mornard's appointment as acting treasurer-general pending an exchange of views with the Persian Government for a definite appointment.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 44.)

[2575] No. 161.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 54 of 18th January: Situation in Southern Persia.

My telegram No. 38 of 17th January was intended to explain why we prefer withdrawal to occupation. Information received all points to one or the other of these courses being inevitable, and to opinion that position at Shiraz will be untenable by existing force. I think you were amply justified in expressing this opinion.

[2810] No. 162.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January* 21, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 45 of 19th January, last paragraph: Turco-Persian frontier.

Yes.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[2968] No. 163.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Tehran, January* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of the two notes and the *aide-mémoire* which I reported in my above-mentioned telegram that I had received from the Persian Government on the subject of the recent attack on Mr. Smart's escort in the south.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 163.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)
Your Excellency, *Tehran, December* 30, 1911.

I HAVE received with much regret your Excellency's note of the 27th instant respecting the attack stated to have been made on Mr. Smart's Indian escort by the inhabitants of the villages in the neighbourhood of Kazerun.

On the evening of the 26th, when Abbas Kuli Khan informed me verbally of the incident, after expressing my regret for the incident, I sent strong telegrams for the investigation into the matter, punishment of the offenders, and for the protection of Mr. Smart and party. I am waiting for the reports of the measures taken by the local authorities, when I will communicate again with you on the subject.

I do not consider it superfluous to refer you to my reply of the 30th October last, in which I had foreseen the difficulties which might arise on the arrival of the Indian troops. I also refer you particularly to the passage in your note of the 24th of the same month, in which you have expressly stated that the force in question will neither patrol the roads nor make expeditions. I have to add that, had the British Government carefully considered my sincere statements at the time, there would have been less chance of the present regrettable incident for which the Persian Government is extremely sorry.

While drawing your Excellency's attention to the opinion all the time expressed by the Persian Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Persian Government will make every possible effort for the punishment of the offenders and for the preservation of suitable respect towards Mr. Smart, and I request the assistance of your Government in the matter in order that the measures taken by the Persian Government may freely and without hitch or hindrance come to a successful issue.

I avail, &c.
VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 163.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)
Your Excellency, *Tehran, December* 30, 1911.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 30th instant regarding the arrival of 269 Indian infantry at Bushire, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram from the Governor of the Gulf ports, stating that the consulate-general informed him on the 29th that the troops would arrive on the 30th. The governor at the same time states that in view of the present public excitement, which is on account of the present incident, the arrival of the troops may in all probability give rise to some unexpected incidents.

I, therefore, have the honour to inform you that at the present moment when the public excitement is not yet allayed, the Persian Government adhere more than ever to the opinion expressed in my note of the 30th October last, on the occasion of the arrival of the Indian sowars.

I feel confident that a friendly Power will not admit that before the difficulties created by the dispatch of the first party of troops are removed (and of these Mr. Smart's regrettable incident is an example), further troubles should be created by the dispatch of fresh troops.

As is evident from the telegraphic reports received from the Shiraz Karguzari, and which were sent to the legation for your information, the measures taken by the Persian Government for the arrest of the perpetrators have been quick in their effect, and the men have been arrested by the Government officials. Of course, after full investigation, they will be punished.

Under these circumstances there will be no necessity for the dispatch of further troops on the part of that friendly Power, as such a measure will increase the present difficulties.

I earnestly hope that your Excellency will take the matter into serious consideration, move your Government to give up their present intention, and oblige the Persian Government by the removal of the causes of the present difficulties.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 163.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Barclay by Persian Government.

ACCORDING to a telegram received this morning from the Movagher-ed-Dowleh, the British consul-general has informed him that a force of 250 Indian soldiers are landing to-day at Bushire.

Contemporaneously with this intimation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning received Sir G. Barclay's note corroborating that statement, and requesting that facilities be afforded for the disembarkation of these troops.

1. Hussein Khan is instructed to inform the British Minister that the Persian Government have taken without loss of time the most stringent measures to deal themselves with the situation; as the Vossuk-ed-Dowleh himself assured Sir George when he expressed deep regret on Thursday, all necessary steps are being taken to ensure Mr. Smart's safe arrival in Shiraz and the exemplary punishment of the offenders. Already, according to a telegram received yesterday and communicating to the British Minister through Abbas Kuli Khan, the culprits, or a number of them, have been apprehended, and they will be dealt with, after an enquiry, with the utmost rigour of the law.

2. Moreover, Sir George Barclay will admit that by the improper use of Maxim guns the sowars have already exacted for these untoward incidents a more than sufficient reparation represented by the loss of over 100 Persian lives.

3. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Russian ultimatum to which Great Britain was a party, has created a widespread anti-foreign feeling in the country, which it will not be so easy to modify. It has intensified the agitation already fostered by the increase of consular guards.

4. Sir G. Barclay will remember that when first, in spite of our protests, these reinforcements arrived it was specifically and officially undertaken by His Britannic Majesty's Legation that they would not be used as escorts or on expeditions. Sir E. Grey even stated in the House of Commons on the 27th ultimo that their action had been limited; they were merely going to increase the consular guards at three places, and they would remain there to protect life and property if danger occurred.

Nevertheless, and without any attention being paid to our remonstrances, these troops have been constantly sent to and fro, without even due notification being given to the local authorities; they have freely moved about the interior with artillery, and, as already pointed out, this action has added fuel to the fire of public feeling.

5. The coincidence of the projected arrival of the new force, mentioned in Sir G. Barclay's note, with the period of religious mourning, when the susceptibilities of the people are awakened in a peculiar degree, make it difficult for the Government—who are quite able themselves to cope with the situation—to take any responsibility for the safety of a foreign armed force.

Hussein Khan is to urge strongly that any contemplated measures be dispensed with, and a free field given to the Persian Government to exercise their legitimate sovereign action.

The situation is a delicate one and requires to be handled with great care; we must guard against all provocation, which might have disastrous consequences. The British Minister knows that the southern tribes are numerous and powerful; they are brave, restive, and well armed. Once their passions are aroused—and such foreign intervention will achieve that end—it will be a gigantic task to bridle them.

An expedition in the present circumstances would not only be a direct infringement of the sovereignty of Persia, but it would defeat the very object it was intended to serve.

Hussein Khan is, finally, to appeal to Sir G. Barclay's feelings of friendship for Persia, his foresight and sagacity, and his desire to facilitate the arduous task of the

Cabinet (at a moment when they are hard pressed by so many misfortunes) to urge the British Government, for the above reasons and extenuating circumstances, not to take any drastic measures, but to leave it to the Persian Government to deal themselves effectively with the situation.

December 30, 1911.

[2860] No. 164.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 16, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Van dealing with various points connected with the Turco-Persian frontier question.

You will observe that the frontier line given by Captain Seel in this despatch would not include the district of Deshtebil, between Urmia and Ushnu, which is now in the possession of the Turks. The Turkish boundary does not, however, include Soujboulak, but passes round it to the south and west.

On the whole, the line indicated by Captain Seel is less advanced than the one apparently indicated by the commissioners' reports as being the boundary of the territory now occupied by the Turks.

I would venture to suggest that it would be very useful if Captain Seel could be furnished with copies of the commissioners' reports.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 164.

Vice-Consul Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Van, December* 25, 1912.

IN my telegram No. 12 I had the honour to inform your Excellency of the positions on the frontier said to be held by the Turkish frontier guards.

By reference to the map it will be seen that the frontier line bounding the territory claimed to be Turkish descends south from Bayezid to Razi. It then turns east, skirting the south edge of the Kotur country to Yezdikhan. It then turns south through Vardane, Nazirova, west of the Salmas plain, to Chari (Kala Cheirik). From here it turns south-east to Jamalava and Galungi, on the main Khoi–Urmia road. Thence it bends back, leaving the Urmia plain to Persia, to Issisu. From here it appears to run in a south-easterly direction through Nawana, Ushnu, and Nagirde to Soujboulak, but the incompleteness of our maps prevented me from following this part accurately.

This line is what the military authorities claim to represent the *status quo*. Your Excellency will be able to judge whether this line corresponds with that represented as being the frontier to the British and Russian commissioners who travelled there this summer.

This information, having been given to me voluntarily, evidently with a view to my transmitting it to your Excellency, leads me to believe that in the summer they may possibly have represented themselves as not being quite so advanced, the more so as I have been told that some minor officials boast of having deceived the commissioners.

In order to prevent the Russians from sending troops to Urmia, it evidently would suit the purposes of the Turks to claim that their posts had always extended so as to entirely cut off Urmia from the north. The vali here says that the troops sent to Khoi now occupy posts distributed along the main Khoi–Urmia road.

As regards the calling to the colours of the Ihtiat (my telegram No. 13), from a military source I have learnt that only five battalions were to be strengthened, and that to the extent of 200 men each, who would be replaced by recruits when possible. The inference is that the effective of the battalions on the frontier at present is only 200, and that it is desired to raise them up to the normal peace strength of 400. There is a discrepancy between this information and that contained in my telegram, but I am unable to say at present which is the more likely to be true.

The reason now alleged for the strengthening of these battalions is the fear that the close proximity of the Russian troops will excite the Kurds in the Nevahi-i-Sharkie to further lawlessness, and that thereupon the Russians, on the pretext that the Turkish Government was unable to maintain tranquillity, might attempt to enter this territory.

It appears that since my despatch No. 26, after a certain amount of vacillation, the Government sent instructions to the military authorities here to avoid as far as possible for the present any action that might raise the Persian frontier question.

As evidence of Russia's hostile intentions with regard to the Nevahi-i-Sharkie, in addition to the accusation that Russia supplies these frontier Kurds with arms and systematically instigates them to lawlessness and rebellion against Turkish rule, and the alleged purchase by the Russian Bank at Urmia of the tapous of the lands of the evicted Persian khans, the case of Abdul Rezzak, who, while engaged in rousing the hostility of the Kurds to Turkish rule, was accorded protection by the Russian vice-consul at Urmia, is also cited. Further, it is alleged that in the district of Erkil two Russian missionaries are busily engaged in converting the Nestorians to Orthodoxy, and that the Russian consul of Mosul, a lieutenant-colonel of the General Staff, who paid a visit to Van this summer, made a reconnaissance of the Wazna Pass route and Sulduz district during his return journey.

With reference to my telegram of the 15th November, the transport waggons which formed a portion of the caravan of ammunition have returned to Van, and I have ascertained that they left their portion of the ammunition at Ashkale. Other consignments went to Arjish and Serai.

I do not see anything abnormal in these movements unless it be that normal activity should prevail in the straightening out of the chaos which has existed in this, and to a lesser degree in the Erzeroum, Army Corps.

There is no doubt that the chief Simko of Kotur is a grievous thorn in the side of the Turkish Government, and that if Turkey had been as favourably situated as other nations it would have been considered as having more than a sufficient pretext for assuming the control of the Kotur country. Whatever be the cause of Simko's restlessness, it is a fact that the Turks suffer great annoyance from him, and dare not, for fear of remonstrances from foreign Powers, take effective measures for his suppression.

The control of the Van–Serai–Kotur–Khoi is also regarded as of strategical importance by the Turks. This view I have further explained in an appreciation, from military considerations only, of the value to Turkey of the Nevahi-i-Sharkie, which I have the honour to enclose.*

This appreciation embodies the considerations which appear to have weight with the Turkish military authorities, and I forward it in the hope that it may be of aid to the understanding of the sacrifices which Turkey would be prepared to make for the preservation of these districts either now or at any future date when more fortunately situated.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[2867] No. 165.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 22.)

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 36 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, respecting the journey of a Russian staff officer to Kharput.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 165.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)
(Confidential.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, January* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to Captain Molyneux-Sell's despatch No. 28 of the 25th ultimo, in which he discusses the probable Turkish lines of advance in the event of hostilities with Russia, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that Colonel Vyshinsky, the staff officer attached to the Russian consulate-general at Erzeroum, who left here with his family on the 14th November, ostensibly on leave, is now staying at Kharput, having spent the last seven weeks in travelling through the districts of Erzinjan, Sivas, and Malattia.

As I have now reason to believe that the leave of absence granted to Colonel Vyskinsky will not begin to run until his arrival at Beirout, the presumption is that he is engaged on the collection of military information.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[3072] No. 166.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 22.)

Sir, *India Office, January* 20, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant forwarding a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated 11th December last, regarding the recent disorders at Shiraz, and to say that he concurs in the views expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Knox's despatch of the 20th October, read with Mr. Chick's report of the 11th November (copy of which was included in the correspondence sent to your department on the 1st instant), indicates, on the part of the Persian authorities and tribesmen, a degree of contempt for the representatives and subjects of Great Britain which is unexampled in a region where British influence has until recently been paramount, and which, it is to be feared, will make the maintenance of British interests in the future a very difficult matter.

For the succession of outrages recorded in the correspondence mentioned above (which culminated in the organised attacks on Mr. Smart's escort in December) His Majesty's Government, in their desire not to increase the difficulties of the Persian Government, have, so far as is known to this Office, not yet formulated to the Persian Government any statement of the reparation to be demanded; and it has been decided that in present circumstances the evacuation of Shiraz is the best course to be pursued. It is suggested, with a view to maintain British interests in the regions concerned and to prevent the evacuation being interpreted as a permanent victory for the forces of disorder, that the nature of the reparation to be demanded of the Persian Government should be considered and communicated to them at the same time as the intention of His Majesty's Government to evacuate Shiraz.

With regard to the last paragraph of your letter I am to say that the Secretary of State for India has read with much pleasure of the good services rendered by Mr. Smith and by the Indian troops, and he will not fail to bring them to notice in the proper quarter. But though he recognises that the circumstances were of exceptional difficulty he thinks that the grant of any tangible reward is not called for and would create an undesirable precedent.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[2841] No. 167.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 34 of 16th January.

After consultation with respective consular officers I do not think that there is any need to evacuate Yezd or Ispahan, or that evacuation of Shiraz will have very much effect at Kerman.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[2842] No. 168.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 22, 1912.*

FOLLOWING sent to India:—

"Your telegram S. No. 18 of 19th January.

"After consultation with Colonel Douglas, I consider that a brigade of four battalions of infantry, of which one should be pioneers, and one or two mountain batteries would be required, in addition to communications troops, which should be at least two battalions. The best time for the troops to arrive would be towards the end of March. Tribes would be then beginning to move, and would be more vulnerable. Water would be abundant, and there would be some grazing for the animals.

"Is it intended to withdraw squadron from Ispahan? British consul-general thinks that this might be done without endangering life and property of British subjects, though it would diminish [?] prestige. Squadron could probably proceed to the coast by the Bakhtiari road unsupported by other troops."

[2266] No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 22, 1912.*

WITH reference to Mr. O'Beirne's despatch No. 302 of the 9th July, 1910, relative to the purchase by a British syndicate of growing timber in Persian territory on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the solicitors to that company,* setting forth the present position of this enterprise, and asking that the necessary information on the subject may be conveyed to the Russian Government.

I have to request your Excellency to address a note to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense desired by the firm.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3164] No. 170.

Messrs. Ellinger to Foreign Office.—(Received January 23.)

Sir, 28, *Oxford Street, Manchester, January 22, 1912.*

WITH further reference to your letter of the 8th instant relative to the Muin-ut-Tujjar's right to your unofficial protection in respect of the disputed Hormuz concession, we are now in receipt of letters from this gentleman in which he writes as follows:—

"I have just received your telegram of the 4th instant, which has very much astonished me, in that you tell me that the Foreign Office states that I have not applied to the British Legation to ask their protection, and that in the opinion of this legation I do not wish for their protection, &c. As far as I think, I have always persisted in

* No. 131.

seeking this protection, not only through your mediation, but myself personally at Tehran, and I have always forced myself to act in such a manner that this protection might be granted me at the desired moment. You have assured me that if I transacted business with an English firm the British Government would protect my rights; but, unhappily, when the time arrived and I applied to you and to the legation, they have not kept the promises which they made, and both the Foreign Office and the legation have excused themselves, alleging that a member of the Medjliss, Vekil-el-Royaya, had stated that the firman had expired.

"In the first place, the statement of a member of the Medjliss is not a document, and especially the statement of a man like Vekil-el-Royaya, about whose misdeeds have been published long articles in the newspapers, and who only acted in this manner in order to obtain a commission.

"In the second place, I had already deposited my firman at the legation, and this had been translated by the dragoman of the legation, who had informed the Foreign Office that the firman was in perpetuity.

"Thirdly, I protested to you that, admitting that the Foreign Office had not kept the promises which it made me, it is you whom I hold responsible for my losses, seeing that it is you who informed me that the protection had been promised.

"Fourthly, if you will refer to my letter you will see that I had to submit to force.

"As regards your statement in your telegram that I wish to make a contract with the Persian Government in conformity with the Medjliss's Bill, this is not a wish, but rather submission to force.

"I have been waiting patiently for twenty-three months for a just Government to do me justice, but unhappily I gave in at the evidence that the situation was being aggravated after my stock of the value of 40,000*l.* had been confiscated. Although I was given a bond of 24,000*l.*, they kept back, however, everything until I had accepted the proposals which were made to me, and if I had not accepted I should not have got into possession of my funds so soon.

"Considering the situation of the country, and in order to reduce the figure of the losses I have suffered, and also to re-enter into possession of my mines, I have had to accept the forcible propositions looking forward to happier days to protest against the injustice.

"I lay great stress on obtaining the protection of the British Government, providing that it is complete and not like it has been in the past.

"In my opinion, the best way would be if you could get the Foreign Office to telegraph to Sir George Barclay in order to enter into negotiations with me and to guarantee me his support for the solution of the Hormuz question, in order that we may be able to enter into discussion for the solution of Messrs. Strick's affair first of all.

"If the legation guarantees me its support to act in the matter as an impartial judge, I think I can prove that their contract has been illegal and that they have taken without right the oxide which I had prepared for you, and in case the legation would not be willing to allow Messrs. Strick's contract to be cancelled, at least they should oblige these gentlemen to meet their engagements towards you and forbid them to make further shipments before your affair has been settled.

"According to a document of our Foreign Office, which came into my possession about four months ago, the Persian Legation, London, has informed Messrs. Strick that if in the space of twenty days your affair had not been settled, these gentlemen would be held responsible for all the damages which might result. In our new arrangement with the Government I am not compelled to execute their contract, but I am held responsible for any loss which the non-execution would cause the Government.

"Moreover, I think, if Messrs. Strick do not meet their engagements we will have the right to cancel their contract, but if anything is done in accordance with the legation there will be no further unpleasantnesses for us. I think also that, if Messrs. Strick's affair is settled, our affair with the Persian Government will become simpler.

"In case such a telegram is dispatched to Sir George Barclay, I shall thank you to advise me."

We hope you will give the matter your serious consideration, and that you will be able to see your way to cable to Sir George Barclay on the lines indicated by the Muin.

Mr. M. Ellinger will call upon you on Thursday next, and hopes then to hear that

you are agreeable to the dispatch of a cable giving the desired instructions to Sir George Barclay, and also to receive your assurance that His Majesty's Government will not support any claim on the part of Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited), either against the Persian Government or the Muin-ut-Tujjar, arising out of the contract made by the Persian Government with Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited), in violation of the rights of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves, and in defiance of the warning given by His Majesty's Government to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited), that they could not count upon the help of the former in support of the maintenance of their rights under this contract.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND Co.

[3253] No. 171.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd January, 1912, relative to the position at Shiraz.

India Office, January 23, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 171.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January 23, 1912.*

IN accordance with directions contained in your telegram dated the 16th instant, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran is being consulted. We consider it necessary, however, to state our opinion before any specific action is taken. The situation appears to have become considerably easier since the alternative of evacuation was adumbrated. Arrival of party at Shiraz unmolested and safe passage and treatment accorded along a parallel route to Mr. Chick have greatly mitigated the serious aspect which was then presented by reports of attack on Mr. Smart. In any case the urgency, on which the above alternative was based, of relief of our military column at Shiraz does not appear to exist any longer. The detachment could, with little risk, return viâ Ahwaz or [? and] Ispahan, should need arise. No impression of imminent necessity, moreover, of withdrawing our consulate even from Shiraz, still less of need for evacuation of other centres of interior [?] mentioned, is conveyed to us by recent information and expressions of view as to gravity of situation at Shiraz, existing and prospective, which we have received from that place. We do not believe either, as at present advised, that the several local situations in those places would be regarded by British and foreign firms or institutions represented there as justifying them in any way in leaving their posts and valuable properties and vested interests. We are inclined to think, in fact, that seriousness of present situation at Shiraz, and also probable danger of developments next spring, have been over-estimated by our local officers; and it is our belief that by timely negotiation with tribes concerned, and by other means which should in our opinion first be attempted, the danger can very probably be averted.

Further, a serious endeavour to effect improvement in Shiraz and Shiraz road is being made by the Persian Government, and the arrest of a large number of the persons concerned in the recent attack on our troops has in some way been effected by them, if a telegram received from them by Persian consul-general here can be credited. Information also reaches us of actual departure for Shiraz of four Swedes. It would appear from these developments, if they are confirmed, that situation is less hopeless than anticipated, and that more effective action may be hoped for from Persian Government under Regent than formerly when the Medjliss hampered them. In the second place, wisdom of withdrawing consulates, and thereby leaving in Central Persia a vacuum likely to be taken advantage of to our detriment by others, is becoming increasingly doubtful to our minds; and the aspect of the case might verge on the ludicrous, in the event of a force being dispatched by us to withdraw consulates without

other British or foreign subjects. A war division less one brigade is considered by our military advisers to be the minimum force required to effect withdrawal with dignity from Shiraz alone; and no one will believe, we are afraid, mere withdrawal of a consulate to be our object in dispatching a force of such strength. Our good faith will be further impugned if untoward and not improbable incidents lead to further hostilities causing withdrawal to be delayed or impeded; and, in either case, Russia will be afforded [? passage omitted] in the north, and [? passage omitted] effect will be produced on Mahommedan opinion in India and elsewhere.

We are strongly of opinion, in these circumstances, that His Majesty's Government should reconsider the question of withdrawal.

As alternative, we recommend that negotiations with a view to satisfaction being exacted from those responsible for past incident, and to opening the road by levies of subsidised headmen, should be opened with the tribes as suggested in our telegram dated the 11th instant. As a means of associating Persian Government with the scheme, the Swedish officers now reported to be starting for Shiraz might be employed to supervise such levies with assistance of British officers.

It is necessary, however, that present Khan of Borasjun should be punished or eliminated before there can be a commencement of negotiations. Persian Government should, we suggest, be at once called upon to depose him formally from Borasjun governorship; if they fail to do this, it will be necessary for us to deal with him ourselves, a course of action in which, owing to khan's accessibility from the coast, no serious difficulty is involved.

Restriction of the present free import of arms and ammunition to the tribes is a primary essential to their good behaviour and control in future. It is of imperative necessity, in order to effect this, that Persian littoral should be placed under a strict blockade, on the same lines as that of the coast of Mekran. Arrangements for increasing the stringency of this blockade are already being made by us.

The vindication of our position *vis-à-vis* Persian Government, in regard to recent incidents, has still to be considered. Desire not to increase Persian Government's difficulties, and not to create a situation from which withdrawal would be difficult, is to a large extent the basis of our abstention from sending more troops to Shiraz and Shiraz road, or even to Bushire; it is for consideration, however, whether we should not take steps to exact reparation for recent incidents and cost of measures now proposed from Persian Government. Amount of pressure which must be brought to bear on Persian Government with this object is a matter for Sir G. Barclay to advise upon. The location of an infantry regiment and a mountain artillery battery in our own enclave at Basidu is suggested as a preliminary step in this direction. For several reasons, more especially in connection with blockade of coast of Tangistan against importation of arms, it is desirable that there should be some military force in the Gulf at the present time. Our communications to Persian Government will acquire weight from presence of troops at Basidu, and by occupying Kishm position [?] with same force we could conveniently apply increased pressure should it become necessary to do so.

In view of these reports, we earnestly trust that policy of withdrawal will be abandoned for the present.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.)

[3242] No. 172.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received January 23.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January 23, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, dated the 20th instant.

A copy has been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 172.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Calcutta, January* 20, 1912.

AFFAIRS in Persia.

The unruliness of the tribes at Fars and Luristan is to be greatly accounted for by facility with which arms and ammunition can be obtained from trucial chiefs of coast and Albida and Koweit. It is known that large quantities are going to those places from Muscat, partly by land, partly by sea. Tribes are at present mostly armed with small-bore modern rifle ammunition, which cannot be refilled. Older rifles, of which the cartridge cases can be filled up by black powder many times, are mostly sold to tribes farther north and east. Only routes by which ammunition can be obtained are first through Russia, second through Turkey viâ Bagdad, third across Persian Gulf. First and second are not practicable at present for large supplies, and if we stop third the movement among the tribes must come to an end soon for want of ammunition.

At conference of the 20th January, at which general policy to be pursued was discussed, it was decided that blockade should be made as stringent as possible. At request of Viceroy and Government of India I have ordered "Proserpine" to proceed immediately to Persian Gulf.

[3187] No. 173.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 23, 1912.

PERSIAN Government have learnt from telegrams which they have tapped that a combined movement on Tehran in the interests of the ex-Shah is contemplated by the forces of Shuja-ed-Dowleh and of other agents of the ex-Shah at Ardebil and other places in Azerbaijan. This discovery has caused the Regent and the Cabinet great anxiety.

Telegrams which have been read to me leave little doubt that the Russian consular officers are encouraging the movement.

You might see your way to urge Russia to discourage any scheme of Shuja-ed-Dowleh on behalf of the ex-Shah, as it would only be owing to the Russian occupation that he would be able to carry on such an enterprise.

The Regent and the Persian Government both urge that we should lose no time in making known to the Persian Government our joint programme, which they surmise will include some proposal for dealing with the ex-Shah. In this connection Minister for Foreign Affairs reminds me of your promise that after [? group omitted: ? compliance with] Russian demands as formulated in second ultimatum [? groups omitted: ? your influence] would be used for future measures helpful to Persia (see your telegram No. 462, repeating Foreign Office telegram No. 834 of 16th December to St. Petersburgh).

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me not to divulge to Russian Minister that telegrams had been tapped.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3257] No. 174.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 23, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 43 of 15th January: Imperial Bank's minting contract.

To-day's "Novoe Vremya" contains a telegram from its Tehran correspondent maintaining that the extension of the Imperial Bank of Persia's minting contract is plainly contrary to the Anglo-Russian understanding and to the interests of the Russian Bank.

[2805] No. 175.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 18 of 20th January: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

There seems at present no alternative to the man's remaining at His Majesty's consulate.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 47.)

[2807] No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 20th January: Ex-Shah.

Your language is approved.

I should wish you to obtain from the Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible a definite reply to the various points raised in the identic telegram of the two Ministers (Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 29 of 10th January), as it is of importance that some proposals should be placed before the Persian Government without undue delay.

With regard to pension to ex-Shah, it must be remembered that he has forfeited all equit ble claim to one. His incursion put the Persian Government to expense, thereby weakening them and contributing indirectly to increase state of disorder in the south, which is inflicting great injury upon British trade and places us in a very embarrassing position. If, therefore, he receives a pension it should only be in return for some increased security against his return. He should at least give a written promise to reside in Russia and not return without consent of Russian Government.

I think Minister for Foreign Affairs ought to exact some security to this effect, as, though Russian Government were not cognisant of his return, it seems impossible that he should have returned to Persia through Russian territory or received any support from it without some negligence on part of subordinate Russian officials.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 52.)

[3651] No. 177.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1912.

I SPOKE to Count Benckendorff in the sense of my telegram No. 48 of to-day's date about the ex-Shah's pension, emphasising the damage which the ex-Shah's incursion into Persia had done incidentally to British interests in Southern Persia. Count Benckendorff said the important thing was to get the ex-Shah out of Persia. He did not deprecate a written undertaking such as I had suggested being required, but it might be that the ex-Shah would refuse to come out of Persia with such a condition. Would it be wise to insist on the condition if his withdrawal from Persia could be obtained by waiving it? I said if the ex-Shah did come out of Persia without any condition I thought the Russian Government should put him under surveillance.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2266] No. 178.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lawrance, Webster, Messer, and Nicholls.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, relative to the purchase by a British syndicate of growing timber in Persian territory on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, and to state that he has instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to convey the necessary information to the Russian Government in accordance with your request, and has similarly notified His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and consul at Baku.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[3484] No. 179.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, January 24, 1912.

MR. SHIPLEY et M. Minorski ont constaté clairement que les Turcs se sont avancés assez loin au delà de la zone contestée, et sur toute son étendue, et qu'ils y ont pris toutes les mesures indiquées pour y affermir leur autorité.

Le Gouvernement Impérial reçoit en outre de bonnes sources des informations portant que le Gouvernement turc prépare l'expédition dans la zone occupée par lui, de nouveaux contingents militaires, et de nombreuses indications prouvent le désir du Gouvernement turc d'occuper tout le Soujboulak persan, où, d'ailleurs, les délégués susnommés ont constaté que l'expansion turque ne s'est nullement arrêtée.

En vue de ce qui précède, et en vue aussi que la Commission turco-perse de Délimitation doit commencer sous peu ses travaux, le Gouvernement Impérial estime opportun et très désirable qu'une démarche soit faite à Constantinople, conjointement avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, en vue de prévenir toute nouvelle expédition de forces turques dans les confins persans et toute nouvelle expansion de leur autorité.

Le Gouvernement Impérial pense qu'il y aurait lieu, si ce projet était approuvé par Sir Edward Grey, que des instructions à cet effet soient données aux Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de Russie à Constantinople.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 24 janvier, 1912.

[3411] No. 180.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January* 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 47 of 20th January: Treasurer-general.
Russian Minister has not received these instructions.
(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3415] No. 181.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 24, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 23rd January, penultimate paragraph.

Until I know what reparation is to be demanded, and on this point I hope to be able to make suggestions to-morrow, I cannot advise as to the amount of pressure which will be necessary to exact it.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[3412] No. 182.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 50 of 23rd January: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

I am quite willing, with your approval, to urge basti to leave the British consulate, provided that he be given safe-conduct to Tehran, and that Russian Government give proper assurances that they will not demand further punishment than that indicated in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 18 of 20th January.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3418] No. 183.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 13th January.

After seeing Lecoffre and satisfying myself that he is not likely to prove an undesirable, I asked Mornard to give him a post in the south, and Mornard is now urging his appointment at Shiraz upon the Persian Government. I shall, if necessary, support his action.

[3413] No. 184.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 24, 1912.

MORNARD has asked the permission of the Persian Government to engage eight Belgians as assistants for the Treasury, as nearly all the American assistants desire to leave.

He asks my support, but as the engagement of these Belgians will naturally tend to consolidate Mornard's position as treasurer-general, I ask your sanction before supporting his application, which, unless he is instructed to the contrary, will certainly have the support of my Russian colleague.

The engagement of Europeans in place of the resigning Americans is of course necessary.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3429] No. 185.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 24, 1912.

I SPOKE to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon in the terms of your telegram No. 48 of 23rd January, and supplemented it by repeating what Sir G. Barclay had reported in his telegram No. 59 of 23rd January about projected movement on Tehran and encouragement given to it by Russian consuls.

His Excellency assured me that he did not believe for a moment that Russian consuls were encouraging such a movement, though their sympathies might be with the ex-Shah, as they imagined that they understood Persia better than their Government and had no confidence in the new régime. He would, however, telegraph to the Russian consul-general at Tabreez to do all he could to discourage Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and to warn him that, if he made any such movement, Russia would have nothing more to do with him.

He was quite prepared to join His Majesty's Government in making a communication to the Persian Government on the lines proposed by the Ministers. He had already, he said, explained attitude which he was ready to take with regard to the ex-Shah, and would agree to attach to his pension condition that he would not return without the consent of the Russian Government. He would also tell him that the

Russian Government would not consent to his again establishing himself on Russian territory, as they had had quite enough of him, and he might go to Switzerland or wherever he chose. He said that he thought that it would be better for us not to fix pension definitely at 50,000 tomans, but to let the Persian Government settle the matter with the ex-Shah, as they might perhaps not be prepared to go so far. I explained that we had mentioned this sum as the maximum which the two Governments should suggest.

As regards loan, we might tell the Persian Government that we were consulting together as to the best means of giving them financial assistance and raising a large loan. He then told me that a Frenchman by the name of Benac was coming to see him on Friday. Benac represents Noetzlin, director of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, who is a friend of Lord Revelstoke. That the bank seem to be prepared to float a large Persian loan and to make temporary advances to the Persian Government conjointly with question of the concession of the Trans-Persian Railway. Minister for Foreign Affairs believes that Baring Brothers would be prepared to act with the French bank. He thinks that the loan contract might be negotiated by the Russian and British banks at Tehran, so as to show that it had the support of the British and Russian Governments, and then be transferred to the French bank and Barings. His Excellency much prefers this scheme to Seligman's, whom he regards with suspicion as having German connections. I expressed no opinion on the subject.

His Excellency approves all the other points included in the programme drawn up by the two Ministers relative to gendarmeries, small army, and constitutional changes.

If you are in favour of making communication to Persian Government without delay, I would suggest that you should draft text, and that I should submit it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his observations.

[3253] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay,

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1912.

VICEROY of India's telegram of yesterday repeated to you Shiraz.

I approve of proposals of Government of India, and agree that the best possible effect should be given to them without delay in the hope of averting necessity of withdrawing from Shiraz later on.

[3187] No. 187.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 59 of 23rd January: Ex-Shah.

You should point out to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that activity by Shuja-ed-Dowleh ought certainly to be capable of being checked, and that, in view of his Excellency's assurances (see your telegram No. 1 of 3rd January), I earnestly hope that every sign of such activity will be discouraged.

You should also urge his Excellency to convey to the ex-Shah immediately the warning mentioned in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 20 of 20th January.

Persian Minister here also informs us that Reshid-es-Sultan, whom we understood the Russian Government were sending back to Astara, is active near Resht, and contemplates joining hands with Shuja-ed-Dowleh.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 54.)

[2810] No. 188.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegrams Nos. 49 of 17th January and 56 of 21st January: Turco-Persian frontier.

As the Persian Government were represented at the sittings of the Erzeroum commission, we propose, if the Russian Government have no objection, to allow a representative of the Persian Legation to make such extracts as Persian Government may desire from our copies of the reports of the sittings of commission.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 56.)

[2806] No. 189.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 19 of 20th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

The report of the joint commission has now arrived, and it appears to contain much of a very confidential character, including strategic considerations and criticisms on the Turks. It therefore seems undesirable to communicate it to either Persia or Turkey. If Persian Government already have the map there can be no objection to furnishing them with another copy.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 58.)

[3440] No. 190.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Tehran, January* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 242 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz reviewing the events in Fars during the months of July and August.

This despatch, which gives an interesting description of the state of affairs at Shiraz during those months, was written previous to that transmitted in my despatch referred to above, but owing to postal interruption it has only just reached me.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 190.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Shiraz, September* 7, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 26 of the 27th June, I have the honour to submit a review of events in Fars during the past two months. I regret that I have been led by the vain hope that this period might bring some definite modification in the state of affairs which could serve as a landmark for a clearer narrative, to delay so long the submission of this report, which will, I fear, only detail a monotony of chaos.

On the night of the 26th June the situation was further complicated by the surreptitious departure of Intizam-el-Mamalek, the only male heir of the Kawami family. On receipt of the first news of this, Kawam-ul-Mulk sent through me a telephone message to the Kedkhoda of Sivend instructing him to detain his son there; two days later the message was delivered to Intizam-el-Mamalek himself, who returned to Shiraz on the night of the 30th June. The object and result of this escapade still remain equally obscure. Nizam-es-Sultaneh's statements to me that he had taken money and large quantities of arms and ammunition to the Arabs may be dismissed as trivial, since his journey was made so rapidly that Nizam-es-Sultaneh's sowars, who were dispatched in pursuit within an hour of his departure, failed to overtake him, and his small party of thirteen could not thus have been accompanied by baggage animals,

or in any way impeded by such heavy weights as an appreciable amount of cartridges or Persian specie; and I have been unable accurately to ascertain whether he even saw any of the Arab chiefs. His own explanation that he had gone to investigate the state of his father's estates is equally hollow, and, for my own part, I am inclined to believe that his action was nothing more than the impulsive movement of a boy who wished to test the temper and fidelity of his retainers, and who returned immediately that he had learned of his father's disapproval. Kawam-ul-Mulk holds the view that his son's rashness was deliberately inspired by Mutamin-ul-Mulk, the brother-in-law of Nasr-ed-Dowleh, whose daughter he has long schemed to obtain in marriage for his own son, and thus secure the trusteeship of a still valuable estate. This lady has, however, for some years been betrothed to Intizam-el-Mamalek, whose elimination would thus be necessary for the success of the other's plots. There seems, indeed, little doubt that Mutamin-ul-Mulk played an important part in the affair, since it was he who, immediately after Intizam had left, denounced his departure to the Governor-General, in whose shadow he has subsequently remained, not venturing to return to his house in the Kawami quarter. This view seems further supported by the fact that a member of Nizam-es-Sultaneh's entourage informed me some days later that Mutamin-ul-Mulk had offered the Governor-General 100,000 tomans if he would secure for him this marriage and the attendant administration of the estate.

This incident was closely followed by another which has kindled an unprecedented conflagration in Fars. In the course of last autum a party of Bulvardi villagers (a sedentary offshoot of a Kashgai tribe) had lost one of their number in a scuffle with Ali Akbar Dehbozoorgi. Shortly after the occurrence Kawam, then acting governor, attempted to arrest Ali Akba, who fled in the direction of Ispahan, and remained absent until the arrival of Nizam-es-Sultaneh, with whom he subsequently took service. The Bulvardis, after repeated attempts to obtain satisfaction of their blood feud, sent at the beginning of July a large number of women from their village to set their wrongs before the Adliyeh, which gave them an assurance in the name of the Governor-General that full reparation would be made in four days' time. The men, however, were not satisfied with this, and on the fourth day came to town, about eighty strong, and installed themselves in the houses of some fellow-villagers near the Saadi (or north-eastern) gate. In the course of the night the Governor-General dispatched a force of police and others to arrest the brother of the murdered man, who was chiefly prosecuting the feud. The Bulvardis, however, refused to surrender him, and after some ineffectual argument, exchanged shots with the police. On the next day the Bulvardis took possession of the town gate, strengthening their position with sangars, and from there gave out that they would leave as soon as Ali Akbar was handed over to them, but not before. No attempt was made to molest them during the day, but on the following night firing broke out generally through the town. This was, however, of a more or less inoffensive character, the Bulvardis and Governor-General's men merely shooting in the air to denote vigilance, and many of the inhabitants joining in from the roofs in accordance with a time-honoured convention by which the people imply dissatisfaction with their governor, and proclaim that the town is in a state of disorder. On the next morning Nizam-es-Sultaneh attempted to reassert his authority by blowing from a gun an elderly robber who had been in prison for many months, at the same time two of Kawam-ul-Mulk's cooks were led out to be hanged, under the accusation that they had not given the Governor-General warning of Intizam-ul-Mamalek's intended departure, but were ultimately reprieved.

Shortly after this the great majority of the more influential mullahs took bast in a sacred building known as the "Seyyid Ali-ed-Din Hussein," situated in the south-eastern corner of the town, from whence they have not ceased for two months to beat the "drum ecclesiastic." Of these mullahs a considerable number had taken a prominent and very violent part in the anti-Kawami demonstrations of April and May, and there is consequently a plausible presumption that they had not been incited to this step by any encouragement from Kawam's family, but that it had rather been provoked by a wish to protest in self-defence against the high-handed action of the Governor-General which had recently culminated in the arrest of Zergham-es-Sherich, the Imam Juma's grandson, or perhaps by disappointment at Nizam-es-Sultaneh's avarice not having accepted on the former occasion their own estimate of the value of their services. This move was almost simultaneous with the issue of a proclamation by the Governor-General to the effect that the intrigues of Kawam and his family had brought matters in Shiraz to such a pitch that after twenty-four hours he would have to bombard the eastern quarters of the town; at the

same time he gave notice that all those not concerned in the revolt should leave these quarters immediately. This, however, only resulted in thoroughly arousing the temper of the inhabitants, who forthwith set about placing the threatened portion of the town in a state of defence.

From all my investigations of the origin of these disturbances, I can only draw the conclusion, that the Kawamis had no hand in the outbreak of the trouble which was clearly inspired by the personal grievance of the Bulvardis, who are of Kashgai stock, and in no way connected with Kawam's family, but it is most probable that Leka-ed-Dowleh (his wife) has since taken what advantage she could of the reaction which had united all the eastern quarters against Nizam-es-Sultaneh after the issue of his proclamation, and, indeed, it seems to me that the seeds of the whole affair lie in the insensate policy which Nizam has seen fit to pursue since his first failure to annihilate the Kawami, namely, that of throwing every barrier in the way of a settlement with Kawam, and at the same time struggling by any means to drive his family to some overt act, which would, when duly magnified, be used to induce the Persian Government to support him in destroying them and assimilating their estates. At the same time, however, as on all subsequent occasions, when I have thought it expedient, I have persuaded Kawam to write to his son, wife, and dependents, bidding them avoid at any cost giving countenance to disorderly elements, or acting in any way that could be interpreted as intrigue against constituted authority. The complaint so frequently made by Nizam at the outset of these disorders that the Kawamis had called in tribesmen to their assistance is quite unjustifiable, since the only appearance of tribesmen in their quarter which has been noticed up to the present date was a flying visit by two Baharloo chiefs, who sent off a telegram addressed to the Regent, and signed by a number of their compeers, in which they begged assurances that a solution of Shiraz affairs would soon be reached, failing which they declared that they would come in force to restore order themselves.

After some ten days of general unrest, accompanied by incessant firing at night, Nizam-es-Sultaneh sent on the 17th July some of the leading merchants to treat with the mullahs, who agreed to accept as conditions for their surrender a general amnesty and the exile of Ata-ed-Dowleh, Nasr-ul-Mulk, Beha-es-Sultaneh, and Moghis-ed-Dowleh. A few hours later the Governor-General's force, which had lately been reinforced by a considerable number of Kashgai villagers, made a concerted attack on three points of the eastern quarters, whence they were repulsed with a loss of about thirty killed. Nizam shortly after followed up this attempt by fresh overtures made through Beha-es-Sultaneh, who wrote to Kawam's wife that he wished to see her in the interests of peace, and asked her to send some prominent retainer to escort him to her house. Bahadur-ul-Mulk, an old dependent of the Kawami family, was sent at once to the spot indicated, and there treacherously murdered by a party of Ata-ed-Dowleh's men concealed in a mosque. Following on this success Nizam-es-Sultaneh dispatched two small forces of cavalry to Servistan, where Kawam owns large estates. Before the departure of these men I was reliably informed of their instructions, which enjoined upon them the unrestrained pillage of these districts, and a few days later it transpired that their orders had been most thoroughly carried out, five kedkhodas of Kawam's villages having been hanged and a considerable number of the population, including women and children, killed. A great part of the property was also destroyed by fire. Meanwhile the Sorkhis and other Kashgai villagers had been actively employed in the pillage of the immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz, in the intervals of frequent attacks on the eastern quarters, and on the 23rd July a number of tribesmen arrived from Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who joined forthwith in the same congenial occupation. One body of about sixty of these savages even forced their way into a garden, occupied by Messrs. Zeigler's manager, in spite of the protests of the Persian guard, and were only with much difficulty persuaded to leave. After frequent representations to the Governor-General half-a-dozen men were beaten in the presence of the consulate Mirza as satisfaction for this invasion of a British subject's domicile, but I have a strong suspicion that those thus punished were in no way connected with the incident.

About this time, since the lawlessness of the Kashgais showed every sign of increasing, I telegraphed, with your approval, to Soulet-ed-Dowleh pointing out how the Kashgais were behaving in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, requesting him to telegraph immediately to put a stop to this and warning him that if the conduct of these men should lead to British intervention, His Majesty's Government would hold him personally responsible. Some days later I learned that Soulet had sent strong orders to his men not to pillage—which, needless to say, were completely disregarded—and

about ten days after dispatch of my telegram I received a letter from him stating that he had done so. At the end of July and beginning of August Nizam made fresh overtures through the acting Karguzar to the mullahs; these, however, invariably ended in night attacks by the Governor-General's forces and consequently remained fruitless. At the same time when a rumour had got about that those in the eastern quarters were running short of ammunition and likely soon to be reduced to straits, Nizam posted pickets of Kashgais at the various approaches to the consulate presumably to prevent intending refugees from taking sanctuary there. Although I have frequently found occasion to make objection to this action, the pickets have so far only been strengthened. Attacks on the eastern quarters still continue at short intervals and with complete insuccess, the Kashgais and their allies having lost, on their own confession, about 200 killed. The other party, remaining entirely on the defensive, have suffered far less severely, and have not as yet yielded a single foot of ground.

Since the outbreak of disorder in Shiraz the completest anarchy has prevailed in most of the outlying districts and particularly in those of Darab and Fesa, where the Baharloo and Mezidi Arabs, having captured a field-gun from a party of Government troops sent to collect taxes, proceeded to besiege the town of Fesa and devastate the neighbourhood, and at the same time gave it to be understood that they were preparing to come to Shiraz in force in order to protect a widow of Nasr-ed-Dowleh who is closely related to their chiefs. The fact of the two chiefs already mentioned actually coming in and dispatching their telegram to the Regent seems to give some support to their boast.

Throughout the course of these disturbances I have been frequently pressed by various parties to act as peacemaker, but the bad faith of all concerned has been so obvious that I have been obliged to decline any association of the name of His Majesty's consulate with the overtures of any faction in Fars. At the same time, however, I have used as far as possible my influence both with Nizam-es-Sultaneh and Kawam-ul-Mulk in the direction of a peaceful settlement, having, while urging general moderation on the former, pointed out to him privately more than once the objections to his persisting in violent measures only calculated to exasperate a resistance which had already shown that it could not be overcome without the greatest difficulty and considerable danger to the peaceful part of the population and to European interests, any damage to which could not but react most unpleasantly upon himself. Kawam, too, I have frequently warned of the prejudice resulting to his own position from any injudicious action of his family, and on every occasion when I have requested it he has written to them in the terms I desired, and has also, whenever any question of peace has come forward, invariably urged upon his dependents to meet any advance in a conciliatory spirit. Nizam, however, has continually endeavoured to draw me officially into the matter, stating that he was ready to give, through me, any assurance that I might suggest to the bastis in the Seyyid Ali-ed-Din Hussein, and even requesting me to write to them that in the event of their being reduced to extremes they would receive no support from His Majesty's consulate. Since it has appeared to me most inexpedient that we should assume any degree of responsibility in connection with the quarrels of these parties, whose relative positions as rebels or champions of law and order may from one day to another be reversed, I have replied to all such overtures that I have no authority to associate myself in any way with these negotiations.

In the matter of Kawam-ul-Mulk's departure from the consulate I regret to report that no tangible progress has yet been made. The statement of the Persian Government to the effect that they were satisfied with the assurances given for his safety was communicated to him on the 9th July. Kawam replied to this that the fact that Nizam-es-Sultaneh was then threatening to attack his family without provocation was sufficient proof of the worthlessness of his assurances, and added that he would voluntarily leave the consulate only on one of the following conditions:—

That the Persian Government should give an undertaking to farm his estates during his absence from Persia, and should pay his debts and serve him a pension out of the proceeds with the understanding that he should re-enter into possession on his return. That the Persian Government should give to you formal assurances (to be communicated by me to him in writing together with the statement that you were satisfied with their validity) that the lives and freedom of his family and the integrity of his estates will be respected. That if a Governor-General of Fars with no personal animosity towards himself be appointed, he is willing to give through me a written assurance that he will leave Persia for so long as the Government may direct without any guarantees.

Subsequently, when pressed by Nizam-es-Sultaneh for a statement on the subject of

the assurances given to you by the Central Government, I told him the substance of the first two of these proposals, adding that I had informed you fully of their nature. After this Nizam-es-Sultaneh himself approached Kawam, promising him every guarantee for his safety. The latter has, however, confined himself to replying that any assurances on this count must reach him through the intermediary of His Majesty's Legation.

No further proposal was made until the 11th August, when Samsam-es-Sultaneh telegraphed to Kawam that the necessary guarantees for his safety would be given through the Regent and His Majesty's consulate; that, on his leaving Fars, he would be appointed Governor of Kerman and his son chief of the "five tribes," and that suitable security would be found for the safety of his estates. To this suggestion Kawan replied that it was indispensable that he should spend at least forty days in his own house before leaving the province, so that he might set in order his own affairs and those of the heirs of Nasr-ed-Dowleh. He added at the same time privately to me that, in the present unstable condition of the whole country, he could not be sure that the decision of the one Government would not be reversed by that of another within a few days, in which case, with Nizam-es-Sultaneh still here, his life would again be placed in the same grave danger.

Throughout the period under review, Nizam-es-Sultaneh's attitude has been unsatisfactory in the extreme, and our commercial claims and those for robbery on the roads have been systematically neglected. He has also, apart from the more recent indignity of posting tribesmen round the consulate, found frequent occasion to assert both verbally and in writing, that Intizam-ul-Mamalek's escapade and the Bulvardi incident had occurred at the direct instigation of Kawam. This, although he was abundantly aware that the strictest supervision was exercised over him—his correspondence passing entirely under my eyes, and no letters being handled in the consulate precincts otherwise than by the Indian guard, who are permitted to deliver or dispatch them only after my inspection. I have from time to time found it necessary to protest against these implied slurs on the good faith of His Majesty's consulate, but, I fear, without result, since the same insinuations have been constantly renewed. In our many conversations on this subject, the Governor-General has been unable to produce any reasonable indication of Kawam-ul-Mulk's complicity, or indeed of his family's intrigues. With regard to the latter, he told me once that he had intercepted a letter from Kawam's wife to the Arab chiefs urging them to rise, but declined to submit it to my examination, from which I can only conclude that it did not exist. He has gone, in this direction, even to the length of sending members of his entourage to tell Kawam that if he did not put a stop to these disorders his house would be pillaged. Kawam replied in writing to these threats that all his communications with the outside passed through my hands, and that he was in no way connected with these happenings, in which, as a refugee, he could not conceivably interfere.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh's private conversations, on the other hand, have been more than ever friendly and outspoken, and he has frequently hinted to me in unmistakable terms that he is ready to take any line in Fars that His Majesty's Government may choose to direct. Thus, if we wished it, he would, with our help, restore order in the province; again, if we desired, he would resign, or would allow disorders to take their course so that intervention would be forced upon us. He has always added on these occasions that, though by birth a Northerner, he has large vested interests in Fars and Arabistan, and that his first intention is to dispose of all his property elsewhere, and to invest the proceeds in further acquisitions in the South, where he knows himself to be entirely dependent on the good wishes of His Majesty's Government.

I have replied on these occasions that His Majesty's Government only desired to see an efficient restoration of order in the province and adequate protection of our trade, and that so long as we were convinced that he was working in this direction I had no doubt that he would receive our support. After the return of the ex-Shah his language became still more open, and on the 6th August, when calling on me, he expiated for more than two hours on his ambitions in Fars. After expressing the belief that the constitutional cause was already lost, he dwelt on the great advantages accruing to Russia from a restoration of the old régime, and suggested that the moment was now come when His Majesty's Government could, without showing their hand in the matter, gain at least an equal advantage in the south. He added that he had the fullest assurances from the Sheikh of Mohammerah, the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, and Soulet-ed-Dowleh that they would stand by him in an uncompromising opposition to Samsam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet and would join hands with him in either opting for the ex-Shah or creating an independent State in Southern Persia. He and his allies, he said, were of

course well aware that British intervention in some parts of the south was equally desirable and inevitable, and that although the British Government did not at present appear inclined to take such a step, it could only now be delayed by the formation of the State indicated. He assured me that they were all expecting some secret hint which could show them what our wishes were in the matter, and stated that they would wait two days for some sign from you before corresponding further with his supporters. I told him that I would communicate his remarks to you and let him have an early reply. When pressed for my own views, I answered that I thought it unlikely that such a project would prove attractive to His Majesty's Government, who, since the beginning of the constitutional movement, had always been reckoned the champions of the independence and integrity of Persia. Some academic discussion followed, and I enquired what significance Nizam found in the close correspondence then going on between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Amir Mufakhkham, whose staunch allegiance to Mohamad Ali Shah two years ago could not easily be forgotten. He replied that both he and Soulet had received the fullest assurances of support in this project from Amir Mufakhkham, as well as from Sardar Muhtashem, with whom Soulet had long been negotiating a marriage connection. I endeavoured also, but without success, to elicit a coherent explanation of how such a combination could come to any agreement regarding Behbehan.

On the following day I gave to Nizam-es-Sultaneh your reply that you could not countenance any attempt of his or of his allies to dismember Persia or to rebel against the Central Government. Yet even before this answer was received, Nizam had dispatched a most seditious telegram to the Sheikh of Mohammerah *en clair* and by the department wire, of which I enclose translation. I cannot but think that Nizam must have wished, by dispatching this message in such a way that its exceptional character would probably be brought to our notice (his considerable correspondence with the sheikh being ordinarily carried on by the Persian wire in code), to impress me with the certainty of his seriousness in the matter, and I am thus inclined to believe that the whole proposal was little more than a crafty hoax designed to induce us to press for his reinstatement as Governor-General; and, indeed, the fact that the question of the governorship of Behbehan, which, in my eyes, is the most crucial point in the relations between Sheikh Khazzal, the Kashgai, and the Bakhtiari, does not seem to have received any consideration from these conspirators would alone, I think, suffice to prove that, though the question of a separation of this sort has no doubt been debated by Soulet and Nizam, the unanimity of their allies is at least exaggerated.

Altogether Nizam-es-Sultaneh, though as usual plausible and lucid to a degree, seems to have acquired during the past months a strange infatuation from his constant commerce with such windy braggarts as Soulet-ed-Dowleh's and Nasr-ul-Mulk's circle, and to think that his powers, in reality so circumscribed as to have won him of late the local title of "Emperor of the Palace Garden," are quite unlimited. Thus at the time of his attempted dismissal he announced openly to all his entourage, in the presence of acting Karguzar, a young man of pronounced constitutional views, that he would never leave Shiraz without killing Intizam-ul-Mamalek and looting the town. On another occasion he had annihilated the same personage with the remark that the peasants of Servistan, who had been robbed of everything by his orders, were "no more than his subjects and slaves."

What little I have seen of the attitude of the Soulet-ed-Dowleh, apart from the elucidations of Nizam, seems to show that his whole endeavour at present is to avoid compromising himself by openly opting for either party in the north; though, with a Bakhtiari Premier hostile to himself in office, his close communication with Amir Mufakhkham, which was very noticeable during the last week of July, cannot fail to rouse some suspicion. In any case it seems tolerably certain that he is still ready to give every support he can to Nizam-es-Sultaneh, but his authority which has now been waning for some eighteen months, appears this summer to have dwindled more rapidly than before, and quite recently a strong group of the chiefs of various tribes, headed by Mohamed Ali Khan, Kashkuli, Ayyaz Kikha, Darashuli, and Ahmed Khan, Shish'olooki wrote formally to him declining in future to pay any further "maliat," since that of the past three years had only gone to swell his coffers, and pointing out the reproach he had cast on the Kashgais as a whole by abetting Nizam in the murder of Nasr-ed-Dowleh. Taking into consideration the traditional loyalty of these tribesmen to their acknowledged Ilkhani, such language can only be considered as most significant.

There seems thus at present no prospect of any improvement in the state of the province. The Governor-General has given every proof of his impotence to make any

impression on the revolted quarters. He has consistently shown during his tenure of office here that his word can under no circumstances be relied on, and that the only consideration able to influence him is the direct anticipation of pecuniary gain. Thus it may reasonably be expected that his opponents will continue to remain quietly on the defensive until his dismissal may be successfully undertaken. There cannot, I think, be two opinions as to the urgency of removing a Governor-General whose sole intrigues have led to such formidable chaos, and who makes no secret of his revolutionary intentions; but the Persian Government, with its own more obvious troubles facing them, are no doubt in a most difficult position, and the ultimate eventuality of their taking a strong line in this matter—which to my mind alone offers any hope of success—seems unfortunately remote. At the beginning of August the Government had, it appears, arrived as near as can reasonably be expected of them to some decision, and they had certainly gone far enough for the Karguzar, Nizam himself, and his private secretary all to inform me that he had been officially recalled, and for the Prime Minister to telegraph officially in the same sense to the chief mujteheds and the commander of the forces, yet the inadequate measure of placing in charge of Fars at this juncture so flaccid a deputy governor as Yedullah Mirza could only entail the reinstatement of a Governor-General rendered doubly noxious by his incomplete disgrace. Doubtless the first consideration of the Government, after their natural wish to guard the Bakhtiari rear against Kashgai inroads, was to avoid plunging Fars into a still more complete anarchy, but I have little doubt that in this matter, as on so many previous occasions, they have been chiefly guided by the empty bombast of Soulet-ed-Dowleh. The Persian Government seem never yet, for some incomprehensible reason, to have grasped the well-established fact that the Kashgai, unlike the Bakhtiari, cannot, even when united, dispatch an appreciable number of fighting men to any distance from their tribes, and it is even more extremely doubtful whether Soulet, when his power was most firmly established, could ever have collected for service in the neighbourhood of their tribes so many as 4,000 sowars, and certainly he could not at present raise half that number. I am thus convinced that the Persian Government have neither help to expect nor active danger to fear from Soulet, and now, with the Kashgai, at present thoroughly disloyal to their Ilkhani, passing on their southward migration out of striking distance of Bakhtiari territory, could dismiss him with safety—a consummation in itself most desirable as well as affording the only means by which Nizam-es-Sultaneh can be removed without active danger to European interests in Fars.

To sum up this already inordinately long despatch, there are at present some 2,000 armed men, Kashgais, Dashtistanis, and villagers with Nizam-es-Sultaneh in the western half of the town. In the eastern part there are about 1,000 townsmen and peasants from the neighbouring districts; collisions between these two parties ending in considerable bloodshed are of almost daily occurrence, and sufficient feuds have already resulted to keep the province in a ferment for a whole generation. Added to this the southward migration of the Kashgais is bringing nearer the arrival of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the possible renewal of his dangerous policy of last May; there is also a reasonable probability that the still wilder Khamseh tribesmen will take their share in the general medley, which, with a Governor-General approaching perilously near to open revolt, cannot but become more threatening. All these considerations, as I had the honour to point out in my telegrams Nos. 252 and 255 of the 11th and the 15th August respectively, seem to require that we should be prepared to take some step, in the absence of any competent Persian authority, to safeguard our own interests, and particularly to protect isolated British subjects in Shiraz against any possible aggression, which might either be the outcome of the general exasperation resulting from a prolonged faction fight or the desire of some party or individual to save their own life by an act calculated to provoke intervention.

Thus the present situation appears to me not only pregnant with unpleasant possibilities but also full of the widest significance. One cannot in Fars ever lose sight of the deplorable results of the disintegration of the Central Government's authority which has been progressively making itself felt since the commencement of the constitutional movement. This has now been precipitated to an unheard-of degree by the recent actions of Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and it is readily conceivable that a large population of well-armed tribesmen, seeing how easily a single man may defy the Central Government, will adopt his apparent views of constituted authority, and turn their hands at the bidding of the first comer, with more alacrity than ever to their already too congenial pursuits of rapine and murder. The lamentable failure of the Persian Government's forlorn hope in sending to Shiraz a man whose only visible motives have been a modicum of conceit and an overwhelming avarice, must have opened the eyes of

those who still persisted in doubting to the real state of affairs in Fars; and it is to be expected that after following to the end his usual practice of juggling with the dangerous vanities and rivalries of tribal chiefs, Nizam-es-Sultaneh will leave in Fars, as formerly Luristan and Kermanshah, his successor—and, incidentally, the Persian Government to reap the whirlwind. Moreover, it is highly improbable that this unfortunate successor will bring any better qualities to a task which would probably now prove too heavy for stronger men than Persia seems capable of producing.

I have, &c.
G. G. KNOX.

Enclosure 2 in No. 190.

Nizam-es Sultaneh to Sheikh of Mohammerah.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.)

August 7, 1911.

SAMSAM-ES-SULTANEH has dismissed me, but the people of Fars have prevented me from leaving. The whole population and Sardar Ashair (Soulet-ed-Dowleh) do not recognise Samsam-es-Sultaneh as Prime Minister, and pay no attention to his orders. Already there are about 4,000 Kashgai Sowars and "tofangchis" in Shiraz, and in four days' time the Sardar will himself arrive. I am sure you will co-operate and sympathise with Sardar Ashair and the people of Fars.

[3538]

No. 191.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 25.)

Sir,

India Office, January 25, 1912.

WITH reference to this Office letter of the 1st January last, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of further telegrams (dated 11th and 23rd instant) regarding the situation in Southern Persia.

It will be seen that the Government of India do not consider the necessity for relieving Shiraz to be so urgent as to justify the dispatch of a large force with a view to carrying out the policy of evacuation which has been approved by His Majesty's Government with the same data before them.

It will further be seen that the Government of India deprecate the policy of withdrawal which they advocated in certain contingencies in their telegram of the 31st December. On this head I am to refer to the views expressed in this Office letter of the 1st January.

As regards the alternative recommended by the Government of India, it is for consideration whether a scheme of subsidies—which might possibly have been successful when Sir G. Barclay suggested it in 1909—is now possible, when British troops have been defeated on the road and are virtually prisoners in Shiraz, unless it is preceded by the exaction of reparation so signal as to make clear to all concerned that it is something more than the payment of blackmail.

This seems to be also the view of the Government of India, who further distinguish between reparation from the Persian Government and reparation from the tribes—a distinction important, not only because measures that will impress the one will not necessarily impress the other, but also because (as pointed out by Sir G. Barclay in his telegram No. 55 of the 19th instant), while the Persian Government are generally responsible for the condition of affairs in Southern Persia, and cannot be allowed to evade their responsibility, the particular responsibility for the outrages culminating in the attack on Mr. Smart rests with the tribes. It seems to follow that the reparation to be exacted from the tribes—as a condition precedent to subsidising them—must be the most signal. But it seems doubtful whether the measure proposed by the Government of India is adequate for this purpose, since it seems doubtful whether the deposition of a khan whose head-quarters are in the plains 28 miles from Bushire will have a chastening effect on the tribesmen in the hills.

There are four other considerations which the Government of India do not mention:—

1. The danger of undertaking, or forcing the Persian Government to undertake, retaliatory measures which will certainly irritate the tribesmen, when a small force is locked up in the heart of their territory *ex hypothesi* beyond reach of relief.

2. The difficulty of carrying out such measures, or of holding the chiefs, if subsidised, to their obligations without an adequate backing of force. This backing expressly excluded from the Government of India's proposals as regards Bushire, while as regards Kishm it is for consideration whether the location there of a force too small to operate on the mainland is likely to afford sufficient leverage.

3. The possibility that the subsidised chiefs may not be able to control their own men, in view of the "widespread anti-foreign feeling" to which the Persian Government referred in their memorandum (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 2 of the 1st instant), and the inflammatory telegrams from the Mahommedan clergy urging the tribes and inhabitants to rise against foreign invasion, which Mohammad Ali pleaded as his excuse (Sir G. Barclay's telegram No 39 of the 13th January).

4. The high improbability that the four Swedish officers, however efficient, and however well supplied with funds by the Persian Government (a very doubtful point), will be able to organise a sufficient force before the movement of the tribes in March, which is the moment when danger is most to be feared.

These considerations, taken together, seem to suggest that the Government of India's proposals involve very great risk of a disaster at Shiraz if they are regarded as an alternative to the policy of withdrawal.

There remains the question of blockading the coast in order to prevent the import of arms and ammunition. Sir E. Grey will doubtless agree with the Government of India and the naval commander-in-chief, that this is a measure which must, sooner or later, be undertaken. But it is to be feared that if it is put in force now the stoppage of supplies may cause the same irritation among the tribesmen there as it did among the Afghans on the Mekran coast and the tribes on the north-west frontier of India, and may, therefore, seriously endanger the safety of Shiraz. It is a question, therefore, whether it should not be postponed unless a sufficient force to effect relief, if necessary, is within reach. In this connection, it will be remembered that the Viceroy was instructed, on the 23rd instant, at Sir E. Grey's request, to proceed with the least possible delay to frame proposals for dispatch of troops, and as to number and composition of a relieving force.

As regards the question of the cost of the blockade, I am directed by the Secretary of State in Council to say it is assumed that half the expenditure will be borne by Imperial revenues.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 191.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 11, 1912.

NO further information as to details or responsibility for attack upon Smart, and composition of force concerned, has reached us from Minister at Tehran. It would appear, in the meanwhile, from papers which resident, Persian Gulf, who is here, has received, that the attack was partly due to appeals addressed to Fars chiefs by Mesopotamian clergy referring to action of Russia in north, and calling on them to oppose similar British action in south, and was thus more than a local ebullition of resentment on part of discontented road guards.

It is also reported by resident that tribal chiefs accorded Mr. Chick, who has just returned through Kashgai tribe's winter quarters to Bushire after commercial researches at Shiraz, extremely friendly treatment as an officer of the residency. Mr. Chick states, however, that, as a result of the attitude which, in connection with Nizam-es-Sultaneh's vagaries and support of Kavam, consulate at Shiraz has of late been driven into adopting towards Kashgais, the conviction is entertained by Kashgai tribal chiefs that the crushing of their tribe will be the first objective of any British troops that may enter Fars, and that consequently the Kashgais, who could probably put into the field 7,000 or 8,000 well-armed men, will certainly fight. Basing his view on a suggestion from Bill, now in charge at Bushire, and having regard to urgent necessity that very extensive military operations, which might clearly be forced upon us, should be avoided, resident expresses the opinion that a reversion to the former idea of entering into direct relations with tribal chiefs for preservation of order on the road might conceivably still afford a solution of the present difficulty. A native infantry regiment would be sent to Bushire, and chiefs concerned would then have it explained to them that we are extremely anxious to avoid intervention, and have no designs against any of them,

that these outrages cannot be tolerated by us, but that we offer them an opportunity, before military operations on extensive scale are resorted to, of giving us satisfaction for recent outrages, and of concluding with us a direct compact to provide for security being maintained on the road, a matter in which we are not more interested than they themselves. The suggestion is that we should subsidise the chiefs concerned, who would in their turn keep up guards on regular pay and on a regular roster, and that a special assistant to the resident, something on the lines of the political officer in the Khyber, should be appointed to supervise arrangements.

There has not been time for details of scheme, and all its *pros* and *cons*, to be thought out either by resident or ourselves; but we consider that *primâ facie* a possible means of satisfying our interests without extensive military operations is offered by the proposal, and that at the same time the *bona fides* of our desire to do all we can to avoid intervention would be thereby demonstrated to the public in Southern Persia and India.

After scheme has been fully examined a further communication will be addressed to you.

Enclosure 2 in No. 191.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 23, 1912.

IN accordance with directions contained in your telegram, dated the 16th instant, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran is being consulted. We consider it necessary, however, to state our opinion before any specific action is taken that the situation appears to have become considerably easier since the alternative of evacuation was adumbrated. Arrival of party at Shiraz unmolested, and safe passage and treatment accorded along a parallel route to Mr. Chick, have greatly mitigated the serious aspect which was then presented by reports of attack on Mr. Smart. The urgency, on which the above alternative was based, for relief of our military column at Shiraz does not appear to exist any longer. The detachment could, with little risk, return viâ Ahwaz or [? and] Ispahan should need arise. No impression of imminent necessity, moreover, for withdrawing our consulate even from Shiraz, still less of need for evacuation of other centres of interest mentioned, is conveyed to us by recent information and expressions of view as to gravity of situation at Shiraz, existing and prospective, which we have received from that place. We do not believe either, as at present advised, that the several local situations in those places would be regarded by British and foreign firms or institutions represented there as justifying them in any way in leaving their posts and valuable properties and vested interests. We are inclined to think, in fact, that seriousness of present situation at Shiraz, and also probability of dangerous developments next spring have been overestimated by our local officers; and it is our belief that by timely negotiation with tribes concerned, and by other means which should in our opinion first be attempted, the danger can very probably be averted.

Further, a serious endeavour to effect improvement in Shiraz and Shiraz road is being made by the Persian Government, and the arrest of a large number of the persons concerned in the recent attack on our troops has in some way been effected by them, if a telegram received from them by Persian consul-general here can be credited. Information also reaches us of actual departure for Shiraz of four Swedes. It would appear from these developments, if they are confirmed, that situation is less hopeless than anticipated, and that more effective action may be hoped for from Persian Government under Regent than formerly when the Medjliss hampered them. In the second place, wisdom of withdrawing consulates, and thereby creating in Central Persia a vacuum likely to be taken advantage of to our detriment by others, is becoming increasingly doubtful to our minds; and the aspect of the case might verge on the ludicrous, in the event of a large force being dispatched by us to withdraw consulates without other British or foreign subjects. A war division less one brigade is considered by our military advisers to be the minimum force required to effect withdrawal from Shiraz alone; and no one will believe, we are afraid, mere withdrawal of a consulate to be our object in dispatching a force of such strength. Our good faith will be further impugned if untoward and not improbable incidents leading to further hostilities cause withdrawal to be delayed or impeded; and, in either case, Russia will be afforded fresh pretext for action in the north, and injurious effect will be produced on Mahommedan opinion in India and elsewhere.

We are strongly of opinion, in these circumstances, that His Majesty's Government should reconsider the question of withdrawal.

As alternative, we recommend that negotiations with a view to satisfaction being exacted from those responsible for past incident, and to opening the road by levies of subsidised headmen, should be opened with the tribes, as suggested in our telegram dated the 11th instant. As a means of associating Persian Government with the scheme, the Swedish officers now reported to be starting for Shiraz might be employed to supervise such levies with assistance of British officer.

It is necessary, however, that present Khan of Borasjun should be punished or eliminated before there can be a commencement of negotiations. Persian Government should, we suggest, be at once called upon to depose him formally from Borasjun governorship; if they fail to do this it will be necessary for us to deal with him ourselves, a course of action in which, owing to khan's accessibility from the coast, no serious difficulty is involved.

Restriction of the present free import of arms and ammunition to the tribes is a primary essential to their good behaviour and control in future. It is an absolute necessity, in order to effect this, that Persian littoral should be placed under a strict blockade, on the same lines as that of the coast of Mekran. Arrangements for increasing the stringency of this blockade are already being made by us.

The vindication of our position, *vis-à-vis* Persian Government, in regard to recent incidents, has still to be considered. Desire not to increase Persian Government's difficulties, and not to create a situation from which withdrawal would be difficult, is, to a large extent, the basis of our abstention from sending more troops to Shiraz and Shiraz road, or even to Bushire; it is for consideration, however, whether we should not take steps to exact reparation for recent incidents and cost of measures now proposed from Persian Government. Amount of pressure which must be brought to bear on Persian Government with this object is a matter for Sir G. Barclay to advise upon. The location of an infantry regiment and a mountain artillery battery in our own enclave at Basidu is suggested as a preliminary step in this direction. For several reasons, more especially in connection with blockade of coast of Tangistan against import of arms, it is desirable that there should be some military force in the Gulf at the present time. Our communications to Persian Government will acquire weight from presence of troops at Basidu, and by occupying Kishm position with same force we could conveniently apply increased pressure should it become necessary to do so.

In view of these representations, we earnestly trust that policy of withdrawal will be abandoned for the present.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 191.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, January* 23, 1912.

SHIRAZ.

Reference is invited to your telegram, dated the 21st January.

Pending consideration of the further telegram just received from you, no announcement will be made as to evacuation. But since the situation is so uncertain that we must be prepared to deal with unfavourable developments that would require us to render possible the withdrawal of the force now at Shiraz, Sir Edward Grey has requested that framing of proposals for dispatch of troops, and as to number and composition of a relieving force, should be proceeded with with least possible delay.

No. 192.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 25, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 49 of 24th January to St. Petersburgh: Ex-Shah.

Persian Government now learn that a force of 2,000 Shahsevans is on its way to Mianeh and Zendjan, by order of Shuja, who is sending Reshid-ul-Mulk (this man is not the same as Reshid-es-Sultan, who, when last heard of, was at Kerganrud, but is the man referred to in my telegram No. 294 of 28th July) to take command.

The force is provided with six guns, some of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs say can only have been served out to it by the Russians out of the Tabreez arsenal.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3541] No. 193.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1912.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 14 of 14th January and your telegram No. 20 of 17th January : Turco-Persian frontier.

Russian Ambassador has not yet received instructions in that sense, but tells me that His Majesty's Government are being approached by his Government with a view to protest against increase of three battalions of Turkish troops, probably about 900 men, in disputed district.

Considering that Russia now admits to having 4,000 men between Khoi and Urmia "for the protection of caravans," such a communication would naturally be seriously resented here, and provoke the answer from Turkey that she will withdraw when Russia does.

[3424] No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 33.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 25, 1912.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a notice left at this Office on the 23rd instant by the French Ambassador, enquiring, on behalf of his Government, the view of His Majesty's Government as to the formation of the "société d'études" to examine the route of the proposed trans-Persian railway and as to the question of the encouragement to be given to the participation of French financial establishments in this enterprise.

I informed M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government had no objection to offer on either of these points.

In this connection I would refer your Excellency to the letter from this Office to Count d'Arnoux of the 27th ultimo, which may be found in the Confidential print "Persia," December 27, Section 2.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 194.

Note communicated to Foreign Office.

LE Gouvernement français désirerait savoir comment le Gouvernement britannique envisage la formation de la société d'études pour le tracé d'une ligne de chemin de fer transpersan. Le Gouvernement anglais voit-il un intérêt politique à ce que nos établissements financiers, invités à participer à la constitution de cette société, soient encouragés dans cette voie.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 23 janvier, 1912.

[3675] No. 195.

Lord Mayor of Manchester to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

Sir, *Town Hall, Manchester, January 25, 1912.*

AT a numerously and influentially attended town's meeting held in this Town Hall yesterday evening, I was desired to transmit to you the following resolution, which was then unanimously adopted :—

That this meeting expresses its great dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Persia, and most strongly urges upon His Majesty's Government to uphold and protect British interests and rights in Persia, as well as the integrity and independence of that country in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Russian convention of the 31st August, 1907, and to take steps in conjunction with the Russian Government to attain full observance of the letter and spirit of that convention by both parties thereto.

I have, &c.
S. W. ROYSE.

[3668] No. 196.

Mr. Barry to Foreign Office.—(Received January 26.)

(Confidential.) *2, Queen Anne's Gate, Westminster, S.W., January 25, 1912.*

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, and in reply thereto, I send you herewith, for the information of Sir E. Grey, a copy of the brief notes on the project prepared by the Russian committee. On pages 124 and 125 you will find a complete list of the members of the Russian committee.

The names of the English committee are as follows :—

Lord Ronaldshay, M.P.
Sir E. Sassoon, Bart., M.P.
Leiut.-Colonel A. C. Yate.
Mr. C. F. Campbell (Forbes, Forbes, Campbell and Co.).
The Hon. M. de P. Webb, C.I.E. (Forbes, Forbes, Campbell and Co.).
Mr. J. Herbert Tritton.
Sir Charles Ollivant, K.C.I.E.
Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.I.E.
General Sir Bindon Blood, G.C.B.
Sir Walter C. Hughes, C.I.E.
Mr. A. J. Barry.

It is proposed to invite :—

Mr. Edulji Dinshaw (Kurrachee).
Sir D. Tata.
Sir Shapurji Barncha.
Sir Sassoon David, Bart.
Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim, Bart.

With regard to Lord Ronaldshay, the day before he sailed for India he wrote that for certain reasons of a political nature, which I need not mention here, he considered it his duty to withdraw from the English committee. I am of opinion, however, that in all probability subsequent events will reassure his mind, and that on his return to England he may reconsider the attitude he then took up.

A word is perhaps necessary on the subject of the origin of the British committee. Some months ago M. A. Goukassof, representative of the Russian committee after a conversation with Lord Ronaldshay and the writer, urged the desirability of forming a representative British committee to work with the Russian committee, and, if they found it possible, to promote the project, interesting themselves more particularly with the British side of the question. Following on this the British committee as enumerated above was formed.

The Russian committee had approached Lord Revelstoke, inviting him to join with the Russians in providing the cost of the preliminary surveys, the application for and negotiations in connection with obtaining the concession from the Persian Government. I understand that at first Lord Revelstoke was not prepared to take the matter up at all in its preliminary stages. Subsequently, the Russian committee approached certain French financiers ; in the first instance, M. Bardac. A group of French financiers was thereupon formed, who took the matter up with considerable enthusiasm, and, as I understand it, as a result of representations made by them to him, Lord Revelstoke agreed to join the group.

The financial group to which I refer consists of twelve Russian banks, six French financial houses, and Lord Revelstoke. The names of the Russian banks I do not at this moment know, but if desired they could easily be ascertained.

The names of the French financial houses are as follows :—

Banque de Paris.
Crédit Lyonnais.
Société générale.
Comptoir d'Escompte.
Union Parisienne.
Messrs. Bardac and Vitali.

These financial houses have formed themselves into a Société d'Étude which it is proposed should consist of twenty-seven members, viz. :—

Eight representing Russian financiers, eight representing French financiers, and eight representing British financiers, plus three members representing the Russian committee.

These twenty-seven members will appoint a council of seven, to whom the direction of affairs will be entrusted. Of the seven members two are to represent French interests, two Russian interests, two British interests, and one to represent the interests of the Russian committee.

I have been given to understand that Lord Revelstoke has not agreed to the representation of the various interests in the proposition proposed by the Russian and French financial houses, maintaining that in his opinion he would find it impossible to obtain the approval of the Foreion Office to the proposed arrangement, since the representatives of British interests in the Société d'Étude and council would be numerically inferior to those of the Russian group.

The Russian committee, however, claim that they have a right to superior representation because –

(*a.*) They initiated the project ; and
(*b.*) Because the Russian Government have indicated their willingness to assist the financing of the construction of the railway by agreeing to guarantee the proposed new railway company by a subsidy in the form of a rebate on the Russian railway system on all interchanged traffic (see confidential memorandum enclosed with my letter of the 17th instant).

I also take this opportunity of enclosing a copy of the draft memorandum somewhat revised, which has been handed to the representative of the Russian committee in London.

I have, &c.
A. J. BARRY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 196.

Brief Notes on the Preliminary Expenses for the Construction of a Transcontinental Railway through Persia (prepared by the Russian Committee).

(Translated from the Russian.)

List of Members of the Russian Committee for the Construction of an International (Transcontinental) Railway through Persia (in alphabetical order).

1. A. Bunge (chairman), chairman of the Russo-Belgian Company, senior partner in the firm "Bunge and Palachkovsky."
2. P. Bark, director of the Volga-Kama Bank.
3. Count Andrew Bobrinsky, chamberlain to His Majesty, chairman of the Union of Russian Sugar Manufacturers.
4. E. Dymsha, director of the Maltzef Works, and deputy-director of the Vladi-Caucasian Railway.
5. A. Ewert, manufacturer, of Moscow.
6. A. Goukassof, chairman of the Baltic Trading Company (Limited), Caspian Oil Company (Limited), director of Anglo-Russian Bank (Limited), Anglo-Maikop Corporation (Limited), Maikop Pipe-Line Company (Limited), &c.

7. P. Goukassof, Member of the Council of Empire, chairman of the Caspian Society, and chairman of the council of the Russian Bank for commerce and industry.
8. N. Goutchkof, mayor of Moscow.
9. V. Joukovsky, mining engineer, Member of the Duma.
10. M. Khomyakof, ex-president of the Duma, Member of the Duma.
11. Prince Alexander Obolensky, equerry to His Majesty, member of the Council of Empire.
12. S. Palachkovsky, member of the firm "Bunge and Palachkovsky."
13. V. Petchkovsky, civil engineer, chairman of the Vladi-Caucasian Railway and member of the council of the Volga-Kama Bank.
14. A. Pommer, director of the Russian Bank for foreign trade.
15. A. Poutilof, chairman of the Russo-Asiatic Bank.
16. N. Raffalovich.
17. Baron P. Raush, of Traubenberg, equerry to His Majesty, ex-governor of Tiflis, author of geographical works on Persia.
18. V. Sakhansky, engineer, railway constructor, chief engineer of the surveys made in the year 1900 in Persia.
19. A. Svegintsef, Member of the Duma.
20. B. Timiriasef, Acting Privy Councillor, member of the Council of Empire, chairman of the Anglo-Russian Chamber of Commerce, and of the council of the Russian Bank for foreign trade.

Estimated Income of a Persian Transit Line from Astara to the Frontier of British Baluchistan.

The choice of direction for the line intended to connect the system of Russian railways with that of British India has been determined by considerations for establishing the shortest railway route between Europe and India, which should at the same time further the development of the trade of Russia and British India respectively with Persia, and supply the needs of the latter in her local trade and industry.

With these objects in view the route in Persian territory is projected to start at Astara, on the Russian frontier, and to reach the boundaries of British possessions viâ Resht, Kazvin, Tehran, Kashan, Nain, Yest, Kerman, Bam, Gehan, and across Persian Baluchistan.

The length of the route in Persia will be about 2,100 versts, the last stretch of 700 versts including a detour to avoid the deserts of Desht and Loot, which result in an increase of the length by 200 versts.

The distance from the frontier of Baluchistan to the Nushki station on the India North-Western Railway is about 350 versts, and from the latter point to Bombay 1,737 versts.

The sources of income of the future Indian route in Persian territory will be as follows :—

(*a.*) Transit of passengers and goods from Europe to India and *vice-versâ* (see "Earnings of Russian Railways").
(*b.*) Goods traffic in connection with the trade between Persia and neighbouring districts of Russia and British Baluchistan.
(*c.*) Local passenger and goods traffic.
(*d.*) Use of Persian passenger cars by Russian railways.

Estimates of income from the transit are based on the figures supplied for passengers and goods in the notes on earnings of Russian railways.

The takings from passenger traffic are estimated at following rates :—

Express trains, 1st class = 6 copecks per verst.
Express trains, 2nd class = 5 copecks per verst.
(In round figures, 125 roubles and 105 roubles respectively for the entire run.)
Fast passenger trains, 2nd class = 4 copecks per verst.
Fast passenger trains, 3rd class = 3 copecks per verst.

It is assumed that 7,000 passengers going from Europe to Persia and back

will accomplish in Persia only half the journey travelling 2nd class in fast passenger trains.

The income from carrying luggage and quick dispatch goods is estimated at the rates charged per pood per verst for Russian transit, while the income from carrying mails is estimated proportionately to distances on the basis of the income derived under the same head by Russian lines.

The volume of import and export trade of Russia and India with Persia, as computed on the statistics supplied in consular reports, customs returns, &c., aggregates to 21,537,200 poods (see schedule No. 2), with an average verstage of 463 versts.

The income from goods traffic is estimated for each class of merchandise separately on the basis of rates charged by Russian railways, and the estimates are made up for runs from frontier points to Persian stations of destination for goods imported from Russia and India, and from stations of origin to frontier points for goods exported from Persia to those two countries. The goods verstage averages 463 versts, the rate per pood per verst amounting to $\frac{1}{16}$ copeck or to 28·89 copecks per pood for 463 versts of average verstage.

As can be seen from the schedule annexed, it is owing to the nature of the goods carried, and to the comparatively small verstage, that the pood rate for a carriage over a distance of 463 versts is nevertheless not high when compared with the cost of caravan transportation (by pack horses, mules, asses, camels, &c.), not to speak of the deterioration of goods from exposure and protracted journey unavoidable in this case. According to Colonel Medvedieff ("Persia," p. 241) the cost of carriage varies with the value of the goods, their susceptibility of being made up into packs, the state of the market, and the number of beasts required. For instance, the charge made for carrying one harvar (about 19 poods) by mule from Meshed to Kerman, a distance of 924 versts over a well-frequented caravan road, is 10 to 12 tomans (about 20 roubles to 24 roubles) in the summer and 30 roubles to 36 roubles in the winter, averaging 1·45 roubles per pood.

The transportation of one harvar by donkey costs, in the summer, from 16 roubles to 20 roubles, in the winter, 24 roubles to 30 roubles, or, on an average, 1·18 roubles per pood, and by camel, 10 roubles to 12 roubles in the summer and 18 roubles to 20 roubles in the winter, averaging 79 copecks per pood.

Thus the average cost of carriage by beasts of burden over a distance of 924 versts is 1·14 roubles, which, for the average verstage of 463 versts of rail transportation, amounts to 57 copecks per pood, or, in other words, it is twice as much as the estimated cost of rail carriage.

As there are no data for determining the extent of the passenger traffic between Persia and the bordering countries, and as it cannot be of importance, it has not been taken into account at all.

To attain some degree of approximation, the probable income of the future Persian Railway from local passenger traffic is estimated on the basis of the income (according to returns of the State control for 1908) of the least frequented Russian railways of the time from carrying full-rate passengers (*i.e.*, with the exclusion of free or reduced fares, soldiers and officers of the army, &c., and of luggage), namely, the Perm Railway, 528·95 roubles; the Central Asian Railway, 1,086·77 roubles; and the Tashkent Railway (opened to traffic in 1906), 822·08 roubles. These give an average of 800 roubles per verst per annum, which figure is adopted as the probable income of the future Persian Railway.

Nothing like an extensive local goods traffic can be expected, especially in the earlier period of the working of the railway, between the populated points on the line.

The population is distributed unevenly, the inhabited places forming oases, situated in a strip of land which is only about 30 versts in breadth, and is hemmed in between hill ranges or salt deserts. The local industries are carried on exclusively on a very small scale, and, without the assistance of any machinery, are limited to the manufacture of felts, carpets, cheap woollens, silks, and earthenware.

The needs of the country in machine-manufactured goods are supplied chiefly by imports from Europe. For these reasons the local goods traffic is estimated, to produce only the insignificant amount of 200 roubles per verst. In the aggregate the income of the Persian Railway from the local passenger and goods traffic may be estimated, in round figures, 1,000 roubles per verst.

Assuming for goods an average verstage of 200 versts and freight rate of $\frac{1}{10}$ copeck per pood per verst, we shall obtain as the average cost of carriage 10 copecks per pood, and as the volume of the expected goods traffic, $200 \times 2{,}100 \times 100 = 4{,}200{,}000$ poods.

The volume of the goods traffic will be so insignificant only in the earlier period of the exploitation.

It is proposed that the passenger and dining cars and luggage vans required for Russian lines for the projected through train service shall be paid for out of the construction capital of the Persian Railway, and the latter shall receive 30 copecks per train verst for cost of depreciation, maintenance, repairs, heating, lighting, &c. The income from this source is estimated 1,462,920 roubles for 4,876,400 train versts (see schedule No. 1).

Based on the foregoing estimates of income from passenger and goods traffic, the working of the Persian Railway must be organised on the following considerations:—

The number of train versts for express and fast passenger trains will be $2 \times 2 \times 365 \times 2{,}100 = 3{,}066{,}000$ train versts.

The goods traffic in connection with the trade of Persia with Russia and British India will require 9,964,571,000 pood versts (schedule No. 2), the verstage being 463 versts per pood. The transit goods traffic is not taken here into account.

The trains will not carry the full complement of cars on the entire verstage of 463 versts; in the case of export beginning from the stations remotest from the frontiers the number of cars will gradually increase through the coupling on of loaded cars; in the case of import the number will decrease through dropping off of cars for unloading.

Therefore, to be on the safe side, and nearer the actual position of the matter, the train load is not taken to amount to 15,000 to 20,000 poods, which corresponds to a train made up of thirty-five loaded cars, each carrying 450 to 600 poods (the load limit being 900 poods), but only to 10,000 poods, which will correspond to a train of thirty-five cars with a load of 300 poods per car, or to a train of seventeen to twenty-two cars, with a load of 450 to 600 poods per car.

On this assumption the number of train versts for the goods traffic in connection with the import and export trades with Russia and British India will be $\frac{9{,}964{,}571{,}000}{10{,}000} = 996{,}457$.

These trains, having a short verstage of 463 versts, will serve for the traffic only on the end sections of the Persian line. Therefore, to comply with the local needs on the entire length of the line, it is proposed to run a mixed passenger and goods through train, with an annual run of $2 \times 2{,}100 \times 365 = 1{,}533{,}000$ train versts. This train will serve also for the railway's own needs.

To sum up, the aggregate number of train versts required will be as follows:—

1. Express and fast passenger trains	3,066,000
2. Goods trains for the trade with Russia and India	996,457
3. Local mixed goods and passenger through trains	1,533,000
Total	5,596,457

or, in round figures, 5,600,000 train versts.

In accordance with the work required from the railway, the working expenses will be as follows:—

Expenses affected little or not at all by the traffic, namely, maintenance of the Board and central management, and principal local branches of the latter on the line; maintenance and repairs of the permanent way, superstructures and buildings are estimated 4,000 roubles per verst; this figure is based on the expenditure under the same heads of the Tashkent and Central Asian Railways, which present many points of similarity with the proposed Persian line. According to the returns of the State control, expenses under those heads for 1908 amounted to 4,104·69 roubles for the Tashkent Railway and to 3,489·26 roubles for the Central Asian Railway.

Expenses affected by the traffic: those incurred in the working of the trains and inthe maintenance and upkeep of the rolling stock and appliances (the guards and locomotive staff, goods agents, loading, fuel for locomotives, heating and lighting of cars, repairs and upkeep of rolling stock), are estimated 1·20 roubles per train verst, on the basis of the average corresponding expenditure of the Transcaucasian Railway, 1·35 roubles; the Central Asian Railway, 1·05 roubles; and the Tashkent Railway, 1·12 roubles (see returns of the State control for 1908).

Although the greater portion of the proposed Persian Railway is to pass through localities inhabited by Persian natives, who are of a sedentary and peaceful character,

nevertheless, in places, and chiefly in Southern Persia, the road passing through districts inhabited by nomadic tribes, there will be a need of an armed guard. This will be required altogether for about one-third of the entire length of the road, or 800 versts. The expenditure for the maintenance of the guard is estimated at about 500,000 roubles, on the basis of the expenditure incurred for a similar purpose by the Vladikavkaz Railway.

The foregoing data and considerations are intended only to supply means for estimating the probable income of the proposed Persian Railway, and they relate only to a trunk line. No account is taken of possibilities presented by such branch lines as one to Enzeli on the Caspian coast, about 38 versts long, and another one to Ispahan of about 135 versts, which, there can be no doubt, will soon be found necessary, and, if built, will result in a considerable increase of traffic.

As can be seen from the schedule No. 1, the net income of the Persian Railway is estimated at 6,924,320 roubles, which represents 3,297 roubles per verst, or 1·24 roubles per train verst.

Estimated Income of Russian Railways from the Passenger, Mail, and Quick-dispatch-goods Traffic between the West of Europe and India.

(1 pood = 0·162 ton. 1 ton = 62·028 poods. 1 verst = 0·663 mile. 1 statute mile = 1·508 verst.)

The establishment of direct railway communication between the West of Europe and India viâ Persia is undoubtedly of world-wide importance.

The question as to what may be the extent of the passenger and international goods traffic by the proposed route can be answered to the full only after a thorough and detailed study of existing conditions of traffic between Europe, Persia, and India, and of possibilities of its future development with the expected growth of industry and requirements of the population.

The fact that this traffic will be traversing Russia over a distance of 3,340 versts, and is certain to become a source of considerable additional revenue for Russian railways, is of especial significance.

The approximate estimate of this revenue forms the subject of the present memorandum.

The trade between Europe and India is very large. According to returns for 1909, imports to India were valued at 63,000,000*l.*, while exports reached 54,000,000*l.*

Although official statistics of the Indian trade, as given in the Board of Trade Returns for 1909, are very elaborate, it is difficult to determine what proportion of imports and exports is likely to go by direct transit through Russia.

The distance between the extreme points of railway communication are as follows:—

	Versts.
Calais to Russian frontier (Skalmerschitsi)	1,135
Skalmerschitsi to Persian frontier (Astara)	3,341
Astara to Baluchistan frontier..	2,100
Baluchistan frontier to Bombay	2,087
Total	8,663*

* According to the existing lines, the distance between Noushki and Bombay is 2,061 versts, of which a part has a gauge of 3 ft. 3⅜ in.

After the construction of the straighter projected broad gauge line, the distance from Caiderabad to Sabarmati will be 1,737 versts; the distance from Noushki to the frontier of Baluchistan is about 350 versts.

Even at a rate of $\frac{1}{18}$ copeck per pood per verst, the cost of transportation would amount to 1·10 roubles per pood. This is very much higher than the sea freight, which, inclusive of charges (insurance excepted), fluctuates between 25 and 75 copecks per pood, according to the volume of the consignment. The insurance ($\frac{7}{16}$ per cent. of the value of the merchandise) for goods of average price (not exceeding 10 roubles per pood) would amount in all to 4·4 copecks.

The time taken by overland transport could not be much shorter than that required for sea transport. Assuming even a very much greater speed than is usually allowed for goods traffic, viz., 300 versts per day, the journey would occupy 8,817 divided by 300 = twenty-nine days, whereas the Norddeutscher Lloyd, according to their time-tables for 1910, require thirty-two days to deliver goods from Bremen at Colombo. More time would be required if the steamer finds it necessary to call at intermediate ports on the route.

Hence it is more than doubtful that any important quantities of low-priced goods will be diverted to the proposed railway route for transport by slow trains.

It is certain, however, that goods of a comparatively higher value can be diverted for transportation overland by the Anglo-Indian route, but on the condition of quick delivery by passenger trains.

It is impossible to determine exactly the quantity of such goods, as the Board of Trade Returns are made up in various units of price, in cwts., lbs., gallons, yards, and pieces.

Only valuable goods of over 40 roubles per pood have been taken into consideration. The quantity is fixed conditionally, and only such goods have been considered which could be reduced to weight and represented in poods. (Schedule No. 3.)

The imports from England, France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium to India consist of chemicals (quinine), glassware and beads, clothes, ribbons, hats, handkerchiefs, silk thread and stuffs, gold and silver thread, umbrellas, carpets, wool stuffs and hosiery; electrical, optical, musical, photographic, and surgical instruments; works of art, cycles, clocks, perfumery, typographical appliances, &c., making up in all about 950,000 poods.

For purposes of estimating the income, it is assumed that only 1,000 poods of goods will be carried daily, or 365,000 poods per annum.

Of the more valuable goods exported from India to England and to other parts of the Continent may be mentioned indigo, kerchiefs and shawls, sifars, rugs and carpets, furs and skins, &c.

Although the average value of exports is lower than that of imports, it may be assumed, however, that the more costly class of goods for certain considerations will be conveyed by rail. But, to be on the safe side, only a certain percentage, and not the entire quantity, of these goods, according to their kind, is taken into account (see schedule No. 3). They aggregate to 440,000 poods; for estimating purposes, however, only 1,000 poods per diem, or 365,000 poods per annum, is taken into account.

According to the trade returns of British India for the last five years, from 1905 to 1909, the average annual imports into India consisted of 2,167 poods of gold and 95,921 poods of silver, and the exports therefrom, 2,177 poods of gold and 450 poods of silver. The whole turnover consisted of about 100,715 poods.

It is estimated that 100,000 poods (schedule No. 4) of these precious metals, the value being taken into consideration, will be conveyed by railway, and it is further assumed that the whole of these 100,000 poods will be consigned as quick-dispatch goods by passenger trains at a tariff rate of $\frac{1}{6}$ copeck per pood-verst. As regards other classes of merchandise mentioned above, to these the lower rate of $\frac{1}{15}$ copeck per pood-verst must be applied; at the latter rate the freight would amount to about 6 roubles per pood for the whole distance, and out of this, 2·23 roubles will represent the cost of carriage on the section of the Russian railways. The sea freight, including insurance, is more than four times cheaper, but taking into consideration that insurance companies do not pay for any loss under 3 per cent. of the value of the goods, that these goods in themselves are very valuable, and a great advantage is derived from their quicker delivery and turnover, there is good ground to expect they would be diverted for railway transit. There is all the more reason for relying on such a quantity of cargo that the trade of Western Europe with Persia has not been taken into account in our estimates, and which will be diverted also for transit by Russian lines.

Coming now to the question of the conveyance of passengers, it is quite evident that the saving of time and considerably cheaper fares will induce them to travel by rail.

The voyage from London to Bombay (by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, see list of sailings for 1910) occupies twenty-two days, and the combined trip, partly by rail and partly by steamer (viâ Marseilles), fifteen days.

By rail the time required for the journey will be seven and a-half days by express and nine and a-half days by fast train. The saving in time as against the sea voyage will be fifteen and a-half days for express train, single journey, and twenty-nine days for the return journey; in comparison with the combined sea and railway journey, the saving will be six and a-half days and thirteen days respectively.

The minimum cost of the combined rail and sea voyage, inclusive of victualling, is: first class, 463 roubles; second class, 342 roubles; third class, 214 roubles.

For the journey there and back the single fare is increased by 50 per cent. Therefore the limit for the railway fare, including the cost from London to Calais, should not exceed half of the cost of the double sea voyage, or 333 roubles, 246 roubles, and 153 roubles.

Based upon these considerations, and taking into account existing passenger rates, we obtain the following fares for the journey first and second class by express trains, and third class by fast trains :—

Distance.	Terminal Station.	Fares (in Roubles).			Fares from London to Calais (in Roubles).			Total Fares (in Roubles).		
		1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.	1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.	1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.
Versts.										
1,315	Calais-Skalmerschitsi ..	53	34	25	..	..	..	..	..	..
3,341	Skalmerschitsi-Astara ..	86	54	20	..	..	..	..	..	..
2,105	Astara-frontier of Baluchistan	125	105	63	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Frontier of Baluchistan-Bombay	54	34	25	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Totals	318	227	133	15	11	7	333	238	140

The Suez Canal returns show that in 1909 the number of ordinary passengers (excluding pilgrims and emigrants) travelling by that route was 116,255, and in addition there were carried 33,175 British soldiers. (Schedule No. 5.)*

As not all these passengers proceed to India, the number for the overland route can be taken as 80,000 ordinary passengers and 33,000 military; to this number must be added, say, about 7,000 persons proceeding to and from Persia.

For computing the revenue for Russian railways, the number of through passengers is assumed only at 120,000.

These passengers, to the number of 330 per day, travelling in both directions, could be conveyed in two pairs of trains; in the beginning one pair could be run at a speed of 50 versts, each train being made up of one dining-car, four first-class cars, one second-class car, and one composite mail and luggage van. The other pair, run at a speed of 40 versts per hour, would consist as to each train of one second-class and one third-class cars, one luggage van, and one or two wagons of the type of luggage van for quick-dispatch goods.

The number of seats in the trains would be as follows: 160 first class, 112 second class, 300 third class; total, 572 seats in each direction.

With a fairly regular distribution of the passenger traffic, the trains would be filled to the extent of 58 per cent. of their seating capacity. In reality, however, owing to the irregularities of the traffic, the number of passengers in any train may exceed this percentage considerably. (Schedule No. 6.)

In view of the length of the journey, an additional $\frac{1}{2}$ pood of luggage over the usual free allowance is reckoned upon making a total of 60,000 poods per annum.

The following passenger fares are proposed :—

(1.) For express trains, with a dining-car, same as on the Siberian express for distances from 3,291 to 3,360 versts.

(2.) For passenger trains, with a speed of 40 versts, same fares as per ordinary differential zone passenger tariff.

For luggage, the charges to correspond to the zone tariff on Russian railways, for distance of 2,240 versts, *i.e.*, 126·75 copecks for 10 lb., or 5·07 roubles per pood.

It is proposed to make up the trains exclusively of cars of the Persian Railway, and work them with the engines of the transit lines.

The Persian railways are to receive from the transit lines revenue 30 copecks per train verst, which corresponds to the amount received by the Vladikavkaz Railway from other lines for the use of their cars of the fast Black Sea trains.†

* The following number of passengers was conveyed through.

† The Suez Canal during the last five years:—

In 1905	252,691	or an average 256,498 per annum.
„ 1906	353,881	
„ 1907	243,826	
„ 1908	218,967	
„ 1909	213,122	

The earnings from carrying mails, estimated (schedule No. 7) on the basis of the earnings of the Chinese Eastern Railway, will amount to 1,500,000 roubles per annum.

The total net income (see schedule No. 8) derived by Russian railways from the passenger and goods traffic is estimated to amount to 4,400,000 roubles.

The realisation of this additional revenue depends upon the building of the proposed Persian line, forming the connecting link between Europe and India. This line will be 2,100 versts long, and would require a considerable construction capital. Half the line is expected to be guaranteed by Russian capitalists, and the additional net income of 4,400,000 roubles accruing to the Russian railway system might at any rate help to cover the deficits of the Persian line, unavoidable at the commencement of the exploitation.*

Financial Results.

For establishing direct railway communication between the West of Europe, Russia, and India, in the direction on which are based the foregoing preliminary estimates of the paying capacity of the proposed route, it will be necessary—

(*a.*) To reinforce Russian railways with additional engines, certain structures and appliances.

(*b.*) To lay a third track between the stations Baladjari and Aliat on the Trans-Caucasian Railway for a distance of 64 versts.

(*c.*) To build the railway Aliat-Astara in Russian territory of a length of 195 versts.

(*d.*) To build a Persian trunk line of a length of 2,100 versts.

(*e.*) To build a branch line of 350 versts from the frontier of Baluchistan to the station Noushki of the North-West Indian Railway.

(*f.*) To substitute for the narrow-gauge line Hyderabad-Marvar and Sabermati, 849 versts long, with the proposed broad-gauge Hyderabad-Sabermati line, 525 versts long.

The work enumerated under (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) should be carried out by the Russian State, or by private enterprise of Russian railways interested in the scheme, and the work under (*d*) and (*e*) should be carried out by British-Indian enterprise. For the building of a Persian trunk line from Astara to the frontier of British Baluchistan a new private company will have to be formed. The cost of construction of a railway, and the acquisition of rolling stock for the proposed line, and also for the through trains running between the Russo-German frontier, and the frontier of Persia and British-Baluchistan over a distance of 3,340 + 2,100 = 5,440 versts, according to the investigations made by the engineer, W. A. Sabansky (for the distance from Astara to Kerman), and on the basis of the estimates annexed relating to rolling stock, will be as follows :—

CONSTRUCTION of Line.

			Roubles.		Roubles.
1. Astara-Resht	150 versts at	45,000	=	6,650,000
2. Resht-Tehran	329	„	70,500	=	23,194,500
3. Tehran-Kerman	880	„	75,000	=	66,000,000
4. Kerman to frontier of Baluchistan ..	741	„	85,000	=	62,985,000
Total	2,100	„	75,633	=	158,829,500

	Copecks.
* Depreciation on the cost of cars	5,600
Maintenance and repairs of cars	12,076
Lighting of cars	1,100
Heating „	0,620
Supply of linen	1,930
„ furniture covering	0,350
Repair and washing of linen	2,070
Wages of drivers and firemen	4,960
Fitting out buffet and kitchen	0,400

Rolling Stock (including Delivery).

	Roubles.
1. Locomotives	9,272,000
2. Cars for through express and accelerated passenger trains	4,643,000
3. Goods stock for local goods-passenger trains	754,000
4. Goods vans and trucks	2,960,000
Total	17,629,000
Combined cost	176,458,000
Adding 2 per cent. of total cost for unforeseen expenses	3,541,500
Total construction expenditure	180,000,000

Assuming, for example, that the share capital will represent one-tenth of the debenture capital, and that the latter, with a guaranteed interest of 4 per cent., will be realised at 85 per 100, the total nominal capital will be—

	Roubles.
Shares	16,000,000
Debentures (nominal)	211,785,000
Total	227,765,000

The guaranteed interest on debentures, including redemption (assuming the term of concession to be seventy-five years), will amount (at 4·22 per cent.) to about 8,936,000 roubles.

According to the estimate of income and expenditure (schedule No. 1), the net income of the Persian railway is expected to amount to 6,924,328 roubles, or, in round figures, 7,000,000 roubles per annum.

It can be seen from the comparison of these figures that, at least in the earlier period of its existence, the Persian line will be unable to pay out of its own income the entire cost of its capital. For paying off the interests on the debenture capital there will be a shortage of about 2,000,000 roubles (1,936,000).

In addition, interest must be secured on the share capital of 16,000,000 roubles. At the rate of 6 per cent. this item of expenditure will amount to 3,000,000 roubles (2,896,000).

The building of this railway, forming, as it will do, a connecting link in the world's railway system, will result in a considerable increase of the income of existing lines forming part of the proposed route, owing to additional passenger and goods traffic. The increase for Russian railways alone is estimated at 4,400,000 roubles. The Russian lines could use this sum, at least partly, for assistance to the Persian railway. On the other hand, it cannot but be admitted that the building of the proposed railway will be of enormous importance to the Government interests of India. There is, therefore, justification for the belief that the Indian Government will also participate in guaranteeing the payments in respect of the capital of the Persian railway, and thereby help in the realisation of this world-wide undertaking which is of so great importance to India. Lastly, postal conventions for carrying mails with Governments interested in the establishment of frequent and quick postal service to India and countries further East will prove a source of definite income for the proposed transit line.

Schedule No. 1.

Estimated Revenue and Expenditure of the Persian Railway.

Revenue of the Persian Railway from Passenger and Goods Traffic.

Distance, 2,100 versts; train-versts, 5,595,457.

			Roubles.	Roubles.
A. By transit—				
I. Passengers—				
Express—				
1st class	45,000 passengers at	125 =	5,625,000	
2nd class	15,000 ,,	105 =	1,575,000	
Fast passenger trains—				
1st class	3,000 ,,	84 =	252,000	
2nd class	7,000 ,,	40 =	280,000	
3rd class	50,000 ,,	63 =	3,150,000	
				10,882,000

	Roubles.
A. By transit (*continued*)—	
II. Luggage: 60,000 poods at 4·20 roubles	252,000
III. Precious metals: 100,000 poods at 3·50 roubles	350,000
IV. Quick dispatch goods: 730,000 poods at 1·40 roubles	1,022,000
V. Mail: At 450 roubles per verst*	945,000
Total transit	13,451,000
B. By Persia's goods traffic with India and Russia: Goods by slow trains, 9,964,571 poods at $\frac{1}{16}$ copeck	6,222,847
C. By revenue from the local passenger and good traffic at 1,000 roubles per verst	2,100,000
D. By revenue from the lease of the Russian railways for the use of passenger cars at 10 copecks for 4,876,000 train-versts	1,462,920
Grand total	23,236,767
Revenue per road-verst	11,065
,, train-verst	4·15

* The revenue of the Russian Railway, as per special estimate, is taken at 1,500,000 roubles, making $\frac{1,500,000}{3,340}$ = 4,491 roubles per verst.

Expenditure of the Exploitation of the Persian Railways.

Distance, 2,100 versts; train-versts, 5,595,457.

	Roubles.
I. To expenses irrespective of the traffic, 2,100 versts at 4,000 roubles	8,400,000
II. To expenses depending on the traffic, 5,600,000 train-versts at 1·20 roubles	6,720,000
III. To expenses for maintenance and repairs, heating and lighting of passenger cars in proportion to their transit on the Russian lines, 4,876,400 train-versts at 14·2 copecks	692,499
IV. To expenses for maintenance of a military guard	500,000
Grand total	16,312,449
Expenditure per road-verst	7,768
,, train-verst	2·91
Net revenue	6,924,320
Net revenue per road-verst	3,297
,, train-verst	1·24

Schedule No. 2.

Imports into Persia.

Articles.	Poods.	Average Verstage.	Thousands of Poodversts.	Tariff of Russian Railways per average Verstage in Copecks per Pood.	Earnings per Pood per Verst.	Gross Earnings in Roubles.
Sugar	5,300,000	640	3,392,000	35·82	$\frac{3}{16}$	1,898,460
Kerosene	1,800,000	640	1,152,000	24·18	$\frac{3}{16}$	435,240
Rice	600,000	172	103,200	9·56	$\frac{1}{16}$	57,360
Wood	500,000	150	75,000	4·40	$\frac{1}{16}$	22,000
Cotton manufactures	500,000	640	320,000	60·00	$\frac{1}{11}$	300,000
Grain	450,000	172	77,400	5·06	$\frac{1}{16}$	22,770
Iron and steel	400,000	150	60,000	6·25	$\frac{1}{16}$	25,000
Tea from Russia	9,000	285	3,465	48·13	$\frac{1}{2}$	4,332
,, India	300,000	643	192,900	79·30	$\frac{1}{2}$	237,900
Flour	250,000	150	37,500	4·84	$\frac{1}{11}$	12,100
Mixed wool and cotton manufactures	19,000	640	12,160	70·00	$\frac{1}{9}$	13,300
Iron manufactures	200,000	640	128,000	48·37	$\frac{1}{16}$	96,740
Flax thread	130,000	640	83,200	46·33	$\frac{1}{11}$	60,229
Matches	85,000	640	55,040	36·80	$\frac{1}{16}$	31,648
Cotton thread	62,000	640	39,680	46·33	$\frac{1}{16}$	28,725

Articles.	Poods.	Average Verstage.	Thousands of Poodversts.	Tariff of Russian Railways per average Verstage in Copecks per Pood.	Earnings per Pood per Verst.	Gross Earnings in Roubles.
Skins	50,000	479	23,950	46·58	1/10	23,290
Indigo	15,000	1,043	15,645	116·20	1/9	17,430
Drapery and fancy goods	14,000	479	6,706	59·88	1/8	8,383
Gold and silver bars	14,000	479	6,606	59·88	1/8	8.383
Woollen manufactures	13,000	479	6,227	56·58	1/8	7,355
Cocoons	10,000	150	1,500	18·75	1/8	1,875
Gold and silver coin	5,000	479	2,395	59·88	1/8	2,994
Mixed silk and cotton manufactures	2,600	479	1,245	57·88	1/8	1,557
Total	10,729,600	..	5,795,819	..	..	3,317,071
Average verstage	..	540	..	..	..	..
„ freight per pood	..	..	..	30·92	..	..
„ earnings per pood per verst	..	..	..	..	1/18	..

Exports from Persia.

Dried fruit into Russia	2,000,000	625	1,250,000	47·95	1/8	959,000
„ „ India	300,000	696	208,800	49·97	1/14	149,910
Rice	3,300,000	150	495,000	8·33	1/18	274,890
Cotton	1,800,000	565	1,017,000	30·72	1/18	552,960
Wood	500,000	150	75,000	4·40	1/4	22,000
Fish goods	350,000	150	52,500	8·33	1/18	29,155
Nuts to Russia	200,000	405	81,000	33·66	1/12	67,320
„ India	50,000	696	34,800	49·97	1/12	24,985
Wool to Russia	100,000	1,364	136,400	92·44	1/6	92,440
„ India	70,000	488	34,160	39·20	1/15	27,440
Carpets	220,000	875	192,500	89·58	1/12	197,076
Skins, raw	200,000	405	81,000	20·42	1/10	40,840
Pitch to Russia	85,000	479	40,715	14·98	1/20	12,783
„ India	80,000	696	55,680	17·46	1/32	13,968
Skins, dressed, to Russia	50,000	405	20,250	40·42	1/10	20,210
„ „ India	25,000	696	17,400	61·67	1/10	16,168
Cocoons	60,000	150	9,000	18·75	1/24	11,250
Paints	115,000	696	80,040	84·60	1/8	97,290
Animal entrails	50,000	305	15,250	7·89	1/8	3,945
Chemicals	20,000	488	9,760	61·00	1/20	12,200
Eggs	43,000	150	6,450	8·33	1/8	3,582
Henna	35,000	1,362	47,670	137·46	1/18	48,111
Tobacco	30,000	688	20,640	38·62	1/10	11,586
Opium to Russia	1,200	1,364	1,637	137·00	1/18	1,651
„ India	14,800	696	10,301	84·60	1/10	12,521
Gold and silver coin	11,000	479	5,269	59·88	1/8	6,587
Cotton, wool, and silk goods	17,600	479	8,430	56·58	1/8	9,958
Smaller animals, 152,000*	760,000	150	114,000	0·50 (each)	..	114,000
Large animals, 16,000*	320,000	150	48,000	3·00 „	..	72,000
Total	10,807,600	..	4,168,652	..	..	2,905,776
Average verstage	..	386	..	..	..	..
„ freight per pood	..	..	..	26·89	..	..
„ earnings per pood per verst	..	..	..	..	1/14	..
Total imports and exports	21,537,200	..	9,964,571	..	..	6,222,847
Average verstage	..	463	..	..	..	..
„ freight per pood	..	..	..	28·89	..	..
„ earnings per pood per verst	..	..	..	..	1/14	..

* Small animals are reckoned at 5 poods the piece and large ones at 20 poods.

Schedule No. 3.

Imports of Goods into India in Poods at higher values than 40 Roubles per Pood.

Articles.	Countries.						
	England.	Austria-Hungary.	Belgium.	France.	Germany.	Holland.	Italy.
Woollen manufactures	45,715	2,455	1,777	2,416	39,650	609	872
Instruments	127,624	..	..	..	..	..	..
Drapery and fancy goods	80,722	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cigarettes	58,818	267	..	..	..	..	..
Clothing	18,952	1,719	270	..	9,272	..	..
Stationery	39,956	..	..	..	..	..	..
Boots	36,000*	..	..	..	..	..	..
Thread	26,985	1,830	..	..	..	..	..
Cycles	18,380	..	..	..	..	..	..
Leather articles	30,700	..	..	..	..	..	..
Flax	16,166	..	506	..	..	..	..
Toys	15,203	..	..	..	..	440	..
Drugs and medicines	15,249	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spirits used in drugs and chemicals	11,841	..	..	..	..	..	..
Caoutchouc articles	11,917	..	..	..	..	..	..
Wool articles (knitted)	8,204	..	..	..	..	..	..
Surgical instruments	8,931	..	..	..	..	..	..
Firearms	1,812	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ivory	2,560	..	66	..	..	176	..
Leather (unwrought)	9,687	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hats	1,667	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ammunition	4,906	..	..	..	..	..	..
Silk yarn	2,503	1,158	105	1,524	..	..	7,709
Saddles	3,270	..	..	..	..	..	..
Silk piece goods	1,692	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spirits, all sorts	7,027	..	..	1,578	..	..	..
Quinine	1,426	..	363	..	..	..	..
Typewriting machines	1,932	..	..	..	..	..	..
Knitted articles	2,401	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tape	4,192	..	..	..	..	..	..
Productive articles	4,659	..	..	..	..	..	..
Watches	381	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mixed silk manufactures	1,019	264	3,087	..	..	..	1,645
Quicksilver	2,472	..	..	..	..	..	..
Yarn and wool	2 055	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sticks and whips	1,193	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cigars	413	..	696	..	..	636	..
Chinese and Japanese goods	304	..	..	..	..	..	..
Jewellery (manufactured)	89	..	..	4	..	..	..
Jute—							
Twist and yarn	5,797	..	..	..	..	..	..
Articles	466	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ivory manufactures	13	..	..	10	..	29	..
Camphor	158	..	..	..	..	..	..
Gold and silver thread	3	13	18	7,951	..	..	..
Haberdashery	..	53,598	..	..	..	888	4,853
Cotton prints	..	5,919	..	..	..	..	..
Glass beads	..	11,126	..	..	..	..	..
Bran articles	..	2,251	..	..	..	..	..
Wool yarn	..	947	..	..	..	..	..
Plaited tape	..	558	..	..	..	..	..
Cotton stuffs (unbleached)	..	96	..	..	..	..	..
Cotton manufactures	..	..	15,459	8,783	..	..	19,394
Champagne	..	..	1,543	2,358	..	..	..
Cotton thread	..	..	2,145	..	..	..	..
Saffron	..	..	..	1,150	..	..	..
Instruments, apparatus, and appliances	..	..	..	4,137	..	..	..
Umbrellas	..	..	..	350	4,819	..	..
Velvet and plush manufactures	..	..	..	..	4,087	..	..
Velvet and plush, &c. (white, coloured, and chequered)	..	..	..	..	5,185	..	..
Hosiery	..	..	..	..	5,490	..	..
Twist thread	..	..	..	..	20	..	..

* Mean price per pood of boots, 31 r. 15 c., hence 50 per cent. is taken of the total quantity.

Articles.	Countries.						
	England.	Austria-Hungary.	Belgium.	France.	Germany.	Holland.	Italy.
Gold articles	..	..	..	..	2,623	..	..
Sewing and embroidery ..	..	..	..	..	..	323	..
Handkerchiefs and shawls ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,007
Corals	..	..	..	..	..	..	149
Hats and caps	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Woollen articles	..	1,784	1,149	..	..	..	..
Manufacture of leather ..	..	..	173	..	..	..	..
Silk—							
Articles	..	..	43	1,911	..	..	..
Yarn	..	..	..	..	1,647	..	204
Parcels sent by post ..	45,000	..	1,500	5,500	600	..	1,200
Total	680,460	83,985	28,900	37,672	73,393	3,101	38,033

Export from India in Poods valued above 40 Roubles per Pood.

Indigo	31,658	..	..	2,167	..	..	..
Silk	5,116	..	..	..	..	..	..
Handkerchiefs	6,515	..	..	..	..	..	..
Silk yarn	1,350	..	..	133	..	..	..
Fish manure	4,652	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cigars	5,317	..	..	..	..	..	..
Works of art	2,000	..	..	..	..	..	..
Jewellery and other precious stones	10	..	..	..	..	..	..
Books	1,472	..	..	..	..	..	..
Textile fabrics	860	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ether oils	630	..	..	1,745	..	..	..
Ivory	54	..	..	..	3,233	..	..
Skins and furs	220,000*	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mixed silk manufactures ..	..	..	..	70	..	..	..
Silk, raw	..	..	..	9,862	..	..	..
Caoutchouc	..	..	..	..	58,377	..	..
Dye stuffs, mica, &c. ..	..	..	..	..	34,709	..	..
Pearls and corals	..	..	..	..	10	..	..
Opium	93	..	..	..	..	..	..
Parcels sent by post ..	40,000	..	..	3,500	..	..	..
Total	319,727	..	..	17,477	96,329	..	..

* The average cost of a pood of skins is 23 roubles; therefore, 20 per cent. of the whole is taken.

Schedule No. 4.

Gold and Silver Imports from Europe to India, and Exports therefrom.

(Trade of British India.)

Imports.

Gold.

Name of Country.	1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	Totals.		
	£	£	£	£	£	£	Roubles.	Poods.
From England..	4,044,836	4,016,079	5,436,659	5,878,696	3,335,143	..	..	..
„ Austria ..	2,067	6,338	2,952	2,153	927	..	..	..
„ France ..	21,164	11,418	26,040	24,220	4,327	22,815,319	216,745,531	10,837

Average per annum, 2,167 poods.

Silver.

Name of Country.	1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	Totals.		
	£	£	£	£	£	£	Roubles.	Poods.
From England—								
Private ..	4,130,932	2,761,836	4,290,541	5,963,298	7,984,246	..	..	..
Government..	4,276,959	6,737,187	10,188,648	4,064,382	..	..	..	..
From Austria ..	33	112	344	86	141	..	..	..
„ Belgium ..	5,352	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
„ France ..	35,030	..	20,992	88	24,553	50,484,759	479,605,211	479,605

Average per annum, 95,921 poods.

Exports.

Gold.

Into England—								
Private ..	2,334,691	2,363,066	2,013,062	2,201,143	2,166,364	..	..	..
Government..	5,600,002	6,000,000	..	..	240,249	22,918,597	217,726,482	10,886

Average per annum, 2,177 poods.

Silver.

Into England—								
Private ..	32	138	230,202	3,500	3,125	236,992	2,251,424	2,251

Average per annum, 450 poods.

	Poods.
Average annual imports of precious metals	98,088
„ „ exports „ „	2,627
Total	100,715

Note.—Exchange taken at 9·50 roubles for the £. Cost of a pood of silver, 1,000 roubles. Cost of a pood of gold, 20,000 roubles.

Schedule No. 5.

Extracts from the Sues Canal Returns.

Conveyance of Passengers for the last Thirty Years, from 1880–1909.

Year.	Number.
1880	101,551
1881	90,524
1882	131,068
1883	119,177
1884	151,916
1885	205,951
1886	171,411
1887	182,997
1888	183,895
1889	180,594
1890	161,353
1891	194,467
1892	189,809
1893	186,495
1894	165,980
1895	216,938
1896	308,243
1897	191,215
1898	219,554
1899	221,332

Year.	Number.
1900	282,511
1901	270,221
1902	223,513
1903	196,024
1904	210,980
1905	252,691
1906	353,881
1907	243,826
1908	218,967
1909*	213,122

* Arranged in categories:—

	Number.
German troops..	4,407
American „	842
English „	33,175
Spanish „	10
French „	12,695
Italian „	744
Netherland „	2,480
Turkish „	15,791
Private passengers	116,255
Special pilgrims, emigrants, convicts, &c.	26,273
Total	212,672

Schedule No. 6.

Arrangement for the Accommodation of Passengers.

In Carriages of the Vladikavkaz Type.

Class.	Alb. 1909.	Black Sea Express.	Estimated for the Persian Railway.
1st class	..	18	20
2nd „	48	28	28
3rd „	56	..	50

(A.)—*Estimated Number of Passengers in Express Trains.*

	Per annum.	Per diem.
1st class	45,000	123
2nd class	15,000	41

Train made up of—	Passengers.	Seats.	Accommodation.
			Per cent.
Four waggons, 1st class ..	123	160	77
One waggon, 2nd class ..	41	56	73

(B.)—*Estimated Number of Passengers in Fast Trains.*

	Per annum.	Per diem.
2nd class	10,000	28
3rd class	50,000	138

Train made up of—	Passengers.	Seats.	Accommodation.
			Per cent.
One waggon, 2nd class ..	28	56	50
Three waggons, 3rd class ..	138	300	46

Average number of passengers per diem	330
„ „ seats	572
„ accommodation, per cent.	58

Schedule No. 7.

Mail Transport.

To fix the revenue for carrying of the transit mail the following data can be made use of:—

1. For the present, and until the next assembly of the Postal Union, the international transit mail is carried by the Chinese Eastern Railway, on condition that a rate of 5 fr. per kilogramme for letters and 70 centimes per kilogramme for parcels be levied on that line.

One kilogramme equals 2·44 lbs. (Russian), hence the transmission of 1 lb. of letters on the Chinese Eastern Railway will amount to 187·50 ÷ 2·44 = 76·80 copecks; and the transmission of 1 pood of letters would therefore be 76·80 × 40 = 30·72 roubles.

The length of the Chinese Eastern Railway is 1,388 versts, and thus their earnings, derived from the transmission of letters on that line, equals 2·2 copecks per verst.

The distance from the frontier of Russia and Germany to the frontier of Russia and Persia equals 3,340 versts. Hence the earnings on this journey would amount to 73·48 roubles per pood of letters.

2. Taking into consideration that the Chinese Eastern Railway receives 70 centimes for the transmission of parcels, and applying the present mode of reckoning, one can assume that the section of the Russian railways will receive 10·28 roubles per pood of parcels.

According to the returns of the representatives of the post and telegraph departments, regarding the carrying of the mail along the Chinese Eastern Railway, as considered at their special conference on the 19th September, 1908, the present quantity of mail dispatched daily from the West of Europe to China, Japan, and Corea, and *vice versâ*, is fixed at 60 poods per day.

From the 56th annual returns of the post office department of Great Britain for 1910, it will be seen that the mail carried during the official year 1909–10 from England to India and Australia and back amounted to 205,000 poods, of which 24,605 poods were sealed and open letters, and 180,395 poods were composed of parcels, catalogues, books, newspapers, and samples.

By applying the above calculations to the whole of this quantity of Anglo-Indian and Australian mail, the gross revenue of the Russian section of the railway for carrying of the mail would amount to 3,662,435 roubles, and that of the Persian railways to about 2,236,000 roubles.

Besides India, Ceylon, and Australia, it should be borne in mind that there are other countries with postal connections, such as the French and Indo-Chinese, which would undoubtedly use the overland route to Calcutta.

With regard to the amount of revenue which the railway can reckon on from the carrying of the mail, this depends upon the conditions laid down at the time by the Postal Union with the respective interested countries. At any rate, there can be no doubt that the possibility of a daily dispatch and delivery of letters, combined with the enormous gain in time, will without fail cause letters, newspapers, and other kinds of correspondence to be sent by the overland route.

For purposes of safety, however, the gross revenue from the carrying of the mail on the section of the Russian railway is reckoned per annum at 1,500,000 roubles. For the Persian Railway, with a distance of 2,100 versts, the revenue, as estimated in accordance with its length, will be about 945,000 roubles, or 450 roubles per verst.

Schedule No. 8.

Revenues of Russian Railways from the Fast Train Traffic.

Revenue.

Distance, 3,340 versts; train verstage, 4 × 3,340 × 365 = 4,876,400 train versts.

I. By passengers—	Roubles.	Roubles.
(*a.*) In express trains—		
1st class, 45,000 at 86 roubles	3,870,000	
2nd class, 15,000 at 54 roubles	810,000	
(*b.*) Fast passenger trains—		
2nd class, 10,000 at 30 roubles	300,000	
3rd class, 50,000 at 20 roubles	1,000,000	
	———	5,980,000

	Roubles.
II. By luggage: 60,000 poods at 5·07 roubles	304,200
III. By precious metal (silver) at $\frac{1}{8}$ copeck per poodverst: 100,000 poods at 6·68 roubles	668,000
IV. By quick dispatch goods at $\frac{1}{16}$ copeck per pood: 730,000 poods at 2·23 roubles ..	1,627,790
V. By mails	1,500,000
Total	10,079,990

NOTE.—A tariff for express and fast trains corresponding roundly to those of the Siberian express, and for the accelerated passenger trains corresponding to the ordinary zone passenger train, and also for luggage, namely, for a distance of 3,340 versts (the zone = 3,291—3,360), has been fixed as follows:—

For the express trains—
1st class, 49·50 roubles + 36·40 roubles for rate of speed; total, 85·90 roubles.
2nd class, 29·70 roubles + 24·10 roubles for rate of speed; total, 53·80 roubles.
Fast passenger trains—
2nd class, 29·70 roubles.
3rd class, 19·80 roubles.

EXPENDITURE.

	Roubles.
I. To passenger train verstage, 4,876,400 at 80 copecks	3,901,120
II. To payment to Persian railways for use of their cars for 4,876,400 train-versts at 30 copecks	1,462,920
III. To interest on capital for augmenting the transit railway, supplying locomotive and appliances for the line as per detailed returns herewith enclosed	330,000
Total	5,694,040

NOTE.—The cost of verstage of the fast passenger train (expenses depending on the tariff as per returns of the Vladikavkaz Railway for 1909) amounts to 82 copecks per verst, including use of their own cars.
After deducting the cost for repairs, heating, and lighting (amounting to 16·70 copecks), as included in the sum of 30 copecks per train-verst, and paid by the Persian railways, the cost of this verstage would be 65·3 copecks. For safety, 80 copecks is taken.
The net revenue is fixed at 4,385,950 roubles; or, in round figures, 4,400,000 roubles.

COST of reinforcing the Russian Lines of Transit with additional Engines, Premises, and Appliances.

	Roubles.
I. Locomotives: For the working of 4,876,000 train-versts there are necessary $\frac{4,876,000}{45,000}$ = 108 locomotives at 52,000 roubles	5,616,000
II. Additional appliances for the line: For the erection of additional locomotive sheds, laying of lines, and alteration of stations..	1,000,000
Total	6,616,000
NOTE.—To unforeseen expenses: 5 per cent. of 6,616,000 roubles	330,000
Total	6,946,000
Or, in round figures	7,000,000

Assuming the realisation of 85 on the 100, a capital of 8,240,000 roubles will be required, with an annual interest of about 330,000 roubles.

Enclosure 2 in No. 196.

The Trans-Persian Railway Scheme: Draft Memorandum for the consideration of the Committee constituted to represent British Interests in relation to the Project for linking up the Russian and Indian Railway systems.

(Confidential.)

THE accompanying notes refer to the questions of:—

1. The alignment or route to be followed.
2. The gauge.
3. The capital cost of the undertaking } on the basis of the Russian Committee's
4. The revenue return } report,

and it is now desired to invite consideration of some important points of principle having reference to the interests of Great Britain, India, and Persia, based on the data which the notes supply.

It has first to be observed that, whereas it has hitherto been the custom with writers on the question, official and public, to treat the line through Persia by itself, the real undertaking is to link up the Russian and Indian railway systems, and the capital required for the complete project will, it is shown in the notes under the head capital cost, on the basis of the Russian estimates, amount, not to 15 or 18 millions, as has been variously quoted for the Persian line by itself, but to upwards of 35 million pounds. This includes the cost of the two links connecting the projected Persian line with the Russian railway system on the north at Aliat, and with the Indian railway system on the south at Kurrachee.

The Russian system, proposed in this and adopted in many similar cases, of financing schemes for public works, principally by means of debenture capital, presents a danger which in a case of this kind calls for serious consideration. It affords no guarantee, such as the ordinary English system of restricting the debenture capital to a comparatively small proportion of the total (the balance being raised by share capital and called up as required) affords, for the complete execution of the project.

To put it quite plainly, so long as the interests of the Russian Government are vitally concerned in the progress of the scheme, it may be taken as certain that the debenture capital required will be forthcoming. But having attained their principal purpose, any slackening of their interest in the further prosecution of the works would, unless the British Government were prepared to take an active interest in the completion of the project, probably, if not certainly, mean a failure of funds and the practical stoppage of the works. It seems that the Russian Government are likely to be more vitally interested in getting a line through to Bunder Abbas or Charbar—which would open up the Persian markets to their commerce and satisfy their long-felt desire of a port on the Persian Gulf or Arabian Sea—than they are in an actual connection with India, and on this hypothesis there is a risk of the line stopping at Bunder Abbas or Charbar, and the British Government finding themselves committed to making the connection to Kurrachee, which would involve the construction of some hundreds of miles of unprofitable coast line.

If it be assumed that British and British Indian interests are centred in the provision of means for through and rapid communication with Europe and rail connection between India and the Persian markets, it is hardly necessary to point out that those interests can only be secured by the execution of the project as a whole, and that those interests will suffer materially if the Russian railway system is extended southwards to the Persian Gulf, or even into the interior of Persia, without a connection being made with the Indian railway system.

Again, it would not seem reasonable that the British or Indian Government should undertake responsibility for the construction of the link from Guattar to Kurrachee as a separate undertaking. It is an essential part of the through line, and should be treated, so far at least as finance is concerned, as such, in spite of the fact that it traverses territory under British protection. Some of the reasons for this conclusion are given in the notes attached. In such a case the Indian Government might well undertake to give the project the benefit of a subsidy from the net earnings on Indian lines from traffic to be interchanged therewith, as it is proposed the Russian lines shall do. This would be to place both Powers on an absolute equality as regards their interests in the line through Persia, which is in itself a most desirable consummation.

It is suggested accordingly:—

1. That it should be laid down as soon as may be possible that the scheme shall be complete, and embrace the entire length of line necessary to effect a junction between the Russian and Indian Railway systems at Aliat and Kurrachee respectively.
2. That it should be a condition that the construction of the sections Aliat to Resht and Kurrachee to Charbar shall be proceeded with simultaneously, and that southward from Resht and northward from Charbar the construction of the line shall be proceeded with *pari passu*.
3. That conditional on the Russian lines formally agreeing to a similar course,* the Indian Government should agree to grant a subsidy to the undertaking on the basis of the Indian "branch line terms."

NOTE.—Extract from Government of India resolution, N. 105 R.P., dated the 23rd June, 1910, paragraph 2, clause (vii):—

(*b.*) *Rebate.*—When the branch line connects with a railway owned and worked by the State, the Government of India will be prepared to allow the company

* For proposals to this effect already made by the Russian committee, see p. 147.

in respect of and at the end of each calendar year, by way of rebate, such a sum, not exceeding in any year the net earnings (exclusive of earnings derived from the carriage of revenue stores) from traffic interchanged between such State railway and the branch line as shall, together with the net earnings of the branch line, make up an amount equal to interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum on the actual expenditure charged to the capital account of the company. This undertaking will be subject to the proviso that, when the net earnings of the company, without the assistance of a rebate, suffice to pay interest at a rate exceeding 5 per cent., the surplus shall be divided equally between the Government and the company. . . . . .

The Bunder Abbas route, it is suggested, should be abandoned without awaiting further survey. If the line is kept for the length of 400 miles between Guattar and Kurrachee, within striking distance of the sea, it would apparently sufficiently "outflank not only all political objections, but would satisfy those military objectors who can only see in a railway the opportunity for invasion of India" (Holdich), and the strategic advantage of extending the coast line to Bunder Abbas is surely outweighed by the provision by Russia of a line outside the British sphere extending to the shore of the Persian Gulf.

The further survey to be made should embrace the alternative alignment viâ the Kech Valley, referred to on p. 142. This would still leave a length of about 250 miles within reach from the sea.

There is strong reason on the grounds of economy alone for advising that the gauge of the line throughout should be 3. ft 6 in., otherwise, if it is not too late now to go back on what has been said as to break of gauge, it would seem reasonable that the break should be at Anar, *i.e.*, about half-way across the neutral sphere. Failing this the break should be at Kerman, as already stipulated by the British Foreign Office, but from the Persian point of view this may be taken exception to because of the inconvenience to local traffic.

The main line is to be internationalised, and its management will accordingly fall to a joint board. It would be right that following the arrangement adopted in the case of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, the president of this board should be a Persian, and that Persia should have, in addition, at least one representative on the board, which would otherwise be representative of the respective financial interests involved, but the construction of the line within the British sphere, or from Kurrachee to Kerman, and the supply of a proportionate share of the rolling stock of all kinds should be secured to British enterprise, and it seems very necessary that some intimation to this effect should now be given, lest matters be proceeded with on a different basis, which will prejudice British interests.

It is common knowledge that French financiers are participating in the scheme, and would no doubt desire to participate in the construction as well as the finances. The situation, however, hardly lends itself to such an arrangement. The British Government will no doubt require that the line up to at least the boundary of the British sphere (Kerman, or alternatively Bunder Abbas) shall be British, and the Russian Government, probably as regards construction, will hold the corresponding view in reference to the section from Astara to Yezd. It would probably not be agreeable to either Power for a third Power to engage in public works within their respective spheres. This leaves only the length within the neutral sphere, *i.e.*, from Yezd to Kerman (218 miles) on the one route, and Yezd to Bunder Abbas (425 miles) on the other. Since, as has already been suggested, the route viâ Bunder Abbas is one not to be recommended, it would appear probable that unless the Russian Government is prepared to permit French construction within the Russian sphere, that only a length of line of 218 miles from Yezd to Kerman would be available for French enterprise, so far as construction is concerned. So short a length would probably not satisfy French aspirations, even if it were worth while to have a separate organisation for the construction of so short a distance. But, on the other hand, it would appear both reasonable and feasible for French manufacturers to participate in the supply of rolling stock, &c. in proportion to French financial interests.

2, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
January 15, 1912.

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1. *Route.*

The route which it was proposed the projected line should follow, as described in the report issued by the Russian committee in May last, is shown by a full red line on the sketch map attached,* the total length of the line being :—

—	Versts.	Miles.	Miles.
In Russia—			
Aliat to Astara	195	129	129
In Persia—			
Russian sphere: Astara to Yezd.. ..	1,030	683	
Neutral sphere: Yezd to Kerman ..	329	218	
British sphere: Kerman to frontier of Baluchistan	741	491	
	2,100	..	1,392
In Baluchistan—			
Frontier to Nushki	350	232	232
Total	..	..	1,753

The route to Nushki was, however, found too mountainous for the traffic contemplated, and partly for this reason, and partly apparently on account of views expressed by the British Foreign Office, the line from Kerman was altered so as to make Kurrachee the point of junction with the Indian system instead of Nushki, the route followed being direct to Kair and Charbar, and thence viâ Guattar (on the Baluchistan frontier), along the coast to Kurrachee. The effect was to increase the length of the through line by about 100 miles, or from 1,392 to 1,492 miles, and to also increase the length of the Baluchistan section from 232 to 373 miles, making the total length of the line 1,994 miles, namely :—

—	Miles.	Miles.
In Russia as before	129	129
In Persia—		
Russian sphere: Astara to Yezd	683	
Neutral sphere: Yezd to Kerman	218	
British sphere: Kerman to Guattar	591	
		1,492
In Baluchistan—		
Guattar to Kurrachee	373	373
Total	..	1,994

The British Foreign Office subsequently made it a condition of their support to the scheme that, subject to reconsideration as the result of actual survey, the line should enter the British sphere at Bunder Abbas instead of Kerman. The effect in point of mileage (assuming the route to be followed to be viâ Yezd) would be to increase the length of the Persian line to approximately 1,554 miles, and the mileage statement would stand as follows :—

—	Miles.	Miles.
In Russia as before	..	129
In Persia—		
Russian sphere: Astara to Yezd	683	
Neutral sphere: Yezd to Bunder Abbas ..	425	
British sphere: Bunder Abbas to Guattar ..	446	
		1,554
In Baluchistan—		
Guattar to Kurrachee	..	373
Total	..	2,056

* Not reproduced.

A very grave objection to this route from all points of view, except perhaps the strategic point, is that for over 800 miles (Bunder Abbas to Guattar and Guattar to Kurrachee) the railway runs along the coast line. It would for this great length be practically entirely dependent on the through traffic, as very little local traffic could be looked for, and it would be of no avail whatever as a means of developing the agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources of Persia.

The alternative route from Yezd to Charbar viâ Kerman (population 40,000), Bam (population 6,000), and the populous plains of Narmashir and Regan, Bampur, and the Panjgur district appears to offer advantages which outweigh all comparison. The district is described as possessing a delightful climate for the greater part of the year, and generally a fair water supply. It is, moreover, important that it should not be overlooked that one of the consequences that are bound to follow the opening up the country by a through line of railway is the development of enterprises for the construction of irrigation works, for which it is believed there is considerable scope in the valleys of this district.

It is true that the Foreign Office proposals contemplate the construction of a branch line from Bunder Abbas or Charbar viâ Regan and Bam to Kerman. The route Bunder Abbas to Kerman may, however, be said to be impracticable, and the alternative, Charbar to Kerman, would involve the construction of an additional mileage of over 500 miles, which would not of itself be a paying investment unless made as part of the through line.

The conditions that the line should be within striking distance from the sea, on the grounds of strategic considerations, would appear to be very amply met by the fact that the whole length of 440 miles from Charbar to Kurrachee on the route viâ Kerman would be so situated. If this assumption is correct, the arguments in favour of the adoption of the route Yezd, Kerman, Charbar and Guattar, in preference to that from Yezd to Bunder Abbas, Charbar, and Guattar, would appear to be overwhelming.

It is advisable that the further surveys to be undertaken should include an alternative line south of Bampur viâ Serbaz, Turbat, and the Kech Valley to Pasni. This route would serve a large number of villages which would contribute to the traffic.

2. *Gauge.*

Nothing is said in the Russian committee's report on the subject of the gauge; but their proposals contemplated that the whole line up to the Baluchistan boundary should be of the Russian gauge (5 feet). The British Foreign Office have, however, stipulated that there shall be a break of gauge at Bunder Abbas, or wherever the line enters the British sphere of influence in Persia. This would mean at Bunder Abbas in the one case, and at Kerman in the case of the alternative route.

If there were no political or strategic points to be considered, it would without doubt be preferable to make the break of gauge at Kurrachee, for this reason, that a line of the 5 feet (Russian) gauge is somewhat cheaper than one of the 5 ft. 6 in. (the Indian) gauge. From the traffic point of view, given that there must be a break, it is immaterial where it occurs. On the other grounds referred to, it would seem that the point at which the break of gauge occurs should be as far removed as possible from the Indian frontier, and it would appear to be justifiable to stipulate that the change should be half-way across the neutral zone, that is, half-way between Yezd and Bunder Abbas in the one case or half-way between Yezd and Kerman in the other.

But the interests of Persia have also to be considered, and it would appear that they would be within their rights in stipulating for a separate gauge within the limits of Persian territory, so as to prevent the line being used by either Russia or Great Britain to their prejudice. If they elected for the English gauge (4 ft. 8½ in.) in use throughout Asia Minor it would economise in cost of construction, but would involve two breaks of gauge, one on the Russian and one on the Baluchistan or Indian frontier. It must not be lost sight of that the Bagdad Railway, which, when the Tehran-Khanikin Railway is made, will form a junction with the Persian main line, is being constructed to 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge. It would effect a still further and greater economy if the metre, or, preferably, a 3 ft. 6 in. gauge was adopted for the Persian line. Owing to the considerable distances involved, a double break of gauge would not entail any inconvenience to passenger traffic. For example, through passengers to Peking by the Siberian route change trains no less than five times. In the case of goods, through goods from England and the north of Europe would have to be transferred at the Russian frontier on entering Russia, and again at the Persian and

Baluchistan or Indian frontiers, making three instead of two breaks. In such a long journey the extra expense involved would not be a consideration of much importance. The chief objections are the risks of delay, possible damage in handling delicate goods, and pilfering, which could be obviated only by exceptionally good management. In the case of short distance goods traffic, say from southern Russia to Persia, a break of gauge at Astara would be an inconvenience, but the benefit Russia will derive from the construction of the line being so great, it would seem that they could hardly on this ground take exception to the condition if Persia stipulated for an independent gauge. Russia has in fact so much to gain by the markets of Northern, Western, and Central Persia being opened up to her commerce, and by the Indo-European passenger traffic being attracted to Russia, that Persia, and it may be added England, are in a position to insist on concessions to their interests in return for the great advantages which Persia will confer by granting the concession for the construction of the line, and which England confers by consenting to link it up with the Indian railway system.

3. *Capital Cost.*

The capital cost of the line through Persia is estimated by the Russian committee at 19,125,000*l.*, including rolling stock. This was on the Nushki route, and is at the rate of 13,739*l.* per mile. This mileage rate and the estimate of the length of the different sections of the line appear to be on a liberal basis, but it is impossible to criticise the figures in the absence of anything but a superficial reconnaissance of the country to be traversed. Including interest during construction, the total is increased to 21,993,750*l.*, or 15,800*l.* a-mile, and assuming that about 90 per cent. of the capital is raised on 4 per cent. debentures at 85, it has been shown that the total capital to be raised to cover this expenditure, on which interest is payable, is 25,500,000*l.*, or 18,320*l.* per mile.

NOTE.—There is an arithmetical error in the Russian committee's figures of 100,000 roubles, which would increase this total by about 13,000*l.*, but for convenience it is disregarded.

For the route viâ Kerman to Charbar the amount to be borrowed would be increased on the basis of the average rate to 25,500,000 + 18,320 × 100 = 27,332,000*l.*, or, say, 27,345,000*l.* allowing for the correction referred to in the foregoing note, and for the route viâ Yezd and Bunder Abbas it would be further increased to 27,345,000 + 18,320 × 62 = 28,480,840*l.*, or, say, 28,481,000*l.*

NOTE.—No allowance has herein been made for the difference in mileage cost due to increase of gauge, in the one case from Kerman and in the other from Bunder Abbas.

To arrive at the cost of the entire scheme, allowance has to be made for the cost of the section in Russia from Aliat to Astara (129 miles), and for the cost of the line in Baluchistan—Guattar to Kurrachee—(373 miles). For the former short length it may be assumed that the construction cost per mile would not exceed the Russian estimate for the section Astara to Resht, or 7,213*l.* a-mile, or, allowing 10 per cent. for rolling stock and proportionately for interest during construction, and discount on debentures 13,739 : 18,320 : : 7,213 + 721 : 10,579—say, 10,600*l.* a-mile.

For the coast line through Baluchistan, which would be of the Indian gauge (5 ft. 6 in.), allowing for the character of the line on a rocky coast with mountains coming in places down to the sea level, and the numerous spurs and cross drainage that would have to be dealt with, it would not be safe at this stage to estimate at a mileage rate much below that assumed for the rest of the line, or, say, 18,000*l.* a-mile.

On this showing, the entire cost of the undertaking, that is, the amount of the capital that would have to be raised to finance it, assuming that 90 per cent. of the amount is raised on 4 per cent. debentures at 85 net (including, of course, commission and underwriting), would be—

—	Route viâ Kerman.	Route viâ Bunder Abbas.
	£	£
Persian section—		
Russian sphere	11,547,000	11,547,000
Neutral sphere	3,965,000	8,263,000
British sphere	11,833,000	8,671,000
	27,345,000	28,481,000
Russian section—		
Aliat to Astara	1,367,000	1,367,000
British section (Baluchistan)—		
Guattar to Kurrachee	6,714,000	6,714,000
Total	35,426,000	36,562,000

NOTE.—The distribution is approximate only, being based on average mileage rates, whereas the rates for different sections vary.

In the case of the route viâ Kerman, British interests would be concerned to the extent of 52 per cent. of the total capital, of which approximately one-third would represent the cost of the unproductive coast line. In the other case, the British portion aggregates 42 per cent. of the total, the whole of which would be represented by coast line with but little local traffic, and which would practically be entirely dependent on through goods and passenger traffic.

4. *Revenue Account.*

There can be no question as to the Russian committee's estimate of through passenger traffic being very greatly overstated. It is shown that 116,255 private passengers and 33,175 British soldiers passed through the Suez Canal in 1909, and on this basis it is assumed that—

Private passengers	80,000
Troops	33,000
Passengers for Persia	7,000
Total	120,000

would use the line, and pay full through fares per annum. It is, of course, most improbable that the line would be used for the conveyance of British troops, and most unlikely that nearly 70 per cent. of the passengers viâ the Suez Canal, a large proportion of whom are for Ceylon, the Straits, China, and the Australian Colonies, would resort to the use of the line. But, on the other hand, the traffic in goods appears to be considerably under-estimated (for instance, the through goods traffic, including bullion, is estimated at only 36 tons per day), and, if the returns on the Trans-Siberian line may be taken as a criterion, it does not seem that the mileage estimate of 11,065 roubles per verst can be regarded in the aggregate as excessive. It is made up of—

	Per verst.
	Roubles.
Passengers and luggage	5,302
Goods*	4,616
Other receipts, including mails	1,147
Total	11,065

* Includes local passengers.

The actual receipts on the Trans-Siberian line (3,141 versts) in 1908 were :—

	Per verst.
	Roubles.
Passengers	1,952
Goods	9,634
Other receipts	371
Total	11,957

It may be noted that the revenue estimate shows a net credit of 81,780*l.* on account of the lease to the Russian railways of the through passenger cars. This would seem to be an error, if, as it is elsewhere assumed, the cars are leased at cost price only, without allowance for profit. Without any correction on this account, the revenue account, taking the line through Persia by itself, shows a net credit of 735,698*l.*, against which are to be set :—

1. The interest charges on share capital at 6 per cent.
2. The interest and sinking fund charges on debenture capital at 4·22 per cent., assuming seventy-five years as the duration of the concession, and that the sinking fund is invested at 4 per cent.

The capital involved being, say—

—	Kerman Route.	Bunder Abbas Route.
	£	£
Share capital	2,700,000	2,850,000
Debenture capital	24,645,000	25,631,000
Total	27,345,000	28,481,000

These charges would amount to :—

—	Kerman Route.	Bunder Abbas Route.
	£	£
Share capital	162,000	171,000
Debenture capital	1,040,000	1,082,000
Total annual interest and sinking fund charges	1,202,000	1,253,000
Deduct estimated net receipts ..	736,000	736,000
Net annual deficit..	466,000	517,000

The Russian committee refer to the additional net income accruing to the Russian lines (which they estimate at 467,500*l.* per annum) being available to help to cover the deficit on the Persian line. It would obviously not be allowable to make the finances of the whole undertaking depend on a subsidy in the shape of a rebate on the charges for traffic passing over the Russian railways only. Indeed, this is not apparently contemplated, for it is said half the line is expected to be guaranteed by Russian capitalists. We are assured that there is no prospect of either the British or the Indian Government entering into a financial guarantee, but it seems urgently necessary that some announcement should be made in connection with the finances as to the willingness or otherwise of the Indian lines to contribute on the basis of the Indian Railway branch line terms.

Something has been said about the grant of a subsidy by the British Government for the carriage of the mails. The present subsidy paid to the Peninsular and Oriental Company covers the entire cost of the transport of the mails, and in the revenue estimates of the proposed undertaking credit is taken for their transport by rail as an item of traffic. It does not appear that it could be expected that a mail subsidy in addition to the charge for transport would be granted.

On the basis that the gross receipts would aggregate 11,065 roubles per verst throughout, except on the coast sections, where they may be taken at 10,315 roubles per verst (1,000 roubles per verst being the full estimate of the receipts from local goods and passengers, the receipts on the coast line under this head are taken at 250 roubles per verst only), and that the working expenses would amount to 70 per cent. of the gross receipts, the net receipts from the complete undertaking would amount to :—

—	Kerman Route.	Route via Bunder Abbas.
Length	Miles. 1,994	Miles. 2,056
Capital cost	£ 35,426,000	£ 36,562,000
Gross receipts	3,491,510	3,547,216
Working expenses	2,444,057	2,483,051
Net receipts	1,047,453	1,064,165
Interest at 6 per cent. on share capital (10 per cent.) and interest and sinking fund at 4·22 per cent. on debenture capital	1,557,277	1,607,886
Annual deficit	509,824	543,721
Say	510,000	544,000

These deficits, in either case, would be amply covered by the joint subsidies, if fixed as suggested at those allowable under Indian branch railway terms, namely, to the net earnings of interchanged traffic on Russian and Indian railways respectively.

[3548] No. 197.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 66 of 25th January: Ex-Shah.

Russian Minister informs me that his Government have instructed the Russian consul-general at Tabreez to tell Shuja that, as Russia has declared that so long as Russian troops are near Tehran ex-Shah will not be recognised, His Majesty's cause is hopeless, and expeditions in his name are aimless and are disapproved by the Russian Government.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3692] No. 198.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 26, 1912.*

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 23rd January.

It would seem undesirable, as we are discouraging Russia from making large money demands in analogous but graver circumstances, and as we are desirous, as far as possible, to avoid embarrassing the Persian Government, to exact cost of measures contemplated, and I think we might confine our demands to a moderate compensation based on scale of pension given by the Government of India to families of killed and wounded, the value of the horses killed and of munitions of war, &c., stolen, and, say, 1,000*l.* for Smart. I think it ought to be possible to obtain an undertaking to pay this sum out of the next loan without any active coercion. I am in consultation with Colonel Douglas on this basis, and will inform you later of the total amount.

I would make a separate demand for the dismissal of Khan of Borasjun, who, so far as I know, was not directly concerned with recent incidents, but I would propose saying nothing to Persian Government of the subsidisation scheme until we see how the negotiations with the local chiefs prosper, and until it is found necessary to obtain consent of the Persian Government to the co-operation of the Swedish officers with British officers in charge of scheme.

I am repeating Government of India telegram of 23rd January and your telegram No. 55 of 24th January to acting consul-general at Bushire, with whom I presume Government of India will communicate direct regarding details of the initiation of the scheme.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and Bushire.)

[3678] No. 199.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 66 of 25th January: Ex-Shah.

Following from consul at Resht, 25th January:—

"Reshid-es-Sultan left Enzeli for Astara yesterday, and his men a few days ago by the overland route. Their arms were returned to them.

"Aga Khalil and Seyyid Abd-ul-Wahab have been released by the Russian consul."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3693] No. 200.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 26, 1912.*

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 23rd January, beginning of second paragraph.

Acting consul at Shiraz reports that Mohammed Ali Khan states that some of the aggressors have been arrested, and that Kawam has sent one of his own men to Kazerun to bring them to Shiraz. Mohammed Ali, however, is now procrastinating, and cannot be induced to hand them over. Acting consul adds that there is no proof whatever beyond Mohammed Ali's bare statement that any of the culprits have been arrested.

I am informing Persian Government of the above, and urging that Mohammed Ali be ordered to hand over the arrested men as a step to reparation.

I omitted from my suggestions, as regards reparation from Persian Government, a demand for the punishment of the aggressors. It would probably be impossible for the Persian Government to compel this, but I presume that such a demand ought to be included *pro formâ*.

As regards serious endeavours of the Persian Government to effect improvement of Shiraz and Shiraz road, it is true that four Swedish officers are preparing to leave, but whether they will be able to reach Shiraz, and whether, when they are once there, they will be able to cope with the prevailing anarchy, must be very doubtful. Still, I think that Government of India's scheme is so greatly preferable to the alternative of evacuation as to be well worth a trial.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and Bushire.)

[3699] No. 201.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 45 of 19th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Persian Government now ask that the *procès-verbaux* of the commission which sat at Bagdad and afterwards at Mohammerah after the ratification of the Treaty of Erzeroum may be communicated to them.

[3767] No. 202.

Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

Sir, *The Hague, January 26, 1912.*

THE Dutch newspaper, "De Nieuwe Courant," reported yesterday evening, on the authority of the Berlin paper, "Lokal-Anzeiger," that M. Oudendijk, the Netherlands Minister to Persia, would succeed Mr. Schuster as financial adviser in Persia.

I was already aware that M. Oudendijk's name had been mentioned in London as a possible successor to Mr. Schuster, but this paragraph gave me the opportunity of broaching the question with Count Limburg Stirum this afternoon.

Count Limburg Stirum expressed his surprise at the idea of M. Oudendijk being chosen for a post involving knowledge of finance. M. Oudendijk was a very capable person and a most useful public servant, but he had no notion, so far as Count Limburg Stirum was aware, of financial methods. Had the Netherlands Government been requested to find a person to fill Mr. Schuster's place they would probably have been able to select a competent man from their colonies, but M. Oudendijk would never have been their choice.

I have, &c.
ALAN JOHNSTONE.

[3713] No. 203.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received January 27.)

Sir, *25, Abchurch Lane, London, January 26, 1912.*

REFERRING to my interview of the 23rd instant with Sir E. Grey, as promised I sent a full telegram to our Shiraz manager, Mr. M. M Ferguson, who is in very close touch with Persian matters. I enclose copy of his reply received late last night. If you wish me to telegraph further I shall be glad to do so.

I have, &c.
T. JACKSON, *Chairman.*

Enclosure in No. 203.

Translation of a special Telegram received from Mr. Ferguson, Shiraz, January 25, 1912.

ALTHOUGH tribes trouble anticipated during month after next owing to unsuitability present governor of Fars, we do not consider much likelihood tribes attacking consulate or Indian troops in Shiraz unless, as last year, British consul interfere in local politics.

Withdrawal troops would be popular measure, but withdrawal British consul no doubt will seriously affect British prestige. There is some possibility object would be misunderstood by the people; consequently there might be much danger to lives and property of British left here. If people and tribes do not misinterpret withdrawal, British consul and Persian Government guarantee give sufficient local protection. Cannot see why we could not continue the business bank as usual.

[3852] No. 204.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 63 of 24th January.

Lecoffre has been appointed financial agent for province of Fars at a salary of 4,000 tomans.

[3867] No. 205.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 52 of 24th January and Tehran telegram No. 65 of 25th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was under a misapprehension, and was referring to map of 1870.

In a letter just received his Excellency says that he shares your view that the confidential character of report of joint commission precludes it being communicated to Persian and Turkish Governments. As there is nothing secret about the map, he sees no objection to its being communicated to Persian Government as soon as copies which are being prepared at Tiflis are ready. He also sees no reason why extracts from *procès-verbaux* of the sittings of the Erzeroum Commission, 1843–47, should not be communicated to the Persian Legation in London.

[3868] No. 206.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 49 of 24th January.

I had already, as reported in my telegram No. 22 of 24th January, spoken in the sense of first paragraph, and immediately on the receipt of your telegram wrote private letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs embodying the remaining two. His Excellency, whom I saw for a few minutes last night, told me that he would now cause warning to be conveyed to the ex-Shah.

[3413] No. 207.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 27, 1912.*

WE should prefer that M. Mornard should keep as many of existing assistants as possible if they are capable, but we cannot object to unavoidable vacancies being filled by Belgians.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 57.)

[3412] No. 208.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 27, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 62 of 24th January: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that if his Excellency will give safe-conduct and not demand further punishment than is mentioned in your telegram No. 18 [of 20th January] the basti will be urged to leave His Majesty's consulate.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 62.)

[3429]

No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 22 [of 24th January: Ministers' joint proposals].

You could embody in an *aide-mémoire* for communication to M. Sazonof the proposals made in fourth paragraph of the identic suggestion recorded in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 29 [of 10th January]. Amount of ex-Shah's pension could be left to Persian Government to fix. You should also state in memorandum that, pending discussions as to a loan and to whom it should be entrusted, the two Governments will advance each 200,000*l.* on the condition mentioned at end of sixth paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's above-mentioned telegram. The 200,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government would have to be applied by Persian Government to restoring security on suthern roads.

I think it would not be right after both Governments have been in communication with Seligman, and latter showed every willingness to comply with Russian conditions, to throw Seligman over without reason and support another group. I suggest, therefore, that Seligman should be asked whether he is prepared to take up negotiations for a loan at point where they were left when his representative last visited St. Petersburgh and to proceed with them. If he is not willing to do so at once under altered conditions in Persia, we shall be free to support some other group. As to German connections, all international financiers seem to be in communication with each other.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 65.)

[3484]

No. 210.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 27, 1912.

RUSSIAN Government have received information that a further Turkish advance on the Persian frontier is in contemplation, and, in view of this, and of the fact that report of British and Russian delegates who visited the frontier shows that the Turkish encroachments already extend beyond the frontier zone, they consider that representations should be made by you and your Russian colleague to the Porte so as to prevent the dispatch of a fresh expedition or any extension of Turkish authority.

The Russian Government consider that, as the Turco-Persian delimitation commission will meet shortly, any further encroachments would be very undesirable.

It is true that, as you point out in your telegram No. 10 of 25th January, Turkish Government may retort that Russia is not in a position to make representations respecting encroachments on Persian territory, but the two cases are not parallel, as the Turkish encroachments, which are strategic, began in 1905.

Present representations are only directed against still further increases and encroachments, and Turkish occupation includes claims to possession and administration, which Russians do not claim. As far as Khoi is concerned it is clearly previous Turkish advance that is responsible for presence of Russian troops in that district.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 60, and St. Petersburgh, No. 53.)

[3864]

No. 211.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, January* 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram unnumbered of 18th January.

Smart has now taken charge at Shiraz, and, now that idea of evacuation has been abandoned for the present, I venture to repeat request for sanction for course indicated in my telegram No. 40 of 13th January: Escort for Knox.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[3863]

No. 210*.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January* 28, 1912.

SITUATION in Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 29 of the 10th instant.

The uncertainty as to the degree of support which the Persian Government are to receive from the two Powers is making the position of the Government daily more difficult.

I have spoken to my Russian colleague on the subject. We think that it is quite unnecessary to await a decision as to the nature of the loan, and that we ought to lose no time in putting before the Persian Government conditions on which the two Powers are prepared to make proposed communication to the ex-Shah.

I learn from the treasurer-general that practically no taxes are coming in, and that the Bakhtiaris are clamouring for arrears of pay. The Treasury, he informs me, is quite penniless, and unless an advance of 200,000*l.* is made, pending arrangement of a loan, it will be impossible for the Government to carry on.

I hope that it may be found possible to arrange for this advance at once. Treasurer-general will prepare a programme of expenditure, and we should make its execution a condition of the advance. The programme will include a considerable sum for the gendarmerie. It was only the support of the Medjliss which enabled Shuster to make a stand against waste and thieving, and now that the treasurer-general is without the support of a Medjliss it is all the more necessary that a programme of expenditure should be drawn up and insisted on by the two Powers.

[3865] No. 212.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 729 of 22nd December.

Following from consul at Kermanshah, No. 1, received to-day :—

"Evening of 15th January many shots were fired at consulate. Prince denied complicity, as also does basti. I have forty rifles, and could obtain more guards through Azam-ed-Dowleh. Unless Persian Government take steps, what should I do? Sardar Mozaffir, with 250 horse, joined Prince on 16th January, making about 1,400; others will follow. Non-arrival of Persian Government's forces will cause tribes to join Prince."

I have replied as follows :—

"I think it would be wiser not to obtain more guards through your basti. Such a course would seem likely to provoke further attacks."

[3866] No. 213.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 68 of 26th January.

Total value of animals killed and property destroyed is about 934*l.* Casualties in the two incidents were three killed, one missing, ten wounded, exclusive of Smart, three of the wounded being probably permanently disabled, and three others with severe wounds.

Desiring to reduce our demand as far as possible, I would propose that we should claim 4,734*l.* as a first charge on the next loan, *i.e.*, 1,000*l.* for Smart, 300*l.* for each of the killed, missing, or permanently disabled, and 100*l.* for each of the other wounded. Total amount, exclusive of compensation for Smart and stolen property, would appear to be on the same scale as that proposed for the Russian casualties at Tabreez (see Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 20 of 20th January).

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[3869] No. 214.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 28, 1912.*

IN reply to private letter which I addressed to him on receipt of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 60 of 24th January, Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote to say he considered it was now too late to express our acquiescence in Mornard's acting appointment, seeing that he had already assumed office, and that he did not contemplate opposing his definite appointment should he prove up to the work.

I replied, reminding him of what he had authorised me to say, as reported in my telegram No. 17 of 17th January, and pointing out that, if we took no notice of his acting appointment, we should be neglecting principle insisted on in 3rd article of Russian ultimatum.

His Excellency now writes that he must adhere to what he originally wrote, as such a step as we propose would not fail to weaken Mornard's authority in the eyes of Persian Government. He adds that, as his name was put forward by the two legations, principle to which I had alluded would not be infringed; that he had agreed to consider appointment as provisional for the moment only in order that we might replace him should he prove himself incompetent, but that in the contrary case he would not oppose his retaining post of treasurer-general.

[3882] No. 215.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 19.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 17, 1912.*

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 27 of the 12th of this month, I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and informed him that you were prepared to co-operate with the Imperial Government on the lines proposed by M. Poklewsky and Sir George Barclay, as you considered that it was essential to give some solid support to the Persian Government without further delay. I added that you would be glad to learn his views with regard to the programme which the two Ministers had elaborated.

M. Sazonof replied that, while he approved of the programme as a whole, as offering a practical basis of co-operation, there were two points in it which seemed to him open to criticism. The first had reference to the attitude which it was proposed that the two Governments should adopt with regard to the ex-Shah. The Imperial Government, his Excellency said, would be quite willing to join His Majesty's Government in advising Mohamed Ali in a friendly manner to return to Europe; but they could not go so far as to tell him that they would, under no circumstances, ever recognise him. His Excellency then repeated the various reasons which—as M. Nératof had more than once explained to me on former occasions—rendered it impossible for Russia to take this step, adding that, in spite of his forced abdication, the Emperor always regarded Mahomed Ali as the legitimate Sovereign.

I pointed out that, in view of the fact that the ex-Shah had made his attempt and failed, and that he would never now regain the throne unaided, the Russian Government might, without exposing themselves to a charge of inconsistency, inform him that they could not countenance the perpetuation of the present anarchy which his presence in Persia must entail; that, if he left at once, the two Governments would endeavour to induce the Persian Government to grant him a pension; but that, if he declined to follow their advice, he would have to abandon all hope of ever receiving a pension again. I added that, as his Excellency was aware, His Majesty's Government would never recognise the ex-Shah, and that, as they were meeting the wishes of the Imperial Government in the matter of the proposed constitutional changes, it was but a small thing to ask that that Government should meet their wishes on this one essential point.

M. Sazonof replied that it was by no means so certain that the position of the ex-Shah was as bad as I had made out. He had still a strong backing of Turcomans, and it was always possible that he might attempt to establish his authority in the northern provinces, which had declared for him, even if he had to separate them from the rest of Persia. He begged me to believe, however, that the Russian Government had no desire to take his part. In spite of all that had been said to the contrary, they had done absolutely nothing to facilitate his return, and it was only owing to a false passport and to a successful disguise that he had been able to pass unhindered through Russian territory. I would remember no doubt how, when Saad-ed-Dowleh had, in December 1910, approached the Russian Government with the request for a loan for the purpose of effecting Mohamed Ali's restoration, they had, as reported by Mr. O'Beirne in his despatch No. 475, Secret, of the 6th December, 1910, wholly discouraged the idea and had refused to advance a single penny. In the telegram which he had received from M. Poklewsky nothing was said on the subject of a pension, but it was evident from Sir George Barclay's telegram that this was due to an oversight. The grant of a pension would greatly facilitate matters, and he would be prepared to tell the ex-Shah that it was useless for him to remain any longer in Persia, and to warn him that, if he refused to go, no pension would be granted him. What I had said as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government might also be used by the Russian Government as an argument to induce him to go, as they might further tell him that, in view of the fixed determination of His Majesty's Government never to recognise him, it would be impossible for him ever to establish himself on the throne.

M. Sazonof then proceeded to speak of the second point to which he took exception, namely, the proposed financial operations. This was, he said, a matter on which he could not speak with authority until he had had an opportunity of discussing it with the Minister of Finance. His personal opinion, however, was that it would be a mistake for the two Governments to make small advances to the Persian Government, which would be insufficient to meet their financial requirements. What we ought to do was to arrange at once for a large loan. The Russian Government had no intention

of pressing for the immediate payment of the indemnity, which formed the subject of the third demand accepted by the Persian Government, and they would also allow the outstanding claims of Russian subjects, which amounted to some 300,000*l.*, to stand over for the present. They would, however, be forced by Russian public opinion to demand the immediate payment of an indemnity to the families of the Russian soldiers who had been either killed or maimed for life during the course of the recent fighting. He could not say exactly what would be the amount of this indemnity, but at a rough calculation it would come to about 100,000*l.*

I remarked that at a moment like the present, when complete anarchy reigned in Persia, it would be very difficult to find financiers ready to float a large loan, except on very onerous terms, and that, moreover, this difficulty would be increased by the fact that M. Mornard, as treasurer-general, did not inspire confidence in English financial circles. It seemed to me, therefore, advisable to commence by affording the Persian Government some temporary pecuniary assistance, so that they might be in a position to restore order in the country. With the restoration of order and an improvement in the general political situation it would be much easier for them to negotiate a large loan on reasonable terms. As regarded the question of the payment of an indemnity to the families of the Russian soldiers who had been either killed or wounded, it would, I suggested, be sufficient to obtain an engagement from the Persian Government that the sum demanded should eventually be paid out of the proceeds of the new loan, and that meanwhile the Russian Treasury might advance the money necessary to meet any passing claims on the part of these families.

M. Sazonof replied that he did not believe that it would make much difference, as regarded terms, whether the loan were to be raised at once or to be postponed to a later date. In order to obtain a loan of several millions of pounds it would be necessary that the two Governments, without giving an actual guarantee, should reassure its promoters with regard to the political situation, and give them clearly to understand that behind Persia stood Great Britain and Russia. He would, however, repeat what I had said to the Minister of Finance, and discuss the whole question with him.

I then read over to M. Sazonof the remaining points dealt with in Sir George Barclay's telegram No. 29 of the 10th instant, but his Excellency said that he had no observations to make with regard to them.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[3883] No. 216.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 20.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 17, 1912.*

AT the usual reception of the diplomatic body by the Emperor on New Year's Day, I conveyed to His Majesty the King's congratulations and good wishes, adding that the last commands which the King had been pleased to give me on the eve of his departure for India were to take the first opportunity of assuring His Majesty that there was nothing which the King had so much at heart as the maintenance of the closest relations with Russia. I subsequently succeeded in turning the conversation to Persian affairs, and repeated to His Majesty much of what I had said to M. Sazonof, as reported in my immediately preceding despatch on the subject of the ex-Shah.

The cordial manner in which the Emperor spoke of the Anglo-Russian understanding left nothing to be desired, and His Majesty warmly reciprocated the King's wishes for its maintenance. His Majesty also spoke of the approaching English visit with evident satisfaction. With regard to Persia, the Emperor said that it was incumbent on the two Governments to give the Persian Government every assistance in their power by providing them with capable foreign advisers. He had, His Majesty continued, seen the joint programme which had been drawn up by M. Poklewsky and Sir George Barclay, and the principles which it laid down met with his approval. M. Sazonof had already told him that you could never consent to recognise the ex-Shah, and he quite understood your attitude on this question. On my informing the Emperor of the action which M. Sazonof proposed to take, His Majesty expressed his approval.

The Emperor then proceeded to say that the Persian Government was so weak, and the country in such a state of anarchy, that order could never be restored without the assistance of Russian troops in the north and of British troops in the south. He had

seen with regret that the Persian Committee in London, as well as the "Daily Graphic" and other papers, had recently indulged in attacks on Russia, and had cast suspicion on the sincerity of the assurances which his Government had given. We might, however, rest assured that, when he gave his word that Russia would not annex any portion of Persian territory, that word would not be broken.

I told the Emperor that I had reported to you the categorical assurances which M. Kokovtsof had given me on this subject, and assured His Majesty that His Majesty's Government had not for a moment doubted their sincerity. There was, I added, a tendency among the parties belonging to the Extreme Left in England and to the Extreme Right in Russia to criticise the Anglo-Russian understanding, and I ventured to think that the language employed in the "Zemshchina" and other reactionary papers in Russia had been more violent and more openly hostile than that of the Radical press in England. The essential thing, however, was that the Anglo-Russian understanding should be supported by the two Governments and by general public opinion in the two countries.

His Majesty cordially agreed, and said that neither Government should attach undue importance to what was said by the extremists on the other side.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[3884] No. 217.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 21.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 17, 1912.*

IN a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days ago, I asked his Excellency what he thought of the report of the Anglo-Russian Commission that had recently made a tour of inspection along the Turco-Persian frontier, as well as of the protocol which had been signed by the Persian and Turkish Governments for a settlement of the frontier question.

M. Sazonof replied that the report amply confirmed what he had always said on the subject of the Turkish encroachments on Persian territory, and showed that the Turkish Government, in pushing forward their frontier, had been actuated by strategical considerations, of which Russia was the objective. He doubted very much whether the Turco-Persian Commission contemplated in the protocol would ever meet unless pressure were applied at Constantinople by Russia and Great Britain, and he was convinced that, whatever might be the eventual outcome of such a commission, Turkey would never refer any of the points on which an agreement could not be reached to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, as she knew perfectly well that the case would be given against her.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[3942] No. 218.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 69.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 22, 1912.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairr spoke to me to-day with some bitterness and a good deal of anxiety as to recent Russian action in Persia. He said that the Russian troops in that district between Khoi and Urmia, which the Russian Government had declared to be for the protection of caravans and which had been estimated at 2,000, had now been increased to 4,000, and had been strengthened by several guns. Until their arrival there had been perfect quiet in Khoi and Urmia, but since they had reached there the Russians had discovered all kinds of imaginary disturbances which had required exemplary punishment. The Russians had even gone so far as to hang some mujteheds, and indeed indulged in what amounted to the extermination of all those who held liberal ideas.

The Russian Government, his Excellency said, must be aware of the whereabouts of the late Shah, and if they were sincere they should secure him and remove him to Odessa, and prevent his *immixtion* in Persian affairs.

His Excellency said he could not say what the result of the mixed commission

would be, but it would be quite possible that it or The Hague Tribunal might establish the fact that places now occupied by Russian troops were in Turkish territory, and he would like to obtain some guarantee that if these were declared to be so, the Russians would evacuate those places.

His Excellency evidently had no faith in Russian engagements not to occupy permanently Persian territory, and said that he was at a loss to understand the policy of His Majesty's Government, no doubt inspired by other considerations, of giving the opportunity to Russia when she found us engaged elsewhere of coming down to the Persian Gulf.

His Excellency added that large numbers of Persians in those districts had expressed the desire to become Turkish subjects. It had been intimated to them that if this was their real desire they could do so by coming over to Turkey with their arms, but only on the condition of never returning.

As the Russian Ambassador has not yet received his instructions as to the communication to be made on this subject, which was dealt with in your telegrams Nos. 19 and 20, I did not discuss the point with him.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[3885] No. 219.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 24.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1912.*

I CALLED on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th instant and spoke to him on the affairs of Persia.

I commenced the conversation by saying that order could never be re-established in that country so long as Mohamed Ali remained there, and by urging the necessity of our at once taking action to induce him to retire. Should he consent to do so, you would be prepared to join the Russian Government in recommending the Persian Government to grant him a pension of 50,000 tomans, but you could not support his claim to the full pension, which he had received prior to his return to Persia. Were, however, the pension, which you proposed, to be granted him it must be on the understanding that, if he again returned to Persia without the consent of the two Governments, the latter should support the Persian Government in opposing him.

M. Sazonof replied that he would raise no difficulties with regard to the amount at which you had suggested that his pension should be fixed, and that he was ready to make a communication to the ex-Shah in the terms reported in my despatch No. 19 of the 17th instant. He must, however, beg you not to ask him to give an undertaking that the Russian Government would support the Persian Government against Mohamed Ali should the latter ever again attempt to regain the throne. This would, for the reasons which he had already given me, be going further than the Imperial Government could go; but he would always be ready to address a serious warning to Mohamed Ali, and to impress on him the folly of renewing an attempt that was foredoomed to failure, seeing that His Majesty's Government would never consent to recognise him.

We then proceeded to discuss the question of a loan which M. Sazonow agreed in thinking was one of primary importance. The first suggestion which he made was the one which formerly found favour with M. Isvolsky, namely, that the negotiations for a loan should be combined with negotiations for railway concessions. He mentioned more particularly the concession for the Trans-Persian Railway, and suggested that the financial groups who were promoting that undertaking should also float a large Persian loan. I said that I was not in a position to express an opinion on this subject, and thought that it would perhaps be more practical for us to revert to the offer which Messrs. Seligman had already made to the Persian Government for a loan of 4,000,000*l*. In accordance with his Excellency's request I gave him the general outline of the conditions attached to this loan, and of the conversations that M. Seligman had had with M. Kokovtzof, of which, owing to his long illness, M. Sazonof knew nothing. His Excellency then asked me whether I thought that Messrs. Seligman would be prepared to renew their offer; and I replied that, though the situation in Persia at the present moment was hardly calculated to inspire confidence in financial circles, we might, if he concurred, approach Messrs. Seligman on the subject. M. Sazonof said that before giving a definite answer he must talk the matter over with the Minister of Finance.

I next proceeded to speak on the subject of the recall of the Kazvin troops, reminding his Excellency of the assurances which he had formerly given me, and urging on him the necessity of the two Governments uniting their efforts to restore order by giving the Persian Government some tangible proof of their support and confidence. I dwelt on the grave situation with which His Majesty's Government were confronted in the south, and on the serious prejudice that was being caused to our trade there in consequence of the prevailing disorders, which would never have become so acute had it not been for the state of unrest and excitement produced by Russia's action in the north. I then read to his Excellency your despatch No. 11 of the 15th instant.

M. Sazonof admitted that he had given me the assurances of which I had reminded him, and said that he had no wish to retain the troops at Kazvin a day longer than was necessary, more especially now that there was no question of an advance on Tehran. There had been a decided improvement in the situation, but he could not guarantee that fresh disorders would not break out at one point or another. Only the other day some Russian soldiers had been fired on at Resht; and as long as this danger existed Russian public opinion would not condone the recall of the troops. I suggested that, as everything was quiet at Tehran and Kazvin, they might at any rate be withdrawn to Resht or Tabreez as a first step towards their complete withdrawal when there was no longer any reason to fear the outbreak of fresh disturbances in the north. M. Sazonof seemed to think that it might soon be possible to do this, but said that he could take no decision without first consulting the military authorities. He then went on to say that it would be much easier to explain the recall of the troops to the Russian public if he could at the same time announce that the Persian Government had engaged to indemnify the families of the Russian soldiers who had been killed or seriously wounded during the recent troubles, as soon as the state of their finances permitted of their doing so. He hoped that the amount of this indemnity might be reduced from his original estimate of 1,000,000 roubles to 200,000 or 250,000 roubles.

I subsequently drew the conversation to what Sir George Barclay had reported in his telegram No. 41 of the 14th instant with regard to the action of Russian consular officers in Persia. If, I said, the two Governments were to work together to any good purpose, with a view to establish a stable régime at Tehran, it was essential that they should be loyally supported by their respective agents. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the friendly and cordial relations existing between M. Poklewsky and Sir George Barclay; but I was afraid that some of the subordinate agents were inclined to take a line of their own that was hardly consistent with the policy of their respective Governments. We had had the unfortunate case of Major Stokes, whom I had no desire to defend, but we had recalled him. There seemed, however, reason to fear that some of the Russian consuls, who were in favour of a forward policy, were far too apt either to create or exaggerate incidents, and sometimes even played the part of "agents provocateurs."

M. Sazonof admitted that the Russian consular service in Persia was not all that it should be. Some of the consuls were jealous of M. Poklewsky, and did not apparently always obey his instructions. M. Poklewsky had, indeed, on more than one occasion complained of them, and he would, he thought, have to make several changes, and, perhaps, remove M. Pokhitonof, who was one of the worst offenders.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[3944] No. 220.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for communication to the War Office, a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, giving the Turkish estimate of the number and distribution of Russian troops in Persia, and reporting a conversation on the subject with the Minister of War.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 220.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 19th instant General Holmsen, the Russian military agent, came to see me. His object was to ascertain exactly what battalions the Turks had on the Russian frontier, and he also asked my opinion of the Turkish attitude towards a Persian advance to Urmia through the contested zone now occupied by the Turks. He told me that there were no Russian troops, except the recognised consular guards, yet in Urmia or Soujboulak.

A few days previously the Turkish general staff gave me their estimate of the number and distribution of the Russian troops in Persia, a translation of which document I annex. It is noticeable that no troops are mentioned at Khoi, and it may be that those who were there have since gone to Tabreez. It appears that the Turks are not very well informed as to the Russian dispositions and movements.

This morning I saw the Minister of War, who informed me that the Russians had entered and occupied Urmia. He said that there were from 1,500 to 2,000 of them, and that they had not come round the lake from Tabreez, as I supposed. I remarked that I had thought the Turks were not going to allow them to pass on the Khoi–Urmia road, to which he replied that that was so, but that they had slipped through without being observed; and also that, owing to the war, Turkey was not just now in a position to resist Russian action in the neighbourhood of the disputed zone.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 220.

Statement of the Russian Troops in Persia about the middle of January, according to the Turkish General Staff.

201st regiment at Kazvin.
202nd regiment at Tabreez.
206th regiment at Tabreez.
154th regiment at Tabreez.
5th chasseur regiment, composed of two battalions, at Tabreez.
3rd Caucasus chasseur battalion at Tabreez.
Two regiments of Cossacks at Tabreez.
An artillery brigade of four batteries at Tabreez.
3rd Caucasus engineer battalion at Tabreez.
At Urmia, eighty infantry and two machine guns (being the advanced guard of a battalion which is under orders for that place).
At Meshed, one regiment.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[3946] No. 221.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 73.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for communication to the War Office, a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting a conversation with the Minister of War as to the need for strengthening Turkey as a barrier against Russia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 221.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 22, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that when I saw the Minister of War yesterday he went on to say, *à propos* of the Russian troops entering Urmia, that the British attitude was inexplicable and astonishing to him and his colleagues. It was obvious that the Russians would not withdraw, and that their occupation of Northern Persia would be permanent. This, he said, constituted an important step in their advance to the head of the Persian Gulf, an advance which was as detrimental to Great Britain as to Turkey. He said that we were living in a fool's paradise if we really believed that Russia would withdraw, or that she even wanted to see Persia well governed and independent, and limiting her own expansion to the south; that the only effect of our implicit belief in Russia's good faith was to hasten the day when we would find ourselves confronting Russia on a land frontier which we had not the force to defend against her.

He went on to explain the policy which Turkey was following, and was bound to follow. It was quite impossible, he said, for her to make an offensive and defensive alliance with any one Power, for there was no Power interested equally in the maintenance of Turkey both in Europe and in Asia. In Europe the friend was Austria, to whose own interest it was that the *status quo* in Roumelia should be maintained; therefore the rapprochement between Turkey and Austria was inevitable, even after the latter's annexation of Bosnia. England's position and interests in Eastern Turkey in Asia were analogous to those of Austria in Turkey in Europe. Russia's march to the Persian Gulf could, now that Persia no longer existed as an independent State, only be barred by strengthening Turkey in those parts, not by weakening her. He said that the Turks realised that England had no territorial ambitions or designs inconsistent with Turkish sovereignty in those parts, and that she was the only Power sincerely desirous of maintaining the *status quo* there, which, moreover, it was to her own interest to do.

He then said, "Why are you afraid of Germany? What can Germany do to you? You can always build two ships to her one. You think of nothing but your trade, and you allow Germany's commercial rivalry to prey upon your minds till you forget your real enemy. Your present line is against nature, and, whether you like it or not, the day must come when Russia will again be your enemy."

Much of the foregoing is so trite and obvious that I must apologise for putting it on paper, but as the Minister of War spoke spontaneously and sincerely, and as it is said to be salutary to see ourselves as others see us, I consider it my duty to report Mahmoud Shevket Pasha's conversation fully to your Excellency. I will also permit myself one or two observations.

Though it would be difficult to deny the reason of a great deal of what he said, the Minister of War's depreciation of what he supposes to be the policy of the British Government is based on a fundamental inability to grasp the fact that Russia may be loyal to her engagements. When Russia has proved that she is only in Persia for Persia's good and has withdrawn, the whole edifice of the Minister of War's criticisms falls to the ground.

I would also remark that the Austrian view of the situation seems to be exactly the same as Mahmoud Shevket's. The Austrian Ambassador said to me a few days ago that he considered the estrangement between Great Britain and Germany to be only temporary, and due to the fact that we were always opposed to the Power which for the time being was the strongest in Europe. Russia was rapidly recovering her force and her preponderant position in Europe, and that it was inevitable that we should eventually be forced into opposition to her designs. His Excellency has more than once discussed with me the situation in Turkey, as modified by the Italian war, and he has always given me the impression that he attaches supreme importance to the maintenance of Turkey's present position in Europe, that he regards it as absolutely essential, and that he will not admit that there is anything serious to be apprehended from the state of affairs in Albania and Macedonia. Unless the Turks put themselves out of court by doing something very foolish, I am sure that they will have Austria's support in any question that may arise in the near future in the Balkans.

The coincidence of views is so remarkable that it is not impossible that the ideas which Mahmoud Shevket Pasha propounded to me may have been due to Austrian inspiration.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[3894] No. 222.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 24, 1912.*

THE "Vossische Zeitung" reports your reply to the question asked at the conclusion of your speech at North Sunderland on the 20th instant, as to what steps had been taken to prevent Russia annexing Persia, as follows: "Grey replied that the Persian question could only be dealt with in a long speech; he would point out (1) that Persia is not being annexed, and (2) that if people consider it England's responsibility and duty to guarantee the independence of the whole territory of countries like Persia, greater burdens than she could bear would be imposed upon England, and her expenditure would be far greater than at present."

The "Vossische Zeitung" says that there would not be the slightest objection to your view of the situation if England had not already actually undertaken the above-mentioned obligation. It draws attention to the first paragraph of the Anglo-Russian agreement of the 31st August, 1907, which runs: "The Governments of Great Britain and Russia bind themselves mutually to safeguard the integrity and the independence of Persia." "England," says the "Vossische Zeitung," "has therefore, on the strength of a treaty, the right and the duty to interpose whenever the other party to the treaty oversteps the treaty stipulations." The paper maintains that your assertion that Russia is not going to annex Persia is only a verbal quibble. It says that there will certainly be no formal annexation of Northern Persia, but that Russia has actually already occupied the northern territories of Persia and holds them in her power; and concludes by remarking that in your recent speech you purposely ignored the actual state of affairs in order to avoid the responsibility which England had assumed by treaty.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[3963] No. 223.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 63 of 27th January.

Only two Americans are willing to remain. These are two of the officers of the Treasury gendarmerie, who, now that the latter has been merged in the national gendarmerie, have placed themselves under the orders of the Swedish officers. The other Americans are only waiting until they can come to an arrangement with the Persian Government as regards money they consider due to them.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[4137] No. 224.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 59 of 27th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that he is authorised to make an official communication to the Persian Government respecting the ex-Shah on condition that the fedais are dismissed and that the Persian Cossack brigade is strengthened so that it may be employed at any point where its services are required in Northern Persia, and thus render it possible for Russia eventually to withdraw troops from Tabreez.

He was somewhat taken aback by your proposal that the two Governments should each advance 200,000*l.* pending discussions as to loan, but eventually said that he

recognised the necessity of supplying the Persian Government at once with money to meet pressing requirements, and that he would endeavour to induce the Minister of Finance to consent to such an advance on the understanding that it would be a first charge on the new loan. As regards that loan he is telegraphing to the Russian Ambassador to point out to you the necessity of having a stronger consortium than Seligman's. He says that the French bank is quite ready to give Seligman a share, and that we might explain to him the reason why we consider the proposed new arrangement preferable, and promise to use our influence to secure for him a sufficient interest in the loan to prevent his being a loser.

I impressed on him the necessity of our losing no further time in making communication to the Persian Governmemt, and urged that something should be done with regard to withdrawal of troops from Kazvin before Parliament meets.

His Excellency promised to see Minister of Finance at once, and said that the question of the withdrawal of the Kazvin troops to Resht was almost settled in principle, but that he would not name the exact date for fear of being unable to keep his word. On my further pressing him, he said that he hoped that they might be withdrawn next week. He could promise nothing as to withdrawal of troops at Tabreez and Urmia district on account of Turkish encroachments.

I am sending him *aide-mémoire* as instructed.

[4138] No. 225.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 29, 1912.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 10 of 25th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Instructions are being sent to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that you will continue to support him in bringing pressure to bear at Constantinople with regard to this question, which is becoming very serious on account of the dispatch of fresh Turkish troops. He tells me that the Persian Government have informed him that the Persian delegates on the frontier commission have been appointed, and that they have asked for his assistance to hasten the appointment of Turkish delegates. He thinks that we should press this on the Porte.

[4139] No. 226.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 56 of 27th January: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to give basti safe-conduct to Tehran, and not to demand further punishments than those indicated in my telegram No. 18 of 20th January.

[3699] No. 227.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 29, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 71 of 26th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

The request of Persian Government raises rather an awkward point, owing to the actual frontier at Mohammerah being less advantageous to Turkey than that which the mediating commissioners laid down in 1850; at the same time, as Turkey presumably still retains copies of the *procès-verbaux*, there can be no sufficient objection to furnishing copies of *procès-verbaux* to Persia. But the reopening of this question, and the frequent requests which will probably be made for papers only in possession of Russia and ourselves, but likely from their nature to exercise a decisive influence on the issue of the negotiations, make it necessary to consider whether we should not, on the meeting of the commission

at Constantinople, entrust British and Russian delegates there with the whole correspondence, and leave it to their discretion as to what papers should be communicated to the Persian and Turkish delegates.

Please consult Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 67, and Constantinople, No. 27.)

[4207] No. 228.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received January 30.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street,
Sir, *London, January 29, 1912.*

REFERRING to the correspondence which took place some time ago on the subject of the rebellious Chief Kerim Khan Kalhur of Kasr-i-Shirin, who was causing us a good deal of trouble, and the subsequent appointment of our representative, Mr. E. B. Soane, as consular agent at that place, I beg to enclose extracts from some recent letters from Mr. Soane and from our agents at Mohammerah, which will doubtless be of interest to you, and which show that the position in that part of Persia is now much more satisfactory.

One of the extracts from our agents you will notice reports that the chief Mujtahids in Persia have sent wires to the Mullahs all over Persia to preach a holy war against the Russians and English, and that the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who, among others, received one of these telegrams, after some consideration passed the order on (presumably to the Mullahs of Arabistan), but deleting the word "English."

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

Enclosure in No. 228.

Extract from Letters received by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

(1.)

From Mr. Soane, Kasr-i-Shirin, dated 21st November, 1911.

"I HAVE to advise you that severe fighting has been and is occurring in the immediate vicinity, being the outcome of old feuds between surrounding tribes and Kerim Khan Bajlan. Up to to-day Kasr-i-Shirin had been in considerable danger of raiding, or of being the scene of fighting, but representations made by me to Daud Khan Kalhur and Hussein Khan Guran have averted these eventualities, the success of which actions has been a gain to the company's name, and prove the influence of the vice-consulate here. During this time the wells have been the safest place in the countryside, but a third victory over the Bajlan to-day has rendered the position there insecure. I am going there to-morrow morning, and shall stay till the situation, generally, takes some definite form.

"Kerim Khan has been evicted, for the time being, from the governorship of Kasr-i-Shirin (but not of the Bajlan county and Chia Sourkh), and, as a result, the local refiners of oil—being no longer afraid of his exactions—are inclined to come forward with offers to buy crude, which it may be possible to accept later on.

"So far there are no signs of the Persian Government's influence, and from what can be gathered from the occasional travellers it has not reached beyond Hamadan. The Government adherents and officials of Kermanshah passed here yesterday, having been evicted by Salar-ed-Dowleh's representative there."

(2.)

From Mr. Soane, Kasr-i-Shirin, dated 6th December, 1911.

"Kerim Khan Bajlan has been definitely deprived of the governorship of Kasr-i-Shirin and has withdrawn all opposition to the company, being now in a situation which may force him to look to it for assistance."

(3.)

From Mr. Soane, Kasr-i-Shirin, dated January 1912.

"The situation here has been solved well indeed. Every tribe of note has just concluded a great alliance, and the "Medjliss" governorships have been re-installed, *i.e.*, Hussein Khan, chief of Guran and Kasr (an extremely nice man and personal friend), and other hitherto ignored appointments. Kerim Khan alone is left out, and has received notice to efface himself and hand over to his brother, Ali Agha, a somewhat bovine man but not bad-natured, who called here to-day to pay his respects as Chief of the Bajlan. The company can get on better with him than with Kerim Khan, I think."

(4.)

From Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Agents at Mohammerah, dated 6th January, 1912.

"This* is very satisfactory, as of late things have been far from promising—serious inter-tribal affairs. It appears that the institution of the vice-consulate is proving very popular with the people, and Russian prestige in that particular part has received a decided blow. The attitude of the people towards the English and the company is now quite cordial. The committee of "gawrayan" or "big men" who run the place visits Soane regularly, and although he does not mix himself in their affairs it is apparent that he has a distinct standing there.

"The chief Mujtahids have sent wires all over to the Mullahs (as, no doubt, you will have heard) instructing them to preach a holy war against the Russians and English. The sheikh kept the telegram by him until he received a second enquiring why nothing was being done. He has now sent it out after deleting "English." Apparently, it is impossible for anybody to say how things will go—everything is quiet here as usual."

[4279]

No. 229.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 13.) R.
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 30, 1912.

TURCO-PERSIAN Frontier Commission.

Persian Ambassador informs me that he expects the other members of the commission in three weeks, and that the commission should meet in a month.

[3864]

No. 230.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 30, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 23rd instant, relative to the departure of Mr. Knox from Shiraz on the expiration of his appointment as His Majesty's acting consul at that place, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,† repeating his request for sanction for the course indicated in his telegram No. 40 of the 13th instant, copy of which was forwarded to your department at the time of its receipt.

In view of the fact that it was at the instance of the Government of India that Sir G. Barclay was advised temporarily to retain Mr. Knox at Shiraz, I am to ask that enquiry may be made of them by telegraph as to whether they have any objection to compliance with Sir G. Barclay's request in the changed circumstances of the case.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Refers to preceding extract.

† No. 211.

[4267]

No. 229*.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 30, 1912.

TREASURY-GENERAL.

Please see my telegram No. 77 of yesterday.

I have just received a private message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that a considerable advance will have been made in making Mornard's appointment definitive if the latter's application for the engagement of Belgians is acceded to.

The grounds for the objection of the Persian Government to Mornard are, according to the emissary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following:—

1. The appointment of a man who is regarded as a Russian tool would produce a bad impression.
2. Doubt as to Mornard's capacity.
3. The work of the customs administration already gives Mornard as much as he can manage.

I feel that I can hardly refuse to join my Russian colleague in supporting Mornard's application for the engagement of Belgians to replace the Americans who are anxious to vacate their posts as soon as possible unless the Persian Government formulate their objections to Mornard more officially, or formally propose to the two legations a better candidate for the definitive appointment.

I therefore held out no hope to the emissary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would report to you this purely private communication.

At the same time, my own opinion is that it will be difficult to prevent the definitive appointment of Mornard, or at any rate of a Belgian, if these new Belgian assistants are appointed.

[4317]

No. 231.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 78.)
Sir,

Constantinople, January 26, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van relative to the strength of the Turkish forces on the Turco-Persian frontier.

In Captain Molyneux-Seel's telegram No. 12, to which he refers, he stated that the frontier guards held the following points: Yezdikhan, Vardane, Nazirova, Galungi, Issisu, and the posts along the line from Razi to Yezdikhan, south of the Serai road.

This report contains information which may also be of interest to the War Office.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 231.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2.)
Sir,

Van, January 7, 1912.

WITH reference to the calling out of the Ihtiat to raise the effective of the battalions on the Persian frontier, I am informed that the battalions at Chari, Mawana, and Ushnu, are to be raised to 500 each, and the others to 400 each. The weakness of these battalions on the frontier was due to the fact of their having been depleted to form the new frontier companies.

The calling up of the Ihtiat proceeds very slowly. Only a hundred or so have as yet been dispatched to the frontier. A large proportion of those being called up are Armenians, who, by misstating their ages, had caused themselves to be enrolled in the Ihtiat instead of in the Redif, hoping thereby, as the Ihtiat are so rarely called up, to evade military service entirely. Many of those now required to serve are in hiding in the monasteries, in remote villages, &c. A batch of forty Armenians, who were being marched to the barracks by two gendarmes to perform their military service, on reaching the market place of one of the Armenian quarters of the town, suddenly took to flight and disappeared.

The strength of the frontier companies, according to my information, has now increased to 160 men each, thus leaving a deficit of forty.

In my telegram No. 12 I informed your Excellency of some of the places occupied by troops of the frontier companies.

The head-quarters of the frontier companies attached to the 11th Army Corps are as follows: No. 14, Bayezid; No. 15, between Bayezid and Serai (I am unable to locate it exactly); No 16, Serai; No. 17, Silav; No. 18, Kuni; No. 19, Mawana; and No. 20, Keuke (near Ushnu).

I have, &c.

J. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[4312]

No. 232.

Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)
Sir,

The Hague, January 30, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 16, Confidential, of the 26th instant, respecting M. Oudendijk, I have the honour to report that Count Limburg Stirum telephoned this morning to ask me to come and see him at the Foreign Office.

His Excellency informed me that he had heard from London that a group of British, French, and German financiers had approached M. Oudendijk with a view to his eventual appointment as controller of the Persian finances.

Count Limburg Stirum said he understood that no special knowledge of finance was needed for the post, but that the main requirements for such an official were honesty and ability. He feared I might have misinterpreted the few words he said to me last week about M. Oudendijk, and he therefore wanted to make it quite clear that if the

Netherlands Government had been approached by His Majesty's Government with a request to select for them a Dutch expert in finance, they would never have selected M. Oudendijk. But, on the other hand, if they were approached by the British or Russian Governments and were told that a group of financiers who were acquainted with M. Oudendijk, and knew what work he would be called upon to do, were anxious to have an able and honest official, they could specially recommend M. Oudendijk for the post as possessing these qualities.

I said I had received no official communication from His Majesty's Government about M. Oudendijk's appointment, though I knew through other sources that there was likely to be a question of it. I would at once report to you the conversation I had just had with him on the subject.

I have, &c.
ALAN JOHNSTONE.

[4472] No. 233.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) [*St. Petersburgh, January* 31, 1912.

MY telegram No. 26 of 29th January.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is to have a consultation with the President of the Council on 2nd February on the subject of the proposed advance to the Persian Government by the two Governments, but says that he is telegraphing to the Russian Minister at Tehran, as the latter has spoken of an advance of 200,000 tomans instead of pounds. I told him that this must be a mistake, as such an advance would be quite inadequate.

Meanwhile he is willing to instruct the Russian Minister to draw up at once, in concert with Sir G. Barclay, text of communication to be made to the Persian Government respecting the ex-Shah. This communication would be founded on that portion of my *aide-mémoire* which embodied the paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 29 of 10th January beginning with the words "result of recent pourparlers," down to "principles of Anglo-Russian convention." He says that he is quite ready to act in conformity with the principle laid down in the above-mentioned paragraph, but objects to certain of the words used, such as "preclude recognition of ex-Shah" and "they would not recognise him." The object which you have in view could be equally well attained by slightly altering the phraseology. As soon as the text is agreed on communication could be made to the Persian Government, while ex-Shah could be informed privately that his cause is hopeless and that His Majesty's Government have declared that they will never recognise him, and that he should therefore leave the country. The Persian Government might at the same time be informed that the two Governments are consulting together as to the best means of affording them financial assistance.

He is, he says, about to address me a note, which is only awaiting the approval of the President of the Council, giving a general outline of the policy of the Russian Government in Persia, and of the conditions which they attach to their future support of and co-operation with the Persian Government. In addition to the conditions cited in the above-mentioned paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 29 he mentions the one relative to the Cossack brigade reported in my telegram No. 26, and another to the effect that the meeting of the Medjliss should be postponed as long as possible so as to allow time for the creation of a Senate, which should assemble at the same time as the Medjliss.

[4473] No. 234.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31,)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 62 of 29th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that he must look up *procès-verbaux* in question before giving an answer. He is not, however, much in favour of entrusting the special British and Russian delegates with the correspondence, as he thinks that

the appointment of such delegates would be badly received at Constantinople, and retard rather than help work of Turco-Persian Commission. He suggested leaving it to the discretion of the two embassies as to what papers should be communicated to the Turkish and Persian delegates.

[4474] No. 235.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 31, 1912.

I OMITTED to mention in my telegram No. 29 of 31st January, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that the two Ministers should advise the Persian Government to enter at once into negotiations with ex-Shah on the subject of his pension.

[4157] No. 236.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 28th January: Ministers' joint proposals.

If 100,000*l.* from each Government would be sufficient it would be preferable for each Government to limit their advances to that amount.

Please reply at once.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 63.)

[4137] No. 237.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1912.

MY telegram No. 68 of 31st January to Tehran.

I trust the Russian Government will be able to agree without further delay to instructing their representative at Tehran to proceed with Sir G. Barclay in laying before Persian Government the proposals put forward in the identic suggestions.

[4549] No. 238.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 1, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 68 of 31st January.

Acting treasurer-general thinks that 200,000*l.* should enable the Persian Government to carry on for two months. Whether a larger advance is required must depend on when a loan is likely to be forthcoming.

Could not each Government advance 100,000*l.* at once, leaving the question of a further advance open for the present?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[4562] No. 239.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February* 1, 1912.

HIS Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports that the chief of police and four other persons were hanged yesterday.

[4563] No. 240.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 1, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 30 of 10th January.

British vice-consul at Resht reports the arrival at Resht yesterday of 400 Russian infantry.

I understand that these are to replace time-expired men.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[4638] No. 241.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 64 of 31st January: Proposed communication to Persian Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will not be able to see me till 3rd February; but I am writing to express the hope that the Russian Minister at Tehran will already have received instructions to act with Sir G. Barclay in the manner reported in my telegram No. 29 of 31st January.

[4139] No. 242.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 1, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 28 of 29th January: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

You may urge basti to leave.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 69.)

[4267] No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 74. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 1, 1912.*

MR. SHUSTER'S successor.

I approve the attitude adopted by you, as reported in your telegram No. 78 of the 30th ultimo, with regard to the intimation which you have received privately from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Persian Government object to the appointment of M. Mornard.

I concur in your view that the Persian Government should state in a more official manner than they have yet done the nature of their objections to M. Mornard. You may inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government would not object to their putting forward another candidate to take M. Mornard's place in a permanent capacity on the condition that the British and Russian Legations are consulted beforehand, and that the candidate selected is a subject of a minor European Power.

[4691] No. 244.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 83)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 2, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Smart, No. 22: Situation in Southern Persia:—

"From Government of India telegrams of 11th and 23rd January just received, it appears that schemes involving the gravest issues for British interests in Shiraz consular district have been propounded from Bushire, and, after discussion, decided on. These telegrams contain what appear to me misconceptions of the general situation and details of Fars affairs.

"No previous information whatever regarding these proposals, or the data on which they are based, has reached this consulate, in spite of the fact that Shiraz alone is in a position, both politically and geographically, to command a general view of tribal questions and Fars politics.

"In order to avoid divergence of views and information regarding tribal questions and Fars politics, I would suggest that the entire management of the situation should be entrusted to Bushire.

"Under these circumstances I venture to hope that your Excellency will be good enough to call the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the facts of the matter, in order that I may be discharged from any degree of responsibility for further mishaps in far-reaching schemes adopted in my consular district regarding which I am not consulted."

I have replied as follows:—

"I agree that the management of the scheme should be left, as far as possible, to Bushire, but I am sure that I can count upon your loyal co-operation with consulate-general whenever your assistance is required."

[4724] No. 245.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 2, 1912.*

SWEDISH colonel has communicated to the two legations his gendarmerie scheme, which he estimates, exclusive of purchase of arms and ammunition, will cost 700,000 tomans during twenty-one months, at end of which period force as now contemplated will be completely organised.

The scheme contemplates force of 1,450 men for Bushire and Ispahan road at a cost for twenty-one months of 254,000 tomans.

Force now contemplated will be stationed along the roads. Colonel hopes later to be able to organise in addition mobile column whose operations will not be confined to the roads.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[4764] No. 246.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 72 of 1st February: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

After I had instructed His Majesty's representative at Tabreez to urge basti to leave, I learnt that Russian Minister is instructed to demand, in addition to punishment indicated in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 18 of 20th January, deportation to a far corner of Persia.

I have therefore told British consul to hold his hand.

I think that we must continue to keep basti at the consulate unless the Russian Government waive this new demand.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[4472] No. 247.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 29 of 31st January.

It is of great importance that, in view of the situation in Persia, the two Governments should, without further delay, authorise their representatives to make the following proposals to the Persian Government :—

1. They will advance, to meet immediate requirements, a sum of 200,000*l.* conjointly. The proceeds to be spent under supervision of treasurer-general, and our share of 100,000*l.* to be devoted to gendarmerie in the south. If the two representatives consider that we should each advance 200,000*l.*, we should make no objection.

2. To inform Persian Government that the ex-Shah will be requested to leave Persian territory, and that neither he nor any of his adherents will receive any encouragement or support from either Russian Government or ourselves. The text of the communication on this point can be left to the two representatives to draw up as suggested by M. Sazonof. Amount of pension and condition on which it is granted to be as already arranged, viz., promise not to re-enter Persia without consent of Russian Government.

3. To propose to the Persian Government that a general amnesty be proclaimed, and that when the ex-Shah has left Persia the Persian Government should dismiss their irregular forces.

4. The two representatives should also inform the Persian Government that they would be ready to discuss with them a scheme for a small army.

5. The Persian Government should be requested, in a form to be decided by the two representatives, to engage to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention.

I should be glad if you would obtain the consent of the Russian Government to instructions being sent to the Russian Minister, explaining that all other questions, such as loan, Senate, Cossack brigade, &c., should be deferred for later consideration, otherwise so much time will elapse before any support or help is given to Persian Government that situation will go from bad to worse.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 75.)

[4857] No. 248.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 3, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 10 [not yet received].

According to Russian Minister's latest information from his consul at Asterabad, ex Shah's forces in the neighbourhood of Asterabad number about 3,000, including a contingent of Caucasians, and are confident of success. They are contemplating an attack on Sharud.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has again complained to me that the Russian Turkoman commissioner at Gombed Kabus is encouraging recruiting for ex-Shah.

(Addressed to Foreign Office ; sent to India and St. Petersburgh.)

[4900] No. 249.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 3, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 3rd February : Ex-Shah movement.

British consul-general at Meshed reports that his Russian colleague is encouraging demonstrations in favour of the ex-Shah, which are likely to cause disorders. He adds that a large body of Turkomans and Kurds are raiding near Sharud, and the province is generally disturbed.

Yesterday Persian Government complained to my Russian colleague and to me of encouragement given to the agitation at Meshed in favour of the ex-Shah by Yusuf Khan Herati, who is in bast at the Russian consulate-general, and by a certain Akbar Boland, a Persian employé of the consulate-general. Russian Minister instructed Russian consul-general last night to do his utmost to still the agitation, but it would be well if he could receive sharp instructions from St. Petersburgh.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[4907] No. 250.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 73 to St. Petersburgh of 2nd February : Proposed communication to Persian Government.

I question whether it would be wise to insist on 100,000*l.* for the gendarmerie in the south. Please see my telegram No. 84 of 2nd February. Mornard thinks that 140,000 tomans should be assigned for arms for the whole gendarmerie and 280,000 tomans for the upkeep of the whole gendarmerie for six months.

Cannot the allocation of the advance be left to the discretion of the Russian Minister and me in consultation with Mornard ?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[3164] No. 251.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 3, 1912.*

HORMUZ oxide.

Muin-ut-Tujjar suggests to Ellinger that you should be instructed to enter into negotiations with him with view to the solution of the question.

Ellinger has been told verbally that if Muin chooses to approach legation he will be received, and if he does so you may discuss the question with him and give him such help as you are able.

We cannot, of course, assist Muin to get Strick's contract cancelled.

[4473] No. 252.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 3, 1912.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier commission at Constantinople.

It has been decided to attach Mr. Shipley to His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople during the sittings of commission, so as to advise His Majesty's Ambassador, who will act in concert with his Russian colleague, in regard to communicating to Turkish or Persian delegates any papers which they may request bearing on the points at issue. In view of the possibility of the question afterwards being submitted to The Hague Tribunal, great discrimination must be exercised in this matter, and, before proceeding to Constantinople, Mr. Shipley should arrange to spend a fortnight in London, so as to be taken through the earlier correspondence, which is very voluminous. Can immediate arrangements be made for replacing him at Tabreez? If so, he should start at once.

The Shipley-Minorski map is being sent to you by post, and you can communicate copies to the Persian Government when your Russian colleague is similarly authorised ; but, in regard to the other requests of Persian Government for papers, you should reply that the British and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople will decide as to what papers can be communicated to the Persian delegate.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 39, and St. Petersburgh, No. 76.)

[4473]

No. 253.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No 77.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 31st January: Turco-Persian frontier.

I concur in last sentence, and you should communicate substance of my telegram No. 79 of 3rd February to Tehran [about Mr. Shipley's appointment] to Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining that Mr. Shipley will be appointed as a member of embassy staff, and not as having any *official* position as a British delegate. We consider it essential to place at the disposal of His Majesty's Ambassador someone intimately acquainted with all the details of this question.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 81, and Constantinople, No. 41.)

[4137]

No. 254.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to refer to previous correspondence, ending with your letter of the 29th June, 1910, relative to the proposed advance to the Persian Government by His Majesty's and the Russian Governments of a sum of 400,000*l*., and particularly to the last paragraph of your letter of the 29th July, 1907, stating that there would be no difficulty, should occasion arise, in providing at a very few days' notice any sums which it may be decided to advance on this account in pursuance of the agreement with the Russian Government.

The Marquess of Crewe is aware, from telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Minister at Tehran, that the present financial situation of the Persian Government and the state of affairs in the country generally, have once more brought this question prominently forward, and that the advisability of an immediate advance to Persia is under the consideration of both Governments.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram* which Sir E. Grey has addressed to Sir G. Buchanan on this subject, and to inform you that, as soon as the assent of the Russian Government is received to the suggestions therein contained, a further letter will be addressed to you asking that half of the British share of the advance, which may amount to 200,000*l*. in all, or to 100,000*l*. only, may be accepted as a charge on Indian revenues in accordance with the arrangement already arrived at.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[4137]

No. 255.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to refer you to previous correspondence, ending with the letter from this Office of the 18th June, 1910, relative to the proposed advance to the Persian Government by His Majesty's and the Russian Governments of a sum of 400,000*l*.

The Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury are aware that, though agreed to in principle by His Majesty's Government, this advance has not yet been made, and that the question has remained in suspense since the date referred to.

I am to state that the present financial situation of the Persian Government and the state of affairs in the country generally have now once more brought the question prominently forward, and that the advisability of an immediate joint advance to Persia is under the consideration of His Majesty's and the Russian Governments.

* No. 247.

I am accordingly to inform you that as soon as the exchange of views at present in progress between the two Governments is ended, a further letter will be addressed to you acquainting you with the conditions agreed on and the amount of the proposed advance, and asking that half of the British share of that sum may be accepted as a charge on Imperial revenue in accordance with the arrangement already arrived at.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[2531]

No. 256.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th ultimo, asking for an explanation as to how the decision of Muin-ut-Tujjar regarding the agreement which the Persian Government have offered to conclude with him affects the position of your claim and that of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. in the matter of the shipment of red oxide from Hormuz.

I am to state in reply that, as Mr. Martin Ellinger was informed on the occasion of his last visit to this Office, Sir E. Grey cannot know how these claims are affected by the situation which has arisen till it is definitely known who is in possession of the concession, and that till Muin makes up his mind whether he will enter into the agreement mentioned this point remains undecided.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[4937]

No. 257.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February* 4, 1912.

MY telegram No. 70 of 26th January.
Following from British consul at Shiraz:—

"Kawam informs me that he has received a telegram from Mohammed Ali Khan to the effect that the latter has dispatched the culprits of the recent incidents to Shiraz."

[4929]

No. 258.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 33.)
Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February* 4, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 66 of 31st January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Turkish Ambassador did not make representations in the sense indicated, but confined himself to requesting that no Russian troops should be sent to Soujboulak. His Excellency replied that Russian Government had not intention to do so.

[4931]

No. 259.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 4, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 2nd February. Proposed communication to Persian Government.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and left with him an *aide-mémoire* as his Excellency was too pressed for time to discuss point thoroughly or to give final answer. He had, he said, already instructed the Russian Minister to concert with Sir G. Barclay text of communication to the Persian Government on the lines

sketched in my telegram No. 29 of 31st January advising them to open negotiations with the ex-Shah; and he was causing a private message to be sent to the latter. He could not, however, consent to condition which you attached to his pension. I reminded him that he had already done so. His Excellency replied that, as Russian Government were not going to allow him to settle in Russia they could not assume the responsibility which the suggested arrangement would entail, nor would they again expose themselves to being accused of complicity in his return.

Minister of Finance had, he said, refused to advance so large a sum as 200,000*l.*, as he was not empowered by law to do so, and would be attacked by Duma if he did. Russian Bank had, moreover, incurred financial loss, and Minister of Finance was averse to running any further risk. I urged financial straits of Persian Government. His Excellency said he was most anxious to help Cabinet, and had already instructed Russian Ambassador at Paris to see if Banque de Paris could fix date at which they would be prepared to make any advance in connection with the large loan, as, if they gave assurance, Minister of Finance would consider it a sufficient guarantee and advance the money temporarily. His Excellency eventually promised to write at once to Minister of Finance and to try to induce him to consent to an advance of 100,000*l.*

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was at first inclined to insist that all his conditions must be accepted by Persian Government before any advance could be made, but finally agreed not to make first advance conditional on their acceptance. He will, however, insist that an agreement must be come to with regard to them before any second advance is made, or before arrangements for a large loan are carried through.

[4932] No. 260.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 85 of 2nd February: Basti of deputy-governor at Tabreez.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he could not consent to basti being allowed to reside at Tehran, but that he would send fresh instructions to Russian Minister, as he seemed to have gone farther than his Excellency intended.

[4933] No. 261.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 87 of 3rd February.

I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday of the facts complained of by the Persian Government, and expressed the hope that the consul-general at Meshed would be instructed to do all in his power to discourage agitation in favour of ex-Shah. At his Excellency's request I am sending him a memorandum giving names of the persons implicated.

[4961] No. 262.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 95.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegrams Nos. 19 and 20 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that I to-day read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the annexed communication agreed upon by the Russian Ambassador and myself on the subject of the documents said to have been obtained by force by Turkish authorities from the villagers in the contested districts of the Persian frontier.

My Russian colleague made the same communication yesterday.

Assim Bey replied that if our Governments attached no value to these documents, he attached, if possible, still less. He said it was a fact that many of the villagers had presented themselves to the authorities expressing a desire to become Turkish subjects,

and that the reply that had been given them was to the effect that they might come over to Turkey and assume Turkish nationality, but that in this case they would be expected to remain such. The Turkish Government did not rely on certificates of this nature to substantiate their claim to the disputed districts, but on documents and maps the authenticity of which either the mixed commission, or more probably The Hague Tribunal, would no doubt establish.

It was probable that the latter would decide that certain districts now occupied by Russian troops would be declared to belong to Turkey, and he would like to have an assurance that in this event they would be evacuated by Russian troops. M. Tcharykof had stated verbally to him that this would be the case, but he would wish to see this assurance committed to paper, and he was about to instruct the Ottoman Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to obtain such an assurance from the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 262.

Communication read to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

IL résulte des rapports que le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté britannique a reçus de Mr. Shipley à son retour du voyage qu'il a fait l'été dernier à Ourmiah et dans les districts avoisinants que les autorités locales établies par le Gouvernement ottoman se livrent à une propagande parmi les habitants du pays pour les amener à signer des documents ("mazbatas") exprimant leur dévouement à la Sublime Porte et reconnaissant la souveraineté du Gouvernement ottoman.

Il paraît en même temps que ladite propagande s'appuie sur la menace d'attaques par des tribus avoisinantes et a pour but d'établir au moyen des documents en question des preuves en faveur des prétentions territoriales ottomanes dans les districts contestés.

Or, il va de soi que de tels documents ne sauraient avoir de valeur probante, et c'est en vue d'écarter une source nouvelle de malentendus et de difficultés lors du règlement définitif de la question de la frontière turco-persane, à laquelle question le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie ont voué depuis tant d'années des soins amicaux, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique croit devoir à présent signaler à l'attention du Gouvernement ottoman les efforts déployés par ses agents locaux susmentionnés afin d'obtenir des "mazbatas" auxquels on ne saurait en aucun cas reconnaître de force légale.

[4962] No. 263.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 96.)
Sir, *Pera, January 30, 1912.*

SPEAKING to-day with Assim Bey regarding Persian frontier questions, his Excellency observed that the Russian troops were now within six hours of Soujboulak, and that these districts were occupied by Sunni Kurds who had many relatives in Turkish territory who would undoubtedly take up arms on their behalf should they be attacked. His Excellency said that news had reached him that Samat Khan, the well-known reactionary leader, was about to proceed from Tabreez to Soujboulak, and he feared that the Russians might provoke an incident there which would incite the Kurds in Turkey to cross the frontier and indulge in reprisals which he would much deplore, but which they would be incapable of preventing.

He hoped very much that, counting on your friendly disposition, you would be able to give a hint to the Russian Government as to the danger that might arise in this direction, and use your influence with a view to preventing the Russians from occupying Soujboulak.

His Excellency added that he had yesterday had a visit from the Senator Abdul Kader, a very influential sheikh in these parts, and he had warned his Excellency that it would be very difficult indeed to restrain the Kurds in the above-mentioned eventuality.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[5226] No. 264.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 2nd February to St. Petersburgh.

Russian Minister has been instructed to suggest to the Persian Government, in concert with me, that they should enter into negotiations with the ex-Shah to make him leave Persia on condition that his pension is renewed and full amnesty granted to his adherents. If Persian Government [?] agree, these negotiations are to be conducted through the Russian consul at Asterabad, and Russian Minister will then instruct that consul to advise ex-Shah to accept the offer of Persian Government pointing out to him hopelessness of his case, stating that he will never be recognised by His Majesty's Government, and that the two Powers will give their material and moral support to the Persian Government. If these arguments fail, consul is to do his best to remove the Caucasians who are with the ex-Shah and to induce Turkomans to accept amnesty and make peace with Persian Government.

I venture to hope that, in view of the urgency of the case, I may, if Russian Government in any way delay agreeing to the proposals in your telegram above mentioned, be authorised to join my Russian colleague in the communication which he has been instructed to make.

No mention, however, is [?] made in Russian Minister's instructions of any promise from the ex-Shah not to enter Persia without Russia's consent. Compassionate pension would be matter for negotiation between the Persian Government and the ex-Shah.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[5219] No. 265.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 43 of 15th January and Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 21 of 23rd January.

Russian Minister tells me that, as soon as the Russian Bank heard of the Imperial Bank of Persia's new mint contract, they wrote to the Persian Government asking to be given a chance to compete.

So far Russian Minister has not, to my knowledge, moved in the matter with the Persian Government, but I know that he regards the contract, [?] secured on the eve of Shuster's dismissal and without the consent of Medjliss, as so much waste paper, and I do not doubt that, unless he is instructed to the contrary, he will urge the Persian Government to declare it invalid.

Bank's last mint contract was revised by the Medjliss. I can see nothing in the law of 13th June (see my despatch No. 95 of 13th June, 1911) expressly empowering the treasurer-general to make contract of such importance without consent of the Medjliss, which was still sitting when contract was signed, and I am in some doubt how far you would wish me to support Imperial Bank, should it apply to me.

I understand that the Imperial Bank consider the contract vital to the security of its note issue.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[5221] No. 266.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran. February 5, 1912.*

SWEDISH colonel of gendarmerie desires to engage four more Swedish officers for gendarmerie.

I presume that there is no objection; Russian Minister sees none, but has referred the matter to St. Petersburgh.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[5224] No. 267.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 87 of 3rd February: Ex-Shah movement.

Following from consul at Meshed, No. 7 of 5th February:—

"Situation now most serious, as a large mob, headed by agents of my Russian colleague and by Russian subjects, defies the police. I am advising Persian authorities to await action by Tehran.

(Very Confidential.)

My Russian colleague has stated to karguzar that return of ex-Shah has been agreed to by both Powers, and that my denial of this fact is due to instructions from India.

"Please take any action as soon as possible, as the situation is increasingly serious and authorities in despair. Either there is double dealing or my Russian colleague is disobeying orders.

"Above sent to India.

"Your telegrams Nos. 5 and 6.

"Facts of the case as given by Persian Government are correct, and I hope that both individuals may be punished and deported."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[5225] No. 268.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 5, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 5th February: Ex-Shah movement.

This sort of thing makes it more than ever urgent that the Russian Minister and I should make our communication to the Persian Government about the ex-Shah.

An announcement that we have done so should serve as a deterrent to such mischievous activity on the part of Russian consuls.

I have telegraphed to the British consul-general to urge his Russian colleague to obey Russian Minister's instructions.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, and also my immediately preceding telegram repeated.)

[4907] No. 269.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 88 of 3rd February: Proposed communication to Persian Government.

I agree to suggestion in last paragraph.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 81.)

[5226] No. 270.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 90 of 5th February.

In view of urgent necessity of supporting Persian Government, and of putting an end to internal trouble caused by presence of ex-Shah in Persia, you are authorised to act with your Russian colleague as proposed.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 83.)

[4857] No. 271.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 86 of 3rd February: Ex-Shah movement.

You should bring complaint mentioned in last paragraph to notice of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 83.)

[5225] No. 272.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 37 of 4th February and my telegram No. 78 of to-day: Ex-Shah's movement.

Your action approved.

Besides instances of encouragement cited by Sir G. Barclay in his telegrams Nos. 86 and 87 of 3rd February, Persian Minister states that ex-Shah has arrived at Asterabad with 250 Russian Cossacks. He also asserts that Russian Turkoman commissioner at Gumbad-i-Kabus has sent 250 Turkomans to ex-Shah.

Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 94 and 95 of 5th February show that the Russian consul-general at Meshed must be deliberately disobeying orders of his Government, with the most serious results.

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that this accumulating evidence of encouragement by Russian agents to ex-Shah is causing grave anxiety to His Majesty's Government, who are compelled to ask the Russian Government to send further urgent instructions to their representatives to refrain from giving direct or indirect assistance to His Majesty and his supporters, and to take serious notice of the action of Prince Dabija.

[4138] No. 273.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 27 of 29th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Your Excellency should join your Russian colleague in urging early appointment of Turkish commissioners, which is very desirable, as situation on frontier is becoming very serious.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 80, and Tehran, No. 87.)

[3767] No. 274.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Johnstone.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

I HAVE received your despatches Nos. 16 and 20 of the 26th and 30th ultimos respectively, reporting conversations with the chief of the Cabinet of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs relative to the possible appointment of the Netherlands Minister at Tehran as treasurer-general of Persia in succession to Mr. Shuster.

I have to inform you, in reply, that the report which has appeared in the press that this appointment has been made is unfounded, and that M. Oudendijk's candidature for the post is not in question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4726] No. 275.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador called on the 30th ultimo to enquire on behalf of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government would be disposed to favour the proposed loan to Persia by the French group, possibly allowing Messrs. Seligman to participate.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Benckendorff that the attitude of His Majesty's Government was that Messrs. Seligman could not be thrown over cavalierly, and that they should be given the option of taking up the loan negotiations at the point at which their representative had left them at St. Petersburgh. It would not be fair to them for the two Governments to act otherwise—whether Messrs. Seligman would be disposed to take a share with another group, Sir A. Nicolson could not say—as they had not been consulted.

Sir A. Nicolson said that discussions as to a large loan could very well be deferred for the moment; what was really pressing was that the two Ministers at Tehran should be authorised to place before the Persian Government this modest programme of urgent reforms, and especially the warning to the ex-Shah. Moreover, it was urgently necessary that the Persian Government should be provided with some funds, and for that object His Majesty's Government had suggested the revival of the original joint offer of an advance of 200,000*l.* from each Government. These advances could be repaid out of a future loan, but Sir A. Nicolson trusted that the Russian Government would agree to the two Ministers at Tehran setting to work without delay on the above lines, and that the Russian President of the Council would sanction the advance of 200,000*l.* on the part of the Russian Government.

Count Benckendorff said that he would telegraph to M. Sazonof.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3668] No. 276.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the trans-Persian Railway project, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you two letters, with printed enclosures in original, from Mr. A. J. Barry,* containing certain criticisms on the financial, commercial, and engineering aspects of the undertaking.

Before replying to Mr. Barry's criticisms on the suggested alignment of the railway, Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive the observations of the Secretary of State for India.

Subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, Sir E. Grey proposes to reply to Mr. Barry that the exact proportion of representation in the "société d'étude" seems to be primarily a matter for Lord Revelstoke and those associated with him to decide; that His Majesty's Government have safeguarded their own position by intimating to Count d'Arnoux, as representing the French group, that, "while they have no objection in principle to the formation of a 'société d'étude' to enquire into the feasibility of such a project, they must retain their complete freedom of action in regard to any further developments of the enterprise"; and he further proposes to inform both Mr. Barry and Lord Revelstoke that it would obviate redundant correspondence if a secretary to the "société d'étude" were to be appointed to act as the official channel of communication between His Majesty's Government and the "société d'étude," in order that His Majesty's Government may rest assured that any statement made to the secretary would reach all the members of the "société d'étude."

A copy of this correspondence is being transmitted to the Board of Trade.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Nos. 155 and 196.

[5340] No. 277.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 5, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 936 of 18th December last.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day told me that, owing to innumerable complaints of immense loss suffered by their merchants, the Turkish Government desired to have caravans accompanied by fifty Turkish soldiers, and he had addressed himself to Persian Government with a view to attaining this object. It was the same as Russians were doing in north, but they intended to keep it within small proportions, and Turkish Government were quite prepared to give undertaking of immediate withdrawal directly order was restored.

Minister for Foreign Affairs renewed suggestion that if district was within British sphere Turkish Government would of course be pleased to see duty of protecting roads undertaken by Great Britain.

[5345] No. 278.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 24 of 27th January: Turco-Persian frontier.

Neither my Russian colleague nor I have been able to obtain any evidence of advance this year or intended advance of Turkish troops, and our two military attachés are now engaged in trying to obtain such evidence, in order that our representations may not be met by a denial of any such movement.

[5367] No. 279.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February, 6, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Tabreez, 6th February, No. 22:—

"Zia-ed-Dowleh not making his appearance this morning at the usual time, his bedroom was entered by myself and Stevens and a servant. He was found by us lying dead at full length on his back on the floor fully dressed, with coat and shirt unbuttoned, with a small revolver by his side and a bullet wound over the region of the heart. The room was entirely undisturbed, and all the appearances point to the fact that he committed suicide.

"Doctors have been sent for by me, and representatives of the karguzar have been invited by me to assist at the proceedings. Letters have been left by the deceased, one of which for me I shall open at the proceedings."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[4932] No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 6, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 36 of 4th February: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

Do fresh instructions to Russian Minister justify us, in your opinion, in urging basti to leave?

[5221] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 92 of 5th February: Swedish gendarmerie officers.

We have no objection.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 90.)

[4931] No. 282.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 35 of 4th February: Proposed communication to Persian Government.

Inform Russian Government that, as they do not object in principle to joint advance of 200,000*l.*, we propose to advance our share, amounting to 100,000*l.*, at once and without waiting for them to advance their share, as unless funds are put at the immediate disposal of the Persian Government we shall be faced with a most serious situation at Shiraz.

As regards the ultimate large loan, we are unable, considering how far matters have gone, to throw over Seligmans at this stage without first enquiring whether they are prepared to proceed with the business at once, and we suggest that Colonel Beddoes should go to St. Petersburgh.

If Seligmans are not prepared to go on with the loan, or if they would be satisfied with a share in a loan arranged by the Banque de Paris, we should not object, but should have to insist on the same conditions as were laid down in the case of Seligmans (see Confidential Print, "Persia" volumes, Part XXII, No. 410; Part XXIII, No. 153; and Part XXIV, Nos. 16 and 159).

You should point out again that, if M. Sazonof wishes to avoid German participation, the Banque de Paris is quite as international as any other institution of a similar character.

[5375] No. 283.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 36.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 3, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 19 of the 22nd January, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to M. Sazonof on the subject of Baron Luzsensky's timber concession.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 283.

Sir G. Buchanan to M. Sazonof.

M. le Ministre, *St. Petersburgh, January 21 (February 3), 1912.*

IN an *aide-mémoire*, dated the 25th June, 1910, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs was good enough to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that the Imperial Government saw no objection to the realisation of an arrangement of a purely private and commercial character between a British company and a certain Baron Luzsensky for working a timber concession in the provinces of Mazanderan and Toune-Kaboun.

I have now the honour to inform your Excellency, in accordance with instructions which I have receive from Sir E. Grey, that a company named the "Caspian Timber Syndicate, Limited," and registered in London, has now entered into a contract with

the parties entitled to the right to cut timber in the districts indicated. I am to add that in due course the work of proving the commercial value of the timber will be undertaken by a larger company, to be formed under terms agreed upon with the Caspian Timber Syndicate, Limited.

I avail, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[5427] No. 284.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th February, 1912, relative to Shiraz.

India Office, February 7, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 284.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February 5, 1912.*

PLEASE see your telegram, dated the 31st ultimo, according general approval to our proposals regarding Shiraz. Instructions as to dispatch of troops, whose location in Gulf is an essential preliminary before proposed negotiations can be begun, will be awaited; meanwhile, further details of the steps which we should contemplate taking subsequently, in order to give effect to the scheme, are submitted for general approval. The achievement of three objects is aimed at, viz., firstly, that of obtaining a settlement of accounts with the individual or individuals whom it is decided to hold responsible for the attack upon Mr. Smart. (It may or may not be found possible to include payment of cash indemnity in this settlement, but until result of negotiations is known no specific amount will presumably be claimed from Persian Government); secondly, that of inducing the individuals referred to above, as well as other headmen to whose control the road is subject, to conclude with us an agreement for maintaining order thereon; thirdly, that of discounting the probability that dangerous fighting will take place among tribemen in Shiraz neighbourhood in the spring, as His Majesty's consul at Shiraz apprehends.

We would propose, immediately on departure of troops from India, to prepare the ground for negotiations by influencing the Ulemas of Mesopotamia and the vernacular and English press. As regards the newspapers, we recommend that a full communiqué to the press, giving a brief summary of the robberies and outrages recently suffered by British subjects and merchandise, and then going on to explain the lines of the fresh attempt to find a solution short of intervention which we are about to make, should be issued both in Calcutta and London. With regard to the Mesopotamian Ulemas, permission is requested to give instructions to Resident at Bagdad that a full communication on same lines as press communiqué should be made to them, and that endeavour should be made to persuade them to recant incitations to priests and headmen of Fars recently issued by them, and to address the same persons by telegraph, expressing their belief that non-intervention in Southern Persia is what Great Britain desires, and urging them to adopt friendly attitude towards British subjects and commerce, and to co-operate in maintaining security on the caravan roads, and thus to placate Great Britain and promote their own country's interests.

Whether Persian Government or Regent should be pressed to telegraph in similar sense is a matter for consideration. There will be no point in withholding from them the general exposition of our intentions, which is communicated to press, though we agree with Sir G. Barclay in this connection that nothing need be said at present as to proposal to subsidise headmen. We should recommend, therefore, subject to his Excellency's views being ascertained, that His Majesty's Minister should induce Persian Government to make a communication, conveying exhortation in same sense as that set out in preceding paragraph, both to headmen on the road and tribal chiefs, whom we are anxious to deter from fighting next spring, and to Nejef clergy and Tehran extremists and mullahs.

We would propose that a brief exposition of British intentions and policy in Persia, signed by Resident, Persian Gulf, should simultaneously be issued by him from Bushire to all the headmen in Fars known to or in touch with the residency.

Cox would then, after the ground has been thus prepared, address headmen interested in road and those concerned in attacks upon Mr. Smart, giving an explanation of our intentions, and inviting headmen to meet his representatives at a given rendezvous if they wish for a peaceful solution. Care would be taken in drafting the terms of all such communications.

But final decision must be arrived at as to how Khan of Borasjun's case is to be treated before we can take action on the above lines. We have had to call upon Persian Government on a previous occasion to take notice of khan's conduct, which has repeatedly been unsatisfactory. We should wish, however, to learn Sir G. Barclay's views, and to have latest information from Bushire before making final recommendations.

Representatives of Resident would negotiate on following lines, in event of headmen responding and being ready to meet them:—

Of each individual would be required—

1. An undertaking to accord general co-operation in maintaining order on the road;
2. Acceptance of responsibility to us for a particular section of the road, and the supply, on monthly pay, to be paid under supervision of our own superintending officers, of a certain number of guards of good character;
3. The payment of compensation for all robberies of British goods on their section of the road; and
4. Sale of supplies at fair rates to be arranged in consultation with superintending officer and absolute abstention from levy of transit dues.

As long as obligations are fulfilled by headmen, we should guarantee in return guards' monthly pay and a regular subsidy, and should assure the headmen in some form that, except after specific misconduct proved to our satisfaction, they will receive our good offices or support against extortion or dispossession by Persian authorities.

In order that complications with Persian Government may be avoided, we consider that, at the commencement at any rate, it will be advisable that necessary funds should be found by us. We might ultimately recover the cost from loan to Persian Government or make it a charge on Customs; we should estimate it at 10,000*l.* per annum. We presume in the meantime that cost will be shared by His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Tehran and Bushire.)

[5481] No. 285.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 7, 1912.*

FOLLOWING sent to acting consul-general at Bushire, No. 24:—

"Government of India's telegram No. 60 of 5th February.

"Before giving my views as regards treatment of Khan of Borasjun, I should like to know what complaints can be most usefully urged against him in the event of my demanding his dismissal. He is, I presume, the same man who on one occasion refused our troops admission to Borasjun caravanserai, but I understood that he allowed use of caravanserai last time troops passed through."

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[5499] No. 286.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 90 of 5th February: Communication to Persian Government as to ex-Shah.

Russian Minister and I made yesterday to the Regent and the Minister for Foreign

Affairs suggestion indicated in my telegram No. 90 of 5th February, leaving *aide-mémoire* with Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Highness and his Excellency expressed the gratitude of the Persian Government for the suggestion, and accepted the intervention of the Russian consul at Asterabad.

Minister for Foreign Affairs at first proposed 36,000 tomans as amount of pension, but we pointed out that a more generous offer would facilitate negotiations. Finally it was decided to offer a maximum of 50,000 tomans, and Russian Minister is instructing consul to negotiate on basis of this amount and of a full amnesty, and to act as generally indicated in my telegram No. 90.

Minister for Foreign Affairs pressed hard for a guarantee from the two Powers that they would never recognise the ex-Shah, but, finding that we were not authorised to give this, and realising that reference to our Governments on this point would entail delay, he refrained from insisting on it as a *sine quâ non* for negotiations, while expressing the earnest hope that the two Governments would consent to give such a guarantee.

The treatment of Shua-es-Sultaneh and Salar-ed-Dowleh was also discussed. Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to maintain the confiscation of the former's estates, and to give him a small pension. But we pointed out that this would not accord with grant of a full amnesty, and, moreover, that as Shua-es-Sultaneh was with the ex-Shah, and had great influence, it would be well to treat him generously. His Excellency agreed to revoke confiscations of his estates instead of small pension.

It was decided to negotiate with Salar-ed-Dowleh, offering him revocation of confiscation of his estates, and, as he is very poor, to grant him and his family pension of 12,000 tomans, provided that he maintains order at Kermanshah till the governor arrives, and then hand[s] over to the latter and leaves Persia. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked that our consuls might negotiate for Persian Government on these lines. Have I your sanction for instructing British consul accordingly when Russian Minister is similarly authorised?

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

[5500] No. 287.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 7, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 96 of 6th February: Zia-ed-Dowleh.
Letter of Zia to British consul shows clearly that it was a case of suicide.
(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[5513] No. 288.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 5th February: Ex-Shah movement.

I sent Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday an *aide-mémoire* on the subject of the encouragement given by Russian consuls to the cause of the ex-Shah, and spoke to him to-day. His Excellency said that he had telegraphed instructions as requested, but thought reports were exaggerated. He added that he believed chief supporters of ex-Shah at Meshed were fedais, whom it was very difficult to control.

[5515] No. 289.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 97 of 6th February to Tehran: Swedish officers.
Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection.

[5518] No. 290.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—Received February 7.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 45 of 5th February to Constantinople: Turco-Persian Commission.

Russian Ambassador has been similarly instructed.

Your telegram No. 77 of 3rd February.

He has also been instructed to concert with Sir G. Lowther as to which portions of joint report should be communicated to Persian Ambassador. Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, thinks it will be better not to communicate too much at once, as if Persian delegates have to apply frequently to two embassies for necessary data we shall be in a better position to exercise influence over them.

M. Minorski will be attached to Russian Embassy like Mr. Shipley to British Embassy.

There is no objection to Sir G. Barclay's communicating map as proposed to Persian Government.

[5519] No. 291.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 89 of 6th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that Minister of Finance had consented to joint advance of 200,000*l.* on condition that Russian share should not be advanced until His Majesty's Government had advanced theirs.

His Excellency said he had informed Russian Minister at Tehran that he considered five proposals made in your telegram No. 73 of 2nd February quite acceptable, and had requested his views as a matter of form; he would attach no other conditions to this advance, but an agreement would have to be arrived at with regard to those conditions which Russia still wished to put forward before arrangements for a large loan were completed.

As regards that loan, he begged me to point out to you that it might seriously compromise the chances of the Persian Railway were the revenue to be used as a guarantee for a loan to a syndicate which had nothing to do with the railway. It would be much better that the same syndicate should finance both undertakings; he had just seen Seligman's brother-in-law, and had told him that he had no desire to throw over Seligman and that he would see that he was not a loser, but that it was most important that a powerful syndicate should take up the loan. He asked if you could not speak in the same sense to Seligman. He thought Beddoes ought to go to Paris and open negotiations with Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, rather than come to St. Petersburgh. He did not believe the bank would introduce much German capital into the loan.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also informed me that orders had been sent for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kazvin to Resht.

[5219] No. 292.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 91 of 5th February: Imperial Bank of Persia's mint contract.

Which article of law of 13th June is held to justify view that contract must be submitted to Medjliss, and if such submission was necessary, why did it not take place?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 95.)

[3942] No. 293.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1912.*

IN your Excellency's despatch No. 21 of the 17th ultimo, you reported the misgivings entertained by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as to whether the Ottoman Government would ever actually submit the Turco-Persian frontier dispute to The Hague Tribunal.

I transmit to you now a despatch, dated the 22nd January, from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reporting a conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I authorise your Excellency to communicate verbally to M. Sasonof the third paragraph of this despatch, as showing that he is perhaps wrong in thinking that the Turkish Government will not submit the matter to The Hague Tribunal.

It is, of course, out of the question for His Majesty's Government to approach the Russian Government with a view to obtaining a guarantee of the nature indicated; but if M. Sasonof should make any observations on the wish of Assim Bey to obtain such a guarantee, you will no doubt report to me exactly what he says.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[6099] No. 294.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 34.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 1, 1912.*

IN a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th of last month I spoke to his Excellency in the terms of your telegram No. 48 of the 23rd ultimo, and impressed on him the importance of placing some proposals before the Persian Government without undue delay. I at the same time informed his Excellency of the report which had reached us that Reshid-es-Sultan was contemplating joining hands with Shuja-ed-Dowleh in making an advance on Tehran, and added that I was afraid that this movement in favour of the ex-Shah was being encouraged by some of the Russian consular agents in Persia.

M. Sazonof at once declared that there was no truth in the latter allegation. Some of the Russian consuls, he said, might possibly sympathise with the ex-Shah on account of the little confidence which they placed in the new régime, but this was quite a different thing from giving him open encouragement. He would, however, at once telegraph to the Russian consul-general at Tabreez, instructing him to do all he could to discourage Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and to warn him that if he attempted to advance on Tehran Russia would have nothing more to do with him.

Proceeding next to discuss the various points raised in the identic telegram addressed to their respective Governments by Sir G. Barclay and M. Poklewsky, M. Sazonof said that he was quite ready to join His Majesty's Government in making a communication to the Persian Government on the lines which they had proposed. He had already explained the attitude which he was prepared to adopt with regard to the ex-Shah, and would agree that the grant of a pension should be conditional on his giving an engagement that he would not return to Persia without the consent of the Russian Government. The Russian Government, his Excellency added, would moreover refuse to allow the ex-Shah to establish himself again on Russian territory. It would be better, however, he thought, to leave it to the Persian Government to fix the exact amount of his pension, as they might not be prepared to go to so high a figure as 50,000 tomans.

With regard to the proposed loan, M. Sazonof told me that he was expecting the visit of a M. Benac, who had been sent to St. Petersburgh by M. Noetzlin, the director of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, with whom Lord Revelstoke was intimately acquainted. That bank was prepared to float a large Persian loan and to make temporary advances to the Persian Government in connection with the grant of a concession for the trans-Persian railway. Baring Brothers would, he believed, be ready to co-operate with the French bank; but in order to show that the loan was approved and supported by the two Governments, the contract for it should be negotiated by the British and Russian banks at Tehran, and when concluded handed over to the

Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and Messrs. Baring Brothers. Such a powerful Anglo-French consortium would, in his Excellency's opinion, be far preferable to a firm like Messrs. Seligman, whose connections were mainly German.

After the receipt of your telegram No. 59 of the 27th ultimo I had a further conversation with M. Sazonof, in which I pointed out that after the communications which had passed between the two Governments and Messrs. Seligman, and after the willingness which the latter had displayed to comply with the Russian conditions, it would not be right to throw them over and to support another group unless they should now decline to resume the negotiations at the point which they had reached when Mr. Seligman last saw M. Kokovtsof.

M. Sazonof replied that he was instructing Count Benckendorff to explain to you the advantages of entrusting the loan to a stronger consortium than any which Messrs. Seligman could form. The Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas would, M. Benac had told him, be quite ready to give Messrs. Seligman a share in the loan; and we might therefore explain to that firm the reasons why we considered it preferable that such a well-known bank as the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas should take up the loan, and at the same time assure them that we would use our influence to secure for them such an interest in it as would prevent them being financially worse off.

On my urging on his Excellency the importance of our losing no further time in making a communication to the Persian Government, he promised to see the Minister of Finance at once; but though he wrote to M. Kokovtsof the same evening, he had not yet been able to obtain an interview with him when I called on his Excellency yesterday to discuss with him the *aide-mémoire* which I had sent him in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram above referred to.

After reading over with me this *aide-mémoire*, of which a copy is enclosed, M. Sazonof said that he was to see the President of the Council on Friday and would then discuss with him the question of a temporary advance being made to the Persian Government by Great Britain and Russia. In the meanwhile, however, our two Ministers at Tehran should advise the Persian Government to enter at once into negotiations with the ex-Shah with regard to his pension. They might at the same time draw up together the text of the communication which the two Governments were to make to the Persian Government on the subject, and might take as a basis for discussion the first paragraph of my *aide-mémoire* down to the words "principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention." He was, his Excellency said, quite ready to act in conformity with the principles which you had laid down; but there were certain slight modifications which he would like to see introduced into the text of the *aide-mémoire*. He objected, for example, to such phrases as "seems to preclude the recognition of the ex-Shah" and "they would not recognise him"; but it would be quite easy to alter the text without compromising the attainment of the object which you had in view. The two Ministers would communicate the text to the Persian Government as soon as it was agreed upon, and might at the same time inform them that the two Governments were consulting together as to the best means of affording them financial assistance. In addition to this official communication to the Government at Tehran, we might tell Mohammed Ali privately that his cause was hopeless, that His Majesty's Government would never recognise him, and that he must therefore leave the country.

In the subsequent course of our conversation M. Sazonof informed me that he was about to address me a note, which was only awaiting the approval of the President of the Council, laying down the conditions on which the Russian Government were ready to co-operate with and to support the Persian Government, and giving a general outline of their policy with regard to Persia. In addition to the conditions referred to in the identic telegrams of Sir George Barclay and M. Poklewsky, his Excellency mentioned two others, namely, the strengthening of the Cossack Brigade and its employment at any point in North Persia where its services might be required; and the postponement of the meeting of the Medjliss till it had been possible to constitute a Senate which should assemble at the same time as the Medjliss. The object of the first of these two conditions was, M. Sazonof explained, to enable the Russian Government to eventually withdraw their troops from Tabreez.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 294.

Aide-mémoire.

HIS Majesty's Government agree with the view recently expressed by the representatives of the two Powers at Tehran to the effect that the result of the pourparlers which have taken place between the Imperial Government and the British Government seems to preclude the recognition of the ex-Shah, and that therefore, if the two Powers intervene, it must be on the side of the Persian Government. His Majesty's Government would accordingly propose to adopt the suggestion of the two Ministers that the two Governments should offer to the Persian Government on certain conditions to inform the ex-Shah that they would not recognise him and to advise him to return to Europe. The conditions would be the grant to the ex-Shah of a suitable pension (the amount of which could be left to the Persian Government to fix), the proclamation of a general amnesty, and the more important condition of some form of engagement on the part of the Persian Government binding them to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Although the present Persian Cabinet seems disposed to conform to those principles, the contingency of its resigning must be reckoned with, and, moreover, the two Powers will eventually have to count with the Medjliss. It would therefore be very desirable to obtain an express engagement that the Persian Government will do nothing to injure British or Russian interests, or an engagement to such effect. The Persian Government should at the same time be urged to dismiss their irregular forces (fedais) which, when the ex-Shah has left Persia, will be no longer needed and will merely be a source of trouble. His Majesty's Government is further of opinion that, pending discussions as to a loan to the Persian Government and as to the financial institutions to which the negotiation of such a loan should be entrusted, it would be of advantage that the two Governments should make an advance of 200,000*l.* each on the condition suggested by the two representatives that the proceeds will be spent under the supervision of the Persian Treasurer-General, and that a large portion thereof be earmarked for the expenses of the gendarmerie. The sum of 200,000*l.* advanced by the British Government would have to be used by the Persian Government for the purpose of restoring order on the southern roads of Persia.

It seems to Sir E. Grey that since both Governments have been in communication with Messrs. Seligman on the subject of the proposed loan, and since Messrs. Seligman showed every willingness to comply with the conditions put forward by the Russian Government, it would not be right to withdraw the business from their hands without reason and to support a different financial group. Sir E. Grey suggests, therefore, that an enquiry should be made of Mr. Seligman as to whether he is prepared to resume negotiations for a loan at the point where they stood when he visited St. Petersburgh at the end of October last. Should he, under the altered conditions in Persia, not be willing at once to proceed with the negotiations for a loan, the two Powers would then be at liberty to give their support to some other group.

St. Petersburgh, January 16 (29), 1912.

[5527] No. 295.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 39.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 5, 1912.

THE "Novoe Vremya" of the 4th February publishes a letter from Tehran, dated the 24th January, signed "Elm," and directed against Mr. Shuster. The writer, after formulating all the old grievances against Mr. Shuster, his aggressive personality, his lack of tact, his disregard of established Persian customs, &c., makes a sarcastic allusion to Mr. Shuster's boasted magnanimity in renouncing the two and a-half years salary due to him from the Persian Government. The writer avers that while Mr. Shuster was talking grandiloquently of his self-denial in this respect, he was at the same time pocketing a sum of 61,000 roubles, which the Imperial Bank of Persia paid to him in his capacity of treasurer-general when he no longer filled that office. This sum is alleged to have been paid by Mr. Wood to Mr. Shuster, in order to secure the extension for ten years of the right enjoyed by the bank to import silver for minting purposes. The extension of this right for one year was secured last year with the

consent of the Medjliss and the observance of all proper formalities, but now Messrs. Shuster and Wood have dispensed with all such troublesome restrictions.

The writer goes on to say that, from a legal point of view, this transaction constitutes a punishable "abuse and breach of trust," while from the political point of view, it is a direct infraction of articles 1 and 2 of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, and subversive of the interests of the Russian bank. Sir G. Barclay himself in private conversation has gone so far as to say: *C'est un abus.* The letter finally points out that while Mr. Shuster has decamped and cannot be proceeded against, his accomplice, Mr. Wood, is a British subject and is still in Tehran.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[5624] No. 296.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 8.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 7, 1912.

IN reply to your letter, dated the 30th January, 1912, regarding the departure of Mr. Knox from Shiraz, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India on the subject, and to state that he concurs in their view that Mr. Knox may now leave if His Majesty's Minister is satisfied that he can travel in safety.

The Secretary of State has no objection to Sir G. Barclay being given the discretion asked for in his telegram No. 40 of the 13th January as to the sending of an escort from Ispahan to Abadeh.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 296.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, January* 31, 1912.

PLEASE say whether you concur in telegram of the 28th instant from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, regarding Major Knox.

Enclosure 2 in No. 296.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 5, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram, dated the 31st ultimo.

If His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, is satisfied that it is safe for Major Knox to travel, there is no objection on our part.

[5560] No. 297.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 8.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 7, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd February, 1912, regarding a proposed Anglo-Russian advance to the Persian Government, amounting to 400,000*l.*, or 200,000*l.*, as may hereafter be settled with the Russian Government.

In reply I am to inform you that in view of the undertakings given in the past in somewhat similar circumstances the Secretary of State in Council is prepared to participate in the moiety of the advance to be made by His Majesty's Government which, as he observes, is of a temporary character and to be repaid as soon as a larger loan is arranged by the Persian Government. The main object of this moiety of the

advance is stated to be to put the Persian Government in a better position for maintaining security on the roads of Southern Persia.

On learning that the sum of 100,000*l.*, or 50,000*l.*, as the case may be, has been paid by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Secretary of State will cause a like amount to be transferred to the Imperial Bank of Persia, through whose agency, he presumes, the advance will be made as on former occasions.

In view of the exceptional circumstances on account of which the advance is proposed, the Secretary of State in Council is willing that the questions of security and interest shall be postponed until His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government have had the opportunity of considering them further.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[5653] No. 298.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 100 of 7th February: Imperial Bank's mint contract.

There is no article in the law of 13th June prescribing that the consent of the Medjliss is necessary for such contracts, but Russia might contend that, in default of any express provision in that law empowering the treasurer-general to dispense with it, consent of the Medjliss, which was required in the two previous contracts, is necessary. In support of this she might invoke articles 18 and 24 of the constitution (see Sir C. Spring-Rice's despatch of 27th January, 1907).

I presume that Shuster did not submit it to the Medjliss, either because he agreed with the view of the bank that the consent of Parliament was not necessary, or possibly because he wished to avoid publicity.

[5655] No. 299.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 8, 1912.*

TREASURY-GENERAL.

I replied on the 2nd February to the Minister for Foreign Affairs' message, as authorised in your telegram No. 74 of the 1st instant.

Persian Government have not only not formulated officially their objections to Mornard as Shuster's successor, but they now inform me that, being restricted to the nationals of minor Powers when choosing foreign assistants, they have signified their approval of the engagement of the eight Belgians to fill the places of the retiring Americans.

[5658] No. 300.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 95 of 5th February: Ex-Shah movement.

Russian consul-general at Meshed has written to His Majesty's consul-general that he will do all he can to calm the mob, and that he has ceased to protect Yussuf Khan of Herati.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[5659] No. 301.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 94 of 7th February: Turco-Persian frontier.

In the course of my yesterday's conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs I informed his Excellency in general terms of what Sir G. Lowther had reported in his telegram No. 22 of 5th February. His Excellency said that he was expecting a visit from the Turkish Ambassador, and that the latter would no doubt make a communication to him on the subject. His Excellency evidently did not like the idea of caravans being escorted by Turkish troops, but did not say what attitude he proposed to adopt.

[5660] No. 302.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1912.*

OFFICIAL communiqué published to-day states that, in consequence of serious disorders in Mazanderan and inability of local authorities to cope with them, the Russian consul at Barfrush has asked for reinforcements to protect Russian lives and property, and Moscow merchants have telegraphed begging protection of their trade.

Instructions have been sent accordingly to dispatch two companies (about 250 men each) of infantry with two machine and two mountain guns to Asterabad, one company with two machine guns to Barfrush, and one company to Meshed Iser.

[5499] No. 303.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 98 of 7th February: Proposal to negotiate with Salar-ed-Dowleh through consuls at Kermanshah.

Yes.

[5624] No. 304.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 74 of 28th January: Mr. Knox's leave.

Knox may now leave if you are satisfied that he can travel in safety.

You may use your discretion as to sending escort from Ispahan to bring him to Abadeh (see your telegram No. 40 of 13th January).

[5488] No. 305.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 8, 1912.*

THE Persian Minister called at this office on the 3rd instant, and showed to Mr. Mallet telegrams from his Government to the effect that their situation was becoming intolerable, and that they would have to resign shortly unless some support was given to them.

The Russian commissioner at Gumbad-i-kabus had sent 250 Turcomans to the ex-Shah; the ex-Shah had arrived at Astrabad with 250 Russian cossacks; a man called Yussuf Khan had come from Herat to Meshed in the interests of the ex-Shah, and was intriguing with the Russian consul (this information agrees with that

conveyed in your telegram No. 87 of the 3rd instant); and further executions had taken place at Resht and Enzeli.

Mr. Mallet said that the resignation of the Persian Government would be most regrettable at this moment. His Majesty's Government were consulting the Russian Government on the terms of a communication which they hoped shortly to make to the Persian Government.

The Minister had read in the "Times" a forecast of this communication and pressed for details; but Mr. Mallet said that he could tell him nothing until the Russian Government had replied.

Mehdi Khan then asked that the Persian Government should be informed confidentially of the nature of the communication before it was formally made.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[6205] No. 306.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 8, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF told me to-day that the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin would soon be accomplished—half of them would be returned to Russia and the other half would go to Ardebil and Resht.

I said that I was very glad to hear this. It was also a relief that a warning was to be given to the ex-Shah to leave Persia. His incursion had drawn away the Bakhtiari forces from the south; the whole resources of the Persian Government had been taken up by the struggle against him, owing to the fear that his return to the throne would be followed by a series of reprisals; and one result had been the blocking of the southern roads and the stopping of British trade. We therefore had good reason to resent the action of the ex-Shah. As long as there had been in Tehran a Government not favourable to Russian interests in the north, I had felt that I could not support that Government, or expect Russia to do so. But now that this obstacle had been removed, and there was a Government who realised that they must respect Russian interests in the north and accept advice, the Government ought to be encouraged and supported. It was only by showing that such a Government could keep upon their feet, and would receive goodwill and support, that their authority could be maintained in Persia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5801] No. 307.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 9, 1912.*

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 60 of 5th February [communicated by India Office, 7th February].

I see no objection to communicating to Persian Government general exposition of our intentions, and asking the Regent and the Persian Government to telegraph as suggested by the Government of India.

As regards the Khan of Borasjun, acting consul-general at Bushire, in a telegram which he has repeated to India, urges objections, which seem much to the point, to our demanding his dismissal now. He thinks, and I concur, that we should content ourselves with a formal complaint to the Persian Government against the khan's attitude, which should be presented at the same time as our exposition of our intentions, and that we should at the same time warn the Persian Government that, in view of bad past record of khan, we should be obliged to take forcible measures against him in the event of any further obstruction on his part.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and Bushire.)

[5820] No. 308.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 9, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 22 of 5th February: Turco-Persian frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Persian Government refused this request some time ago, and that Turkish Government then said that they would wait for three weeks for the restoration of order. Persian Government replied that they could not fix definite time, but that order would be restored as soon as possible. They have had no answer to this.

[5824] No. 309.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 9, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 44 of 7th February.

Russian Minister learns from his Government that they have no objection to a joint advance of 200,000*l.* on the conditions indicated in the five paragraphs of your telegram No. 73 of 2nd February to St. Petersburgh, but they look to obtaining 8 per cent. interest, and insist that the advance should be made in portions according to the requirements of the Persian Government, and, as I understand it, that no portion of Russian advance should be paid until the corresponding British portion has been paid.

This payment of the advance in driblets *pari passu* by both Governments seems a cumbrous arrangement.

Russian Government also insist on control of expenditure, though they do not say who is to exercise it. Presumably it is intended by them that the two legations should exercise it, but it seems to me that the supervision by the treasurer-general of expenditure according to a programme prepared by him in consultation with the two legations should suffice.

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

[5822] No. 310.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 46 of 8th February.

On my expressing regret that the Russian Government should have thought it necessary to dispatch further troops to North Persia, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that they had been compelled to take this step in consequence of urgent appeals addressed to them by Russian subjects. His Excellency said that it was absolutely necessary to prevent recurrence of incidents like those which had taken place at Tabreez, as if any serious disturbances occurred he would be powerless to resist pressure which the military and Court parties would bring to bear in favour of permanent occupation of certain districts. Order must be maintained somehow, and the best way of accomplishing this was to dispatch small detachments to the places threatened and to withdraw them as soon as their presence was no longer required. He could not say exactly how many troops had been sent, but he did not believe that they were much over 300 men. The companies were not at a war strength, so the figures given in my telegram were much exaggerated.

He called my attention to attacks made against him in press for ordering the withdrawal of the troops from Kazvin.

[5852] No. 311.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 9, 1912.*

PERSIAN Minister asked me yesterday whether I could not urge Minister for Foreign Affairs to join His Majesty's Government in giving a guarantee that neither Government would recognise ex-Shah should he again return to Persia, as it was most important to discourage him from making such an attempt. I told him that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had repeatedly refused to give such a guarantee, and had even declined to make grant of pension conditional on the ex-Shah giving a written engagement that he would not return without the consent of the Russian Government. The case might, I said, be different if the Persian Government could themselves extract an engagement from the ex-Shah that he would not return without the consent of the British and Russian Governments. Such an engagement, however, was not likely to prevent him from again breaking his word.

I repeated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning what the Persian Minister had said and what I had replied. His Excellency said that he would not object to such an engagement being given by the ex-Shah provided that it was clearly shown that it had been obtained by the Persian Government acting by themselves, and not through the intervention of the Russian Government.

[5823] No. 312.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 44 of 7th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Seligman's brother-in-law has given him to understand that Seligman would be satisfied with a share in the projected loan.

[5519] No. 313.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 9, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 44 of 7th February: Proposed joint advance and communication to Persian Government.

We are paying into Imperial Bank of Persia to-day to your order 100,000*l.*, representing British share. Rate of interest should be 5 per cent. if the Russian Government agree. The advance should be repayable from the first proceeds of the projected loan. Meanwhile, security should be a further charge on southern customs, or whatever else is available. As much of British advance as can reasonably be spared should be allotted directly to southern gendarmerie.

You may now concert with your Russian colleague in drawing up joint communication embodying five points proposed in my telegram No. 73 of 2nd February to Sir G. Buchanan, to which Russian Government have now agreed.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 100.)

[5653] No. 313*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 100 of the 8th February.

Unless Russian Government make a complaint as regards contract granted to Imperial Bank for import of minting silver, I shall not take any action in the matter.

[5519] No. 314.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 109 to Sir G. Barclay of 9th February: Proposed joint advance to the Persian Government.

Inform Russian Government.

[5560] No. 315.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office marked "Confidential" of the 3rd instant, relative to the proposal, recently revised, that His Majesty's and the Russian Governments should jointly advance to the Persian Government a sum of 200,000*l.*, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to request that in accordance with the verbal agreement reached as the result of conversations which he had yesterday with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and this morning with Sir R. Chalmers, the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury will cause to be paid in to-day to the Imperial Bank of Persia, to the order of Sir George Barclay, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the sum of 50,000*l.*, being the half of the British share of the advance which is chargeable on Imperial revenues.

The bank will be warned that this payment is about to be made.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the India Office,* in reply to a communication made to that department also on the 3rd instant, undertaking to transfer a like sum to the bank on account of the share of the advance which is to be derived from Indian sources, as soon as the Marquess of Crewe learns that the share to be contributed by the Imperial Government has been paid.

I am to state that a telegram has been addressed to Sir G. Barclay informing him that the sum of 100,000*l.* has been paid into the bank to his order for the purposes of the advance, that the rate of interest chargeable on the advance is to be fixed at 5 per cent. if the Russian Government agree, and that the repayment of the advance should become a first charge on the larger loan to the Persian Government now in course of negotiation, while it is to be further guaranteed on the unpledged surplus of the customs receipts of the ports of Southern Persia, and on any other available revenues. As regards the rate of interest proposed, I am to refer you once more to the letter from this Office of the 18th June, 1910.

His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has been instructed to inform the Russian Government of the action taken in the matter.

I am to add that the sum contributed from Imperial sources will become a charge on the Foreign Office vote.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive the earliest possible intimation that the payment has been made.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[5909] No. 316.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 9, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, relative to the advance of 200,000*l.* which it is proposed that His Majesty's and the Russian Governments should make to the Persian Government.

I am to transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence with the Treasury on the subject,† from which it will be observed that that department have now paid into this Office the sum of 50,000*l.*, representing the half of the British share of this advance which is chargeable on Imperial revenues.

* No. 297.

† Nos. 255, 313, 315, and 318.

This sum has now been transferred to the Imperial Bank of Persia, and I am accordingly to request that the remaining sum of 50,000*l.*, being the share derivable from Indian sources, may now also be paid into the bank in accordance with the undertaking contained in the third paragraph of your letter.

I am also to transmit copy of a telegram which Sir E. Grey has addressed to Sir G. Barclay on the subject, setting forth Sir E. Grey's views as to the conditions which should be insisted on in connection with the rate of interest and repayment of, and the security of the advance, and to add that His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has been instructed to bring the contents of this telegram to the knowledge of the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[5909] No. 317.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 9, 1912.

WITH reference to the letter of the 19th February, 1910, from this Office and previous correspondence relative to a proposal that His Majesty's and the Russian Governments should make jointly an advance of money to the Persian Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that the financial situation of the last-named Government, and the state of affairs in the country generally, have once more brought this question prominently forward, and that, as a result of negotiations between Great Britain and Russia, it has been decided that each Power shall advance to Persia a sum of 100,000*l.* without delay.

His Majesty's Government have proposed to the Russian Government that the repayment of this advance should be a first charge on an eventual larger loan to the Persian Government, and that it should, moreover, be secured on the uncharged surplus of the customs receipts of the ports of Southern Persia and on any other available sources of revenue.

Of the British 50,000*l.* (one-half) will be contributed from Imperial and the other half from Indian sources, and I am to transmit to you herewith an order for the amount of the Imperial share, and to request that it may be placed to the order of Sir George Barclay, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, who has been advised by telegraph of the transaction. The India Office, on their part, have undertaken to transfer to the bank the amount of the Indian share as soon as they are advised that the Imperial share has been paid in, and I am to request that this sum may also be placed to Sir G. Barclay's order as soon as it is received.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[5909] No. 318.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received February 10.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, February* 9, 1912.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury the letters from your department of the 3rd and 9th instant, explaining that, in consequence of the present financial situation of the Persian Government, and of the state of affairs in that country generally, it has now become necessary that His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government should make the joint advance to the Persian Government which has been agreed to already in principle.

It is proposed that the amount of the advance on this occasion shall be 200,000*l.*, of which 100,000*l.* will be provided by the Russian Government, and the remainder, in equal moities, by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India (a course to which the Secretary of State for India has assented), and that the advance shall (subject to the consent of the Russian Government) bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent., and be repaid as a first charge out of the larger loan to the Persian Government, now in course of negotiation, with a further guarantee on the unpledged surplus of the customs receipts of the ports of Southern Persia, and on any other available revenues.

In these circumstances I am directed to say, for the information of Secretary Sir

E. Grey, that my Lords, for their part, assent to an immediate advance of 50,000*l.* on the terms stated, and in view of the urgency of the matter they have given directions for the transfer of the sum in question from the Treasury chest fund to the credit of the account of the vote for diplomatic and consular services, on the understanding that His Majesty's Government will take the first suitable opportunity of asking Parliament to repay the advance to the Treasury chest account.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[5940] No. 319.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received February 10.)

Sir, 28, *Oxford Street, Manchester, February* 9, 1912.

WITH reference to our letter of the 22nd ultimo relative to the Muin-ut-Tujjar's right to your unofficial protection in respect to the disputed Ormuz concession, Mr. M. Ellinger understood, when he had the pleasure of seeing Mr Norman on the occasion of his last visit to your Office, that Mr. Norman would consult Mr. Mallet as to whether you could meet the Muin-ut-Tujjar's wishes by cabling out to Sir George Barclay regarding the matter, and that we should hear from you what had been decided.

We should be glad to hear from you regarding this as soon as possible.

Mr. Ellinger further understood from Mr. Norman that His Majesty's Government would not support any claim on the part of Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited) either against the Persian Government or the Muin-ut-Tujjar, should the Muin-ut-Tujjar, after resumption of the concession, decline to make further shipments to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited), in fulfilment of the contract between the Persian Government and Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited), which contract, as you are aware, was made in violation of the rights of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves, and in defiance of the warning given by His Majesty's Government to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (Limited), that they could not count upon the help of the former in support of the maintenance of their rights under this contract.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND Co.

[6006] No. 320.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 109 of 9th February.

You will have noticed from my immediately preceding telegram of 9th February that Russian Government regard giving of an advance as conditional on the points indicated in five paragraphs of your telegram No. 73 of 2nd February to St. Petersburgh, of which one—the fifth—may present some difficulty.

Wording of our communication to Persian Government must depend on whether this view is correct or whether it is intended to give the advance subject only to conditions regarding security, interest, and proper expenditure, and to treat questions of dismissal of fedais, army, and recognition of convention as separate from advance.

As regards formula for point 5, my Russian colleague and I propose to request Persian Government "to undertake to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention," and I think that, notwithstanding there may be difficulty in obtaining it, we ought at least to make this or some other undertaking in the same sense a precedent condition.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[6007] No. 321.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 10, 1912.*

EX-SHAH.

Please see my telegram No. 98 of the 7th instant.

Ex-Shah appears to have been much taken aback by the communication made to him by the Russian consul at Asterabad acting on the Russian Minister's instructions.

He had, he said, hoped for Russian sympathy, and, had he been victorious, would have been guided in his actions by Russian interests; he alleged that he was on the point of victory.

However, he said that if the Emperor desired it he would leave Persia: he would await a repetition from his Imperial Majesty of this order.

He did not consider that the amount of the pension was consistent with his dignity; however, on receiving the Emperor's further telegram, he would leave to his Imperial Majesty the adjustment of the conditions of his departure.

[6008] No. 322.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 10, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 103 of 8th February.

Russian consul-general at Meshed having reported that 90 per cent. of the province were in favour of the ex-Shah and that change of the two Governments from neutrality to opposition to His Majesty was likely to cause very serious disorders, I asked British consul-general his view. Following is his reply:—

"There is no strong feeling in favour of either party, but general disgust with present situation is undoubted and natural. Present agitation was organised by my Russian colleague to create disturbances and provide excuse for taking charge of administration.

"Since his support was withdrawn mob has dispersed, and he is now anxious to justify his conduct.

"In my opinion if my colleague obeys his orders and acts in accordance with agreement no serious demonstration in favour of ex-Shah need be feared, in which connection none is reported from other towns. Meshed is quieting down."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[5820] No. 323.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 10, 1912.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 105 of 9th February, which will reach you by post, and your telegram No. 22 of 5th February.

If Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs refers again to the question, your Excellency should say that His Majesty's Government have refrained from escorting caravans on the southern routes out of regard for the Persian Government, who are organising a gendarmerie for the protection of the routes, and that His Majesty's Government hope the Sublime Porte will show similar restraint and patience.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 114, and St. Petersburgh, No. 109.)

[5223] No. 324.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 10, 1912.*

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Mr. Shipley, His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez, will be attached to your Excellency's staff as technical adviser during the sittings of the proposed Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

M. Minorski, who accompanied Mr. Shipley on his recent tour of investigation on the frontier, will be attached to the staff of the Russian Ambassador.

Mr. Shipley is now on his way to London, and on his arrival he will spend some time studying the earlier and somewhat voluminous correspondence in the archives of this Office. He will probably be ready to proceed to Constantinople at any time after the 10th March, and I have to request your Excellency to report immediately it is settled when the commission will meet.

During the sittings of this commission frequent requests are likely to be made to His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government for the communication of documents bearing on different phases of the dispute, and it has been decided to leave the selection of such documents as can properly be communicated to the Persian and Turkish delegates to the discretion of your Excellency and your Russian colleague.

Your Excellency should in no case communicate any document without the assent of your Russian colleague; and, in cases where you are in any doubt as to the expediency of such communication being made, you should defer action until the point in question has been referred to me.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5375] No. 325.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lawrance, Webster, Messer, and Nicholls.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February 10, 1912.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 23rd ultimo relative to the purchase by a British syndicate of growing timber in Persian territory on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, reporting that he has addressed a note to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, conveying to his Excellency the particulars contained in the last paragraph of your letter of the 15th January.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[6009] No. 326.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 106 of 8th February.

I cannot say I am satisfied that Knox can travel in safety. Safe travelling in Fars is a thing of the past.

Still, I see no likelihood of safer travelling in the future until at least our negotiations with the headmen on the Bushire-Shiraz road succeed, and this must at any rate be a matter of time.

Unless, therefore, instructed to the contrary, I propose to authorise Knox to leave with a Persian escort, and to instruct Ispahan to send Indian troops to escort him northwards from Abadeh.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[6003] No. 327.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 101 and 109 of 9th February to Tehran.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me in a private letter that he will enquire what rate of interest Minister of Finance proposes to ask for Russian share of advance, but that he believes he had intention of fixing it at 7½ or 8 per cent. This, his Exellency adds, was rate fixed with regard to an advance to Persian Government for payment of American officials engaged by Shuster.

[6004] No. 328.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 11, 1912.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 82 of 5th February I sent an *aide-mémoire* to Minister for Foreign Affairs, and have now received following reply :—

"Russian consul-general at Meshed, whose serious attention had been called to representations made by His Majesty's Government, has replied that, though a certain agitation exists at Meshed, Russian consulate-general had done all it could to calm and restrain population. Basti, whose conduct had been complained of (Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 87 of 3rd February), had been ordered to leave consulate-general, while Persian employés of consulate-general had taken no part in movement.

"Consul-general stated he could not prevent certain Russian subjects implicated in agitation from attending public meetings.

"In view of favour with which restoration of ex-Shah is regarded by a numerous party, with clergy and the aristocracy at its head, consul-general fears that unless ex-Shah's departure takes the form of a voluntary act there will be general discontent followed by serious troubles directed against England and Russia."

[6074] No. 329.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Tehran, January 17, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 247 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to report that the force of the ex-Shah, which was stated in that despatch to have advanced as far as Semnan, has been compelled to retire. It was defeated at Damgahan on the 2nd January by a force of Mujaheds under Montasser-ed-Dowleh, who are now reported to have reoccupied Shahrud.

From the west the news is confirmed that Salar-ed-Dowleh has reoccupied Kermanshah. His Majesty's consul reports that he has about a thousand men with him, and that he intends in the spring to collect further forces and to make another attempt to reach the capital.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh has taken advantage of the Russian occupation to enter Tabreez. He made his entry on the 2nd January with 200 men, and is now apparently *de facto* governor.

It is satisfactory to note that Shuja-ed-Dowleh has been prevented by the Russian consul from proclaiming Mohammad Ali; a further indication that Russia is acting up to her assurances that her military measures in Persia have no connection with Mohammad Ali's aspirations to the throne is furnished by the recent action of the Russian consul at Resht. In my despatch above referred to I reported that the Persian Government had information that Shuja-ed-Dowleh had sent a force to Ardebil whence it was threatening Resht. That force, consisting of 150 Shahsevends, arrived at Enzeli on the 13th instant under a certain Reshid-es-Sultan, but the Russian consul at Resht, under orders from St. Petersburgh, caused them to be disarmed and shipped back to Astara, whence they had come. Reports, too, from Meshed show that recruits enrolled by Mohammad Ali's agents at Askabad are now being stopped by the Russian authorities from entering Persia.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[6075] No. 330.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Tehran, January 19, 1912.*

EXCEPT for one or two trifling demonstrations immediately following the dissolution of the Medjliss on the 14th ultimo, the past four weeks have been a period of unusual calm in Tehran. My apprehensions and those of the Cabinet as to the effect of the execution at Tabreez of Sikat-ul-Islam on the 10th of Muharram—the Good Friday of the Mahommedan year—have proved to have been exaggerated. The Government appears to have the situation in Tehran well in hand, and no particular effervescence as a consequence of this prelate's execution has made itself felt in the provinces, a fact due doubtless to the rigorous fashion in which the Government have recently suppressed inflammatory telegrams.

I gather that the Government intend to postpone the elections for the new Medjliss as long as possible, and indeed now that Tabreez, the centre of nationalism, is so completely in Russian hands, there seems little likelihood of any irresistible pressure being put upon the Government to facilitate the meeting of Parliament.

There have been rumours in the past few days that the Regent and his Cabinet were not at one, and that his Highness was about to resign, but he told Mr. Churchill yesterday that there was no truth in these stories, and that affairs were going smoothly enough. He added that he was anxiously awaiting a pronouncement of the two Powers as the result of M. Poklewsky's and my deliberations on the situation, and that he had intended after he had set things going on the lines then indicated by the two Powers to go abroad on leave for two months, when he hoped to have an opportunity of seeing both you, Sir, and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I should explain that I had told his Highness of our deliberations when last I saw him, on the 3rd instant. On that occasion he asked me what line the two Powers intended to follow now that the Persian Government had shown their desire for conciliation by submitting to the Russian demands, and I had replied that the Russian Minister and I had been instructed to confer on the situation and to suggest to our Governments a line of action which would bring about the establishment of normal and stable relations.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[6077] No. 331.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Tehran, January 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit a French translation of the decree of the 6th January appointing M. Mornard acting treasurer-general.

It is with much regret that I have seen from cuttings from the British press which have reached me that M. Mornard's candidature, which has had my support, is so unpopular in England.

The objections from different quarters raised to his appointment seem to be based on one or other of the following assumptions: (1) that he is dishonest; (2) that he is a Russian tool and hostile to British interests; (3) that he lacks financial ability; (4) that the Persian Government strongly object to him. As regards the first two of these assumptions, I have no reason to think that they are other than false. I know that Mr. Wood, the manager of the Imperial Bank, and others, who, by their desire to support Mr. Shuster in his conflict with M. Mornard last summer, were led into a position of open conflict with M. Mornard, have not been backward in casting reflections on his honesty, but, unless they can produce better evidence than they have so far done, I must continue to regard him as the upright and straightforward man I have always found him in his dealings with me.

As regards the allegation which has appeared in the British press that he is hostile to British interests, I believe this is merely a survival of the obsolete tradition that the Belgian customs officers were in Persia "pour embêter les Anglais." During the more than three years that I have been in Persia I have never seen any sign of hostility to British interests on the part of any of the Belgian officers, and, in particular, I have always found M. Mornard most conciliatory and helpful in customs matters, and I am sure that Mr. Oliphant, who, as commercial secretary, was in close relations with M. Mornard, will bear me out in this. In the old days, before the Anglo-Russian agreement, the Belgian customs officers were no doubt used as pawns in the Russian game of hampering British interests, but, so far as my experience goes, they have loyally accommodated themselves to the changed circumstances.

As regards M. Mornard's financial ability, I am not enough of an expert to be able to judge. He is, of course, not on a par with the able and brilliant man who has just been dismissed, but nor for that matter, in my opinion, is the other proposed candidate, M. Oudendijk.

How far the Persian Government really object to M. Mornard's candidature is not very clear. The only ground which they have urged for their objection is that it would produce a bad impression to appoint a man who had at one time been in acute conflict with Mr. Shuster. Moreover, I should observe that this objection was urged only at a time when the Government was dreading manifestations of indignation from the "democrats" as a consequence of the Cabinet's submission to the Russian demands. The Cabinet doubtless feared at the time that the appointment of one in so close relations with the two legations would aggravate the resentment of those from whom they apprehended vengeance.

The campaign in the British press against M. Mornard is, I think, greatly to be regretted in the interests of both the Imperial Bank of Persia and the oil company, as there is more than a suspicion in Belgian minds that the campaign is their work, and even if M. Mornard's appointment as treasurer-general is not made definite, the suspicion of the hostility of the bank and the company may well react unfavourably to them in questions with the customs administration. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of the oil company, whose pretensions in the matter of customs exemption sorely need the support of a friendly administrator.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 331.

Decree dated January 6, 1912.

Au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale Soltan Ahmad, Schah de Perse.

STATUANT dans le sens du projet formulé par le Conseil des Ministres,

Nous décidons :

Article 1er. Vu la décision prise par le Conseil des Ministres, conforme à l'avis de la Commission spéciale formée par les membres élus du Parlement, Mr. Morgan Shuster ayant été déchargé des fonctions de Trésorier général, M. J. Mornard, Administrateur général des Douanes, est nommé, provisoirement, à la gérence de la Trésorerie générale.

Art. 2. A cet effet et à partir de la date du présent décret, M. Mornard, sous les ordres du Ministre des Finances, s'occupera des fonctions inhérentes de la Trésorerie générale ; à partir de cette même date, les ordres de paiement, ainsi que les documents de Trésorerie, devront être revêtus de sa signature, faute de quoi ils n'auront aucune valeur.

Art. 3. La réception des comptes de l'ex-trésorier et la remise de ces comptes au nouveau gérant seront effectuées par une commission, dont la formation est autorisée par le Conseil des Ministres.

Art. 4. Le Ministre des Finances a la responsabilité du fonctionnement des attributions du Trésorier général ; les instructions nécessaires, après avoir été approuvées

par le Conseil des Ministres, seront communiquées par lui au gérant provisoire de l'Administration du Trésor.

Art. 5. Le Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

ABOL GASSEM, NASSER-OL-MOLK,
Régent.

NADJAF GOULI,
Président du Conseil.

VOSSOUGH-ED-DOWLEH,
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

GAVAM-ES-SALTANEH,
Ministre de l'Intérieur.

ZOKA-EL-MOULK,
Ministre de la Justice.

MOAZED-ES-SALTANEH,
Ministre des Postes et Télégraphes.

GOLAM HOSSÉIN,
Ministre de la Guerre.

HAKIM-OL-MOULK,
Ministre des Finances.

15 *Muharrem Tangouz, il* 1330.

[5537]

No. 332.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 14.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 22, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 43 of the 15th January, I have the honour to forward a copy of the contract for a period of ten years for the exclusive importation of silver for minting purposes, which the manager of the Imperial Bank obtained from the late Treasurer-General on the eve of the latter's dismissal.

I fear that the question of the validity of this contract is likely to be raised by the Russian Government. For the Russian Bank, who have twice been beaten in their efforts to obtain a mint contract, are not likely to acquiesce in a third defeat if they can find a flaw, and M. Poklewsky contends that in signing the contract without the express sanction of the Medjliss Mr. Shuster acted *ultra vires*, and that the contract, therefore, is so much waste paper. On the other hand, the manager of the Imperial Bank maintains that, under the law of the 13th June last (see my despatch No. 95 of that date), Mr. Shuster was empowered to conclude a contract of the kind without special reference to the Medjliss.

Before this despatch reaches you, you will doubtless have received a complaint from the Russian Government, and I presume that I shall then be favoured with instructions. The question is a very awkward one, and threatens us with the dilemma of a conflict with the Russian Government or the withholding of our support from the Imperial Bank in a matter which the manager of the bank regards as vital for the security of the note issue.

As reported in my telegram referred to above, Mr. Wood only informed me of this contract the other day, as he thought it would be awkward for me to have cognisance of it. He even refrained from having it registered at the legation.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 332.

Agreement between the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Persian Government.

AN agreement made between the Imperial Bank of Persia (hereinafter called the "Bank") of the one part and the Imperial Government of Persia, acting through its representative, the Treasurer-General of Persia, by and with the authority of the law

of the Medjliss of the 23rd Jauza, 1329 (hereinafter called the Government), of the other part, by which the bank undertakes to buy bar silver for account of the Government, and for the shipment to Persia for the purpose of coinage by the Imperial Mint upon the following terms:—

1. This agreement shall be in force for the period of ten years from the 22nd March, 1912.

2. The Government having reserved to itself the exclusive monopoly of importing silver for coinage, the bank is hereby appointed sole agent for the purchase of such silver and for the forwarding of the same to Tehran, and the Government binds itself not to import any silver whatsoever through the agency of any other party, nor to purchase silver imported by any other party during the period of this agreement. The Government agrees to pay all expenses covering the purchase of the silver and its transport to Tehran, including insurance, &c., incurred by the bank for account of the Government, as set forth in article 8.

3. The Government binds itself to purchase exclusively from the bank all foreign exchange for the importation of the silver in question.

4. The rate for purchase of all such exchange is fixed upon the basis of $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. above the buying rate of the bank for telegraphic transfers on London. The price at which the silver is to be purchased shall be determined simultaneously with the fixing of the rate of exchange.

5. The amount of silver to be imported under the terms of this agreement will be determined by the Government month by month, but it is understood that should it not be profitable to import on account of the rate of exchange and the price of silver, it will not be binding on either side to import under such conditions.

6. The Government agrees to pay the bank a commission of $\frac{1}{8}$ per cent. on the value of all bar silver imported during the period of this agreement: this commission to be calculated on the sterling cost of the silver payable in krans at the same rate for sterling as fixed for each parcel of silver purchased.

7. The bank agrees to provide such sums as shall be required from time to time for the purchase of bar silver to the extent of 300,000*l.*, of which the equivalent will be repaid as the silver is coined by the Imperial Mint. Interest on all such advances shall be paid at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum.

8. All silver *en route* to Tehran, in the bank, and at the mint during the process of coinage or otherwise, will remain under hypothecation to the bank as security for the sums advanced. It is agreed that, should the necessity arise, the approximate profit accruing to the Government on each parcel of silver sent to the mint is to be held at the disposal of the Government from time to time in advance, full provision, however, being allowed for the refund of the cost of such silver and the charges and interest due to the bank. It is also agreed that the amount of silver necessary to be at the mint at any one time, in order to keep the machinery fully employed, is considered to be about 50,000*l.*

Done in triplicate at Tehran this 27th day of November in the year 1911.

The Imperial Government of Persia:
W. MORGAN SHUSTER, *Treasurer-General of Persia.*
The Imperial Bank of Persia:
A. O. WOOD, *Chief Manager.*

[6079] No. 333.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Tehran, January* 22, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of an account just issued by M. Mornard, administrator of the Persian Customs, of his administration of the Customs revenue for the four years ending the 20th March, 1911.*

It has in some quarters been made a reproach to the Belgian Customs employés in Persia that their accounts have never been subjected to an audit. It will be

* Not printed.

observed that in the accompanying letter to the Minister of Finance M. Mornard invites the verification of the account of his administration.

The table will have utility as a reference insomuch as the fixed and quasi-fixed charges on the Customs revenue, so frequently mentioned in despatches from this legation relating to the Persian finances, are clearly indicated therein.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 333.

Administrator-General of Customs to Persian Minister of Finance.

A son Excellence Hakim-ul-Mulk.
Ministre des Finances à Téhéran. *Téhéran, le janvier*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence le compte résumé de ma gestion en qualité d'Administrateur général des Douanes, pendant les années Gou-il, Pitch-il, Takagou-il et It-il (1907–11).*

Ce compte divisé en quatre tableaux présente:—

(*a.*) Les recettes, par branche de revenus, effectuées par tous les bureaux des Douanes du pays et centralisées à Téhéran.
(*b.*) Les dépenses d'administration divisées par catégorie.
(*c.*) Les paiements et versements effectués pour compte du Gouvernement, sur les produits nets des douanes.
(*d.*) Le solde restant disponible à l'expiration de la quatrième année d'exercice (It-il).

Les comptes détaillés se rapportant à la même période de quatre années, c'est-à-dire les comptes des différents bureaux de perception de la Perse, ainsi que les comptes de l'administration centrale, sont gardés dans un coffre-fort, avec les pièces justificatives des dépenses, telles que havalehs, quittances, factures, &c., et y attendent, d'année en année, que le Gouvernement daigne en ordonner la vérification par les services compétents.

Ainsi que votre Excellence le remarquera, j'ai fait imprimer le compte résumé de ma gestion. C'est en vue d'en communiquer un exemplaire à toutes les personnes qui s'intéressent aux finances du pays, et qui désireraient particulièrement apprécier la gestion des douanes en connaissance de cause.

Je me permets de prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien me communiquer toutes les observations que pourrait suggérer au Gouvernement l'examen des tableaux que j'ai l'honneur de placer sous ses yeux et qui ont été établis avec le plus grand soin et un souci particulier de clarté et d'exactitude.

Je prie, &c.
L'administrateur général des Douanes,

[6080] No. 334.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Tehran, January* 22, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 334.

Summary of Events in Persia for the four weeks ending January 22, 1912.

Tehran.

Treasurer General.

MR. SHUSTER was informed by the Cabinet on the 26th December that the Persian Government having accepted the Russian ultimatum his services were no longer required. Mr. Shuster left Tehran on the 11th January, and M. Mornard, the administrator-general of customs, was appointed as acting treasurer-general, to date from the 6th January, though he did not actually take over until the 11th January.

The treasury gendarmerie was transferred to the Swedish officers on the 9th January.

Mr. Cairns and the other American officials formerly under Mr. Shuster are still in Tehran, but they are not likely to stay.

The Regent and Cabinet.

There have been rumours of the Regent's intention to resign, and a telegram has been received at the Foreign Office from the Persian Minister in London stating that some members of the Persia Committee have expressed to him their sincere hope that these rumours are unfounded, and that similar reports as to the alleged activity of Sardar Assad are also untrue. The fact is that Sardar Assad has of late shown some disposition to coquette with the democratic party, and that this has tended to further estrange him from the Regent. Sardar Assad has, however, recently endeavoured to reassure the Regent as to his loyalty, and he has availed himself for this purpose of the intermediary of the British Legation.

The Cabinet, which is so far unchanged, seems to have the situation well in hand. The news of the execution of the chief priest of Tabreez by the Russians on the 1st January seemed at one moment to threaten the resignation of the Cabinet and a recrudescence of disorders in the capital, coinciding as it did with the 10th of Moharrem, the great Moslem day of mourning, but nothing of the kind occurred.

The Press.

The local press has practically all disappeared since the closure of the Medjliss. The democratic organs were suppressed owing to their criticism of the Government, and eventually the "Medjliss" newspaper was suppressed for reproducing an inflammatory telegram from the ulema of Nejef, urging the tribes to resist foreign aggression. An official organ called the "Aftab" has now appeared.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

Tabreez.

During the fighting from the 21st to the 24th December the Russians made little headway against the revolutionaries, who had taken up a position in the citadel. The Russian consulate-general was practically isolated throughout, and was frequently attacked.

There was no firing on the 25th, and communication was established between the Russian consulate and the military commander.

On the 26th December Russian reinforcements, strength about 800 men with four guns, arrived, with the result that on the following day the fedais evacuated the citadel and dispersed.

General Voredonof arrived with two regiments of infantry on the 30th December and took possession of the town.

On the 1st January seven leading nationalists and the Sikat-ul-Islam, a greatly revered Mujtehed, were tried by court-martial and executed, and on the 20th January a prominent Armenian, Petros Melik Audressian, of Tabreez, met with similar treatment.

At the time of writing the Russians are in complete possession of the town, the bazaars are open, and the population who took no part in the recent fighting are showing a general desire for peace.

The Russian consul-general reports one officer and thirty-nine men killed, and five officers and forty-five men wounded, and accuses the fedais of mutilating the dead and torturing the wounded.

The charges of general inhumanity brought against the Russian troops by the Persian authorities are, according to His Majesty's consul, false.

To avoid further responsibility, Zia-ed-Dowleh, the Acting-Governor, has taken refuge in the British consulate.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh arrived in the town on the 2nd January with some 200 followers. The inhabitants welcomed his arrival as there was no one else capable of carrying out the duties of Governor.

The approximate strength of the Russian troops in Azerbaijan is as under :—

At Tabreez	.. ..	3,000 men with 14 guns.
„ Marand	.. ..	1,000 „ 4 „
„ Ardebil	.. ..	1,000 men.
Total	.. ..	5,000 men with 18 guns.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

Since the 21st December there have been no further disturbances at Resht.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports that the ex-Shah, with a following of 350 men, is still at Khoja Nafas.

At Resht the bazaars are gradually opening, but all Government offices, excepting the post and telegraph offices, are closed.

The search for arms and for persons wanted by the Russian authorities continues. About a dozen Persian notables were arrested and deported to Russia, but the Russian authorities sent them back to Resht to be tried by court-martial.

Reshid-es-Sultan, an adherent of the ex-Shah, arrived at Enzeli on the 13th January with 153 Shahsevan sowars. They were disarmed by the Russians and subsequently sent back to Astara, whence they had come.

The Russian troops at Enzeli and Resht have been reinforced from Kazvin, and now number about 2,000 men with fourteen machine guns. At Kazvin there are 2,500 men with eight guns.

Meshed.

The town is reported to be quiet, but the feeling against the Russians and ourselves still continues.

The ex-Shah's followers were defeated at Damghan on the 3rd January by a force of 900 nondescript sowars, and fell back to an entrenched position midway between Damghan and Shahrud. The Government troops advanced from Damghan towards Shahrud on the 9th January.

Recruiting for the ex-Shah has been proceeding at Askhabad. He also has agents at Krasnovodsk, but according to latest information the Russians are turning back recruits.

In addition to consular guards, there are some 2,500 Russian troops with eight guns and fifteen machine guns in Khorassan.

Ispahan.

The anti-foreign demonstrations have had little or no effect on foreign trade.

Several robberies are reported in the environs and district. The number of villagers who have been driven by their misfortunes to take to the road is increasing.

Sardar Zafar has been appointed Governor-General of Ispahan, but has not yet left Tehran.

Sardar Ashja, the retiring governor, left Ispahan on the 14th January for Chaharmahak.

Sardar Fateh (Mouin-i-Homayun), Sardar Ashja's brother, arrived on the 25th December with 200 men and two mountain guns. He informed His Majesty's consul-general that he had failed in his efforts to catch Naib Hussein, who had escaped to Biabanek, where he could not pursue him.

Sardar Fateh left Ispahan with his brother on the 14th January.

Yezd.

Amir Azam, the Governor of Kerman, proceeded to Taft at the end of December to punish the "lootis" who have been responsible for so many robberies in his district. He inflicted some loss on them and pillaged their quarters in Taft, but the "looti" leaders managed to escape.

The financial situation is most unsatisfactory. Owing to the insecurity of the roads the Imperial Bank of Persia has been unable to obtain cash from outside for some months, and its reserve has fallen so low that it has been obliged to restrict business.

Shiraz.

On the 24th December a party of fifty men of the Central India Horse, under Major Birdwood, proceeding from Shiraz to Kazeroon to meet a similar party escorting Mr. Smart from Bushire, was attacked near Kotal Dukhter and lost one man killed and one man wounded.

On the 26th December these parties met near Rahdar caravanserai, and were leaving the precincts of that place when the caravanserai tofangchis opened fire on them. The troops had to fight their way into Kazeroon, armed men coming out of the villages *en route* and joining in the attack.

Mr. Smart was wounded early in the engagement, and it was only discovered that he was missing when his horse came galloping in to join the convoy. A hospital assistant who was wounded was also left behind.

Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, in charge of the Kazeroon section of the road, had Mr. Smart and the wounded hospital assistant taken to his camp at Shahpur and attended to by a Persian surgeon. He brought them into Kazeroon on the 29th December.

The casualties in this action were: killed, two followers; missing, one follower; wounded, Mr. Smart, the hospital assistant, seven sowars, and one follower.

On receipt of the news of the first affair Colonel Douglas dispatched a party of fifty men to Dashtarjin, and on hearing of the second attack he himself left Shiraz on the 27th December with 100 men for Dashtarjin and Kotal Dukhter.

On the 2nd January Major Birdwood's party, with all its wounded, joined Colonel Douglas at Kotal Dukhter, and the whole force returned to Shiraz without any further incident, arriving on the 5th January.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has been appointed Governor-General of Fars, but has not yet left Tehran. In the meantime Kavam-ul-Mulk continues to be Deputy-Governor, and order has been maintained at Shiraz.

Seistan.

The crisis in Northern Persia has not affected Seistan and Kain.

According to latest reports the roads were safe as far as British merchandise were concerned.

Kerman.

The town of Kerman is reported quiet.

Rifat-i-Nizam (*vide* summary for November 1911) continues in his attempts to alienate men employed by the telegraph department.

Recent reports state that the roads are in an unsatisfactory condition, and that officials of the telegraph department are frequently robbed when on tours of inspection.

Kermanshah.

There has been no fighting in the town since the arrival of Salar-ed-Dowleh on the 15th December, and the town is now quiet.

Since Salar-ed-Dowleh's arrival, Azem-ed-Dowleh, the representative of the Central Government, has been a refugee in the British consulate.

Mohammerah.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh arrived on the 4th January with the sheikh, and is staying at Mohammerah as his guest.

Ahwaz.

Reports state that unrest in the district continues.

Although caravans arrive from and leave for Ispahan, the Bakhtiari road cannot be said to be satisfactorily guarded. The Bakhtiaris have arranged for the appointment of Amir Mujahid as Governor of Behbehan, which should tend to ensure the safety of the road. The present inactivity of the robber bands is said to be due the severity of the weather.

Lingah.

Some 400 merchants and others, with their families, came into Lingah during November from Lar. They say that as trade has been at a standstill for some time past at Lar they have left the place for good and intend settling at Lingah and Debai.

W. M. FORDHAM, *Major*,
Military Attaché.

[6081]

No. 335.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 23, 1912.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 252 of the 24th December, respecting the state of the southern roads, I have received no reports of any robberies of British goods between Shiraz and Ispahan, though certain sections of the road were considered too unsafe for the inspections of the telegraph employés, and brigands still infested the neighbourhood of Abadeh. The cold weather, however, appears, as usual, to have driven off the larger number of the robbers, and several caravans at the beginning of December took advantage of the passage northwards of the squadron of British Indian troops to Ispahan to hurry through their journey.

Except for the attack on our troops at Kazerun, I have no information as to the state of the Bushire–Shiraz road beyond a report from the telegraph agent that it was fairly safe, but that the road guards were exacting very heavy dues.

The road between Ispahan and Tehran is in a most deplorable state, owing to the operations of Naib Hussein and the depredations of wandering Bakhtiaris. All postal communication between the capital and the south and central portions of Persia was suspended on account of the refusal of the contractor to continue the service in face of the continued losses he sustained in horses, &c., and of the reluctance of the Government to indemnify him. The service has lately been resumed, but the Belgian director of the posts tells me he fears it will again fall through unless he succeeds in coming to a direct pecuniary arrangement with Naib Hussein.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[6035]

No. 336.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 108.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 5, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Mosul transmitting translations of, and commenting on, certain telegrams in regard to Turkish activity on the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 336.

Acting Vice-Consul Hong to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Mosul, January* 12, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translations of certain telegrams which I have been able to obtain.

As regards the military expedition mentioned in Salar-ed-Dowleh's telegram (*vide* enclosure No. 1), I regret that I have no further information, but I am trying to obtain it; it is possible that the telegram has had the desired effect and has stopped the expedition.

In view of the state of affairs which appears to exist in the Solduz district (*vide* enclosure No 3), it is surprising that the people of Soujboulak, who must be aware of it, should be so anxious to become Ottoman subjects; perhaps their appeal was not spontaneous.

The Turks here do not seem to resent Russian movements in Persia as much as might have been expected, but this is probably due to the fact that they know they are doing the same thing themselves on a smaller scale.

I have, &c.
HENRY C. HONG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 336.

Salar-ed-Dowleh to the Sultan.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.) *Khanikin*, 23 *kianoun evvel*, 1327 (*January* 5, 1912).

A MILITARY force is being sent from the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad to punish Mahmoud Khan, chief of the Oramanli Kurds, one of the tribes on the frontier of the two Moslem kingdoms. His Majesty the Sultan is wrong in doing this, for, although those on the frontier may have done some wrong, yet a military expedition cannot fail to have an evil effect on the crisis in Persia and will doubtless influence the political situation. I am sure that His Majesty would not wish to cause trouble and bloodshed among Moslems at this juncture. My firm intention is to bring peace and prosperity to the country which I now govern; and I hope to obtain the favour of God and the good-will of your Majesty, relying on which I shall be successful. I pray your Majesty not to withhold your help in preventing bloodshed and political complications, and to order the appointment of a commission of enquiry by both sides, to solve the present difficulty and prevent the restlessness spreading to other tribes.

I beg and pray your Majesty not to allow our valued neighbour and co-religionist to be the cause of aggravating the evils from which Persia is now suffering.

BENDE DOWLEH KHWAH SALAR-ED-DOWLEH KAJAR.

Enclosure 3 in No. 336.

Translation of Telegrams from the People of Soujboulak.

(1.)

To the President of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies.

Pesswa, 22 *kianoun evvel* (*January* 4, 1912).

THE whole people of Soujboulak are in the depths of despair and sorrow. We sent a telegram on the 23rd December to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and the Grand Vizier, asking how we could give up our Persian nationality and become Ottoman subjects, but we had no answer, so we sent another on the 25th to the Grand Vizier, but again we had no answer; and now the whole people of Soujboulak have collected in their mosques, and decided to make a final despairing appeal to the Chamber of Deputies to let us become Ottoman subjects. Our lives and property are in danger; for the love of God answer us quickly by telegram as to whether you will listen to our appeal. The obedient people of Soujboulak await your answer with the utmost impatience and excitement.

(2.)

To the Grand Vizier, Said Pasha.

Pesswa, 22 *kianoun evval.*

THE cruelty and injustice shown by the Russians a week ago at Tabreez and the quarrelling and fighting have produced a profound effect on the loyal people of the district of Soujboulak, numbering over a million. We telegraphed before to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies about the sole refuge that is left to us, which is the taking on of Ottoman nationality. We have had no answer yet, and are very grieved. We beg you to support our application to become Ottoman subjects. We are awaiting your answer amid anxiety and excitement. Again we beseech you in the name of all the loyal people of Soujboulak.

(Signed) On behalf of all the people of Soujboulak and district,
THE NAIB OF THE VILAYET OF SOUJBOULAK, MIRZA ALI.

Various signatures of merchants, schoolmasters, &c.

Enclosure 4 in No. 336.

Translation of Telegram from Idaré Memour at Solduz.

To Mosul Vilayet, *Pesswa*, 23 *kianoun evvel* (*January* 5, 1912).

THE gendarmerie force here only consists of eleven infantry gendarmes; this is not enough. Mounted men are necessary. In the districts under Van vilayet each officer has under his command forty mounted infantry, and there is an independent captain over every three of these units. It would be very advantageous if the same system were adopted here. But even if this cannot be arranged it is necessary that the present force here should be changed for twenty cavalry or twenty mounted gendarmes, commanded by an officer. I hope that orders may be given to this effect.

SOLDOUZ IDARÉ MULKIÉ MEMOURI AVNI.

Enclosure 5 in No. 336.

Telegram from Reshid-es-Sultanch.

Pesswa, 27 *kianoun evvel*

To the Commandant of the Mosul Army Corps, (*January* 9, 1912).

THE devotion I have always shown to the Ottoman Government is well known, and it is undeniable that I went to Solduz under the instructions of the Government. All the people of the villages in the district of Solduz are exasperated by having every day to conform to some new regulation issued by oppressive officials. I swear that in giving advice to them I have always borne in mind the delicacy of the situation, but all the officials have taken my services in bad part; it is not my intention however to describe in writing the wrongs I have suffered from them, but God knows whether a man under Turkish protection and having done so much for Turkey deserves reward or punishment. Pray consider this, and do justice accordingly. According to news from Soujboulak, the Russians are approaching. It is therefore necessary that the officials be instructed at such a time to show kindness both to us and to the inhabitants. If the authorities force us to leave the homes of our ancestors and fly, they are responsible before God. After this I am responsible neither to God nor man for what may happen. I beg for an answer within 24 hours.

Enclosure 6 in No. 336.

Telegram from Mahmoud Shevket Pasha.

8 *kianoun evvel* (*December* 21, 1911).

To the Commissioner of the 2nd Division of the Persian Frontier at Suleimanieh,

THE Grand Vizierate has transmitted to the War Office a telegram, signed by over a thousand, from all the Moslem and Armenian inhabitants of Solduz, calling attention to the miserable plight of the villagers in the districts which are a subject of dispute between the two kingdoms, and asking that they may be saved, if not from the outrages of Agas under Turkish rule, at least from the aggressions of Ottoman officials who rule in a most arbitrary manner. Please report at once on this.

(Signed) MAHMOUD SHEVKET,
Minister of War.

[6044] No. 337.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 118.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 7, 1912.

IN reply to your telegram No. 45 of the 5th instant, instructing me to join with my Russian colleague in urging the Ottoman Government to hasten the appointment of the Turkish commissioners on the forthcoming Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, I have the honour to inform you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has more than once already given me to understand that the Turkish commissioners are practically appointed, and that official notification of their appointment has merely been deferred pending receipt of news of the departure of the Persian mission, which was fixed for the 4th instant.

The Turkish commission will be composed as follows:—

Adil Bey, Under-Secretary to the Grand Vizierate; General Daniel Pasha, an officer at present *en disponibilité*, who is of somewhat advanced age, and has had commands in Syria and Mesopotamia; and Ali Pasha, presumably also an officer, whose identity I have as yet been unable to establish.

Assim Bey has intimated to me in conversation that he fears there is little likelihood of the commission coming to any agreement here, and both his Excellency and the Persian Ambassador are of opinion that the matter will have to be eventually referred to The Hague Tribunal.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[6102] No. 338.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 42.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 7, 1912.

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 73 of the 2nd instant I called by appointment on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but as his Excellency was too pressed for time to be able to discuss in detail the various points to be comprised in the joint communication to be addressed to the Persian Government, I left with him an *aide-mémoire* embodying your proposals, of which a copy is enclosed.

M. Sazonof, however, told me that he had already instructed M. Poklewsky to concert with Sir G. Barclay the text of a joint communication to be addressed to the Persian Government, advising them to enter into negotiations with the ex-Shah with the object of inducing him to leave Persia in return for the grant of a pension and the proclamation of a general amnesty. He could not, he said, accept the condition which you proposed to attach to the grant of a pension, namely, that the ex-Shah should promise not to return to Persia without Russia's consent. On my reminding his Excellency that he had already (as reported in my despatch No. 34 of the 1st February) accepted this condition, M. Sazonof replied that as the Russian Government were not going to allow the ex-Shah to settle in Russia they could not assume the responsibility which such a condition would entail, more especially as they

did not wish to expose themselves a second time to being accused of conniving at his return.

Referring next to the question of the proposed advance, M. Sazonof informed me that the Minister of Finance had categorically refused to advance so large a sum as 200,000*l.* to the Persian Government. M. Kokovtsof, his Excellency said, contended that he was not empowered by law to authorise advances of this nature, and that were he to do so he would be taken to task by the Duma. The Russian Bank at Tehran had, moreover, been losing money, and M. Kokovtsof was averse to running any further financial risk. I urged on M. Sazonof the necessity of our coming to the assistance of the Persian Government, who were absolutely penniless, and reminded him of the agreement arrived at between the two Governments in the year 1910 to make a joint advance of 400,000*l.* to the Persian Government. His Excellency assured me that he was most anxious to do all that he could to help them. He had, he said, already instructed M. Isvolsky to sound the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas as to whether they would be prepared at an early date to make any advances to the Persian Government in connection with the projected large loan; as, were they to give a satisfactory assurance on this point, M. Kokovtsof would consider it a sufficient guarantee, and would agree to advance the sum required temporarily. I pressed M. Sazonof to write at once to M. Kokovtsof, and to endeavour to obtain his consent to an advance of at any rate 100,000*l.* to meet the immediate requirements of the Persian Government; and this his Excellency promised to do.

M. Sazonof was at first inclined to insist that no advance should be made to the Persian Government until the latter had accepted the various conditions which the Russian Government propose to attach to their future co-operation with and support of that Government. I pointed out that the discussion of all these conditions would occupy weeks or months, and that something ought to be done at once to ease the financial embarrassments of the Persian Government; and his Excellency finally agreed not to make the first advance dependent on the acceptance of these conditions. He would, however, he declared, have to insist that an agreement should be arrived at with regard to them before any further advances were made, and before the arrangements for a large loan should be carried through.

On my calling on M. Sazonof this afternoon to execute the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 89 of the 6th instant, his Excellency informed me that he had, with much difficulty, obtained M. Kokovtsof's consent to a joint advance of 200,000*l.* on the condition that the Russian share of 100,000*l.* should not be paid in until His Majesty's Government had advanced their share. He would, he said, attach no conditions to this advance beyond those included in the five proposals recorded in the enclosed *aide-mémoire*; and he had already informed M. Poklewsky by telegraph that he considered those proposals quite acceptable, though he had requested his views with regard to them as a matter of form. It must, however, he said, be understood that an agreement would have to be come to with regard to those conditions which Russia still wished to put forward before the arrangements for a large loan were completed.

As regarded that loan, he would be glad if I would explain to you that, in his opinion, it would be far preferable were one and the same syndicate to finance both the Trans-Persian Railway and the loan. Were the chief sources of revenue to be handed over to Seligman's as guarantee for the loan, the Persian Government would have nothing left to offer the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, who were to finance the railway. The Russian financial agent in the United States, who was a brother-in-law of Seligman's, had just been to see him; and he had told him that he had no desire to throw over Seligman's and that he would use all his influence to see that he was not a loser. He had further explained how important it was that the Persian loan should be taken up by a really strong syndicate, and he suggested that you should use similar language to Mr. Seligman in London. He did not think that any useful purpose would be served by Colonel Beddoes coming to St. Petersburgh at the present moment, and expressed the opinion that it would be more advisable for him to go to Paris and to arrange with M. Noetzlin, the director of the Banque de Paris et des Pay-sBas, for a participation in the loan. His Excellency did not believe that that bank had any considerable financial relations with Germany, or that it would introduce much German capital into the loan.

In the course of our conversation M. Sazonof informed me that orders had been already sent to withdraw the Russian troops from Kazvin to Resht.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 338.

Aide-mémoire.

IN view of the present situation in Persia, His Britannic Majesty's Government consider it of great importance that the Russian and British Ministers at Tehran should be authorised without delay to make the following proposals to the Persian Government :—

1. In order to meet the immediate requirements of the Persian Government, Russia and Great Britain will advance conjointly the sum of 200,000*l.*, the expenditure of this sum to be supervised by the Treasurer-General, and the British share of 100,000*l.* to be devoted to the organisation of a gendarmerie in South Persia. His Britannic Majesty's Government would not object to an advance of 200,000*l.* by each Power, should the two representatives at Tehran consider this necessary.

2. That the two Ministers should inform the Persian Government that Mohammed Ali will be requested to remove himself from Persia, and that neither Russia nor Great Britain will afford any encouragement or support to His Majesty or to any of his adherents. His Britannic Majesty's Government agree to his Excellency M. Sazonof's suggestion that the drafting of the text of the communication on this point might be left to the two representatives at Tehran, the amount of the pension to be fixed by arrangement between the Persian Government and the ex-Shah, and the condition on which it was granted being, as already arranged, that His Majesty should promise not to enter Persian territory without the consent of the Russian Government.

3. That the two Ministers should propose to the Persian Government the proclamation of a general amnesty, and that the Persian Government should dismiss their irregular forces when Mohammed Ali has left Persian territory.

4. That the two Ministers should express to the Persian Government their readiness to discuss with them a scheme for the creation of a small Persian army.

5. That the two Ministers should request the Persian Government to give an engagement to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. The form of this request should be left to the discretion of the two Ministers.

His Britannic Majesty's Government is of opinion that the situation will go from bad to worse unless support is given to the Persian Government without further delay. They therefore earnestly trust that the Imperial Government will consent to send instructions to M. Poklewsky, explaining that all other questions, such as that of the Cossack Brigade, the Senate, and the conclusion of a loan should be left for consideration later on.

St. Petersburgh, January 21 (*February* 3), 1912.

[6103] No. 339.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 43.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 7, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 77 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a private letter which I have received from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 339.

M. Sazonof to Sir G. Buchanan.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 23 *janvier* (5 *février*), 1912.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

POUR faire suite à ma lettre du 13 (26) courant et en réponse à votre aide-mémoire d'aujourd'hui, je crois devoir vous informer de ce qui suit :—

Notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople a demandé l'autorisation de communiquer confidentiellement à son collègue de Perse le rapport de Mr. Shipley et M. Minorsky. Nous avons attiré l'attention de M. Tcharykof sur le caractère très confidentiel d'une partie de ce rapport qui ne saurait être portée à la connaissance ni des Turcs, ni des Persans. Nous avons ajouté qu'en conséquence on ne pourrait communiquer à l'Ambassadeur de Perse qu'un extrait dudit rapport, en omettant la partie susmentionnée.

Je crois du reste qu'il serait plus prudent peut-être de ne pas remettre trop de matériaux entre les mains des délégués persans, car, si ces derniers se voient obligés d'avoir fréquemment recours aux deux ambassades pour obtenir les données qui leur sont nécessaires, ce fait les mettra dans une certaine dépendance des deux représentants à Constantinople, qui pourront ainsi exercer avec plus de facilité leur influence sur eux.

J'ai appris avec plaisir la décision du Cabinet de Londres d'attacher Mr. Shipley à l'Ambassade britannique à Constantinople, et je m'empresse de vous dire qu'à notre tour nous avons l'intention dans le même but de donner un poste à l'Ambassade de Russie à M. Minorsky, qui est très versé dans la question du litige turco-persan.

Quant à la carte annexée au rapport de Mr. Shipley et M. Minorsky, nous avons déjà autorisé M. Poklewsky d'en remettre une copie au Gouvernement persan dès que ces copies, qui sont en train d'être faites à Tiflis, lui seront parvenues. Il va sans dire que nous n'avons aucune objection à ce que Sir George Barclay en fasse autant lorsqu'il sera en possession des exemplaires qui lui sont envoyés de Londres.

Croyez, &c.
SAZONOF.

[6105] No. 340.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 45.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a communiqué from the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as published in the "Official Messenger" to-day, stating that it has been found necessary to send troops to Astrabad, Barfrush, and Meshedesser to protect the lives and property of Russian subjects in these districts.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 340.

Communiqué.

THE following communiqué from the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs is published in the "Official Messenger" dated the 26th January (8th February), 1912 :—

"The Russian consul at Astrabad has notified an outbreak of serious disorder in the province of Mazandaran, which has given rise to the committal of murders and acts of pillaging. The local authorities appeared to be helpless and unable to take any measures, and absolute anarchy commenced in the district, being further increased by the locality in question being the arena of the struggle between the ex-Shah Mohammad Ali and the supporters of the Government. Much disorder and indiscipline prevails amongst the forces of the Shah, and the Turkomans and other adherents of the Shah are only with difficulty restrained from pillaging the towns of Barfrush and Sari.

"The result of this state of affairs has been a complete cessation of local trade and wholesale bast by merchants, in fear of their lives, at the consular agency in Barfrush.

In view of the evident danger for the lives and property of Russian subjects, and also for the interests of our institutions there, the consul, considering the troops at his disposal (two sotnias of Cossacks with two machine guns) insufficient, begged the urgent dispatch of reinforcements. Simultaneously, representatives of several large Moscow firms carrying on trade with Mazandaran telegraphed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs soliciting the defence of their interests. In view of the above, the necessary instructions have been given for the dispatch to Astrabad of two companies of infantry with two machine guns and two mountain guns, of one company with two machine guns to Barfrush, and one company to Meshedesser."

[6267] No. 341.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 12.)

India Office, February 10, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Langley's letter, dated the 28th October last, and to an enquiry which has been received from the Government of India as to the adjustment of the charges arising in respect of the employment in Persia of the Indian troops who have been recently dispatched to that country, I am directed to state, for the information of Sir E. Grey, that, in view of the nature and amount of this expenditure, it would appear to be more appropriate to adjust it by quarterly claims on the Imperial Government than to include it in the annual claims of diplomatic and consular expenditure in Persia, which, as you are aware, are not adjusted for more than a year after expenditure has been incurred; and that he accordingly proposes, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to instruct the Government of India to forward quarter by quarter claims against His Majesty's Government for half the total expenditure incurred on the troops in question. As the decision in this matter affects the figures of the Government of India's budget for 1912–13, of which the preparation has to be completed by the 20th instant, I am to request that the definite assent of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, to the above proposal may be obtained and communicated to this Office, if possible by the 15th instant.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[6307] No. 342.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received February 12.)

25, Abchurch Lane, London, February 10, 1912.

Sir,

WE have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 9th instant, received this morning, enclosing a cheque for 50,000*l.*, which, with a further 50,000*l.* received from the India Office, we have to-day telegraphed to our chief manager in Tehran to hold at the disposal of Sir George Barclay.

I have, &c.
SYDNEY ROGERS, *Sub-Manager.*

[6265] No. 343.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 12, 1912.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 44 of 7th February, last paragraph.

Russian Minister has heard nothing of any recent orders for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin to Resht.

Possibly Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was referring to movement of troops reported in my telegram No. 5 of 1st January; since then movements of troops reported to me have been rather from Resht to Kazvin than from Kazvin to Resht.

I doubt whether it would be wise to press for the withdrawal of the troops from Kazvin for the moment, and think that we had better wait until the fedais have been removed. Now that the ex-Shah has been advised to leave Persia, one objection to the presence of troops—that they encourage hopes of his restoration—has disappeared.

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

[5824] No. 344.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 107 of 9th February: Advance to Persian Government.

Our share of the advance is at the disposal of the Persian Government, and question of interest should be arranged between you and Russian Minister. It should not be less than 5 per cent. or more than 7 per cent. You could make our advance whenever you like. Control of expenditure could be on the lines mentioned in last paragraph of your telegram.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 112.)

[6009] No. 345.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 111 of 11th February.

In the circumstances Mr. Knox had better remain at Shiraz for the present.

[5824] No. 346.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.

MY telegram No. 117 of 12th February to Tehran [Advance to Persian Government].

You may inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of above and urge him to act similarly in regard to Russian advance.

[5822] No. 347.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 47 of 9th February: Russian troops.

You may tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that, though I regret necessity for dispatch of further Russian troops to Northern Persia (which is, I suppose, due directly or indirectly to disturbances consequent upon ex-Shah's presence in the country), I am much relieved that it has been found possible to withdraw troops from Kazvin. This is a public indication that Russian Government, while insisting upon a disposition friendly to their interest in Northern Persia on part of Persian Government, desire to see authority of latter supported and order maintained wherever possible without direct intervention by force.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 118.)

[6337] No. 348.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 47.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" of the 9th February publishes a sharp attack on the policy of the Russian Government in Persia. It says that the contemplated withdrawal of the troops from Kazvin and reduction of the force at Tabreez will bring things back to the situation that they were in before the Tabreez incident. This looks as if their stay of five weeks had worked wonders in restoring order, but unfortunately this is far from being the case. The dispatch of troops to Mazanderan tells a different tale. These troops will presumably either have to fight against the ex-Shah's forces or drive His Majesty into some other part of Persia where there are no Russian troops, which in its turn may necessitate the dispatch of a fresh expedition.

What is required, according to the writer of the article, is a temporary joint military occupation by Russia and Great Britain until order has been restored. Under the protection of the combined forces and with the assistance of European instructors a police force should be formed, and arrangements should be made for an army, for proper financial administration, for law courts, and for national education. The funds necessary for these reforms should be furnished under a guarantee on the natural resources of the country, without admitting financial adventurers to participate. The article closes by saying that the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs is, as usual, taking steps without any thought or care for consequences.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[6387] No. 349.

Persia Committee to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

7, Chester Place, Regent's Park, N.W., February 12, 1912.

Sir,

THE needs of the situation in Persia have been receiving the anxious consideration of our committee, and we have the honour to submit to you the conclusions at which we have arrived. We feel that the time is ripe for such a solution of existing difficulties as shall contain the elements of permanence.

Of the questions in which His Majesty's Government and that of Russia may properly take action, those to which our committee attaches the greatest importance are the future of the ex-Shah Mohammed Ali and the withdrawal of the Russian troops. The appointment of a successor to Mr. Morgan Shuster is a question which concerns the Persian Government, but it is also one of the utmost urgency.

1. Under the protocol of 1909 our own Government and that of Russia undertook that the ex-Shah, while in exile in the Crimea, should abstain from all political agitation against Persia, and the Russian Government undertook to take effective steps to prevent such agitation. In return, the Persian Government granted a pension to the ex-Shah; but it was stipulated that this pension should be forfeited if the ex-Shah should leave Russia and intrigue against the Persian Government. When the ex-Shah returned to Persia in July of last year and led an armed force against the Government, the two Powers notified the Persian Government that the ex-Shah had forfeited all claims to his pension. Under these circumstances, we trust that His Majesty's Government will not be a party to any pressure upon the Persian Government to continue to pay a pension to the ex-Shah on condition that he leaves the country. Both Powers are under an honourable obligation to do all they properly can to get the ex-Shah out of Persia, and we submit that the question of the contingent payment of a pension to him should be left entirely within the discretion of the Persian Government, which has incurred very large expenditure in suppressing his invasion.

As regards the future of the ex-Shah, the guarantees given by the two Powers to Persia in 1909 having been proved insufficient, it will be necessary to strengthen these guarantees. It is essential that the Persian Government should be relieved of any fear of a repetition by the ex-Shah of his former proceedings. We trust that the measures now to be taken by the two Governments, as signatories of the protocol of 1909, will be framed in such a manner as to secure this result effectively, and that they will be

accompanied with assurances to the Persian Government that the ex-Shah will in no circumstance be recognised as Shah of Persia. Upon a permanent solution of this nature the future peace of the country greatly depends.

2. In view of the assurances given to His Majesty's Government by that of Russia at the time of the issue of the recent ultimatums to Persia that, if their terms were accepted by the Persian Government, the Russian expeditionary force would be withdrawn, we trust that His Majesty's Government will secure the immediate withdrawal of this force and of any troops which were sent to Persia in connection with these events or subsequently.

As regards the remaining Russian troops and the small British force in the south of Persia, we would ask that their withdrawal should be effected as promptly as possible, concurrently with the organisation by the Persian Government of a force of gendarmerie.

3. The power to select a successor to Mr. Morgan Shuster we must continue to regard as one of the sovereign rights of Persia which were guaranteed by the Anglo-Russian Convention, and upon which especial stress was laid in the assurances given to the Persian Government by His Majesty's Minister in Tehran in September 1907. But the Persian Government would no doubt be well advised in consulting the desires of Great Britain and Russia in making the selection, and the two Powers are in a position to render Persia valuable assistance in finding a thoroughly qualified organiser for the department of finance. We feel sure that it must be recognised to be an essential qualification for any successor to Mr. Shuster that he should not have been involved in the disputes which have taken place in connection with the administration of the Persian Treasury. Further, that he should possess the confidence of the British mercantile community as well as of the mercantile community of Russia. We are reluctant to believe that the Russian Government would fail to recognise the reasonableness of these requirements. With a view to increasing the control by the Persian Government over its finance department, we would also suggest that they should obtain the services of a foreign expert as auditor-general of finance, including the Customs.

4. With regard to the reports appearing in the press that proposals for a loan are being made to the Persian Government by our Government and that of Russia, we are strongly of opinion that no influence should be exercised over the Persian Government to conclude any loan until the new Medjliss has been convoked and a new financial adviser has been appointed.

We have, &c.
H. F. B. LYNCH, *Chairman.*
EDWARD G. BROWNE, *Vice-Chairman.*
FREDERICK WHELEN, *Hon. Secretary.*

[6426] No. 350.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th February, 1912, regarding the Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway.

India Office, February 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 350.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February 12, 1912.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 1st January, 1912, regarding railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad. As desired, we have examined the project. No definite opinion can be given as to line's commercial probabilities owing to insufficiency and vagueness of the available data; we agree, however, that line's commercial success, and its ability to rival the route from Bagdad to the Gulf, are doubtful. For views on projected line, please also refer to my telegram dated the 23rd February, 1911, and

despatch from Government of India of the same date. Construction of metre gauge line for estimated cost is not thought possible by our railway experts, who state emphatically that Wilson's figures as regards earnings of line are unduly optimistic, and that line will not pay. They consider that, provided a substantial portion of Kermanshah traffic could be secured, construction of Mohammerah–Dizful section holds out a fairer prospect of proving remunerative. Construction of this section would apparently be easy and cheap.

[6357] No. 351.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 13, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 729 of 22nd December last year.

His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah reports that a Government force arrived on 8th February, and that Salar-ed-Dowleh has fled.

Azam-ed-Dowleh, lately acting governor, who was in bast, has left the consulate.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh and Government of India.)

[6783] No. 352.

Papers communicated by Lord Errington, February 13, 1912.

(1.)

M. Turrettini to Lord Errington.

Mon cher Lord, *Paris, le 5 février*, 1912.

VOUS trouverez ci-inclus copie d'une dépêche reçue samedi dernier de M. Nicolas Raffalovich à Saint-Pétersbourg et de celle que nous lui expédions ce soir.

Nous avons envoyé notre dépêche à la suite d'une visite que nous avons reçue de son Excellence M. Isvolsky, qui est venu nous exprimer combien il serait politique de notre part d'accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement russe par l'entremise de M. Raffalovich.

M. Isvolsky nous a dit que l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres était chargé de la même démarche ; nous supposons donc que vous aurez été abordé de votre côté.

Les Russes paraissent attacher une grande importance à faire disparaître de la scène la maison Seligmann, admettant, cependant, que l'on pourrait dans la suite lui donner une participation une fois l'affaire constituée en dehors d'elle.

Je continuera à vous tenir au courant du cours suivi, et vous prie d'agir de même vis-à-vis de moi.

Croyez, &c.
ALBERT TURRETTINI.

(2.)

Texte du Télégramme adressé par M. Raffalovich, Saint-Pétersbourg, à M. Bénac, le 3 février, 1912.

MINISTÈRE des Affaires Étrangères télégraphie avant-hier Ambassadeur de Russie, Paris, demander Paribas si disposée emprunt persan.

Question devenue aiguë, car Gouvernement russe, Gouvernement anglais intention avancer Perse immédiatement 100,000*l.* chacun.

Si Paribas disposée verser 100,000*l.* part russe, possible stipuler droit préférence sur emprunt.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, désirant réaliser emprunt par consortium Société Études Transpersan, demandera, de concert avec Gouvernement anglais, inclure concession transpersane conditions emprunt.

Ministre des Finances insistera sur application conditions préalables élaborées avec Seligmann à tout autre groupe.

Ces conditions sont rôle principal Banque de Prêts de Perse, Trésor, perception revenus Contrôle.

Emprunt 5 pour cent sera émis en deux tranches 2,000,000*l.* chacune.

1,200,000*l.* effectuées conversion de l'emprunt ancien en Russie.

Groupe émetteur aura 7½ pour cent, dont 1 pour cent Banque de Prêts de Perse.

Garanties surplus douanes monnaies domaine impôt foncier.

Diverses combinaisons division emprunt entre éléments russes, français, anglais possible.

(3.)

Texte du Télégramme adressé par M. Bénac à M. Poutilof, Saint-Pétersbourg, le 5 février, 1912.

VEUILLEZ informer Raffalovich avons déclaré Ambassadeur que Paribas disposée prendre part russe 100,000*l.* si Gouvernement russe exprime tel désir. Considérons nécessaire informiez Kokovtsoff avant nouvelles démarches.

(4.)

Lord Revelstoke to M. Turrettini.

My dear M. Turrettini,

I HAVE to thank you for your letter of yesterday's date, with its interesting enclosure of the text of a telegram from M. Raffalovich to M. Bénac ; also of a telegram from M. Bénac to M. Poutilof. *February 6, 1912.*

I have heard nothing whatever of the business to which these documents refer, either from the British Foreign Office or from the Russian Embassy here ; I am making enquiries this evening, and will let you know their result at the earliest possible moment.

Believe me, &c.
REVELSTOKE.

(5.)

Lord Revelstoke to M. Turrettini.

Dear M. Turrettini,

SINCE writing to you yesterday I have taken the opportunity of making enquiries as to the position of affairs in regard to the projected Persian loan. *February 7, 1912.*

I now understand that both the British and Russian Governments are agreed in principle as to the pressing necessity of funds being placed at the disposal of Persia in order to enable the present administration to carry on the machinery of government.

As to the arrangements by which such an advance is to be guaranteed, or as to what is contemplated in the matter of a loan of 4,000,000*l.* to Persia, such as you were good enough to detail to me in your recent letter, nothing has yet transpired, but I imagine these questions will require time for further consideration by the British Government authorities.

In connection with the proposed loan, I may mention that, as Messrs. Seligman have for some time past been in negotiation with the British and Persian authorities, it is to be anticipated that the Foreign Office will feel themselves under some obligation to turn to this quarter for any Persian financial operations which may finally be decided upon. I will not fail to keep you acquainted with any further developments of this business which may come to my knowledge.

Yours faithfully,
REVELSTOKE.

(6.)

M. Bénac to Lord Revelstoke.

11, *Rue de Milan, Paris, le 9 février*, 1912.

Milord,

M. TURRETTINI m'a communiqué votre lettre du 7 février relative au projet d'emprunt persan. Je vous remercie des renseignements que vous nous donnez et je vous demande la permission de compléter ceux qui vous ont été déjà fournis.

Comme vous le savez, la maison Seligmann a été mise en rapport avec le Gouvernement persan par Mr. Schuster. Les attaches de cette maison avec la place de New York, ainsi que le patronage de Mr. Schuster, ont déterminé le Gouvernement russe à opposer un veto absolu et définitif à l'opération projetée par MM. Seligmann.

On sait à Saint-Pétersbourg que votre Gouvernement est disposé à soutenir les prétentions de MM. Seligmann, et l'idée de confier l'emprunt au Syndicat d'Études du Transpersan est née du désir qu'avait M. Sazonof de substituer à la maison Seligmann un groupe dans lequel les intérêts russes et anglais fussent également représentés.

Dans la conversation que j'ai eue récemment avec M. Sazonof, j'ai indiqué combien il serait difficile d'amener votre groupe à favoriser l'eviction d'une maison qui est aussi anglaise qu'américaine, et j'ai dit qu'en tout cas il serait nécessaire de donner une participation à la maison Seligmann. Ceci ne soulèverait pas de difficulté. Des instructions ont dû être envoyées à M. de Benckendorff pour que le Gouvernement anglais soit saisi de la combinaison transactionnelle suivante :—

On prendrait comme base des arrangements à faire avec la Perse le contrat Schuster-Seligmann. Le Gouvernement persan traiterait avec la Banque russe de Prêts et avec l'Imperial Bank of Persia, et ces deux établissements rétrocéderaient l'emprunt à un groupe anglo-franco-russe, qui serait précisément le Comité d'Études du Transpersan.

L'emprunt, qui s'élèverait à 2 millions de livres, avec option sur une tranche de 2 autres millions de livres, serait gagé par les douanes, la monnaie, un impôt foncier, &c. C'est pour attendre la réalisation de cet emprunt qu'il serait question de faire l'avance de 200,000*l.* dont on nous a parlé.

L'Ambassade russe à Paris va recevoir incessamment le texte du contrat Schuster-Seligmann. Dès que j'en connaîtrai la teneur, je m'empresserai de vous en informer.

Veuillez, &c.

ANDRÉ BENAC.

(7.)

Lord Revelstoke to M. Bénac.

February 12, 1912.

My dear M. Bénac,

I HAVE the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant.

I will take the earliest opportunity of communicating with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and will take measures to find out without delay what is the exact position as far as British interests are concerned. I confess, however, that it seems to me that difficulty may arise as to the Schuster-Seligmann contract being taken over and handed to other quarters. As I have already ventured to point out in my letter of the 7th to M. Turrettini, it is very possible that the Foreign Office will feel themselves bound to adhere to their negotiations with Messrs. Seligmann, but I will find out what is the actual position, and will keep you duly advised.

With reference to the telegram from M. Raffalovich of the 3rd and your answer of the 5th, it would be interesting to hear whether you have actually made the advance of 100,000*l.* referred to in these messages, or if the advance, if indeed already actually made, has been arranged direct by the Russian Government.

Believe me, &c.

REVELSTOKE.

[6562]

No. 353.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 14, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 109 of 10th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the Russian consul at Astrabad had been instructed to tell ex-Shah in the clearest terms, in reply to his latest communication, that his cause was quite hopeless, and that only advice which the Russian Government could give him was to leave Persia at once, in which case they would do their best to secure pension.

His Excellency also told me that they had acquiesced in Shuja-ed-Dowleh being given another post and being replaced by Sipahdar.

[6563]

No. 354.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 14, 1912.

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day terms of your telegram No. 115 of 12th February, and asked if withdrawal of troops had commenced.

His Excellency said that orders had already been sent, and that he believed that withdrawal had begun. They would in any case all leave Kazvin within a very short time.

[6564]

No. 355.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 113 of 12th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Minister of Finance adhered to view that the rate of interest should not be lower than 8 per cent., but that, as it was important that two Governments should adopt a uniform rate, he would induce him to reduce it to 7 per cent. He would consequently instruct Russian Minister to arrange this question with Sir G. Barclay on the basis which you had suggested.

It must, however, he said, be understood that this advance was conditional on the acceptance by the Persian Government of the five proposals recorded in your telegram No. 73 of 2nd February, more especially of the fifth, with regard to Anglo-Russian understanding. This had been his intention all along, and he had only consented to defer the other questions such as Senate, Cossack brigade, &c., for later consideration, when the large loan came up for discussion.

I regret if I did not make his Excellency's views on this point sufficiently clear in my previous telegrams.

[6566]

No. 356.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 53 of 10th February to Constantinople.

In reply to my enquiry Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Turkish Ambassador had so far said nothing to him about escort for caravans, but that if he did he would not be able to use language which Sir G. Lowther had been instructed to hold in view of measures which Russia had been forced to take for the safety of her own caravans.

[6633] No. 357.

Mr. Lynch to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

Sir, 33, *Pont Street, London, February* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your confidential information, a scheme for the policing of the Bushire–Ispahan trade route, which I am to-day submitting to the Persian Government with a request that it may be placed into immediate execution. The initial sum required is not very great, and the increase in the customs duties, after the scheme has been in operation for six months, ought to provide the Persian Government with a sufficient surplus to meet the subsequent cost.

The scheme is based upon the results of my own enquiries upon the spot some years ago into the working of the gendarmerie systems of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Macedonia. Major Stokes has very kindly given me assistance in adapting these results to the local conditions in Persia.

As regards the other two principal trade routes in the South of Persia, namely, the caravan road through the Bakhtiari country, which my own firm constructed some years ago, and the Bagdad–Kermanshah road, the difficulties which have to be overcome on those two roads are of a different nature. In the case of the Bagdad route, its present insecurity is mainly due to the operations of the ex-Shah's brother, Salar-ed-Dowleh, in those regions. The early removal from the scene of the ex-Shah and his brother ought to have the effect of restoring the security of the Bagdad route. The caravan road across the Bakhtiari country is unsafe owing to the fact that so great a number of fighting men have been removed to the North of Persia to combat the ex-Shah. Here, again, normal conditions are likely to prevail when the ex-Shah has left the country and the Bakhtiari tribesmen are enabled to return to their homes.

I would venture to express the hope that His Majesty's Government may see their way to approach the Persian Government with a view to securing compliance with the provisions of this scheme, or of a similar scheme, and its execution without delay.

I am, &c.

H. F. B. LYNCH.

Enclosure in No. 357.

Scheme for the Policing of the Bushire–Ispahan Trade Route.

General Considerations.

THE Bushire trade route consists of two main stages:—

From Bushire to Shiraz (180 miles), and
„ Shiraz to Ispahan (about 315 miles).

The country between Shiraz and Ispahan is more open and less mountainous than the country between Shiraz and Bushire; it is therefore better adapted to the operations of mounted men. On the other hand, it is not so much infested by robbers, and would not, presumably, have to be policed to anything like the same extent.

The scheme set out below is based upon the experience of the Austrian Government in Bosnia-Herzegovina—an extremely mountainous country, which was infested by hostile bands when the Austrian Government took over the administration of the country after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin. They tried other schemes first, but this alone proved efficacious. Of course they were combating organised bands rather than small groups of robbers. From all accounts there would appear to be bands of similar nature, though not to the same extent, on the Bushire–Ispahan road.

The principle upon which the scheme reposes is that of striking terror into the bands by imitating their own tactics. The bands overawe the population by the unexpected nature of their visits. In the same way the mounted columns of gendarmerie turn up in wholly unexpected places, and the band never knows when it will be overtaken by the mobile column of gendarmerie.

I understand that there is a telephone service on the Bushire–Ispahan route; this would greatly assist the operations of the mounted columns.

I understand that 200 gendarmes, accompanied by three Swedish officers, two of whom speak English, were to have left Tehran for Shiraz on the 1st February. These gendarmes are divided into companies of about 100 men apiece, each company being commanded by a captain at a pay of 75 tomans a-month, and two lieutenants at a pay of 50 tomans a-month each. The horses and their keep are extra.

It may not be very easy to improvise a force of the strength given below. It is quite true that gendarmes take a fairly long period to train. However, the evil which they have to meet brooks of no delay; it ought to be possible to engage men with experience of fighting and with fairly good characters to the number given below without any delay, leaving their more detailed training to a later period.

I have not estimated for the pay of the European officers because I understand that such officers are already in Persia and their pay provided for.

In estimating the cost of the scheme I have assumed that the Persian Government may have to buy the arms with which to equip the force. If the Persian Government already possess sufficient arms all this expense may be saved. Under capital expenditure I have also estimated both for a summer and a winter kit. I have also assumed that all the horses will have to be bought. This gives me my initial capital expenditure. To this I have added six months' pay for the entire force. I assume that after the lapse of six months the customs receipts will show a very considerable rise, which ought to be sufficient for the payment of the force after the first six months.

Strength, Character, and Distribution of Force.

The total strength of the force would be 1,500 men, including officers. Of this force 500 men would be mounted. 1,000 men, including 400 mounted, would be distributed over the section Bushire–Shiraz, and 500 men, including 100 mounted, would be apportioned to the Shiraz–Ispahan section. The mounted men would be divided into squadrons of 100 men to each squadron. These squadrons I shall call "flying squadrons."

1. *Bushire–Shiraz Section.*

This section would be divided into four sub-sections of 45 miles for each section. A flying squadron of 100 mounted men would be apportioned to each sub-section. The rest of the force, amounting to 600 gendarmes, would be distributed in villages or in specially constructed block-houses in bodies of fifty gendarmes apiece. This would give a gendarmerie post fifty men strong for every stage of 15 miles. It would probably be found convenient that there should always be thirty men at the post, and twenty men on patrol duty on this stage.

2. *Shiraz–Ispahan Section.*

The 500 men, including the flying squadron of 100 mounted men, which would be apportioned to this section would probably be quite sufficient for the effective policing of this part of the route.

Cost of the Force.

1. Capital Expenditure.

	£
1,500 rifles at 3*l.* apiece	4,500
500 horses at 10*l.* apiece	5,000
Uniform and equipment at 3*l.* per man	4,500
Total capital expenditure	14,000

2. Yearly Maintenance.

	£
Pay for 500 mounted men, including keep of horses, at 17 tomans, or 3*l.* 10*s.* per month per man (say 40*l.* per year per man)	20,000
1,000 unmounted men at 17*l.* a-year per man	17,000
Officers (10 captains at 15*l.* a-month or 180*l.* a-year, and 20 subalterns at 10*l.* a-month or 120*l.* a-year)	4,200
Total annual expenditure	41,200
Add—	
Annual depreciation on the horses	1,000
„ „ rifles	500
„ „ kit, on the assumption that it would last two years	2,250
Total annual expenditure, including cost of renewals ..	44,950

In order to put this scheme into execution it is evident that, unless the Persian Government have sufficient rifles, an initial capital expenditure of 14,000*l.* will be required. It would, further, probably be advisable to ear-mark a sum sufficient for the payment of the wages of the force for six months—a sum of 20,600*l.*, or, say, 21,000*l.* The Persian Government would, therefore, have to find at once a sum not exceeding 35,000*l.* This the Persian Government ought to be able to do without any very great difficulty.

[6695] No. 358.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received February* 15.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 15, 1912.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your letter of the 23rd August, 1911, in regard to consular establishments in Persia, I am directed to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India as to the deputation to Persia of Mr. J. B. Wood, of the Indian Political Department, to make certain enquiries locally, as a preliminary to the submission of proposals for the reduction of expenditure.

In view of the necessity for the issue of early orders, if Mr. Wood, as is proposed, is to start for Persia about the middle of the present month, the Marquess of Crewe will be glad to receive an expression of the views of Sir E. Grey on the proposals of the Government of India. Should he approve, sanction will be given to these recommendations on the understanding that the necessary steps will be taken hereafter to secure an agreement on the part of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to bear a moiety of the cost of Mr. Wood's deputation, which is estimated at about 397*l.* exclusive of travelling expenses.

I have, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure in No. 358.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 8, 1912.

REDUCTION of establishments in consulates in Persia. Before submitting report referred to in paragraph 3 of our despatch dated the 6th July, 1911, and issuing final orders on the subject, we consider it desirable that suitability of our proposals, which include introduction of system of office allowances somewhat on the lines of that obtaining in consulates under London Foreign Office, should be examined on spot by experienced officer, who would explain system to local authorities and hear and meet their objections, if any, and consider practicability of effecting further reductions. For this purpose we propose to depute Wood, now temporary additional Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign Department, whose services will be available about the 15th February. Terms will be salary on time scale plus usual deputation and travelling allowances, and deputation will last about two months. Small establishment will also be required. Total cost of proposals will be about 5,900 rupees, excluding travelling allowances.

We trust your Lordship will be pleased to sanction this proposal, and that the cost will be borne by Home and Indian revenues in equal shares. We should be glad of orders by telegram, as, if approved, Wood should start about the middle of February, as it is important that revised scheme should be introduced on the 1st April.

[6696] No. 359.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 15, 1912.

RUSSIAN consul-general at Tabreez, who finds Shuja-ed-Dowleh a useful tool, is urging that Persian Government be pressed to appoint him as Governor of Azerbaijan. This idea is most repugnant to the Persian Government, who would regard the appointment under the pressure of the Russian Government of this man, who has been in

rebellion against them, and whom they assert to be still plotting against them, as the abdication of Persian sovereignty in Azerbaijan.

Russian Minister sees that the objections of the Persian Government are entirely reasonable, and is not supporting his consul-general, though he is suggesting to his Government that the [? riddance] of Shuja should be accorded only as a *quid pro quo* for an increase of Cossack brigade.

Sipahdar is the Persian Government's candidate for the post. One would have thought that he was Russophil enough to please even the most exacting.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[6698] No. 360.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 15, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 15th February.

Following from consul at Tabreez:—

"Governor-General called on me and I have returned the call. I understand that he is opposed to the present Government, but would obey orders if Sipahdar was Prime Minister. I am informed that secret meetings are taking place to discuss the possibility of re-establishing the ex-Shah; said meetings are attended by clergy and notables; leading member said to be Rashid-ul-Mulk. A rumour has also been spread that a large deputation of clergy and notables has left Tehran to go and bring back the ex-Shah. Mujalal said to have joined the ex-Shah, sent by Governor-General. I also hear that troops are collecting at Mianeh, and that 200 horsemen have been sent to Resht. The Governor-General is in constant communication with the Russian consul-general.

"Head of the clergy in Tabreez, who had been exiled by the nationalists, returned with the Governor-General, but left the town three days ago, refusing to remain under the present state of things."

[6699] No. 361.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February* 15, 1912.

DOUGLAS reports that the lease of the building occupied by the squadron at Ispahan expires shortly, and can now be renewed on favourable terms. He asks whether he is justified in assuming that the regiment will remain in present stations until the summer, and in making arrangements accordingly.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[6681] No. 362.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 15, 1912.

JOINT advance.

Eastern department's telegram of yesterday saying that I may proceed forthwith without awaiting Russian share.

Please see final paragraph of your telegram No. 109. of 9th February, in which I am authorised to concert with Russian Minister for a joint communication on the lines of your telegram No. 73 of 2nd February to Sir G. Buchanan. One of the five points in this latter telegram is a joint advance of 200,000*l.*, and the Russian Government, as the Russian Minister understands it, will make their share in this advance only on the conditions indicated in the five points (see St. Petersburgh telegram No. 44 [of 7th February], second paragraph). If, therefore, I now make the advance without these conditions, it will be difficult for me to join my Russian colleague in the communication foreshadowed in your telegram No. 109 [of 9th February], and if I do

join him in this communication after the British portion of the advance has been accepted by the Persian Government without mention of the impending conditions, the Persians will have reason to complain.

In any case I cannot usefully concert with my Russian colleague as to the interest and control over the expenditure (see your telegram No. 117 of 12th February) until he receives definite instructions.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[6705] No. 363.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 109 of 10th February.

Russian consul at Asterabad is now instructed to inform ex-Shah that the decision of the Russian Government is final, that he had better take the present opportunity to secure a pension for himself and an amnesty for his adherents, and that he can hope for nothing better.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[6712] No. 364.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 119 of 12th February.

Knox is most anxious for the sake of his health to get away from Shiraz before the summer, but he sees no chance of doing so unless he starts within the next ten days.

Acting consul reports that the only part of the road at present unsafe is near Abadeh, and Swedish officer unescorted has just passed dangerous zone without incident. In these circumstances, I venture to recommend that Knox be allowed to leave, trusting to such Persian escort as is possible and as he thinks desirable. There is of course some risk, but if he is not accompanied by Indian cavalry an encounter with robbers will not constitute such a serious incident, and would probably result in nothing worse than robbery.

[6711] No. 365.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 15, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 118 of 15th February.

I fear that it will make a bad impression here if we act independently of Russia in the matter of advance, as Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs always understood five proposals put forward in your telegram No. 73 of 2nd February were interdependent, and has gone so far of late to meet our wishes.

[6564] No. 366.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 58 of 14th February and Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 118 of 15th February [Joint advance].

We did not understand that the advance was to be conditional on the acceptance by the Persian Government of all our joint proposals, and were under the impression that the only condition required by the Russian Government was that our share should be first advanced. This we have instructed Sir G. Barclay to effect as soon as he has arranged with the Russian Minister as to rate of interest and control. If the Russian

Government insist we should be prepared to request 7 per cent. interest. It is however, very necessary, and would undoubtedly help to induce Persian Government to accept the other proposals if the advance were made without delay. Please urge Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to send the necessary instructions to that effect.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 123.)

[6387] No. 367.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 15, 1912.*

YOU should enquire of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether I may state publicly that Russian Government are not going to allow ex-Shah to settle in Russia, and that they will not assume responsibility which guarantee that he will not return to Persia would entail, or expose themselves to being accused of complicity in his return (see your telegram No. 35 of 4th February.) Also whether I may give in a public statement the substance of your telegram No. 17 of 17th January respecting treasurer-general, and that it rests with the Persian Government to propose a candidate if they do not like M. Mornard.

[6387] No. 368.

Foreign Office to Persia Committee.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February 15, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant regarding the situation in Persia.

I am to state, in reply, that the points mentioned in your communication will doubtless be discussed in the House of Commons during the forthcoming debate on the Address, and Sir E. Grey will either then or on some public occasion take an opportunity of giving explanations on the subject.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[6719] No. 369.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 58 of 14th February : Joint advance.

Minister for Foreign Affairs writes that Minister of Finance is unable to accept less than 7 per cent. as interest on advance. His Excellency is telegraphing in this sense to the Russian Minister at Tehran, and informing him that Russian share of 100,000*l.* will be placed at disposal of Persian Government as soon as arrangements respecting conditions attached to this advance shall have been concluded.

[6861] No. 370.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1912.*

FOLLOWING is a summary of *aide-mémoire* in Russian which was enclosed in Minister for Foreign Affairs' letter referred to in my immediately preceding telegram of 16th February.

Russian Government agree to make jointly advance of 100,000*l.* from each Power to the Persian Government on the conditions stated in embassy *aide-mémoire* of 3rd February, omitting the words "without the consent of the Russian Government" from point 2.

Russian Government must, however, insist on 7 per cent. interest on the grounds mentioned in the Russian *aide-mémoires* of 12th February and 29th July, 1910. As

regards control over the expenditure, distribution of the money should be approved beforehand by the two representatives, in agreement with the acting treasurer-general, who would then see that the money went to the objects determined. Security for Russian share of the advance should be the northern customs, and, in case of their insufficiency, any other sources of revenue agreed upon with the Persian Government. The whole advance must be repaid out of the proceeds of the impending large loan.

Although some of the conditions stated in embassy *aide-mémoire* of 3rd February are already fulfilled, the two representatives should address a joint note to the Persian Government setting forth all the conditions imposed by the two Governments. The note should demand from the Persian Government a simple undertaking to make its policy in future conform with the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention, leaving it to the Persians to propose some more acceptable formula if they so desire.

Russian Government reserve the right to make any further pecuniary assistance to the Persian Government dependent on certain further demands, of which they will inform His Majesty's Government in due course.

[6867] No. 371.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 127 of 15th February.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to proposed statement about ex-Shah.

As regards Mornard, he accepted the following formula :—

(R.) "Russian Government expressed concurrence in the proposal that the two Governments should acquiesce in temporary appointment of Mornard as treasurer-general, while keeping question of definite appointment in suspense. They at the ame time stated that, if within two or three months' time Persian Government could show reasonable grounds for not retaining him permanently, they would not raise any difficulty, provided that really good candidate could be found to take his place."

[6869] No. 372.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 16, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 115 of 15th February.

Persian Minister tells me that he was also given the same assurance as that stated in my telegram No. 56 of 14th February about Shuja-ed-Dowleh's removal from Tabreez.

Something would seem to have happened in the meanwhile, as Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the matter was not quite settled. He said that a strong man was required for the post, and that he did not know whether Sipahdar possessed the necessary qualifications. Russian Government, however, would not absolutely insist on the retention of Shuja-ed-Dowleh.

[6711] No. 373.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 62 of 15th February : Advance to Persian Government.

In view of the considerations mentioned in your above-mentioned telegram, I am willing to meet the wishes of Minister for Foreign Affairs and defer the actual payment of our share of the advance until Persian Government accept the proposals on which we are both agreed.

It is most desirable, however, that there should be as little delay as possible.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 125.)

[6699] No. 374.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 16, 1912.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 23rd October last relative to the expense connected with the dispatch of Indian troops to Ispahan, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject of the renewal of the lease of the building occupied by the squadron.*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would propose, with the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, to instruct Sir G. Barclay to inform Colonel Douglas that, while no definite decision can be reached at present as to the length of time for which the regiment will be required to remain at Ispahan, he would do well to secure an extension of the lease, if possible, for a short term.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[2412] No. 375.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Very Confidential.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, February 16, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 15th January, from the Secretary to the Persian Railways Syndicate,† enquiring whether His Majesty's Government have given any assurance of support to the promoters of the Trans-Persian Railway scheme, as stated in the public press, "or to any other syndicate or persons in connection with railway construction in Persia."

I am to state, for your strictly confidential information, that this letter was preceded by a conversation between Mr. Greenway, of the Persian Railways Syndicate, and an official of this department, and that, from this conversation, it appears that the board of the Persian Railways Syndicate apprehend that Mr. Lynch, one of their members who also holds a controlling interest in the Persian Transport Company, may adopt an obstructive attitude basing himself upon the fact of the continuing existence of the assurance, given to the Persian Transport Company in 1903 by the Marquess of Lansdowne, as to preferential treatment in regard to certain railway construction in Persia.

Sir E. Grey, appreciating the privileged position secured to the Persian Transport Company by the assurance of Lord Lansdowne, and the consideration due to Mr. Lynch in view of the importance of the interests with which he is associated in South-Western Persia, but having reason to believe that he had not the financial standing to carry out single-handed any project of railway development, was anxious to bring about the association of the Persian Transport Company with the Persian Railways Syndicate, which, as you are aware, has been formed for the express purpose of promoting railway enterprise in Persia.

Mr. Lynch was accordingly elected to a seat on the board of the Persian Railways Syndicate; but it appears that he has accepted that seat not as representing the Persian Transport Company—which, being the technical recipient of the assurance, he appears, from intelligible motives, to keep studiously *hors de cause*—but as representing his other interests in South-Western Persia.

Sir E. Grey is well aware that the question as to whether or not the projected railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad would prove a commercial success is problematical, the Board of Trade and the Persian Railways Syndicate apparently holding conflicting views on the subject, but, be this as it may, it would seem to lessen appreciably any chances of such commercial success if, before entering upon the enterprise at all, the Persian Railways Syndicate were compelled to buy out the Persian Transport Company by a substantial bonus or consideration; and, in these circumstances, it is important to determine whether Mr. Lynch does in fact possess, by straining to its fullest technical extent the language of the assurance given in 1903, the power to bring about a deadlock to the detriment of British interests in general.

* No. 361.

† No. 130.

Sir E. Grey is disposed to think that such is not the case; for, since the signature of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, His Majesty's Government are not in a position to give full effect to this assurance, in view of the undertaking of Great Britain "not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Ispahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government."

The Transport Company, moreover, fully admitted the limitation imposed upon the assurance in their letter of January 1911, intimating that they expected preferential treatment in another direction.

As further bearing on this point, it will be recollected that the Russian Government agreed, in January 1911, to His Majesty's Government asking for a renewal of the Persian Transport Company's road concession (which expires in August 1912) on the distinct understanding that the renewal was confined to a carriage road and did not extend to railway construction. Sir E. Grey has accordingly caused the accompanying letter to be drafted in reply to the enquiry of the Persian Railways Syndicate, who, on its receipt, would be in a position to confront and to moderate Mr. Lynch, should that gentleman advance extravagant claims based on the assurance in question.

I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be furnished with the views of the Marquess of Crewe on the draft reply generally, and on the following point in particular.

The Persian Government have not yet renewed the concession; if Mr. Lynch persists in adopting an obstructive and unreasonable attitude, it may be more prudent to let the concession expire; the question arises whether or not His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should refrain from supporting any action taken by the company for securing a renewal, and whether the interests involved in the maintenance of the road concession are sufficiently important, from the point of view of British-Indian trade in general, to render such support desirable.

Were the road concession not renewed, any question of compensation for the undertaking given by Lord Lansdowne would fall to the ground, but Sir E. Grey is inclined to the view that His Majesty's Government are in no way bound to give any compensation.

It would, moreover, be difficult to defend the abandonment of a British road concession of some prospective importance; and, although the proposal is worth bringing to Lord Crewe's attention, Sir E. Grey is not, on the whole, favourable to its adoption. If Lord Crewe considers that compensation is due to the Transport Company, then it might be advisable to consult the syndicate as to allowing the company a share in their undertaking in return for a renunciation of any further claim.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 375.

Draft of Letter to Persian Railways Syndicate.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* , 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th ultimo making certain enquiries in regard to assurances of support given by His Majesty's Government to the promoters of railway schemes in Persia.

1. I am to inform you, in reply, that in December of last year His Majesty's Government were approached by certain French financiers who, in concert with British houses of standing and with Russian financial houses, are interested in the proposal to construct a Trans-Persian railway; that these gentlemen enquired what were the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to such a project; that it was intimated to them, in reply, that His Majesty's Government had no objection in principle to the line, and, indeed, regarded it benevolently, but that they expressed no opinion as to its economic or financial side, and would grant no guarantees; moreover, if the line were ever constructed, His Majesty's Government would wish it to follow a certain alignment in the south. The same gentlemen were subsequently informed in

writing that His Majesty's Government had no objection in principle to the formation of a "Société d'Étude" to enquire into the feasibility of such a project, but that they must retain their complete freedom of action in regard to any further developments of the enterprise.

2. I am to add that in 1903 the Marquess of Lansdowne caused the following assurance to be given on behalf of His Majesty's Government to the Persian Transport Company, viz., that—

"Whenever railway construction is permitted in Persia, due regard will, so far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, be had to the claims of the new Transport Company to preferential treatment in respect of proposals for the construction of railways in districts traversed by the roads of the company."

In 1907 the Anglo-Russian convention was concluded, and that convention, as you are doubtless aware, contains the following clause:—

"Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Ispahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government."

It is obvious that this clause must impose some unavoidable limitation upon the subject-matter covered by Lord Lansdowne's assurance of 1903. The Persian Transport Company, while fully recognising this in January 1911, intimated that the board in consequence "counted upon preferential consideration at the hands of His Majesty's Government for the construction of railways in Persia by British capital or for the participation by British capital in railway enterprises undertaken in conjunction with other countries in Persia."

This suggestion, however, is one with which His Majesty's Government have not expressed, and do not feel able to express, their concurrence, since it clearly goes beyond the assurance given to the company in 1903.

Sir E. Grey understands that the Persian Transport Company is practically controlled by Mr. Lynch, who, as is well known to you, is also a member of the Persian Railways Syndicate.

With this exception, His Majesty's Government have given no assurance of support to any persons or syndicates in connection with railway construction in Persia.

[6876]

No. 376.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received February* 17.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 16, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant regarding the sum to be claimed from the Persian Government as compensation for the attack on Mr. Smart and his escort.

The sum named (4,734*l.*) seems to be generally suitable, and should be a first charge on the proposed loan.

It does not appear when His Majesty's Minister proposes to present this demand, but I am to suggest, for Secretary Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the situation, of which this incident was one feature only, should be treated as a whole, and that if it is intended to require of the Persian Government any other reparation or remedial action, a comprehensive demand should be made upon them. This course, it is thought, will better serve to impress them with the serious character of recent events in the view of His Majesty's Government, as to which, after the long time that has elapsed without decisive action, they may be in some doubt; while if reasonable satisfaction is given by them, and such action as may be required of them is taken, the situation will be greatly cleared.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[6932] No. 377.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 17, 1912.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 52 of 11th February.
Following from consul at Meshed, 16th February :—

"Agitation under Yusuf has again become more serious than before. My colleague, who is still openly encouraging it by allowing use of Russian line and in other ways, was asked by me to notify karguzar conjointly that ex-Shah had agreed to leave Persia, but he states that he has no such information. I can hardly expect to restrain constitutionalists from retaliating much longer, and I hope that joint instructions to both consulates-general may be sent [?] to inform karguzar immediately of the arrangement with Mohammad Ali. I suspect double dealings, as otherwise my Russian colleague would surely have changed his attitude. I understand that he is promised large sum for his support.

"(Sent to India.)"

I shall urge my Russian colleague to send instructions to the Russian consul-general for a joint communication in the sense desired, but something sharp from St. Petersburgh would be desirable.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[6695] No. 378.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with your letter of the 27th July last, relative to the reorganisation of the Indian Political Department and the contemplated reduction in the cost of maintaining consular posts in Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to forward to you herewith copy of a letter from the India Office on the subject of a proposal to send to that country a member of the department to make certain enquiries locally in furtherance of that scheme.

I am to state that, in view of the pressing nature of the question, Sir E. Grey has caused the India Office to be informed that he concurs in the proposals of the Government of India with regard to this mission without previous reference to your department, and I am to express the hope that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury may see their way to accept half of the trifling expense involved (amounting to about 198*l.* 10*s.*, exclusive of travelling allowances) as a charge on Imperial revenues.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[6695] No. 379.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 17, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant relative to the proposed mission to Persia by Mr. J. B. Wood in connection with the contemplated reduction in the cost of maintaining consular posts in Persia.

I am to inform you, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposals made by the Government of India with regard to this mission, and to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which he has caused to be addressed to the Treasury on the subject.*

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* No. 378.

[7070] No. 380.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 127 of 16th February.

I cannot report with any confidence of accuracy on number of Russian troops in Persia, as we have no consul in some of the towns involved, and Russian Minister does not seem to have very detailed information.

Please see also discrepancy as regards Khoi in St. Petersburgh telegram No. 349 of last year and Constantinople telegram No. 10 of 25th January, and the discrepancy as regards Asterabad and Mazanderan in St. Petersburgh telegrams Nos. 46 and 47 of 8th and 9th February.

If we assume lower estimate to be correct in each of these cases, and Russian Minister confirms it, there must be about 14,000 Russian troops in Persia. Excluding legation and consular escorts, there are about 4,000 at or near Tabreez, 1,500 at or near Khoi, 500 at or near Ardebil, 2,800 in Khorassan, 500 in provinces of Asterabad and Mazanderan, 400 with Russian Turkoman commissioner at Gumbed Kabuz, and 100 at Hamadan. Enzeli, Resht, and Kazvin must have 4,000 between them (Russian Minister puts it between 3,000 and 4,000), but there is a constant *va-et-vient* between these places. I believe that there are to-day 2,500 Russian troops at Kazvin.

I know of no withdrawal of troops from Persia since Russian ultimatum, nor does Russian Minister, though he speaks of an impending redistribution of units, which I understand, will involve some diminution of numbers.

[7045] No. 381.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 128 of 16th February to St. Petersburgh.

Russian Minister and I to-day handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs joint note on lines of your telegram No. 73 of 2nd February to Sir G. Buchanan. Request that Persian Government should undertake to conform to principles of Anglo-Russian convention was of course unpalatable, but his Excellency promised that our proposals should be considered immediately by Cabinet in sincere desire to place the relations of Persia with the two Powers on a friendly and stable basis.

We afterwards saw Regent and begged him to do his utmost to induce Cabinet to accept our proposals. His Highness promised to do so, and said that he had always recognised the principles underlying our proposals as essential to welfare of Persia.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[7200] No. 382.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Batoum, February 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of Foreign Office despatch No. 2 of the 23rd ultimo, with its enclosure, and, in reply, have to report that, according to information in the possession of this consulate, which I believe can be relied upon, the so-called Russian military punitive force to Azerbaijan, subject to possible very recent modifications, comprises the following units: 2nd, 6th, and 7th Rifle Battalions, one battalion belonging to the 16th Mingrelian Grenadier Regiment, all with Maxim gun companies, and one battery of mountain artillery, which are said to be employed at Tabreez and its immediate neighbourhood. The 1st Rifle Battalion is reported to have proceeded to Hoi and vicinity, and one battalion of the 154th Derbent Regiment, apparently, is on the lines of communication between Julfa and Tabreez. To these troops should be added a further force of nine sotnias (or between 1,350 and 1,400 Cossacks), who are employed in support of the units mentioned when and as occasion may require.

Furthermore, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of the 206th Salian Infantry

Regiment, each with Maxim gun companies, one battalion of sappers, with pontoon and telegraph companies, one mountain artillery battery, and seven sotnias (about 1,000 men) of Cossacks are reported to be in the Resht-Kazvin district.

The above troops would bring the numerical strength of the Russian expeditionary forces at present on Persian soil to about 12,000 men.*

Reinforcements were moved some time ago to various points on the Persian and Turkish frontiers, and, as reported in my despatch No. 1 of the 31st ultimo, a whole infantry division, with corresponding artillery and cavalry, is now apparently employed in Persian territory on lines of communication and on the Persian and Turkish frontiers.

According to reports, a further movement of troops south and south-west would seem to be imminent. Information from several quarters reaches me to the effect that the whole of the grenadier division, the remaining battalions of the two Caucasian Rifle Brigades, with several other detachments (units unknown) of some considerable strength are under orders to proceed to various localities on the Persian and Turkish frontiers; but I have no confirmation of the news that the concentration of such an important force as 40,000 men in Azerbaijan is already in course of progress.

Troops may have recently been sent to Sarykamish, but I am inclined to think that the figures of 20,000 are much exaggerated.

So far as I know, no accommodation for so many men exists at that point, and the military authorities of the Caucasus would hardly expose such a large number of soldiers at this season to the vicissitudes of the climate at such a high altitude, 2,180 feet, as that of Sarykamish by placing them under canvas.

The winter is reported to be mild, however, both in the Trans-Caucasus and in the districts affected by the contemplated movements of troops, and it is just possible the rumoured intention of the Russian Government to augment their military forces on the confines of Asia Minor to an army corps, or 40,000 men, is being actually carried into effect.

The recruiting season was brought to a close in December last. The men that then joined have since that time been trained in marching exercises, discipline, physical development, and military bearing. They have just had their rifles issued to them, and the knowledge they have gained of their use is still very perfunctory. They are, therefore, not efficient soldiers, and cannot be depended upon if employed on active service. The army of the Caucasus, at time of writing, is thus deprived of one-third of its fighting strength. These considerations, I should fancy, should serve as a strong argument in support of the assumption that the reported movements *en masse* are not actually taking place, and that they are likely to be postponed for another month or six weeks.

I have, &c.
P. STEVENS.

[7049] No. 383.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 124)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 10, 1912.*

WITH further reference to my despatch No. 118 of the 7th instant on the subject of the Turkish commissioners appointed on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, which is to meet here shortly, I have the honour to report that the Ali Pasha mentioned in that despatch proves to be a certain Liwa Ali Nadir Pasha, who has served on several local frontier commissions and is known to the Persian Embassy here as a fairly satisfactory person to deal with. He was appointed about a year ago to command the Nizam division at Serres.

The senior military commissioner, Daniel Pasha, is known to the Persian Ambassador personally. He speaks French and Russian fluently, having spent twenty-five years in Russia; he has also served on various local frontier commissions, and has the reputation of being agreeable in manner, but intractable in business matters.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* A telegram received from Tehran to-day estimates the total at 14,000.

[7067] No. 384.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 142.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, reporting on the presence of about 300 refugees from Persia in the Van Vilayet and the undesirability of their remaining there.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 384.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4.)

Sir, *Van, January 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the number of refugees from Persia now number about 300. Of these, seventy are at Van and the remainder at Bashkala and the surrounding villages. Those at Van are being housed and subsisted by the Taschnak committee. The great majority of these refugees are Persian Armenians; the remainder consist of Persians and Georgians. All belong to the Taschnakist party or kindred Persian or Georgian organisations.

It appears that, although an order for their disarmament at the frontier was given, a large number of them have managed to retain their rifles. Each man also has a horse and a certain amount of money. In fact, they convey the impression that their work in Persia of aiding the constitutional forces has been pecuniarily a profitable one.

Among the chiefs of these adventurers are "Ardashes" and "Samson," Persian Armenians, "Nichol," a Russian Armenian, and Ibrahim Bey, a Persian deputy with about fifty followers. There is, I think, undoubtedly an element of danger in allowing these refugees, who are nothing more or less than adventurers, to remain at Van and in the neighbourhood of the Persian frontier. The aid given them by the Taschnakist committee cannot be continued for an indefinite period, and, deprived of their usual means of livelihood, it cannot be long before they come to an end of their own resources. When this takes place they will, if they do nothing worse, probably disperse among the villages of the neighbourhood, billeting themselves on the villagers and extracting money from them. There is the further danger that they may engage openly in brigandage. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Government will see the advisability of having them removed from these districts.

I have, &c.
J. MOLYNEUX-SEEL.

[7273] No. 385.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)

Sir, *Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, February 17, 1912.*

I BEG to give you below copy of a telegram we have received through Mohammerah from our representative at Kasr-i-Shirin, Mr. E. B. Soane, who, as you are doubtless aware, is also acting as the British consular agent at that place:—

"Mohammed Kerim Khan, Kalhur, countenanced by Salar-ed-Dowleh, threatens to prove serious obstruction to company's operations. It is absolutely essential that Salar and Daud Khan be removed as soon as possible. All communications cut. Make strongest representations to the Foreign Office."

The Kerim Khan referred to is a small local chief, subordinate to Daud Khan, who is the most powerful chief in the district lying between Kermanshah and the Turkish frontier. Daud Khan has, it is known, been very actively supporting Salar-ed-Dowleh in his recent attacks on Kermanshah and Hamadan.

From the fact that Mr. Soane reports that all communications are cut, it is

presumable that he is unable to get into communication with Tehran; hence his reference (probably by means of a runner to Bagdad) to us.

I am desired by my board to request that you will be good enough to pass on Mr. Soane's message to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, together with such representations as you may consider desirable, in order that the Persian Government may be induced to give our representative the necessary protection to enable him to carry on the company's operations.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

[7277] No. 386.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 19, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 89 of 4th February, reporting that Mohammed Ali Khan had dispatched culprits in recent incidents to Shiraz.

British acting consul now reports that these so-called culprits are irresponsible scapegoats, who declare that the principal offender, Feridoun, was released by Mohammed Ali, and has fled to Soulet.

Acting consul adds:—

"Most of the culprits whose punishment is of any use to us will be probably soon out of reach unless Persian Government's 'unremitting attention' quickly becomes more effective. Nazar-ed-Dowleh has left in direction of Fesa and Jahrum to collect money and force to watch Soulet. Baseris and Arabs have had scrap with Darashulis, majority of whom are on Soulet's side. Darashulis got much the worse of the encounter. Ilkhani proposes to start shortly for Kazerun to arrange matters with Kashkulis for struggle with Soulet. Keystone of ilkhani's position is Mohammed Ali, who at present is hostile to Soulet and friendly to Kawam. However, if ilkhani presses, as he has promised me, for surrender of culprits, Mohammed Ali, who is wavering, may withdraw his support from ilkhani. Kazerun incident may therefore be very damaging to interests of Kawam and ilkhani unless they decide that Mohammed Ali's friendship is more important to them than our satisfaction."

In the circumstances, and in view of impending negotiations with headmen on the road, it would seem better not to press at this stage for arrest of real culprits. Do you concur?

Government of India, to whom Smart's telegram will be repeated from Bushire, will also be informed by Bushire of my view.

[7304] No. 387.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Meshed, No. 13:—

"Your telegram No. 12 of 18th February.

"Yesterday upon receiving it I communicated with my Russian colleague, who has just written (2 P.M., 19th February) that he has received no instructions whatever.

"This confirms my view that there is double dealing.

"Huge armed mob is assembled [in] mosque in favour of ex-Shah, and bloodshed, which would justify occupation by Russian troops, may occur any minute. Mohammad Ali was proclaimed in the mosque last night, and unless you can arrange for my colleague to be instructed to join me in joint message to the karguzar, as previously suggested by me, it is improbable that I can save the situation much longer. Strongest action urgently required.

"Latter part of message sent to India."

I have replied as follows:—

"Russian Minister assured me 17th February that he was telegraphing to your Russian colleague. I believe that he did telegraph, but only yesterday.

"I am now urging him to send a most urgent telegram, and you can of course act with your Russian colleague in any announcement he may be instructed to make in order to calm the agitation."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[6860] No. 388.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 19, 1912.*

WHAT is your opinion as to dispatching Indian troops to Basidu? Is it desirable or necessary to take this step now? and is it practicable to pursue policy of subsidising tribes concurrently with measures that Persian Government are taking?

[6712] No. 389.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 120 of 15th February: Mr. Knox.

Do you still propose to send the escort (see your telegram No. 111 of 11th February) to accompany Mr. Knox from Abadeh? I gather that you would let him travel the whole way alone with merely a Persian escort. If this is intended, he may start.

[6932] No. 390.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 19, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 121 of 17th February: Russians at Meshed.

If you have not already done so, you should bring to the notice of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs contents of above-mentioned telegram, omitting passage from words "I suspect" to word "support."

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 134.)

[7733] No. 391.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 19, 1912.*

AS Count Benckendorff had spoken privately to Sir Arthur Nicolson about the conduct of Mr. Lecoffre at Tabreez, I read to Count Benckendorff to-day Sir George Barclay's telegram No. 35 of the 11th January, my reply by telegram No. 30 of the 13th January, and Sir George Barclay's telegram No. 63 of the 24th January. I pointed out that I had suspended asking for an appointment for Mr. Lecoffre as soon as I heard rumours of his having misconducted himself at Tabreez; and the appointment had been made only after Sir George Barclay had satisfied himself that there was no objection.

Count Benckendorff said that the Russian consul in Tabreez, M. Miller, was a good man, and was on very good terms with people at the branch or agency of the Imperial Bank where Mr. Lecoffre had stayed. His enquiries from them had convinced him that Mr. Lecoffre had been a party beforehand to the attacks upon the Russians, and after the attacks had begun he had continued to support them. In fact, what he had done would have rendered him liable to be hanged, if he had not been a British subject.

I said that I would make further enquiries as best I could.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7452] No. 392.

Count Benckendorff to Sir E. Grey.—(Received February 20.)

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres, le 17 février, 1912.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Sazonof, en me chargeant de présenter tous ses remerciements à votre Excellence pour l'aimable envoi des exemplaires des comptes rendus des deux délégués qui, dans le courant de l'été dernier, ont visité la zone turco-persane d'Ourmiah, me prie également de vous faire savoir à quel point il a apprécié le concours amical que notre délégué, M. Minorsky, a invariablement rencontré de la part de Mr. Shipley—concours qui a tant contribué à l'heureux accomplissement de la tâche dont ils étaient chargés.

C'est grâce à l'uniformité des procédés et à l'entière concorde qui n'a cessé d'exister entre Mr. Shipley et M. Minorsky, pendant toute la durée de leur mission, que ces deux délégués ont pu simultanément présenter à leurs Gouvernements des rapports constatant l'identité de leurs points de vue, ce qui a considérablement rehaussé la valeur de leur travail.

De son côté, notre consul général à Tauris a constaté avec haute satisfaction l'attitude constamment amicale de son collègue britannique.

En me faisant un agréable devoir de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance de votre Excellence, j'ai, &c.

BENCKENDORFF.

[7394] No. 393.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 20.)

India Office, February 19, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter from this Office, dated the 3rd January last, regarding the proposed Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India on the subject.

It will be seen that, while doubting the commercial success of the line or its ability to rival the Bagdad–Gulf route, they report that, in the opinion of their experts, the Mohammerah–Dizful section might have a better chance of proving remunerative.

The Marquess of Crewe is disposed to concur in these views, and would suggest that, if Secretary Sir E. Grey sees no objection, the Persian Railways Syndicate might be made acquainted with them. It would, however, seem desirable that the syndicate should obtain a concession for the entire line to Khoremabad, even though the construction of the section to Dizful should alone be contemplated.

I am further to suggest that copy of the telegram be communicated to the Board of Trade.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 393.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 12, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 1st January, 1912, regarding railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad. As desired, we have examined the project. definite opinion can be given as to line's commercial probabilities owing to insufficiency and vagueness of the available data; we agree, however, that line's commercial success, and its ability to rival the route from Bagdad to the Gulf, are doubtful. For views on projected line, please also refer to my telegram dated the 23rd February, 1911, and despatch from Government of India of the same date. Construction of metre gauge line for estimated cost is not thought possible by our railway experts, who state emphatically that Wilson's figures as regards earnings of line are unduly optimistic,

and that line will not pay. They consider that, provided a substantial portion of Kermanshah traffic could be secured, construction of Mohammerah–Dizful section holds out a fairer prospect of proving remunerative. Construction of this section would apparently be easy and cheap.

[7404] No. 394.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey —(Received February 20.)

(No. 126.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 133 of 19th February.

I do not propose to send Indian force with Knox for any part of his journey, and I am therefore authorising him to start as soon as arrangements have been made for best Persian escort available.

[7438] No. 395.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 127.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 132 of 19th February.

So far as the troops for Basidu are intended to strengthen my hand in negotiating with the Persian Government for compensation, which I understood to be their chief object (see Government of India's telegram of 23rd January), I do not think their presence necessary at the present stage, nor, unless their presence is needed for other purposes, do I think such a demonstration desirable in view of the conciliatory lines of policy which we are following with the Persian Government.

I cannot say how far it will be practicable to pursue the policy of subsidising the tribes concurrently with the measures which the Persian Government are taking until I have sounded them and the Swedish colonel. A favourable attitude on the part of the Persian Government and the loyal co-operation of the Swedish colonel with our officer — the latter desideratum must of course depend on the former — seem indispensable for the concurrent operation of the two schemes.

Am I authorised to discuss the matter with the Persian Government and the colonel?

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[7507] No. 396.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February* 20, 1912.

MY telegram No. 119 of 15th February.

Ex-Shah is willing to leave Persia, but he demands the renewal of his former pension, and also an immediate payment of 100,000 tomans, which he declares to be needed to pay off his Caucasians and Turkomans. Russian consul at Asterabad, consulted by his Minister as to the need for this latter sum, asserts that it is indispensable if devastation by the ex-Shah's followers is to be avoided.

In the circumstances and the matter being urgent, Russian Minister and I are advising the Persian Government to allow ex-Shah pension of 75,000 tomans a-year, and to pay the 100,000 tomans down, this latter sum to be borne half by the Persian Government and half by the ex-Shah, whose pension for the first two years will be therefore reduced from 75,000 to 50,000 tomans.

100,000 tomans will be distributed with the participation of the Russian consul.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburgh.)

[7511] No. 397.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 132 of 19th February.

As the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not see me, I have written privately to him in the sense of instructions, adding the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 125 of 19th February. I have asked him to send instructions at once to consul general at Meshed.

[2414] No. 398.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant respecting your complaint of the alleged non-fulfilment of the assurances of protection given by His Majesty's Government to Muin-ut-Tujjar.

I would be obliged if you would inform him to which of the statements made to you on the 18th January, 1908, when the proposal to form a limited liability company was under consideration, you refer when you state that the assurances of His Majesty's Government to the Muin-ut-Tujjar have not been fulfilled.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[7623] No. 399.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 69 of 20th February.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the most categorical instructions had been sent to the Russian consul-general at Meshed, and that his Excellency had hoped that matter had been finally settled. He would, however, telegraph again.

As regards demands put forward by the ex-Shah, as reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 128 of 20th February, he had no objections to make to the joint proposals of the two Ministers if the Persian Government could be induced to accept them.

[7273] No. 400.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 21, 1912.*

OIL company's agent at Kasr-i-Shirin reports that "Mohammed Kerim Khan Kalhur, backed by Salar-ed-Dowleh, threatens to prove serious obstruction to company's operations. It is absolutely essential that Salar and Daoud Khan be removed as soon as possible—all communications cut."

You should urge Persian Government to give company's representative the necessary protection to carry on company's operations.

[7733] No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 21, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador has represented here that Mr. Lecoffre when at Tabreez encouraged the rising against the Russians. I read to him your telegram No. 35 of 11th January, my telegram No. 30 of 13th January, and your telegram No. 63 of 24th January, which dealt with the alleged action of Mr. Lecoffre. Count Benckendorff stated that the Russian consul-general was on good terms with people at the agency at Tabreez of the Imperial Bank, where Mr. Lecoffre stayed, and that enquiries which the consul-general had made had convinced him that Mr. Lecoffre had been a party beforehand to the attacks on the Russians, and that after the attacks had begun he continued to support them.

Could you ascertain what, if any, information was furnished by the bank agency to the Russian consul-general in regard to this matter?

[7738] No. 402.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 21, 1912.*

AS your Excellency is aware, on the 15th (27th) July, 1880, a protocol was signed at Sarykamisch by Major-General Sir Edward Hamley and Major-General Zelenoy relating to the territory of Kotur, with a view to fixing the frontier line of that district in conformity with article 60 of the Treaty of Berlin. A map was attached to this protocol, with the following inscription, signed by the British and Russian commissioners:—

"Copie de la carte officielle dite 'identique' à l'échelle $\frac{1}{73050}$, représentant en vert la ligne frontière turco-persane du territoire de Kotour, comme elle était tracée par le Général Kemball et le Colonel Zélénoy, de leurs propres mains, sur deux exemplaires de la réduction anglaise à l'échelle $\frac{1}{253440}$ de ladite carte officielle."

It is within the knowledge of His Majesty's Government that the Kemball-Zelenoy Commission, during their private sittings at Constantinople in 1876, traced in dotted pencil upon the working maps which they employed, a common line of frontier which appeared to them to meet fairly the exigencies of the conflicting claims of Persia and Turkey.

This suggested common line had reference not only to Kotur but to the whole frontier, and I should be much interested in learning if the Russian Government still possess their commissioner's working copy of the reduced English copy of the "identic" map, showing the line of frontier which General Kemball and his Russian colleague considered would constitute an equitable compromise.

I accordingly have to request your Excellency to communicate a copy of this despatch to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to ask his Excellency if he would be so good as to furnish me with the desired information, if possible, at an early date.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7688] No. 403.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 22.)

Sir, *India Office, February 21, 1912.*

IN continuation of Mr. Montagu's letter of the 18th August last, regarding the Trans-Persian Railway scheme, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter that has been received from the Government of India, No. 120, Secret, dated the 21st December, 1911, and enclosures, conveying their further views on the subject of the alignment and of the eventual grant of a financial guarantee.

As regards the former, I am to say that the Secretary of State for India sees no objection on its merits to the alternative alignment Yezd–Furg–Ramishk–Charbar proposed by the Government of India as a compromise. There appears, however, to be good reason to believe that the alignment which they originally proposed, entering the British sphere at Bunder Abbas, is not open to the objections taken to it by the Russian promoters; and in view of this fact, and of the further considerations that it is desirable (1) that the port (which might eventually pass into hostile hands) should lie within the Gulf rather than outside it; (2) that the railway should be so situated that His Majesty's Government can protect their section of it without the risk of entanglements in the interior of Persia, the Marquess of Crewe is of opinion that the alignment viâ Bunder Abbas should be insisted upon as an essential condition. In this connection it will eventually be necessary to consider what conditions should be laid down to ensure that Bunder Abbas is a predominantly British and not an international port.

As regards the question of a guarantee, it would appear from your letter of the 6th February that a joint "Société d'Études" is being formed without the assistance of either Government. The suggestion made in paragraph 4 of the Government of India's letter need not therefore be further considered.

On the more important question referred to in paragraph 5, I am to say that his Lordship concurs in the opinion of the Board of Trade, expressed in Sir H. Llewellyn Smith's letter of the 21st September last, that it does not "appear possible for any sufficient case in favour of the proposed line to be made out to enable a Government guarantee to be defended on a purely commercial basis." He further agrees with the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury that, from the commercial and financial point of view, "the proposal" [to offer a direct guarantee], "does not appear to be one which His Majesty's Government can take into serious consideration."

While, therefore, his Lordship is not prepared to say that in no circumstances could he recommend such assistance as that suggested by the Government of India for the sanction of his council, he prefers to await the results arrived at by the Société d'Études before giving a final decision.

It is observed that, in the memorandum forming an enclosure in Sir E. Grey's despatch No. 324, dated the 12th December last, to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, a contract with His Majesty's Government for the carriage of the Indian, Australian, and New Zealand mails is mentioned as one of the main objects of the Société d'Études. Formal proposals on this point will no doubt be made in due course, but I am to remark that the question of transferring such a valuable asset from the British Mercantile Marine to an international railway would seem to raise large issues which will doubtless receive special consideration.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 403.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

My Lord Marquess, *Calcutta, December* 21, 1911.

WE have had under consideration your Lordship's letter No. 24, Secret, dated the 18th August, 1911, in which you ask for our opinion on certain points connected with the proposed Trans-Persian Railway.

2. In reply, we have the honour to enclose a copy of a report by the committee which has examined the various aspects of the question. The conclusions of the committee are:—

(*a.*) That, both on military and commercial grounds, any proposal to bring the railway through Kerman, or viâ Yezd–Kerman–Charbar should be resisted;

(*b.*) That, although the best alignment, in British and Indian interests, would be that viâ Yezd–Bunder Abbas, the alignment viâ Yezd–Furg–Ramishk–Charbar presents less objection than the alignment viâ Yez–Kerman–Charbar, and may be recommended as a possible basis of compromise;

(*c.*) That a British contribution should be made to the expenses of the Société d'Études as a means of securing representation on an equal footing with the Russian representation on the Société; and

(*d.*) That the Government of India might safely undertake to give a "rebate" guarantee, limited to the amount of the net profits gained by Indian railways from interchange of traffic with the Trans-Persian Railway.

3. We concur generally in these conclusions, and recommend that the alignment from Yezd viâ Furg and Ramiskh to Charbar be put forward as a compromise, to meet the objections raised by the Russian Consortium to the Yezd–Bunder Abbas project. The difference in distance between the two alignments is negligible; the commercial advantages of the Yezd–Charbar line are evident; while the strategical conditions are in both cases very much the same.

4. The objects and methods of the proposed Société d'Études are not altogether clear from the papers before us; and we have no information as to the financial standing and repute of its members or promoters. These are matters on which your Lordship is in a position to judge, while we are not. If, however, you are satisfied that there are adequate guarantees of the good faith of the syndicate, we think it would be desirable that we should take our share in such a contribution to their expenses as would secure the equal representation on their body of British and Russian interests. Assuming that the Russian Government subscribe 30,000*l.* to the funds of the Société, we should be prepared to find half of an equivalent amount, or 15,000*l.*; the other half being a charge, under the ordinary rule, on the British Treasury.

5. As regards the question of a Government guarantee of the line, we are not prepared to offer an opinion at present; but if this should prove to be necessary for the furtherance of the scheme, we should be willing to consider the grant of an indirect guarantee in the shape recommended by the committee.

We have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.
O'M. CREAGH.
GUY FLEETWOOD WILSON.
J. L. JENKINS.
R. W. CARLYLE.
S. H. BUTLER.
SEYYID ALI IMAM.
W. H. CLARK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 403.

Further Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the proposed Trans-Persian Railway.

(Confidential.)

THE Secretary of State has sent to the Government of India further papers in regard to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, and has requested their views thereupon, especially on the question whether the objection of the Russian promoters to the route viâ Bunder Abbas could be met without detriment to Indian interests by bringing the line from Yezd viâ Kerman to the coast at Charbar. This question has been remitted to the committee, and it has also been suggested to them that they should consider the feasibility of yet another alignment, namely, from Yezd to Charbar without passing through Kerman. These two alternative alignments are examined in sections 1 and 2 of this report. In section 3 the committee have considered the desirability of a British contribution to the Société d'Études (see letter from M. Homiakoff to Sir A. Nicolson of the 17th July, 1911, Annex 3 to Secretary of State's despatch No. 24, Secret, of the 18th August, 1911), and of a financial guarantee, when the railway is working, on the lines of the rebates granted on Indian railways (see letter from Messrs. Baring Brothers to Sir A. Nicolson of the 13th July, 1911, Annex 1 to the same despatch).

(1.)—*Alignment from Yezd viâ Kerman to Charbar.*

2. The strategical disadvantages to India of a railway cutting across Persia from the north-west to join the Indian railway system either at Nushki or Kurrachee have already been so fully indicated (see enclosures 4 and 6 of Government of India despatch No. 18, Secret-external, dated the 23rd February, 1911) that it seems only necessary now to recapitulate such arguments as may assist in answering the question now put to the Government of India by the Secretary of State in the paper under consideration, viz., whether it would be possible, without detriment to Indian interests, to meet the wishes of the Russian Consortium so far as to agree to an alignment viâ Yezd–Kerman–Charbar and thence by the coast to Kurrachee, instead of the Bunder Abbas–Yezd route.

3. The final section of the alignment now suggested, viz., from Charbar to Kurrachee, will run near the sea, and so is vulnerable to England's sea power, though, of course, not to the same extent as a line from Bunder Abbas to Kurrachee. We do not think that the difference in the extent of the line on the sea face would by itself justify rejection of the Russian proposal. But we have also to consider whether an enemy, who has once acquired a through line from the Caucasus, or from the head of the Gulf, to Kerman and Bam, would not be in a position to continue his advance inland through a rich country such as Seistan, instead of having to proceed by the exposed and barren route along the coast.

4. In our previous report we did not think it necessary to discuss the strategical advantages and disadvantages of this route, as on commercial grounds alone we considered that, of the different alignments from Yezd to Kurrachee, that viâ Bunder Abbas had overwhelmingly the strongest claims. If the route viâ Kerman and Bam is considered from the strategical point of view, it will be seen at once that Kerman is dangerously close to Seistan (260 miles). Moreover, the route viâ Bam to Seistan is by no means deficient of water at the present time, and might readily be so improved as to supply a considerable army ; it was a trade route of importance in ancient times, and during the last few years has been regularly used by arms caravans going to or returning from the Mekran coast. We are advised, therefore, that once a hostile army has established itself at Kerman, a considerable force could, without much difficulty, be developed against Seistan. In this connection, it must be remembered that a line such as is now contemplated could maintain a force of greater strength than the whole of the present army in India, together with the home expeditionary force.

5. The general staff argue that, having gained a position in Seistan, Russia would be able (presuming this railway from the Caucasus to Kerman was built) "to throw a force upon the Afghan frontier, on the Kandahar flank, from the double direction of the Caucasus and the combined position in Trans-Caspia and Turkistan" (see Committee of Imperial Defence paper No. 52 D., remarks by Lord Curzon), that is to say, that the Helmand position would be turned, and we should be forced to accept decisive battle at the gates of India itself near Quetta, and probably with inferior numbers. In connection with this part of the subject, we have also appended to our report some further notes by Lord Curzon, which have been received with a batch of Committee of Imperial Defence papers since our former report was framed, and also a note by Mr. Balfour on the danger of Seistan being connected with the Russian Empire. Lord Curzon's notes deal with Captain Rittich's report on Russian railways in Persia. The project which Captain Rittich advocated was practically the same as that now advocated by the Russian syndicate, but was, of course, for a purely Russian railway.

6. We recognise that the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 has for the time being, and, perhaps, for many years to come, placed a different complexion on the situation. But while agreements may lapse or be broken, railways are, comparatively speaking, permanent, and in considering the alignment of a railway destined to link up the frontiers of Russia and India, we have to take all contingencies into account. We agree, therefore, with the view laid before us by the general staff that the strategical reasons against allowing a through railway to be constructed from the Caucasus, or the head of the Gulf, direct to Kerman are so weighty that the Government of India should oppose such an alignment by all the means at its disposal.

7. Another point requires notice. The Russian syndicate, like ourselves, foresee a time when the Bagdad Railway will be extended into Southern Persia, and compete with through traffic with Europe. For this reason they say that they wish to avoid Bunder Abbas. But the junction of the two lines is, it seems to us, only a matter of time, and the selection of a line further eastward would only postpone the competition which they fear, for a term of years, which is insignificant compared to the vast future which lies before this railway. We do not, therefore, consider that any weight need be attached to this contention.

8. We have so far demonstrated that for very strong political and military reasons it is most essential that the main route should not pass through Kerman, and we are also in a position to show that commercially the Bunder Abbas route is the better alignment.

9. In Mr. Homiakoff's letter to Sir A. Nicolson, dated the 17th July, 1911, it is stated "that it is an indispensable condition for the commercial success of the railway that the line through Persia should be as short and straight as possible in order to enable it to compete both with other existing means of transit and possible future lines." This expression of opinion is true only when the country traversed by the shorter route is of a similar character to that traversed by a longer route. When the character of the

country passed through on the alternative routes differs most materially, the shorter route traversing a rough mountainous tract and the longer route running through relatively level country, the cost of haulage by the shorter but steeper-graded route will be larger than the cost of haulage by the longer route. The latter, therefore, commercially becomes the better one to adopt, since haulage charge govern the rates for the carriage by rail of goods and produce.

10. The suggestion made by Mr. Homiakoff is that, if Nushki be found unsuitable as a point of junction, and if Kurrachee be recommended instead, it would suit Russian views if the alignment ran from Kerman direct to Kurrachee. The Secretary of State suggests as a modification to this proposal that the alignment might run from Kerman to the coast at Charbar and thence along the sea-face to Kurrachee. Both these alignments are open to the commercial objection that the extra cost of working them would far outweigh the saving in mileage length, and we are advised that goods could be carried from Yezd viâ Bunder Abbas to Kurrachee at cheaper rates, owing to the flat gradients, that it would be necessary to charge if the viâ Kerman route were adopted.

11. We append to this report a section of the line from Charbar to Kerman, viâ Bampur and Bam, and it may be taken that the direct route from Kerman to Kurrachee would be a still more difficult section to work from the railway point of view. It will be seen that the line would have to rise over two passes, one 7,300 feet high and the other 8,300 feet high. To surmount these heights the grades would have to be very steep, necessitating light roads and the provision of very heavy locomotives, both for direct haulage and banking purposes. The speeds would be slow, and the cost of working very high. As illustrating this last point, it will be useful to point out that on hill lines in India the Government of India have admitted the high cost of working such grades as would be met on the Kerman–Charbar route by allowing hill railways to charge very much higher maxima than in the ordinary fixed standard for railways generally in India :—

The Kalka–Simla Railway is allowed to charge four times the ordinary maxima.
The Ootacamund Railway is allowed to charge eight times the ordinary maxima.
The Darjeeling-Himalayan Railway is allowed to charge five times the ordinary maxima.

The distance from Yezd to Kurrachee, viâ Kerman, is 1,147 miles, and from the same place, viâ Bunder Abbas to Kurrachee, 1,341 miles, a difference of 194 miles. The advantage derived from this difference would more than disappear with the higher rates which would have to be levied by the viâ Kerman route.

12. We have, therefore, no hesitation in advising that the viâ Bunder Abbas route is by far the better route to adopt from the point of view of cheaper working cost, which would permit of lower rates being charged for public traffic than it would be necessary to exact if the viâ Kerman route were selected.

(2.)—*Alignment from Yezd to Charbar without passing through Kerman.*

13. So far as we are able to ascertain from the route books, the best and most economical alignment, both from the point of view of construction and working to follow on this route, would be viâ Furg and Ramishk to Charbar. The most difficult section of this alignment, namely, from Yezd to Furg, would be common to this route, and the one viâ Bunder Abbas ; and we are of opinion, consequently, that the cost of working the railway by either of these routes would be approximately the same, especially as the route to Charbar, viâ Furg and Ramishk, will be a little shorter (about 40 miles) than that by Bunder Abbas. As compared with the Yezd–Kerman–Charbar route, the route viâ Furg and Ramishk to Charbar would have considerable advantages, ample length would be available for the line to ascend to the heights to be crossed, thus providing easy grading, whereas on the Kerman–Charbar route the heights rise abruptly, and, having to be surmounted in short distances, involve very severe gradients.

14. We consider, therefore, that from a commercial point of view this alignment is immensely superior to that viâ Kerman, and that there is not very much to choose between it and the alignment viâ Bunder Abbas. From a military point of view the alignment has the great advantage of not passing through Kerman. It is not so favourable to British interests as the alignment viâ Bunder Abbas, in that the portion running along the sea coast is very much shorter, but, as we have already stated in paragraph 3 above, we do not consider that this drawback should by itself be considered

fatal. We are of opinion, therefore, that while the Bunder Abbas route would be the best from the point of view of British and Indian interests, the route viâ Furg and Ramishk to Charbar is to a large extent free from the objections which we have had to urge against the other alternative routes, and might be recommended to His Majesty's Government as a possible basis for arriving at a compromise.

(3.)—*The Société d'Études and the proposed Guarantee.*

15. We now propose to examine the two questions of—

(*a.*) A contribution to the Société d'Études, the syndicate which is to be formed—

(1.) To further preliminary investigation.
(2.) To negotiate with the Persian Government to obtain the necessary concessions.
(3.) Finally, to form the company for the construction of the railway.

(*b.*) A guarantee by the British Government to the company to be formed to build and work the railway.

16. On the first question, considered solely from the business point of view, we are in entire accord with the opinions expressed by Mr. Huth Jackson in his letter of the 18th July, 1911; but we recognise that the question requires consideration also from the point of view of general policy.

17. It is stated in M. Homiakoff's letter of the 17th July, 1911, to Sir A. Nicolson, that the leading Russian banks have subscribed a capital of 300,000 roubles, say, 30,000*l.*, towards the establishment of a Société d'Études for the objects quoted above. It seems likely, though we have no definite information on the point, that the Russian Government are in reality behind this subscription, and the question arises whether it would not be desirable that His Majesty's Government should also, directly or indirectly, contribute to the expenses of the Société d'Études with a view to obtaining a measure of control over their operations, and thus making more secure our position in respect of the company which is eventually to be formed. We consider that it is of the greatest importance that the United Kingdom should not be left out of the preliminary negotiations to be undertaken by the Société d'Études, especially in view of the possibility that German financiers might be more than willing to step in. We would, therefore, advise that 30,000*l.* be found by India and England as the British contribution to the Société d'Études, on the condition that British and Russian representation in the Société be equal.

18. The exact form in which this contribution should be made will have to be decided in London. If objection is taken to Government subscribing direct, especially as the Russian Government have not professedly done so, we would suggest that it might be possible to arrange terms on which some leading bank or group of financiers in England would be willing to make the contribution, Government retaining sufficient powers in regard to the selection and subsequent action of the British representatives on the Société.

19. With regard to (*b*), the question of a guarantee to the company to be formed to build and work the line, it is stated that the Russian Government are prepared to consider the question of an indirect guarantee to the scheme in contemplation by reserving a certain proportion of their railway revenue surplus for this purpose, in consideration of the increased traffic on lines in Russian territory, which would necessarily accrue from the opening of a Trans-Persian railway to India (see Annex 1 to Secretary of State's despatch No. 24 of the 18th August, 1911.

20. The wording of this proposal is not very clear, but it would appear to indicate a financial arrangement similar to the rebate system on Indian railways. On those railways, rebate is very often given to assist in the formation of a company to construct a line. The Southern Punjab Railway is a leading case in point. This line, with the extensions recently sanctioned, is about 600 miles long, and the capital has been raised under a rebate given by the North-Western State Railway. The amount so paid by the North-Western Railway is limited to the net profits earned by the North-Western Railway on the traffic interchanged, and the rebate is only payable up to an amount sufficient for the Southern Punjab Railway to earn a fixed percentage on its capital, the rebate being the difference between what the line actually earns in dividend and the amount of the fixed dividend decided on.

21. A rebate guarantee on the terms applied to Indian railways is therefore no new proposition to India, and we think that the Government of India might commit

itself to the extent of agreeing to give a rebate on the same terms as are applied to Indian railways. We are inclined to doubt whether the investing public will understand, and be induced to invest their capital on a rebate guarantee, as it has taken a long time to educate English investors in Indian railways to this form of guarantee. Nevertheless, the recommendation seems to us one which might safely be adopted. We do not think that it places any great liability on the Government of India, or any liability which the Government of India could not fairly accept, as the rebate to which we would agree would be limited to the net profits gained by Indian railways from interchange of traffic with the Trans-Persian Railway; and at the same time the recommendation has the advantage of being in accord with the proposal (if we have understood it correctly) put forward on the Russian side.

(4.)—*Conclusions.*

Briefly summarised, our conclusions are as follows:—

(i.) We consider that, both on military and commercial grounds, the Government of India should resist any proposal to bring the railway through Kerman, and consequently should not agree to an alignment viâ Yezd–Kerman–Charbar.

(ii.) The same objections do not appear to us to exist in regard to the alignment viâ Yezd–Furg–Ramishk–Charbar, and while we hold to our previous opinion that the best alignment in British and Indian interests would be viâ Yezd–Bunder Abbas, we think for the reasons stated in our report that this route might be recommended to His Majesty's Government as a possible basis of compromise.

(iii.) We are in favour of a British contribution to the expenses of the Société d'Études as a means of securing representation equal to the Russian representation on the Société.

(iv.) We think that the Government of India might undertake, in the event of the line being constructed, to give a rebate guarantee, limited to the amount of the net profits gained by Indian railways from interchange of traffic with the Trans-Persian Railway.

W. H. C[LARK].
D. HAIG.
T. R. WYNNE.
A. H. McMAHON.

October 12, 1911.

APPENDIX.

(1.)—*Notes by Lord Curzon (dated the 26th February, 1904) on Captain Rittich's Report on Russian Railways in Persia.*

NOW appears upon the scene Captain Rittich and his men; and they produce a scheme which seems to me to be based upon profound political and strategical insight, and, if realised, to secure for Russia all that she desires, with the maximum of advantage to herself and the maximum of detriment to us.

Let me point out the nature of the advantages to Russia, under the two heads, political and strategical—

I.—*Political.*

(i.) Cutting across Persia diagonally from north-west to south-east, the projected line would place in Russian hands the whole of the principal cities of Persia from Tabreez to Kerman, including Kazvin, Hamadan (by a branch line Kazvin–Hamadan), Tehran, Kum, Kashan, Ispahan (by a branch line Kashan–Ispahan) and Yezd. The whole of the Central Persian plateau would thus fall under Russian control, and from this line she could push her influence southwards—to such places as Sultanabad, Shiraz, and elsewhere, as she pleased.

(ii.) Such a line would not merely firmly establish Russian influence throughout the whole of Central Persia, but it would also effectually destroy British influence in the south, for it would skirt, along its northern flank, the whole of the sphere that we have hitherto been disposed to claim.

(iii.) The line would be a relatively cheap and easy one to construct, for it would proceed through a generally level country, with a few mountain passes; and it would also be cheap and easy to guard, for the tribes along it are of a peaceful character, and would give no trouble.

II.—*Strategical.*

The strategical advantages of the line are even more striking—

(i.) It possesses the supreme merit of enabling the Russians to direct against Southern Persia, or against the Indian frontier on the Seistan–Mekran section, the whole of the troops of the Caucasus, escaping both the Caspian crossing, the precarious transit along the single line of the Trans-Caspian Railway, and the long march southwards from the direction of Meshed.

(ii.) It possesses the scarcely inferior merit, from the Russian standpoint, of avoiding the Gulf altogether, with a British fleet patrolling it, with British forces very likely in occupation of its principal ports, and with British war-ships closing its mouth. It takes Russia right out into the open ocean, and plants her on the sea at Charbar, a place which, by dint of the great expenditure that Russia is never reluctant to undertake, could be converted into a naval base of considerable strength, in close proximity to the western borders of British protected territory.

(iii.) Similarly, if a branch line were constructed from Bam to Seistan, would the railway enable Russia to reinforce her position in Seistan, and to throw a force upon the Afghan frontier, on the Kandahar flank, from the double direction of the Caucasus and the combined position in Trans-Caspia and Turkistan.

(iv.) The line would be absolutely invulnerable against British attack until it reached the neighbourhood of the British frontier. It would be protected by the great desert on the north, and by mountains on the south. It would be too far from the sea to be cut from that quarter; and it would have achieved its purposes before we could even scratch its extremities.

Finally, the line possesses the physical advantages of running parallel, through its entire length, to the general trend of the Persion mountain system instead of attempting to cut it; and the commercial advantage of tapping all the principal entrepôts of trade.

Again, when at home on leave, after seeing the English papers on Seistan, Lord Curzon wrote on the 1st June, 1904 :—

There is a general concurrence—

That Captain Rittich's line of railway, involving a direct and independent communication with the Caucasus, would place Russia in a position of overwhelmin advantage on the flank of Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and would constitute a greate strategical danger to India than any Russian scheme hitherto contemplated. This conclusion appears to have been accepted by all the authorities in England.

(2.)—*Note by Mr. Balfour* (*April* 1904—*Committee of Imperial Defence Paper No.* 46).

We must discourage the connection of Seistan by railway with any portion of the Russian Empire. . . . . I am clear that, in addition to the occupation of Charbar, we should employ every means at our disposal for preventing the project of a Caucasus–Charbar or a Caucasus–Seistan railway being seriously proposed.

[7689] No. 404.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 22.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 21, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 5th February, 1912, enclosing copies of two letters from Mr. A. J. Barry regarding the projected Trans-Persian Railway.

As regards the alignment viâ Kerman, for which a preference is expressed by Mr. Barry, the Marquess of Crewe has nothing to add to what is said in my letter of to-day's date.

With regard to the reply proposed to be made to him in paragraph 3 of your letter, I am to observe that there is some force in the criticism that if the British representation on the "société d'étude" is inferior to the Russian, British enterprise will be at an initial disadvantage which it may be difficult altogether to annul if the project for a railway takes actual shape hereafter. On the other hand, if formal exception is taken at the present stage to the constitution of the société, His Majesty's Government will to a certain extent be committing themselves in advance, instead of "retaining their complete freedom of action in regard to any further developments of the enterprise." In the circumstances and subject to any observations that may be made by the Board of Trade, Lord Crewe is disposed to suggest that the reply to Mr. Barry might be somewhat differently worded, as, for instance, that it is for Lord Revelstoke and those associated with him to decide whether inequality of representation of British interests on the société will not tend to affect unfavourably the later development of the enterprise, it being at the same time added that, so far as His Majesty's Government are themselves concerned, they have already safeguarded their position by intimating, &c. (as in your letter under reply).

His Lordship concurs in the intimation it is proposed to make to Mr. Barry and Lord Revelstoke regarding the appointment of a secretary to the société.

I am, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[7809] No. 405.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 129.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February* 22, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 20th February.

After discussion with the Persian Government, Russian Minister is instructing Russian consul at Asterabad to press the ex-Shah to accept pension of 75,000 tomans, and, in addition, such a lump sum as is necessary for payment of his Caucasians and Turkomans, the latter amount to be repaid to the Persian Government by annual deductions of 25,000 tomans from pension.

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

[7810] No. 406.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February* 22, 1912.

MY telegram No. 123 of 18th February.

Russian Minister and I are given to understand that, subject to some verbal changes, our proposals will be accepted if a more palatable formula can be found for recognition of Anglo-Russian convention. Persian Government have suggested two alternative formulas, of which only one is worth submitting to the two Governments. It runs as follows :—

"Animated by desire of establishing stable relations of friendship with the neighbouring Powers, Persian Government undertake to conform their policy to principles of the convention of 1907 in so far as such policy shall not be derogatory to ("pas porter atteinte à") the fundamental principles laid down in preamble of the said convention, viz.: (1) independence and integrity of Persia; (2) her peaceful development; and (3) equal opportunities for commerce and industry of all countries."

This formula seems to be a logical elaboration of what we have asked for, but third point is inconvenient and may give rise to misunderstandings. Shall we suggest to Persian Government that third point should be omitted? Another course would be expressly to exclude from it such concessions as those mentioned in joint note of 20th May, 1910. Former course would doubtless be line of least resistance, and would be less likely to give offence to other Powers.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[7811] No. 407.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 22, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Meshed, No. 14 :—

"Position is that my colleague acknowledge[d] receipt by telegraph of instructions to change his attitude on 20th February, and wrote letter in this sense to a leading agitator. Secretly, however, he is supporting Royalists, and on 21st February delivered telegram from brother of ex-Shah to the effect that Mohammad Ali was coming to Meshed, and this has encouraged them considerably. I have secured a copy. Royalists are fortified in the shrine, and have been joined by Mahomet Nishapuri and some of his men. My Russian colleague refused to act with me as he had had no special instructions to that effect. Has the ex-Shah left Persia, as this would strengthen my hand against double dealings?

"(Addressed to Tehran ; sent to India.)"

Russian Minister is away till Saturday.

Could not Russian Government be urged to instruct Russian consul-general categorically to concert with his British colleague to announce jointly the attitude of the two Powers towards the ex-Shah.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[7623] No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 22, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 71 of 21st February : Ex-Shah.

If the Persian Government strongly object to the increase in pension, possibly some compromise might be reached.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 139.)

[5940] No. 409.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 22, 1912.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 25th ultimo and previous correspondence relative to the complaint of Messrs. Ellinger and Co. in connection with the shipment of red oxide from Hormuz, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith further papers on the subject.*

I am to enquire whether there is, in the opinion of the Board of Trade, any objection to informing the firm in writing that His Majesty's Government will support no claim brought by Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co., either against the Persian Government or against Muin-ut-Tujjar, should the last named, after the resumption of the concession, decline to make further shipments to that firm in fulfilment of the contract between them and the Persian Government.

I am to state that an assurance of this nature has already been conveyed verbally to Mr. Martin Ellinger, and that, if it is considered advisable to repeat it in writing, Sir E. Grey would be disposed at the same time to cause Messrs. Strick to be informed of what has passed and of the probability that, in view of the assurance given, Muin will either decline to ship any further oxide to them and run the risk of an action being brought against him or will endeavour to induce the Persian Government to cancel their contract with the firm. It would further be pointed out to Messrs. Strick that, though His Majesty's Government are not in a position to take any action on their behalf, Sir E. Grey considers it only fair to convey to them a warning of the nature indicated.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Nos. 129, 141, 170, 251, 256, 319, 398, and Sir G. Barclay, No. 53, Telegraphic.

[7684] No. 410.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 148.)
Sir, *Pera, February 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 23 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the report which the British and the Russian military attachés have jointly drawn up and communicated to my Russian colleague and myself on the subject of the military measures taken by the Ottoman Government on the Persian frontier since the beginning of the year.

The impression which I share with M. Tcharykof is that, whatever may have been the original intentions of the Ottoman Government, they do not seem to be now in the direction of an advance, and M. Tcharykof is consequently writing to his Government to suggest that a protest against such an advance as contemplated in the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 24 of the 27th January last does not seem now to be necessary.

We have, however, instructed our respective military attachés to watch with special care for any news of movements of troops and of military preparations towards the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 410.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 16, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a memorandum concerning the military measures of the Turkish Government on the Persian frontier since the 1st January, which, in accordance with your Excellency's instructions, has been drawn up in conjunction with my Russian colleague, General Holmsen.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Major,*
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 410.

Joint Memorandum by the Russian and British Military Attachés at Constantinople respecting Turkish movements on the Persian Frontier since January 1, 1912.

THE result of an examination and comparison of all the reports which were demanded by telegram from the British and Russian consular officers at Bagdad, Mosul, Bitlis, Van, Erzeroum, and Bayezid, is to show that there is no confirmation of the rumoured dispatch of five battalions to the frontier, either by Van or Mosul, and that no passage of troops has been reported by the consuls on the frontier. A report from the British consul at Erzeroum mentions that orders have been given for five battalions, a regiment of field artillery (six batteries), and a regiment of cavalry to hold themselves in readiness to start for Bayezid if required. However, the Turks are still calling up ihtiyats with the object of reinforcing the battalions now on the frontier and in the contested zone, and a calculation based on details furnished by the Russian consuls at Bitlis and Bagdad shows that the intention is to bring each of these battalions to a strength of 800.

The 3rd (cadre) battalions of the regiments now stationed at Van, Mush, Mawana, Rowanduz, Kerkuk, Nefte, and Sulemania have also been expanded, a proceeding which cannot be regarded as abnormal when ihtiyats are being called up.

It has been noticed everywhere that there has been a considerable movement of ammunition for the troops on the frontier, which may be attributed to the fact that the new Mauser rifle ammunition, sent from Constantinople during the autumn, is now being distributed. At the same time an acceleration of these movements is observed since the entry of the Russian troops into Tabreez, as well as the transport of other articles of supply and equipment.

Since the commencement of January a good deal of war material has been shipped from Constantinople for the Black Sea ports, including the whole cargo of two steamers.

The news given by the Russian consul at Erzeroum of the mobilisation of the Nizam troops as well as of 64,000 redifs is without confirmation from any other source.

The news of the dispatch of 5,000 recruits for the IIIrd Army Inspection from the district of the VIIIth Army Corps is formally contradicted by the consuls in Syria, but 2,500 recruits have been sent to the IVth Army Inspection, a step which is rendered necessary by the scarcity of local recruits there.

None of the Nizam battalions which were sent to the Yemen from the IIIrd Army Inspection in 1911 have returned.

[7936] No. 411.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tehran, February* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 138 of 22nd February.

Following is text of joint note of 18th February :—

"Animées du désir de mettre les relations entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, et le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse sur une base solide d'amitié et de confiance et désireuses d'aider autant que possible le Gouvernement persan dans sa tâche de rétablir et de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans le pays, les Légations de Russie et d'Angleterre, d'ordre de leurs Gouvernements, ont l'honneur de faire au Gouvernement persan les propositions suivantes :—

"1. Les deux Gouvernements sont prêts à avancer, pour faire face aux dépenses urgentes, au Gouvernement persan une somme de 100,000*l.* chacun. La Banque Impériale et la Banque d'Escomptes ouvriront chacune un crédit pour cette somme aussitôt que les deux légations auront reçu une réponse favorable à la présente note, et il est entendu que le crédit de la Banque d'Escomptes sera mis à la disposition du Gouvernement persan en roubles, s'élevant à la somme de 945,750 roubles.

"2. Les sommes susindiquées seront prêtées à un taux d'intérêt de 7 pour cent par an et devront être remboursées du premier produit du prochain emprunt du Gouvernement persan, et jusqu'alors les excédents des revenus des douanes du nord et du sud, qui jusqu'ici ont été mis par les deux banques à la disposition du Gouvernement persan, devront être employés intégralement et respectivement pour le service de l'amortissement et des intérêts des parties russe et anglaise de la présente avance.

"3. L'avance doit être dépensée sous le contrôle du Trésorier général et d'après un programme élaboré par ce dernier d'accord avec le Cabinet et approuvé par les deux légations. Il est entendu qu'une partie considérable sera affectée à l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale avec l'aide des officiers suédois. En faisant cette proposition et pour atteindre les buts indiqués au commencement de cette note, les deux légations espèrent que le Gouvernement persan s'engagera (1) à conformer dorénavant sa politique aux principes de la convention anglo-russe de 1907 ; (2) à licencier, aussitôt que Mohammad Ali Schah et Salar-ed-Dowleh auront quitté la Perse, les fédais et les forces irrégulières qui se trouvent actuellement au service persan ; (3) à discuter avec les deux légations un projet d'organisation d'une petite armée régulière et effective ; (4) à arriver à un accord avec Mohammad Ali Schah au sujet de son départ de la Perse, de sa pension et d'une amnistie générale à ses partisans.

"En espérant une réponse favorable, nous saisissons, &c."

[7950] No. 412.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 23, 1912.

MY telegram No. 57 of 14th February.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that the Russian Minister at Tehran had expressed opinion by telegraph that it would be most inadvisable to withdraw all the Russian troops from Kazvin at this moment, and that, in view of intended disarming of fedais, he believed that Persian Government would themselves prefer that a Russian force should remain within three days' march of Tehran.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had been making enquiries as to the possibility of retaining troops, but feared that final arrangements for their withdrawal had already been made.

[7951] No. 413.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 23, 1912.

BARCLAY'S telegram No. 130 of 22nd February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that we should press for omission of third point, and explain that, as matter in discussion is one which only concerns Great Britain, Russia, and Persia, there is no need for the Persian Government to insert in their reply any reference to outside Powers.

[7953] No. 414.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February* 23, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 115 of 15th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me telegram from Russian consul-general at Tabreez stating that acting British consul had telegraphed to Sir G. Barclay that it was in every way desirable to recognise Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who was popular and possessed influence among nomads, as Governor-General. Acting consul was opposed to appointment of Sipahdar, who was surrounded by fedais and Armenians, and whose arrival might give rise to fresh disorders. (End of R.)

His Excellency observed that, while not wishing to force Shuja-ed-Dowleh upon the Persian Government, he thought it would be far wiser to retain him, at all events temporarily, as Governor-General, as, were fresh disorders to break out at Tabreez, he could not answer for the effect they might have on Russian policy.

[7810] No. 415.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 130 of 22nd February: Joint note to Persian Government.

Persian formula appears to us objectionable because it places in opposition the principles of the convention and those of the preamble, a distinction which the two signatory Powers could hardly admit. Moreover, the principles of the preamble are incompletely summarised in the formula, "maintenance of order" being omitted.

I would propose to omit all words in Persian formula from "convention of 1907," and substitute following words: "and gladly recognise (or take note of) the assurances implied in the preamble of the said convention."

You should suggest this to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and enquire whether Russian Government have any other proposal to make.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 142.)

[8437]

No. 416.

Memorandum by Mr. Parker on the proposed submission of the Turco-Persian Frontier Dispute to the Hague Tribunal.

[Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 118 of February 7, 1912, No. 6044.]

I VENTURE to draw special attention to the last paragraph of this despatch, containing the opinion of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the Persian Ambassador at Constantinople that the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission is unlikely to come to any agreement at Constantinople, and that the matter will have eventually to be referred to the Hague Tribunal.

It will be recalled that on 21st December, 1911, the Turkish and Persian Governments signed a protocol, of which article 4 is as follows:—

> "4. Dans le cas où les délégués des deux parties ne tomberaient pas d'accord sur l'interprétation et l'application de certaines clauses de ce traité, au bout d'une période de six mois de négociations, pour solutionner complètement la question de la délimitation des frontières, il est entendu que tous les points sur lesquels il y aurait divergence seront soumis ensemble à la Cour arbitrale de la Haye afin que la question entière soit ainsi définitivement tranchée."

Before the Commission meets at Constantinople it seems desirable that His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government should look ahead and consider how a reference to the Hague Tribunal is likely to affect their respective interests and their prestige; whether the cases of the litigants, and more especially that of Persia, can be drawn up without the co-operation of Great Britain and Russia; whether it is desirable that Great Britain and Russia should, either by advice or supplying important documents in their possession, facilitate a reference to the Hague Tribunal; and whether, in the probable event of the Turco-Persian negotiations at Constantinople proving abortive, an effort should not first be made by Russia and Great Britain to solve the dispute by means of a Mixed Commission composed of a British, a Russian, and a third delegate or more, possessing powers of arbitration or, if Turkey declines as in the past to admit arbitration, then of mediation.

(a.) *The question of British and Russian interests and prestige.*

The Turks and Persians have bound themselves, failing agreement after six months' negotiation at Constantinople, to refer the whole dispute to the Hague Tribunal: according to article 45 of the "Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" (1907), each party selects two arbitrators, who must be chosen from the general list of members of the Court,* and one of whom may be its own national. It is not possible to forecast the constitution of the Court; but it is highly improbable that Turkey would choose a Russian arbitrator and not likely, for obvious reasons, that she would choose a British one; Persia would perhaps be more likely to select a British or a Russian arbitrator. But, however this may turn out, it seems far from likely that the Umpire would be either a Russian or a British member of the Court.

The upshot of this is that British and Russian arbitrators may be excluded altogether: and, *in any case*, if the matter goes before the Hague Tribunal, the British and Russian Governments cannot, even in the very improbable contingency of a majority of the arbitrators being Russian and British, exercise a decisive influence on the judgment of the Court.

On the other hand, we possess so many leading documents, and so much evidence, indispensable to the successful preparation of the Persian case, that we possibly could induce Persia to allow her case to be represented by an advocate possessing the

* The general list includes the following British members: Sir E. Fry, Sir E. Satow, Sir C. Fitzpatrick, and Lord Desart.

confidence of Great Britain and Russia: but the precise effect of such representation on the terms of the award would of course be quite uncertain.

It must not be overlooked that Russian interests are involved in the frontier dispute in the north, as are British interests in the south in relation to Mohammerah and the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab: and an award prejudicial to those interests would prove highly embarrassing.

Moreover, even if the Hague award proved not inconsistent with such direct interests, it might not redound to the prestige of Great Britain and Russia, while possibly furthering that of other Powers, for a solution of the dispute to be thus found independently of the two Powers who, at such great sacrifice of labour and money,* have mediated for 70 years. In estimating the effect of this mediation, it should be borne in mind—though the actual boundary delimitation has never prospered—that it was wholly and entirely owing to the exertions of the British and Russian Commissioners that the Kurdish tribes upon the frontiers were kept down for more than ten years, at a time when the great massacre at Kerbela had rekindled the old animosity of Shiite against Sunnite to a dangerous heat, and that indeed, ever since, the population from Bussorah to Mount Ararat has enjoyed a relative state of tranquillity and prosperity, such as was unknown in the memory of man.

Mr. Curzon's "Armenia." (London: 1854.) Sir S. Canning. Memoirs.

(b.) *Can the cases of the Contracting Parties be drawn up without British and Russian assistance?*

(i.) TURKEY:

In 1875 Turkey accepted, conditionally, the frontier zone of the Anglo-Russian "Identic" map of 1869, and this acceptance on the part of Turkey may prove a point of some importance, and possibly a governing consideration, in framing the award at the Hague. Appreciation of this, and of the importance likely to be attached by the Court to neutral testimony, may compel Turkey to seek the support and evidence of Great Britain and Russia regarding certain contested points within the frontier zone.

But it seems more probable that Turkey may dispense altogether with Anglo-Russian assistance. She *can* put forward a claim, based on Dervish Pasha's fantastic map and on spurious documentary proofs collected by that officer, to places outside the frontier zone; and, on the flimsy pretext of temporary occupation in the past, she might, if earlier pretensions were again put forward, lay claim to such places as Tabreez and even Kazvin.

It must not be forgotten, however, that though the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847) is to be the basis of the arbitration, that instrument only deals specifically with certain regions of the frontier, confirming, in regard to other portions, the antecedent treaties, of which the most important is that of 1639. Neither Persia nor Turkey could produce the original text of this treaty 70 years ago, much less now; and the only reliable information on the subject of the text is in the possession of His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government. On this point, therefore, Turkey might have to appeal to those Governments.

Colonel Sheil to the British Commissioners at Erzeroum, August 29 and September 27, 1843.

(ii.) PERSIA:

With Persia the case is materially different in various respects.

In the first place the Persian Government intimated definitely in 1875 that they would agree to the *arbitration* (as distinct from mediation) of the British and Russian Commissioners, and accept any line which they might lay down within the frontier zone of the Anglo-Russian "identic" map.

Persia appears to have lost, at the time of the bombardment of the Medjliss in 1908, such scanty papers as she still possessed; and for documentary proof of her claims she would seem to be largely, if not entirely, dependent upon the British and Russian Governments.

(c.) *Is it desirable that Great Britain and Russia, either by advice or by the provision of important documents in their possession, facilitate a reference to the Hague Tribunal?*

The Persian Government have now asked for copies of the *procès-verbaux* of the Conferences of Erzeroum (1843–1847) and Bagdad and Mohammerah (1848–1850). It is, however, important to note, in determining whether this request should be acceded

* Great Britain alone has spent over 100,000*l.* on work connected with the Turco-Persian frontier.—A. P.

Colonel Williams No. 12, February 12, 1844

to or not, that the *procès-verbaux* of the Persian and Turkish Commissioners were taken down in their respective languages, and probably differed essentially from those drawn up, principally in French, on behalf of the British and Russian Mediating Commissioners. In fact the present request made to us by Persia is for papers which she has never actually possessed. It seems most undesirable to communicate those relating to Mohammerah to Persia with a view to their submission to the Hague Tribunal, as it would bring to public notice matters relating to the territorial position in those regions: and it is desirable, for reasons set forth in detail in a separate memorandum which is being prepared on the Mohammerah question, not to abandon any control we may possess as to the ultimate demarcation of this portion of the frontier.

On the whole I think it is not to the interest of Great Britain to promote a reference to the Hague Tribunal. Apart from other arguments, it is questionable whether we are serving our interests by advancing money to Persia in the shape of a loan, if she is to incur heavy liabilities for an arbitration at the Hague, which may be so costly as to run into six figures.

(d.) *If the Turco-Persian negotiations at Constantinople prove abortive, should an attempt be made by Great Britain and Russia to settle the dispute by means of a Mixed Commission to meet at Constantinople?*

The past history of this question does not encourage a fresh attempt at intervention. But the experience of Great Britain and Russia has at least served to bring out one consideration clearly: any such attempt, to quote the words of Sir Stratford Canning, is bound to terminate in a fruitless and discreditable failure, unless it has been provided beforehand that the decision arrived at shall be final. Lord Palmerston, in commenting on the views of Sir Stratford Canning and his Russian colleague at Constantinople, expressed the opinion that the boundary between Turkey and Persia could never be finally settled except by an *arbitrary decision* on the part of Great Britain and Russia.

Sir Stratford Canning, September 17, 1851.

Sir Arnold Kemball, September 14, 1907.

As recently as 1907, General Sir Arnold Kemball wrote: "The facts as traced and recorded by you amply justify the conviction that has always possessed me, that if practical results are to be obtained . . . . arbitration must be conceded to supersede mediation for the determination of final issues not otherwise reconcilable. Even so, the proposed change must still fail of effect unless fortified by preliminary agreements, recognising the neutrality of a well-defined zone—say that of 1869 (viz., that of the identic map) . . . ."

No one was more intimately acquainted with the Turco-Persian frontier question in all its complicated aspects than Sir Arnold Kemball.

It is apparent from the above enumeration of views that an attempt at Anglo-Russian *mediation* would be futile, foredoomed to failure, and possibly harmful in its effects.

It remains to consider whether any means can be devised for inducing the Porte to agree to some form of arbitration at Constantinople: Turkey has now agreed to submit the whole question to the Hague Tribunal, and there seems no *primâ facie* reason why, such being the case, she should object to the less costly procedure of a Mixed Commission of Arbitration at Constantinople, especially since, in any case, even if the dispute goes to the Hague, Anglo-Russian influence cannot be entirely excluded, inasmuch as the support of the two Powers is essential to enable Persia to state a case at all.

It is indeed hardly conceivable that Turkey would abandon her interests to the absolute and uncontrolled arbitral decision of Russia in this question; much less in fact now than in the past, since Russia is a by no means disinterested party. But it might be possible to induce Turkey, and at any rate worth trying to induce her, to agree to the arbitration of a Mixed Commission, composed of Russian and British Delegates (who might be members of the two Embassies), *and of three other Delegates of legal standing nominated by minor European Powers.* I think it is undesirable that a French Delegate should be proposed, owing to the special political relation in which France stands to Russia: it is of course important, if the Mixed Commission is to be accepted by Turkey, in lieu of the Hague Tribunal, that it should, apart from Anglo-Russian participation, as far as possible be judicial as distinct from political in constitution.

I would suggest that a note should be sent to the Russian Government reviewing the more important aspects of this question; summarising the existing situation as it presents itself to His Majesty's Government; expressing the view that a frank and detailed interchange of opinion between Great Britain and Russia, who have acted in close co-operation in this question for so many years, is desirable in

order to avoid confusion of purpose in the circumstances which have now arisen; and proposing that if, after two months' negotiation, the Turco-Persian Commission has reached no conclusion, then we should recommend the appointment of a Mixed Commission with powers of arbitration to sit at Constantinople.

Before, however, adopting this course, it would seem desirable to consult the India Office, and also His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. A. P.

February 23, 1912.

[8078] No. 417.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24, 1912.)

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Shiraz, December* 26, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Minister, a despatch enclosing a return of robberies and attacks on British subjects and of robberies of British goods which have occurred on the roads in this consular district during the last four years. The amount of property lost in these robberies and recovered by the Persian authorities is also noted.

I have, &c.
G. G. KNOX.

Enclosure 1 in No. 417.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Shiraz, December* 26, 1911.

IN compliance with instructions contained in your circular telegram of the 8th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith a return of attacks and robberies on British subjects and of robberies of British goods which have taken place in this consular district within the past four years. This return is confined to those attacks and robberies that have occurred on the main roads.

I have treated the subject-matter in two forms, the first dealing with the date of the robbery, the locality, the aggressors, and the persons prejudiced; in the second I have noted the nature of the attack or robbery, the value of the property robbed, and the amount recovered by the Persian authorities. It has also seemed not inappropriate to append a statement of wilful damage to the lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Department during the last three years for which figures are at present available.

I have, &c.
G. G. KNOX.

Enclosure 2 in No. 417.

RETURN of Attacks on and Robberies from British Subjects for 1908–12.

Form I.

No.	Date.	Locality.	Aggressors.	Persons or Firm Prejudiced.
	1908.			
1	January 12 ..	Kotal-i-Malu ..	Villagers	His Majesty's Government.
2	February 5 ..	Sivand	Arabs	Messrs. Haji Ali Akbar, of Manchester.
3	March (?) ..	Ab Barik	Basiri	Messrs. Dixon
4	„ 18 ..	Mian Kotal ..	Kashgais	„ „
5	July 8 ..	„	Kaloonis	„ Ziegler.
6	August 10 ..	Dalaki .. .	Villagers	„ Somech.
				„ Isaacs.
7	„ 18 ..	Near Dalaki ..	„	„ Dixon.
8	„ 20 ..	Zarghun	Arabs	„ Ziegler.
				„ Zeitoon.
9	„ 20 ..	Kazerun	Road guards ..	„ Dixon.
10	„ 23 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Villagers	„ D. Sassoon.
11	September 6 ..	Mian Kotal ..	„	„ Dixon.
12	„ 9 ..	Shulgistan	Boir Ahmad ..	Imperial Bank.
13	„ 9 ..	Khaneh Khorreh ..	Arabs	Egyptian subject.
14	October 3 ..	Shulgistan	Boir Ahmad ..	Tehran Club.
15	November 7 ..	„	„ ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
16	„ 10 ..	Ahmadi	Unknown	Bombay Parsi firm.
				Major Ducat.

No.	Date.	Locality.	Aggressors.	Persons or Firm Prejudiced.
	1908.			
17	November 17 ..	Shulgistan ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Messrs. Dixon.
18	December 7 ..	Deh Sheikh ..	Masermi (?) ..	„ Zeitoon Khalil.
	1909.			
19	February 15 ..	Zinian	Unknown	Messrs. Somech.
20	March 17 ..	Kurdshul	Lashanis	Mr. E. Gentleman.
21	„ 30 ..	Abbasabad ..	Villagers	Rev. J. C. Linton.
22	April 6 ..	Sivand	Arabs	Messrs. Ziegler.
23	„ 9 ..	Behbehan	Lurs	Mr. J. C. Smith (Indo-European Telegraph Department).
24	May 16 ..	Chenar Rahdar ..	Masermi	Messrs Ziegler.
25	„ 18 ..	Abdui	Road guards ..	„ Dixon.
26	„ 22 ..	Deh Sheikh ..	Masermis	„ Ziegler.
27	June 3 ..	Haft Mullah ..	Villagers	„ Dixon.
28	„ 7 ..	Zinian	Kashgais	„ Mowla, of Bombay.
29	August 16 ..	Pul-i-Khan.. ..	Arabs	Mr. G. Middleton.
30	October 28 ..	Khaneh Kergun ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Messrs. D. Sassoon.
31	November 28 ..	Sineh Safid ..	Kashgai	„ Andrew Weir.
32	„ 18 ..	Konar Takhteh ..	Villagers	„ Ziegler.
	1910.			
33	January (?) ..	Chenar Rahdar ..	Masermis	Messrs. Ziegler.
34	April 12 ..	Kaderabad.. ..	Villagers	Clerk, His Majesty's consulate.
35	„ 17 ..	Shulgistan.. ..	Boir Ahmad (?) ..	Mr. J. H. Bill, His Majesty's consul.
36	May 30 ..	Near Siakh ..	Sorkhis	Messrs. Ziegler.
37	August 13 ..	„	Kashgais	„ „
38	November 14 ..	Ag. Cheshmeh ..	Kashgai and Lur (?)..	„ Dixon. „ Somech. „ Service Reeve. „ D. Sassoon. „ H. S. Mohammed Kazeruni, of Bombay.
39	August (?) ..	Gerdeneh Imamzadeh Ismail	Kashgai	British Indian subject.
40	November (?) ..	„ „	Boir Ahmad ..	Two British Indian subjects.
	1911.			
41	February 22 ..	Ab Barik	Arabs	Messrs. Ziegler.
42	„ 15 ..	Khaneh Kergun ..	Kurdshulir.. ..	„ „
43	March 13 ..	Surmek	Villagers	„ „
44	April 1 ..	God-i-Narm ..	Kurdshulis.. ..	„ Dixon.
45	February 12 ..	Khaneh Kergun ..	„	„ D. Sassoon.
46	June 20 ..	Kamarej	Kashgais	„ Livingstone.
47	July 7 ..	Dastarjin	Villagers	„ Dixon.
48	„ 17 ..	Morghab	Unknown	„ Ziegler.
49	„ 27 ..	Khosrow Shirin ..	Kashgais	Imperial Bank of Persia.
50	August 22 ..	Kazerun	Villagers	Messrs. Livingstone.
51	„ 26 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Kamarejis	„ Somech.
52	September 7 ..	Konar Takhteh ..	Villagers	„ Ziegler.
53	„ 9 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Kashkulis	„ Sassoon.
54	„ 17 ..	„ ..	Road guards ..	British Indian subject.
55	„ 26 ..	Pul-i-Fesa	Kashgai	Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, I.A.
56	October 1 ..	Pulabguineh ..	Villagers	Messrs. Ziegler.
57	„ 3 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Kashkulis (?) .	„ Andrew Weir.
58	„ 12 ..	Shulgistan.. ..	Boir Ahmad ..	(*a.*) Miss Ross. (*b.*) Messrs. Ziegler. „ Dixon. Lloyd's (insured opium).
59	„ 13 ..	Deh Sheikh ..	Kashgai	Messrs. Ziegler.
60	„ 29 ..	Khaneh Khorreh ..	Uncertain	Miss Ross.
61	November 19 ..	Pul-i-Karagach ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Japanese merchants under British protection.
62	„ 30 ..	Shulgistan	Kuhgelus (?) ..	One squadron 39th C.I. Horse.
63	December 20 ..	Dastarjin .. .	Villagers	Messrs. Ziegler.
64	„ 24 ..	Kotal Dukhter ..	Kashkulis	Fifty men 39th C.I. Horse.

Note.—It seems worthy of note that only one British subject has travelled between Shiraz and Ispahan in the interval between the attack on Mr. Bill in April 1909 (No. 35) and that on Miss Ross on the 12th October, 1911.

No. 62 was an attack on a caravan near the squadron of Central India Horse proceeding to reinforce the consular escort at Ispahan; in the ensuing skirmish the rissaldar major of that regiment was severely wounded.

No. 64 was a treacherous attack by road guards, in which one sowar was killed, one wounded, and two horses killed.

Form II.

No. in Form I.	Nature of Robbery.	Value Robbed.	Amount Recovered.
		Krans.	Krans.
1	Escort, sowar, held up	2,360·00	Nil.
2	Caravan robbery	630·00	„
3	„ „	2,615·00	„
4	„ „	4,398·00	„
5	„ „	350·00	„
6	„ „	1,470·00	„
7	„ „	2,300·00	„
8	„ „	9,768·00	5,255·00
9	„ „	2,745·00	Nil.
10	„ „	7,800·00	„
11	„ „	2,785·00	„
12	„ „	2,550·00	„
13	„ „	1,150·00	„
14	„ „	2,730·00	„
15	„ „	2,650·00	„
16	„ „	1,220·00	„
17	„ „	31,368·25	„
18	„ „	2,065·75	„
19	„ „	2,396·00	„
20	Robbery and assault	10,600·00	„
21	„ „	6,194·00	„
22	Caravan robbery	651·00	651·00
23	Attack	5,800·00	5,800·00
24	Caravan robbery	18,888·00	Nil.
25	„ „	1,749·00	„
26	„ „	1,800·00	„
27	„ „	2,332·00	„
28	„ „	5,800·00	„
29	Robbery and assault	2,110·00	„
30	Caravan robbery	23,072·00	„
31	„ „	28,080·00	„
32	„ „	1,119·00	„
33	„ „	21,792·00	4,196·00
34	Robbery and assault	5,600·00	600·00
35	Attack on His Majesty's consul (two sowars of escort killed)	..	..
36	Caravan robbery	565·00	Nil.
37	„ „	2,941·00	1,373·85
38	„ „	54,277·00	Nil.
39	Attack	398·00	„
40	„	346·00	„
41	Caravan robbery	5,673·00	„
42	„ „	1,320·00	„
43	„ „	835·00	„
44	„ „	4,510·00	„
45	„ „	3,500·00	„
46	„ „	4,698·00	„
47	„ „	1,300·00	„
48	„ „	15,515·00	„
49	„ „	15,000·00	„
50	„ „	750·00	„
51	„ „	2,057·00	„
52	„ „	280·00	„
53	„ „	2,500·00	„
54	„ „	1,349·00	„
55	Robbery and assault	..	Property restored.
56	Caravan robbery .. .	600·00	Nil.
57	„ „	21,600·00	„
58	(*a.*) Robbery and assault ..	13,515·00 (255*l.*)	13,515·00
	(*b.*) Caravan robbery	359,100·00 (approximate)	Nil.
59	Caravan robbery	5,115·00	
60	Attack	633·00	„
61	Robbery and assault	..	„
62	Skirmish	..	..
63	Caravan robbery	..	..
64	Attack	850·00	850·00
	Total..	..	..
		738,165·00	32,240·85

Note.—The designation of caravan robbery includes in some cases simple thefts of merchandise on the road.

STATEMENT of Wilful Damage to the Lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Department between Bushire and Abadeh.

	Krans.
Year ended the 1st January, 1909	16,726
" " " 1910	33,893
" " " 1911	47,323
Total	97,942

G. G. KNOX.

[8094] No. 418.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 24.)

Sir, *India Office, February 23, 1912.*

IN continuation of previous correspondence and with reference to Sir Eyre Crowe's letter dated the 24th January, 1912, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to enclose, for the information of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, copies of a telegram and a despatch transmitted to the Government of India in regard to the establishment of wireless telegraph stations in the Persian Gulf.*

It will be observed that, in accordance with the request made in Sir Eyre Crowe's letter, the Government of India have been asked to furnish an estimate, for communication to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, of the amount of revenue to be derived from the new stations.

I am to add that the Marquis of Crew sees no reason why the Persian Government should not be informed of the intentions of His Majesty's Government, but I am to suggest that His Majesty's Minister at Teheran should consult the political resident in the Persian Gulf before making the intimation.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[8090] No. 419.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd February, 1912, regarding the protection of trade routes in Persia.

India Office, February 23, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 419.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) *February 23, 1912.*

MY telegram dated 9th January.

Following received from Chamber of Commerce, Kurrachee, 15th:—

"Chamber would urge the provision of a small armed escort of Indian troops for each caravan leaving Bundar Abbas for Kerman and *vice versâ*, also, if possible, for caravans beyond Kerman. This temporary measure would, the Chamber think, help materially towards the protection of British trade interests viâ Bundar Abbas till such time as Persian Government re-establish order on trade routes of Southern Persia."

Following reply sent:—

"Proposals similar to those put forward by Chamber have been considered already. His Majesty's Government does not think it desirable to send small armed escorts of Indian troops to accompany caravans, but other measures for safeguarding the trade routes are under consideration."

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* Not printed.

[8040] No. 420.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 137 of 21st February.

Some time ago Russian Minister told me that the Russian consul-general at Tabreez suspected Lecoffre of having disseminated reports as to Russian atrocities and also of having instigated mutilation of Russian corpses.

I made enquiries, the satisfactory result of which I communicated to the Russian Minister.

British acting consul at Tabreez has now made enquiry at the branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia, who emphatically declare that they made to the Russian consul-general no statement whatever of the kind indicated in your telegram. Local bank manager considers the charge a base calumny and is willing to swear that Lecoffre, who stayed with him during his whole stay at Tabreez, is innocent. Manager also states that he himself heard Lecoffre tell fedais whom he happened to meet that it was folly to fight the Russians.

[8051] No. 421.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 24, 1912.*

I GATHER from my Russian colleague that the Russian Government have in contemplation a loan to the Persian Government of 6,000,000*l.* to be arranged by the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Russian Bank.

They have instructed my colleague to report on the value as security of the Crown lands, maliat, mint, passports, and unpledged surplus of the customs.

(Repeat to St. Petersburgh.)

[8076] No. 422.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 131 of 22nd February.

Governor-General at Meshed has asked British consul-general to write to the agitators that the ex-Shah has agreed to leave Persia on the representations of the two Powers.

British consul-general has asked my authority, as the agitation is increasing and as his Russian colleague is encouraging it, to act as desired by the Governor-General.

I have told him that he can write to whom he likes that the two Governments are urging the ex-Shah to leave Persia, and that the only matters which remain to be settled are those connected with his pension.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[8141] No. 423.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 136 of 21st February.

Oil company's agent at Kasr-i-Shirin asked last month whether I could send an escort of Indian sowars to protect the company's property till order was restored.

I replied that I could not authorise the use of Kermanshah consular escort for the purpose, and that I did not see my way to advise further dispatch of troops from India.

I have acted as instructed in your telegram, and Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Persian Government are trying to send the new governor, Farman Farma, with some forces to Kermanshah, but the necessary money is lacking.

Salar-ed-Dowleh and Daoud Khan have already fled from Kermanshah (see my telegram No. 113 of 13th February).

[8148] No. 424.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 24, 1912.*

REUTER telegram reports that you stated in the House of Commons on 21st February that our share in the Anglo-Russian advance would be used to restore security on the southern roads.

In view of your telegram No. 88 of the 5th February, I have discussed with Mornard a draft programme of expenditure which, in accordance with Swedish colonel's estimates, provides for 420,000 tomans for the gendarmerie, enough to finance the organisation for six months. I presume that you regard this as satisfactory, or would you wish me to insist on the sum being expressly divided between north and south gendarmerie? It would seem quite unnecessary, and would starve other urgent needs, to earmark so large a sum as 100,000*l.* for the portion of the gendarmerie to be organised in the south. See my telegram No. 84 of 2nd February.

[7394] No. 425.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the proposed construction of a railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of further correspondence with the India Office on the subject,* and to enquire whether, in the opinion of the Board of Trade, the section of the line from Mohammerah to Dizful might be expected to prove remunerative.

Sir E. Grey would also be glad to learn the views of the Board as the prospects which the line would be likely to have of competing successfully with the Bagdad Railway.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[7438] No. 426.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a draft telegram regarding the situation in Southern Persia which he would propose, subject to his Lordship's concurrence, to send to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I am at the same time to enquire, with reference to your letter of the 16th instant, whether Lord Crewe is of opinion that the moment has now arrived for informing the Persian Government of the amount of compensation that His Majesty's Government have decided to claim for the attack on Mr. Consul Smart, in view of the fact that the sum has recently been mentioned in the House of Commons.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Nos. 39 and 393.

[7950] No. 427.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 112 of 12th February and Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 74 of 23rd February: Russian troops.

The withdrawal of Russian troops from Kazvin is so extremely desirable that I should be much disappointed if the decision is now reversed. Do you consider that their presence near the capital is essential for the safety of foreign lives and property, or are the Persian Government strongly urging it?

(Repeated to Sir G. Buchanan, No. 150.)

[7956] No. 428.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 25, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 77 of 23rd February: Tabreez.

I gather that Mr. Shipley shares in a measure acting consul's opinion respecting Shuja, and the desirability of his being appointed Governor-General.

In view of our joint action regarding ex-Shah, is there any possibility of Persian Government agreeing to the appointment of Shuja as Governor-General, and could he be trusted to remain loyal to them?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 151.)

[8338] No. 429.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Batoum, February 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the newspaper "Kavkaz" of the 31st January (13th February) reports the return to Erivan from Tabreez, on the 27th January (o.s.), of the battalion of the Mingrelian Grenadier Regiment which has been employed in Persian territory for the past three years. This battalion was originally sent to Ardebil, but when further reinforcements were required at Tabreez the battalion was ordered to proceed thither by forced marches. The grenadiers were the troops that suffered so heavily during the attack made by the fedais in the streets of Tabreez on a detachment belonging to the regiment.

According to the same newspaper, the 1st Caucasian Rifle Regiment also returned to Tiflis on the 29th January (o.s.) from the Persian province of Azerbaijan.

I have, &c.
P. STEVENS.

[8230] No. 430.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 54.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the *aide-mémoire*, of which a summary was forwarded to you in my telegram No. 64 of the 16th instant, setting forth the conditions on which the Russian Government consent to join His Majesty's Government in making an advance of 100,000*l.* each to the Persian Government.

The Russian Government consider that, although some of the conditions stated in your telegram No. 73 of the 2nd instant are practically fulfilled, the British and

Russian Ministers at Tehran should nevertheless address a joint note to the Persian Government, recording all the conditions laid down by the two Governments. This note should, in their opinion, more especially demand an undertaking to the effect that the Persian Government will in future conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian understanding, leaving it to them to propose a formula that will be acceptable to themselves.

The *aide-mémoire* adds that in thus agreeing, in view of the desperate financial position of the Persian Government, not to connect the question of this advance with any further conditions than those above referred to, the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to make any further pecuniary assistance dependent on certain demands, of which they will in due course inform His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 430.

Aide-mémoire.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government agrees to make, jointly with the British Government, an advance to the Persian Government of 100,000*l.* from each Power, on the conditions expressed in the *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy of the 21st January (3rd February), omitting, however, from the second point of these conditions the phrase "without the consent of the Russian Government," as has been already verbally intimated to the British Ambassador by M. Sazenof.

At the same time, the Imperial Government considers it necessary to insist on a higher rate of interest on this loan than that which was mentioned in the embassy *aide-mémoire* of the 28th January (10th February), namely, on a rate of 7 per cent. The considerations which impel the Imperial Government to this decision were set forth in detail in the *aide-mémoires* addressed by the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the embassy on the 30th January (12th February) and the 16th (29th) July, 1910. As regards the control over the expenditure of this advance, it appears desirable that the distribution of the money should be approved beforehand by the Russian and British missions in Tehran, in agreement with the acting Treasurer-General, who would then see to it that the money was in fact spent on the objects determined. The security for the Russian share of the loan should be the surplus of the northern customs receipts, and, in case of their being insufficient, any other sources of revenue of the Persian Treasury which may be agreed upon with the Persian Government. The whole advance must be repaid out of the first proceeds of the impending large loan.

Although some of the conditions stated in the *aide-mémoire* of the embassy of the 21st January (3rd February) are already in fact fulfilled, it appears, nevertheless, desirable that the two Ministers should address a joint note to the Persian Government, setting forth all the conditions laid down by the two Governments. In particular, this note should demand from the Persian Government a simple undertaking to make its policy in the future conform with the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention, leaving it to the Persians, if they so desire, to propose some other formula on this point more acceptable to them.

While bringing the above to the knowledge of the British Embassy, and while expressing its readiness to furnish the Russian representative in Tehran with instructions in the sense above indicated, the Imperial Ministry considers it necessary, at the same time, to stipulate that, though now agreeing, in view of the desperate position of the Persian Government and the necessity of coming rapidly to its assistance, not to connect the question of the advance with any further conditions than those stated above, it reserves to itself the right to make any further pecuniary assistance to the Persian Government dependent on certain demands, as to which it will not fail in due course to inform the British Government.

St. Petersburgh, February 2 (15), 1912.

[8193] No. 431.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 158.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 21, 1912.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 54 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that, in reply to enquiries made recently at the Sublime Porte, I have been informed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has so far only heard of the departure of one of the Persian members on the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission for Constantinople. It has, therefore, not been possible to fix the date for the meeting of the commission, but the Ottoman Government expect to hear soon that all the Persian commissioners are on their way, and they anticipate no delay in commencing work on their arrival, as the Turks themselves are quite ready with their commissioners and their *dossier*.

I will inform you by telegram as soon as I have any more definite news on the subject.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[8236] No. 432.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 59.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 22, 1912.

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your despatch No. 35 of the 7th of this month, I yesterday informed M. Sazonof that Assim Bey had, in a recent conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, expressed the desire to obtain some guarantee that, in the event of the places now occupied by Russian troops being declared by the Turco-Persian Commission or by The Hague Tribunal to be in Turkish territory, the Russian Government would cause those places to be evacuated.

M. Sazonof informed me, in reply, that the Ottoman Ambassador had already spoken to him on the subject, and that he had replied that the Russian Government had not the slightest intention of occupying any portion of Turkish territory. His Excellency had added that, as many of the places now occupied by Turkish troops were considerably outside the disputed zone, there was not the least likelihood of any such decision as the Ambassador had indicated being taken either by the Turco-Persian Commission or by The Hague Tribunal.

M. Sazonof explained to me that, in holding this language to Turkhan Pasha, he had had in his mind the Shipley-Minorsky map.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[8459] No. 433.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, February 26, 1912.

DANS notre opinion, le Gouvernement persan ne fait que retarder le départ si urgent de Perse de Mohammed Ali par les difficultés créées au sujet de sa pension, d'une avance destinée à couvrir ses engagements envers ses adhérents Turcomans et autres et de l'amortisation de cette avance.

Nous chargeons M. Poklewsky de s'exprimer dans le sens qu'une défalcation de 20,000 tomans, d'une pension de 70,000, somme de la pension projetée, réduction contre laquelle nous n'élevons pas d'objections, est trop considérable. Cette déduction devrait être réduite à 10,000.

Quant à l'avance, elle devrait être suffisante pour couvrir les nécessités réelles, le contraire ne pouvant que faire prévoir des troubles et des rapines de la part de ces mêmes Turcomans et adhérents.

M. Poklewsky est chargé d'appuyer sur ces conclusions.

La question la plus urgente étant le départ de l'ex-Schah, il serait extrêmement désirable que Sir George Barclay fût muni d'instructions qui le mettent à même d'appuyer M. Poklewsky en cette démarche.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 26 février, 1912.

[8310] No. 434.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 146 of 25th February.

Following is telegram from acting consul at Tabreez, dated 16th February, to which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs refers:—

"I take the liberty of expressing my following humble opinion:—

"However justified may be the view of the Persian Government, they should not forget that Shuja-ed-Dowleh is undoubtedly the only man able to maintain order in Azerbaijan, where numerous lawless tribes, while openly declaring that they have nothing to fear from the central authorities, have the greatest fear of him, excepting perhaps Sipahdar, who, if he is appointed, would require Shuja-ed-Dowleh's co-operation as long as the latter is allowed to remain in the country, Shuja having, I am informed, some secret pact with the chiefs of the tribes.

"Shuja also governs by will of the Russian consul-general, taking all his instructions from him. He tried to take possession of all the administrations, including the customs, but was prevented by the Russian consul-general. His subordinates, Rashid-ul-Mulk and Rafi-ed-Dowleh, are the curse of the town and of the province; they are exacting money from rich and poor, and in any case should not be connected with local authorities."

Persian Government are as strongly opposed as ever to the appointment of Shuja Governor-General, and I very much doubt whether he could be trusted to remain loyal to them.

In confirmation of this opinion following telegram has just reached me from acting consul at Tabreez:—

"Shuja-ed-Dowleh, in order to assure himself co-operation of the Khan Maku, appointed him Governor-General of Khoy [?, Salmas, and Urmia districts; he is also bestowing titles on the principal chiefs of all the tribes, including Kurds; the whole, I am informed, is part of the programme in favour of the ex-Shah. I hear that general rising of the population of Azerbaijan will be made to take place in the spring to try and force the return of ex-Shah. Unless the Persian Government takes immediate steps to thwart such intrigues we can expect trouble very soon."

[8357] No. 435.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 144 of 25th February.

Persian Government are certainly not strongly urging the continued presence of the Russian troops at Kazvin. They occasionally ask me to press for their withdrawal. Nevertheless, and though I do not think that the presence of troops near the capital is essential for the safety of foreign lives and property, I still think that it would be wiser not to press for their withdrawal for the moment, for I feel that the removal of the fedais is more likely to be accomplished without bloodshed if the fedais know that Russian troops are within easy march. Moreover, it ought not to be lost sight of that, if untoward incidents occur at the time of the removal of fedais and the Russian troops had to return, the chance of the reoccupation becoming permanent would be greater.

[8436] No. 436.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 26, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 26th February.

Russian Minister tells me that orders have now been received for the withdrawal to Russia of the Russian troops at Enzeli and Resht and also for the withdrawal of the force at Kazvin, of which one regiment of Cossacks, two battalions of infantry, and four mountain guns will remain at Enzeli and Resht, the remainder returning to Russia.

Considerable reduction in the Tabreez force has also been ordered.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[8439] No. 437.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 138 of 26th February, which I did not repeat to St. Petersburgh.

Russian Minister tells me that he has instructed the Russian consul-general to discourage Shuja from making any appointments, as such a course will make a return to a legal situation—government by a Governor-General appointed by the Central Government—more difficult.

It is no doubt desirable that Shuja should remain *de facto* governor [?] until the Central Government can send Sipahdar, but the strongest injunctions should be given him by the Russian Government to refrain from resisting. I understand that the Persian Government would be quite prepared later on to reinstate him as Governor of Maragha under Sipahdar as Governor-General.

(Private.)

Miller has applied for leave, evidently from fear at not being supported by his Minister in regard to Shuja.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[8444] No. 438.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 129 of 22nd February.

Ex-Shah has asked Russian Government for a ship of war to take him away and for a loan of 6,000 roubles, which he promises to repay as soon as he reaches Odessa. I understand that arrangements are being made to meet his wishes.

His Imperial Majesty has again begged the Russian Government to obtain for him renewal of his former pension, and that the money needed to pay off Turkomans and Caucasians, which he now states is only 70,000 tomans, should be provided partly by the Persian Government.

Russian Government adhere to pension of 75,000 tomans and to ex-Shah bearing expenses of paying off Turkomans, &c., but they think that the sum required should be paid back to the Persian Government by annual deductions not of 25,000 tomans, but of 10,000 tomans.

Russian Minister is pressing for Persian Government's consent, and, in view of urgency of the matter, I am joining him.

Russian consul [*sic*] thinks and Russian Government concur that the distribution of the 70,000 tomans should be effected before the ex-Shah leaves.

Unless the two banks advance this sum, I do not see how it is to be paid. To obtain the necessary sanction for the Russian Bank to bear its share will involve delay. Could not Imperial Bank of Persia be urged to advance it on the current account as a first charge on the joint Government advance?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh and Government of India.)

[8445] No. 439.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 26, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Meshed to-day, No. 16:—

"Position is that Royalists are holding the shrine as before, and are increasing in numbers. I have every reason to believe that my Russian colleague is still encouraging them in every way.

"(Addressed to Tehran; sent to India.)"

I have replied as follows:—

"You should propose to your colleague such joint action as you think desirable with a view to quieting the agitation, and report to me result of your interview.

"After the repeated instructions which I learn from St. Petersburgh have been sent to him, your colleague can hardly refuse to join in any action which would be desirable."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[8449] No. 440.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 113 of 13th February.

Persian Government learn that Salar-ed-Dowleh has retaken Kermanshah and looted bazaars.

Russian Minister has no instructions as regards joint communication to Salar-ed-Dowleh (see your telegram No. 105 of 8th February).

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[8193] No. 441.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 26, 1912.*

TURCO-PERSIAN Frontier Commission.

Please report by telegram as soon as you know date of departure of Persian delegates; according to Turkish Government, only one has started.

[8148] No. 442.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 137 of 24th February: Gendarmerie.

Reuter's report is inaccurate. I regard proposal discussed with acting treasurer-general as quite sufficient. You may act accordingly.

[8444] No. 443.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 26, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 142 of 26th February.

We are asking bank to advance 35,000 tomans at once. Please telegraph whether M. Sazonof will ask Russian Bank to do the same within the next two days, otherwise we will ask Imperial Bank to advance the whole sum.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 149.)

[6633] No. 444.

Foreign Office to Mr. Lynch.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge with an expression of his thanks the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, enclosing for his confidential information a memorandum on a scheme for the policing of the Bushire–Isfahan trade route.

I am to inform you, in reply, that a scheme very similar to the one outlined in your letter is now under consideration—if it is not already decided upon—by the Persian Government. Sir E. Grey will, however, send a copy of your scheme to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and will instruct him to discuss it with the Persian Government if arrangements are not already settled, or if it is thought that any of your suggestions can usefully be incorporated in their scheme.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[8463] No. 445.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 165.)
Sir, *Pera, February 22, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN in his telegram No. 23 stated that M. Sazonof had expressed the view that the report of the joint commission (Shipley-Minorsky) being confidential, it was undesirable that it should be communicated to the Turkish and Persian Governments; and again in your telegram No. 48, repeating Sir G. Buchanan's, the latter stated that M. Tcharykof had been instructed to concert with me as to what portions of the joint report should be communicated to the Persian Ambassador.

I had not gathered that his Excellency intended to make any communication of this nature at the present moment, but proposed to wait until the members of the Persian Commission arrived here. This morning, however, M. Tcharykof told me he had already made a communication to the Persian Ambassador of which he left me a copy, which I enclose herewith.

On my expressing some surprise, his Excellency said that the communication contained nothing confidential, and was of a very anodyne nature.

M. Tcharykof added that the Persian Ambassador, who is the first Persian commissioner, had little or no hope of coming to an agreement here. He thought there would be two or three sittings, and that then the joint commission would break up, and the matter would then be submitted to The Hague Tribunal.

The terms of the submission would be a matter in which we could render assistance to both parties.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 445.

Résumé of Report by M. Minorsky and Mr. Shipley respecting the Turco-Persian Frontier Question, June 8 to September 16, 1911.

Le Statu quo *avant* 1911.

Kotur.

ALORS qu'en général les Turcs tâchent de représenter leur marche en avant depuis 1905 comme une simple reprise de territoires leur appartenant en droit historiquement, ils ne formulent, au moins ouvertement, aucune revendication concernant Kotur pour la raison que ce district a été cédé à la Perse en exécution de l'article 60 du Traité de Berlin.

Nous avons constaté, toutefois, qu'une partie du territoire de Kotur tel qu'il est marqué sur la carte annexée au protocole signé le 15 (27) juillet, 1880, à Sarakamyah par les Colonels Hamley et Zelenoy, a été retenue par les Turcs [à savoir, les terrains des villages de Bedjik (*recte* Biledjik), Razi, Gharatil (Haratil), Ghellik (Djellik)-Youkary, Ghellik (Djellik)-Aschaga, et Panamérik—tous à l'ouest de Kotur].

Chehrik.

On peut dire que les empiétements turcs proprement dits commencent au sud de la montagne de Surava, où la frontière, avant 1905, passait par la ligne de partage des eaux entre Khanyga (turc) et la gorge de Drishvan (Deirik), laquelle se trouvait à cette époque entre les mains des Persans. Voici les points-frontière qui viennent après Chehrik, en allant du nord au sud; entre le col de Boroosh-Khoran (carte id. Borooshe-Koura) celui de Balakoo entre Khaneberi (persan, carte id. Hassaberi), et Khane Soor (turc), les villages de Sary-Chichek (non marqué sur la carte id.) et Djander (carte id. Djan-Dara), et la source de Khani-Ziaret, sise en-dessus du village d'Ourtanya (dans le district de Shepiran).

Somaï.

La limite du territoire persan à l'ouest de Somaï semble n'avoir jamais été clairement définie, mais elle s'étendait certainement le long de la vallée du fleuve nord (la rivière dite Somaï ou Berduk) qui après son confluent avec les rivières Bazhirga et Arzin, forme la Nazly Chaï, jusqu'aux ruines de la Berduk Kala érigée par les anciens begs de Somaï.

Baradost.

A Baradost la frontière était formée par la montagne de Kotur et les embranchements de Seri-Baydost qui dominent la plaine de Baradost. Il est à mentionner que les villages de Séro et Sartyk, situés dans cette plaine, étaient gouvernés par les Turcs quelques temps avant 1905. Nous apprîmes qu'il y a de cela une vingtaine d'années un criminel, qui s'était évadé d'une prison turque, prit résidence à Séro. Les autorités turques s'étant adressées en vue de son extradition au Gouverneur d'Urmiah, reçurent de ce dernier la réponse que l'affaire n'était pas de sa juridiction, vu que le village en question appartenait au Cheik de Shemdinan et se trouvait par conséquent sous l'administration turque. C'est cette confusion des droits de l'État avec ceux du propriétaire terrien, dont il y a maints exemples dans le différend de frontière, qui conduisit, d'après nos renseignements, à l'occupation des deux villages ci-dessus mentionnées. Tout le reste de la vallée de Baradost était à la Perse qui possédait un poste douanier à Béhik.

Tergever.

Au sud de Baradost à Arzin (qui fait partie de Tergever) il existait une maison de douane persane où des impôts étaient perçus jusqu'au mois de Djaddy de l'Ilan II (janvier 1905). Au sud de là, la frontière est formée par la ligne de partage des eaux du haut massif de la frontière coupée seulement par la rivière de Kialoo dans le district d'Alan, et de la petite rivière de Vazné, dépendant de cette dernière.

Tergever est séparé de la Turquie par le massif de Sitaver. Derbond, situé à l'orifice de la gorge d'où sort le Rouze-Chaï, est habité par des Kurdes (sous la domination du frère de Beder Khan Beg) qui même actuellement sont peu disposés à reconnaître la souveraineté turque.

Desht.

Il existait aurefois à Desht une maison de douane persane (au village de Djermi, situé à la source du Berde-Soor) et ce district, ainsi que Tergever, n'ont été occupés par les Turcs qu'après la mémorable défaite de Madjdus-Saltané par Yaver Pacha du 1er août, 1907.

Mergever.

A Mergeyer le siège de la douane persane se trouvait à Norgui. Dans ce district on nous permit de voyager nous-mêmes avec nos escortes jusqu'à Binar, qui est la gorge la plus éloignée dans le massif de la frontière, et nous apprîmes que le caravansérail de Zini-Khan constituait jusqu'à la récente marche en avant des Turcs, la frontière entre les deux États.

Ushnu.

Dans le district d'Ushnu le défilé bien connu de Kélé-Shin a toujours été considéré comme formant la frontière; ce fait est confirmé par tous les voyageurs qui ont visité l'ancien monument qui se trouve à son sommet (*vide* de Morgan, "Mission scientifique," tome IV, vol. *i*, p. 277, 1896). Une maison de douane persane existait dans la ville même d'Ushnu, dont le gouverneur, Suleïman Khan, était subordonné au gouverneur persan d'Urmiah.

Personne des habitants, tant de Djaldian que des autres villages situées sur la route que nous avons visités, n'a pu dénier qu'ils avaient vécu sous un gouverneur persan qui, antérieurement à la marche en avant des Turcs, avait administré le pays jusqu'au massif de la frontière de Kandil.

Lahidjan.

Dans l'ancien Lahidjan il existait une maison de douane persane à Khané et les Persans levaient dans les villages, frontière de Tamarchien, Komtara et Kyz-Kapan des impôts dont le revenu annuel pour tout le Lahidjan se montait à 1,030 tomans. Tant à Shinava que sur le Mootava-tépé on voit les ruines de forts persans.

Tirkesh, &c.

Bien que Baïz Pacha, de la tribu des Mangurs, ait tâché de prouver qu'il avait toujours vécu à Tirkesh sous la juridiction turque, nous avons eu des assurances positives que Soudj-Bulagh levait habituellement des impôts à Mergan (son district). Puis, Hamzé Agha lui-même, l'ancien chef des Mangurs, fut traîtreusement assassiné en 1881 par l'Amir Nizam, alors qu'il venait à Soudj-Bulagh pour faire sa soumission aux Persans. De plus, la fille de Hamzé Agha, Bapir Agha, le représentant reconnu de la ligne aînée, supplanté depuis la marche en avant des Turcs par Baïz Pacha qui appartient à la branche cadette, a depuis les récents événements pris domicile près de Soudj-Bulagh.

Vazné.

Les droits des Persans sont un peu plus incertains par rapport à Vazné, où résident ces tribus Mangurs qui ont leurs quartiers d'hiver à Pishder (turc), et qui, depuis des générations, se considèrent comme sujets ottomans; d'autre part, les Persans font valoir que le statut personnel de ces nomades comme sujets ottomans ne saurait établir en faveur des Turcs aucun titre par rapport aux yailas (pâturages d'été) situés du côté est, c'est-à-dire persan, du massif de Kandil. Il n'y a pas de villages sur le plateau de Vazné qui est inhabitable en hiver par suite du froid rigoureux, et l'on peut dire que la longue série de négociations à ce sujet entre la Perse et la Turquie qui a continué jusqu'à une date tout à fait récente a seulement servi à montrer qu'on n'est pas arrivé à régler la question.

Serdesht.

Le dernier gouverneur persan de Serdesht (1907) a été Izamul Mulk, et des maisons de douane étaient établies à Kohné-Mishka et Bouran, avec, pour directeurs, Mirza Saïd et respectivement Mirza Ali, ainsi qu'à Beytoush. Les districts de

Beradji et Alan, où étaient situées les trois douanes prémentionnées, étaient indubitablement des districts-frontière persans. Le village d'Alsho, situé sur le versant ouest du massif Kandil, nous a été indiqué comme se trouvant en Turquie. La frontière entre Serdesht et le fort turc de Kala-Dizé (Hamidié) est formé par le défilé de Kani-Resh. La frontière sud d'Alani-Adjem (*i.e.*, Alan, turc [*sic* persan] est constituée par la rivière Kialoo à partir du pont Teyyet en amont jusqu'à son confluent avec le Kiveroo, fleuve qui forme la frontière nord-ouest des territoires de Bané.

Bané.

Bané lui-même est composé de huit districts, à savoir, Doli-Khurriava, Balwaw-Bnakhwé, Shwé, Namashir, Deshte-Tal, Kiverco, Tazhan, Pash-Arbéba, qui tous, ainsi que nous l'avons établi par une enquête sur les lieux, ont été occupés par les Turcs il y a seulement quatre à cinq ans.

Les Districts "nouveaux."

Il est à mentionner qu'aucun des fonctionnaires turcs ni civils ni militaires, avec lesquels nous sommes venus en contact durant notre voyage, n'a jamais essayé de soutenir que les districts limitrophes persans auraient été en possession des Turcs antérieurement à 1905. Le nom même de "nevahiyi djédidé" (nouveaux districts), dont on les appelle maintenant officiellement, implique le caractère récent de leur acquisition.

Le Statu quo *de* 1639.

Nous voudrions encore attirer l'attention particulière sur le fait que les Turcs en nous parlant de la nouvelle frontière, faisaient invariablement allusion à cette dernière comme à la "limite du *statu quo*." Mais l'expression précitée, attendu qu'évidemment ils ne se référaient pas à l'année 1905, ne saurait avoir aucun sens à moins d'entendre par là l'année 1639 A.D., date du traité bien connu et dont le texte par suite des omissions qu'il comporte, a fourni la base principale aux revendications Turques (*vide* Mémorandum du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères britannique sur la question de la frontière turco-persane).

Les Limites de l'Occupation actuelle.

Khoï.

Le point le plus avancé vers le nord qui se trouve actuellement entre les mains des Turcs est le village de Yezdikan situé sur le versant appartenant à Khoï du massif qui sépare ce district de Salmas. Deux autres villages dépendant de Khoï depuis une époque reculée, mais situés dans la plaine de Salmas, à savoir Mafi-Kendi et Kenyani, sont occupés par les Turcs. Les deux derniers sont en dehors de la zone neutre, telle qu'elle est représentée sur la carte identique.

Salmas.

Salmas lui-même est laissé à la Perse, mais est entouré au nord, à l'ouest et au sud par les districts occupés, à savoir :—

1. Hoder, ou la vallée des Kuresinly ; les villages persans les plus proches sont : Chichek, Séramérik et Ayan (ce dernier abandonné de ces habitants il y a à peu près deux ou trois ans).
2. Déirik et le haut plateau entre Dérik et Chehrik avec les villages de Hambanova (appartenant aux Pishnamaz de Salmas), Akhveran (appartenant à Kerbelaï Abdulla et Hadji Husseïn de Kohneshehr), &c., tandis que la ville de Kohneshehr, immédiatement à l'est de ce plateau, appartient aux Persans.
3. Chehrik et le versant nord des montagnes de Sé-guird et Karny-yarykh avec les villages d'Adjivadj, Zévédjik, &c. Les villages de Guluzan, Malham. Kabakh-tépé, Temer et Khan-Takhty sont laissés à la Perse.

Anzal.

La péninsule de Karabagh est encore entre les mains des Persans, mais la communication sur la route de Tabriz et Dilman à Urmiah est coupée par les champs du village d'Isti-su occupé par les Turcs, qui s'étendent sur les terrains donnant au nord accès au défilé de Kooshchi.

Le défilé lui-même ainsi que le village de Kooshchi sont encore détenus par les Persans, mais ceux-ci sont coupés à leur tour d'Urmiah par des terrains appartenant aux villages occupés de Djémalova et Gowlan qui s'étendent jusqu'au lac. Quant au district appelé Anzeli-Dir, seuls Djébel-Kendi, Imam-Kendi et Maku-Kendi en sont laissés à la Perse. La frontière passe le long de la crête des montagnes qui se dressent au-dessus des villages prénommés, puis tourne à l'ouest au-dessus de Kérimabad ; ensuite elle longe, dit-on, le massif qui domine Khanyghia (persan) et Askérabad et atteindrait, après avoir suivi le contour de la vallée de Hissar (persan) et Sindji située sur un affluent nord du Nazlu-chaï, le défilé de Khan-guédigi qui sépare Sindji (persan) d'Inchké-su (turc). A partir de Khan-guédigi la frontière, après avoir passé par les sommets de certains pics, descend dans la gorge du Nazlu-chaï, qu'elle traverse en aval de Kyr-neïsa, et se dirige de là le long des collines qui séparent la plaine d'Urmiah des districts éleves de Tergever et Desht. Sur la carte qu'on nous fit voir à Chehrik, la frontière, après avoir franchi le Nazlu, passe par un point appelé Talik. Certaines des personnes questionnées par nous relativement à la dernière localité nous informèrent en effet qu'elles s'en rappelaient le nom ; cependant, aucune d'elles ne fut en état de nous renseigner quant à son emplacement exact. Quoi qu'il en soit, dans la gorge du Nazlu-chaï le premier village persan est celui de Kalé-i-Ismaïl-Agha ; dans la gorge du Rowzé-chaï celui de Kelhur ; et dans la gorge de Berdé-soor celui de Bend.

Baranduz.

De la localité ainsi dénommée la frontière monte sur la montagne Sir, puis descend dans la plaine de Baranduz en laissant à la Turquie le village de Dizé, situé du côté est de la gorge. Ce village nous a été indiqué par les Turcs comme étant le seul occupé par eux sur la rive gauche du Baranduz, mais nous fûmes informés à Serdarud que les Ottomans administraient également les villages de Khataylu, Didan et Saatlu, situés en aval de Dizé. Ensuite la frontière, à partir de Dizé, longe la rive droite (ou sud) de la rivière de Baranduz jusqu'à l'endroit où celle-ci se jette dans le lac, en coupant ainsi—cette fois du côté sud—Urmiah non seulement de Soudj-Bulagh, mais même du district de Dol qui dépend encore d'Urmiah et quant auquel les Turcs ont toujours admis qu'il était territoire persan.

Dol.

La frontière commence de nouveau à un point sur le lac au sud de Djébel-Kendi et va à l'ouest par les collines entre Sarasanly (turc) et Sultanabad (persan) ; puis tourne vers le sud en suivant le massif qui sépare Dol du district de Deshtebil. Le village de Belistan, à l'époque où nous l'avons visité, était le dernier point que les Persans gardaient encore à Dol, mais à notre retour d'Urmiah nous apprîmes que le partisan turc, Mamed Emin, avait été réinstallé par les agents du Cheik Abdul Kadir et les Turcs et que de cette façon la souveraineté persane dans ce village était devenue pûrement nominale.

La Frontière au Sud de Sulduz.

Dol, qui est isolé des autres possessions persanes, est séparé de Soudj-Bulagh par le large et riche district de Sulduz qui s'étend jusqu'au lac. Depuis l'occupation de Bané par les Turcs, le territoire persan, au sud des districts de Sakkiz (séparé de Mirédé) et Khorkhora, consiste dans les districts de Merivan, et parmi eux Khaluzé est considéré comme point-frontière. Merivan (Mehreban) appartient à la province du Kurdistan persan (Senné) et est expressément mentionné dans le traité turco-persan de 1049 A.H. (1639 A.D.) comme étant une possession persane.

[8487] No. 446.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 67.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the semi-official "Rossia" of to-day publishes an article on your recent speech in the House of Commons, which it describes as a dignified reply to the systematic attacks made by English Radicals on Anglo-Russian policy in Persia. This policy is stated by certain ill-informed publicists and politicians to be based on aggressive designs on Persia. The article says that this is not the first time that you have had to come forward as the champion of the Anglo-Russian agreement, and on every occasion the invariable result has been the defeat of the Russophobes in the House of Commons who make these groundless charges. The opponents of the Anglo-Russian agreement have been very much to the fore during the last few weeks, taking advantage, for the purposes of their propaganda, of the presence in London of Mr. Morgan Shuster. The article notes, however, with satisfaction that Mr. Shuster has not succeeded in his object of raising a powerful agitation against the Anglo-Russian agreement in the United Kingdom, though of course his "revelations," coming from one imbued with an implacable hatred of Russia and the Russian Government, were widely exploited by the yellow press. But the serious public, both Liberal and Conservative, regarded the complaints of the American adventurer with indifference and mistrust.

The article goes on to say that your well-merited rebuke to the English opponents of the Anglo-Russian agreement was a fresh, and should be a final, defeat of the malcontents, who were unable to bring forward one single serious reason against the continuance of the agreement. Russian public opinion, the writer says, will note with satisfaction the sincerity and conviction with which you defended the action of Russia in Persia. The article closes by expressing a hope that this unanimity of the two Cabinets in Persian affairs will continue, since it is only such conditions that there can be any prospect of a speedy restoration of a normal political situation in Persia. Persia requires the material and moral support of her two nearest neighbours for the restoration of her credit in the European money market and for the removal of that state of anarchy which prevents her from making use of her great national resources.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[8536] No. 447.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 27.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February 24, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report by the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, dated the 9th January, 1912, which has been received through the commander-in-chief, East Indies, on the subject of the state of affairs at Bushire.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

Enclosure in No. 447.

Captain Tancred to Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

Sir, *His Majesty's Ship "Fox," at Bushire, January 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on receipt of a telegram from the acting resident, Bushire, on the 26th December, reporting grave news from the interior and asking urgently for a ship, I dispatched His Majesty's ship "Espiegle" to Bushire, and wired to the officer commanding the troops at Jashk cancelling the order for the 79th Carnatics to embark for India, and proceeded to Jashk. I also warned the troops to be ready to embark.

2. On the 27th December, the acting resident, Bushire, wired asking the strength of native troops that could be dispatched to Bushire, also what strength naval brigade could be landed. As it seemed certain that some force would be required I gave orders to embark stores and ammunition, and warned the Charbar detachment to be ready to embark.

3. On the 28th December, in accordance with your instructions, I embarked the Jashk contingent of the 79th Carnatics, consisting of 5 British and 4 Indian officers, 2 native surgeons, and 169 rank and file, with 19 camp followers, with tents, ammunition, and provisions for thirty days, and left about noon, with all dispatch, for Bushire. At the same time, I ordered "Minto" to proceed to Charbar, and embark the contingent of 79th Carnatics stationed there, and proceed to Bushire with all dispatch.

4. On the 29th December, I ordered "Odin" to Bushire. R.I.M.S. "Minto" left Charbar, having embarked 2 British and 4 Indian officers, 1 native surgeon, and 100 rank and file. I also ordered "Alert" to Basidu to take on board the portable wireless set and convey it to Bushire.

5. On the 30th December, "Fox" arrived off Reshire at 7 A.M., and commenced to disembark troops at once. A very strong south-easterly wind got up and rendered the operation very difficult, but all troops were landed by 2 P.M. There being too much surf to land the remaining ammunition and provisions, I dispatched His Majesty's ship "Espiegle" with the lighters to land them at the custom-house and arrange for their transport to the troops.

6. On the 31st December, R.I.M.S. "Minto" arrived at noon, but the weather was too rough to attempt landing at Reshire, so I sent her to Bushire inner anchorage to wait orders.

7. On the 1st January, the wind being all gone, "Minto" and "Odin" anchored off Reshire at daylight, and "Minto's" contingent were landed by 10 A.M. with all provisions, &c.

8. The 2nd January, being the day when it was expected that Colonel Douglas would try to effect a junction with the Kaserun detachment of Central India Light Horse, I arranged to meet the acting resident and consult with Colonel Andrews, commanding the troops, and the officer commanding the Bushire company of the 39th Central India Light Horse as to the situation. After due consideration, I did not consider that 290 native troops with 50 cavalry unsupported by a naval brigade or artillery were sufficiently strong to relieve Kaserun if Colonel Douglas with 250 cavalry should fail, but that with a naval brigade there was a good chance of success.

9. On the 2nd January all transport was arranged and the naval contingent ready to land at a moment's notice with fourteen days' provisions; but having received a telegram to the effect that Colonel Douglas had joined up with the Kaserun party on Kotal Dukhti the situation was eased, and I was able to dispatch "Odin" and "Espiegle" to their cruising stations, following myself as soon as I had coaled from the collier expected on the 5th January.

10. I have ordered His Majesty's ship "Alert" to remain off Reshire to keep up wireless communication, and set up the portable wireless set in the telegraph concession.

11. I would submit that a force of native infantry, with a mountain battery detachment, should be retained at Bushire in case of a recurrence of the attack on the cavalry patrolling the road, which appears more than likely, and may, next time, be on a large scale.

I have, &c.
JAMES C. TANCRED,
Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

[8616] No. 448.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 145.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, February 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 147 of 26th February: Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

Persian delegates are Ambassador at Constantinople, Etela-ul-Mulk, who left Tehran on 19th February, and Nazer-ul-Mulk, ex-Vice-Governor of Tabreez, who left Tabreez for Constantinople on 22nd February.

[8633] No. 449.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 27, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Meshed, No. 17 of 27th February:—

"My Russian colleague, having failed to create anarchy sufficient to justify intervention by encouraging the Royalists against the constitutionalists, is now trying another method. He has instigated his subjects to complain that their shops in the shrine are unsafe, and has written to karguzar that he gives him two days to disperse the mob.

"As the mob exists owing to my colleague, situation is again critical."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh and Government of India.)

[8645] No. 450.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 145 of 23rd February.

Russian Government have instructed their representative at Tehran to propose to join with Sir G. Barclay [group omitted: ? in submitting] to Persian Government formula of recognition of the Anglo-Russian convention suggested by you.

[8444] No. 451.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

(Confidential.)
Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February 27, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that it has become necessary for His Majesty's and the Russian Governments to provide a sum of 70,000 tomans for distribution among the adherents of the ex-Shah, Mohammed Ali Mirza, before his departure from Persian territory.

I am accordingly to enquire whether you can make the necessary arrangements to place immediately to the credit of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran the sum of 35,000 tomans, being the share of His Majesty's Government in the transaction.

I am to add that, if for any reason the Russian share of 35,000 tomans is not forthcoming immediately, Sir E. Grey may find it necessary to request you to place a further sum of 35,000 tomans at Sir G. Barclay's disposal.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[8657] No. 452.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

Sir, *India Office, February 27, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 24th instant, regarding the situation in Southern Persia, and, in reply, to say that, in view of the fact that the organisation of gendarmerie by the Swedish officers is expected to take twenty-one months (see telegram from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 84, dated the 2nd instant), he would deprecate the delay involved in waiting for it, especially if no interim arrangement for the preservation of order in the south can be suggested by the Persian Government.

With reference to the enquiry made in paragraph 2 of your letter, I am to say that his Lordship, for the reasons already given, would have preferred that the claims

of His Majesty's Government should be presented as a whole; but, as the sum to be demanded as compensation has been mentioned in Parliament, and as delay in claiming it may be misunderstood, he sees no objection to the proposed communication being made now to the Persian Government.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[8786] No. 453.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

Sir, 25, *Abchurch Lane, London, February 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, enquiring whether the bank can make the necessary arrangements to place immediately to the credit of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran the sum of 35,000 tomans, and to inform you in reply that the bank can at once place the said sum at Sir George Barclay's disposal.

I am requested to add that a further sum of 35,000 tomans can, if necessary, be held at the British Minister's disposal.

I am, &c.
G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

[8837] No. 454.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 28, 1912.*

IMPERIAL Bank of Persia will probably approach you this afternoon with regard to an advance of 100,000 tomans to the Persian Government independently of the advance required for the ex-Shah [?]. I spoke to the manager this morning with regard to former advance in consequence of an appeal from Mornard, but I have since seen my Russian colleague, who wishes to withhold this advance until we see how the Persian Government take the amended formula for recognition of Anglo-Russian convention which we are proposing to the Persian Government to-day. I shall telegraph again this evening.

[8854] No. 455.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 28, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 28th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs gave no certain indication as to the chance of acceptance of the amended formula. He promised to consult Cabinet to-night and tell us to-morrow verbally whether it is accepted. If it is I trust that Imperial Bank of Persia will allow their manager to advance without conditions the 100,000 tomans needed most urgently by Mornard to be repaid from the two Governments' joint advance, which, even after the amended formula is accepted, may be possibly delayed for a day or two.

Manager's present instructions preclude him from making any further advance at all, though I believe that present overdraft at the bank is composed entirely of claims against the Persian Government, which the manager has debited to their current account though they have not been recognised by the Persian Government. Mornard is doing his utmost to get these claims recognised, and manager hopes to put screw on by refusing further advances until they are recognised. I trust that this will be discouraged by the head office.

[8850] No. 456.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 158 of 26th February.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday as instructed.

His Excellency told me to-day that he was in communication with Minister of Finance, and that as soon as he received latter's sanction he would send an urgent telegram to Russian Minister authorising advance of 35,000 tomans by Russian Bank.

[8852] No. 457.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 28, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 144 of 26th February: Communication to Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is sending instructions to Russian Minister on the subject, but fears that after his recent success Salar-ed-Dowleh may not be easy to deal with.

[8946] No. 458.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 29.)

Sir, *India Office, February 28, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 16th February, 1912, regarding the enquiry made by the Persian Railways Syndicate as to assurances given by His Majesty's Government in connection with the Trans-Persian or other railway scheme in Persia.

As regards the Trans-Persian Railway, the Marquess of Crewe concurs in the reply that it is proposed to make to the syndicate.

With regard to the position of the Persian Transport Company, I am to offer the following observations for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:—

It is noted that the argument employed in the draft is dealt with by the Persian Transport Company in their letter of the 28th January, 1911, and is made by them the basis of a claim to compensation elsewhere. No reasoned answer appears to have been given to this claim, and if it is now summarily rejected in the manner proposed in the draft, Lord Crewe fears that controversy and obstruction may result.

I am, therefore, to suggest that the present opportunity should be taken to give to the claims of the Persian Transport Company the "due regard" to which alone Lord Lansdowne's assurance entitles it, and I am to observe that while the company is a body whose capacity to carry out single-handed any project of railway development is, to say the least, unproved, the Persian Railways Syndicate is thoroughly representative of British interests in Persia, its capacity is undoubted, and it comes forward with a large and comprehensive scheme of railway construction that goes far beyond the districts to which the operations of the Persian Transport Company have been confined, and may ultimately cover the whole of Southern Persia. It would, therefore, Lord Crewe believes, not be in the general interests that His Majesty's Government should support any such partial scheme as the Persian Transport Company would be in a position to propose to the detriment of the comprehensive scheme of the Persian Railways Syndicate, and I am to suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the draft reply to the syndicate might be amended by the substitution of the passage, of which a copy is enclosed, for all the words occurring after the words "districts traversed by the roads of the company." This, it will be observed, will render unnecessary the reference to the Anglo-Russian convention, and to the claim put forward by the company for preferential consideration in view of its provisions.

It is a question whether, when the draft reply to the syndicate is dispatched, a communication should not also be sent to the Persian Transport Company in the same

sense with reference to their letter of the 28th January, 1911, and the suggestion be made to them that their object should now be to come into the Persian Railways Syndicate in the manner contemplated by Sir E. Grey when he arranged that Mr. Lynch should be elected to a seat on the board.

Pending receipt of their reply, the question of the renewal of their road concession might be allowed to remain in abeyance.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 458.

Suggested Amendment of Passage in Draft Reply to Persian Railways Syndicate.

THIS assurance was not overlooked by His Majesty's Government when they entered into communication with your syndicate as to their approaching the Persian Government; but having given due regard to all the circumstances, they would not feel justified in supporting the claims of the Persian Transport Company as against the Persian Railways Syndicate for the separate construction of any of the lines included in the large and comprehensive scheme of railway development in Southern Persia which the syndicate have proposed.

His Majesty's Government have given no assurance of support to any other persons or syndicates in connection with railway construction in Persia.

[8943] No. 459.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 29.)

Sir, *India Office, February 28, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 22nd instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he concurs in the answer which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to give to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, regarding the arrest of the persons really responsible for the attack on Mr. Smart. It is, however, for consideration whether the prestige of His Majesty's Government will be advanced by the punishment of persons who were not really responsible, and whether therefore the matter should not be allowed to drop.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[8996] No. 460.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 29.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, February 29, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that Russian military authorities seized some days ago some Persian cannon which were intended for firing the usual salute for the new Turkish Ambassador, who was about to arrive at Enzeli. Notwithstanding all the efforts of the local authorities and instructions of the Russian consul from Tehran, which should have arrived in ample time, local authorities appear to have been unable to recover cannon in time to salute.

Turkish Ambassador on his arrival was very indignant at omission, and has refused to proceed farther than Resht on his way to Tehran without instructions from Constantinople, and has declined all the usual ceremonies. I understand from Russian Minister that whoever is responsible for this unfortunate blunder is likely to receive fitting punishment.

I have just received a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs saying how deeply the Persian Government feel this humiliation.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[8040] No. 461.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 133 of 24th February: Mr. Lecoffre.

There is clearly no reason why Lecoffre should not receive a new appointment.

Russian Ambassador has been informed.

[8657] No. 462.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 127 of 20th February: Southern roads.

India Office deprecate delay involved in waiting for organisation of gendarmerie, which they take as twenty-one months (see your telegram No. 84 of 2nd February).

Is this your meaning? or do you anticipate that the force will be efficient for the preservation of order in the south before that?

You should present claim for 4,734*l.* for the attack on Mr. Smart and his escort (see your telegram No. 76 of 28th January), unless you see objection at present moment.

[8616] No. 463.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 145 of 27th February.

Owing to the voluminous nature of correspondence, Mr. Shipley cannot arrive at Constantinople before 15th March; in the meantime it would be well to defer communicating any papers to the litigants, and to induce your Russian colleague to do likewise. It is especially desirable that no papers relating to discussions at Mohammerah in 1848 *et seq.* should be communicated to Turkey or Persia, pending further instructions.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 178, and Tehran, No. 155.)

[8850] No. 464.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 84 of 28th February: Ex-Shah.

I have requested Imperial Bank of Persia to place immediately at disposal of Sir G. Barclay sum of 35,000 tomans.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 153.)

[8854] No. 465.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegrams Nos. 148 and 149 of the 28th instant: Advance to Persian Government.

You should enquire of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether Russian Government would prefer to advance half the sum required, viz., 50,000 tomans, or that Imperial Bank of Persia should advance the whole.

I am requesting Imperial Bank of Persia to hold whole sum in readiness.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 154.)

[7573] No. 466.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the Russian Ambassador called here on the 16th instant and told Sir A. Nicolson that he had an unpleasant matter to bring to my notice which he wished to do privately and verbally.

M. Miller, the Russian consul-general at Tabreez, had written to say that he had proofs that M. Lecoffre had, both previous to and during the attack by the fedais on Russian troops, been an organiser of the rising, and that he, M. Miller, had had this information confirmed by British subjects in the Imperial bank at Tabreez. Count Benckendorff intimated that if M. Lecoffre received an appointment at Shiraz it would be regarded as a condonation of what he had done.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Benckendorff that M. Lecoffre must not be prejudged, that the proofs against him must be produced, and he must be given an opportunity of replying to the charges. His Excellency did not see how in the meantime M. Lecoffre's appointment in the south of Persia could be suspended or interfered with.

Count Benckendorff said he did not wish to put the matter in writing, or make a case of it, but Sir A. Nicolson replied that as his Excellency had been instructed to mention the matter it could not be left where it was.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8850] No. 467.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th instant, and in reply to request you to be so good as to place immediately at the disposal of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran the sum of 35,000 tomans.

I am to add that, should a second advance of 35,000 tomans be required as foreshadowed in my letter of the 27th, a further communication will be addressed to you.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[8854] No. 468.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that, according to a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the Persian Government may require an immediate advance of 100,000 tomans, independently of the advance of 70,000 tomans mentioned in my letter of the 27th instant.

Sir E. Grey has instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to ask whether the Russian Government would prefer to advance half of the sum required, or that the Imperial Bank should advance the whole, and I am to express the hope that, pending a reply to this enquiry, your chief manager at Tehran may be authorised to hold the entire sum in readiness for the latter eventuality.

This sum would be repaid from the British and Russian Governments' joint advance of 200,000*l.*, which may be delayed for a few days.

Sir E. Grey understands from Sir G. Barclay's telegram that Mr. A. O. Wood is precluded by his present instructions from making any further advance whatever, although the present overdraft of the Persian Government's account at your bank would

appear to consist entirely of claims against that Government, which Mr. Wood has debited to the current account of the Government, although the latter have not recognised them.

It further appears that the acting treasurer-general is doing his utmost to secure the recognition of the claims in question, and Sir E. Grey hopes therefore that instructions may be sent to Mr. Wood, directing him not to refuse the further advance pending the recognition of the claims.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9033] No. 469.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 1.)

Sir, *India Office, February 29, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 16th February, 1912, as to the renewal of the lease of the building occupied by the squadron of Indian cavalry at Ispahan, I am directed to inform you that the Secretary of State for India concurs in the terms of the telegram which Secretary Sir E. Grey proposes to address to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, suggesting an extension of the lease, if possible, for a short term.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[9128] No. 470.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 156 of 29th February.

Swedish colonel hopes to have his gendarmerie in full working order on the Bushire-Ispahan road twelve months after the arrival at Shiraz of the three Swedish officers who are starting from Tehran to-morrow—one Swedish officer is already at Shiraz. In six months after their arrival he hopes to be able to guard half of the road from Bushire to Yezd-i-kasht. He has not yet decided whether this half is to be the portion between Bushire and Shiraz or is to extend somewhat north of Shiraz and stop short at Kazerun.

So far as the south is concerned, his scheme, details of which went home by last bag, aims only at guarding the road from Bushire to Yezd-i-kasht, and whatever may be the Swedish officers' prospect of success in this restricted sphere, it would be rash to count on Persians ever being able to undertake great military effort which would be required to restore order in the south.

I shall now present claim for 4,744*l.* (loss of property was under-estimated in my telegram No. 76 of 28th January by 10*l.*), and press for its payment out of the next loan as distinct from the impending joint advance.

(Addressed to Foreign Office ; sent to India.)

[9123] No. 471.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 1, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 84 of 28th February.

Russian Government consent to advance 35,000 tomans, and have telegraphed to Russian Minister to concert with Sir G. Barclay as to method of utilising this sum for paying off ex-Shah's followers.

[9033] No. 472.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 117 of 15th February : Ispahan escort.

You should inform Colonel Douglas that, while no decision can be reached at present as to length of time for which the regiment will be required to remain at Ispahan, he should secure an extension of the lease, if possible, for a short term.

[9123] No. 473.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 1, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 87 of 1st March : ex-Shah.

You are authorised to act with your Russian colleague.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 188.)

[9117] No. 474.

Minute by the Earl of Onslow.

Sir Arthur Nicolson,

LORD ERRINGTON came to see me this morning about the trans-Persian railway. It appears that the French and Russian groups are pushing things forward, and that Messrs. Barings are therefore taking action to form an English group. The financial consideration is not immediately of any great consequence, only 30,000*l.* being required, of which but 15,000*l.* need be paid up, but Lord Revelstoke is anxious to appoint a "conseil d'administration," and the following names are suggested :—

Sir W. Garstin.
Sir D. Rees.
Honourable Hugo Baring (representing Parr's Bank).
Mr. C. F. Campbell (representing Forbes, Forbes, Campbell and Co.).
General Sir B. Blood.
Representative of Messrs. Sassoon.
Representative of the Imperial Bank of Persia.
Lord Errington.

None of these individuals had been approached yet, and Lord Errington told me that if we had any remarks to make as to their suitability, Messrs. Baring would be glad to hear them before they were approached, rather than later.

As regards the "comité" for technical purposes, they suggest two engineers and Colonel Beddoes. They are not wedded to the latter, but thought that as he knows Persia he was as good as anyone else. Seligmans have offered to lend him to Barings if they want him.

Lord Errington also gave me the letter, copy of which is attached. He is going to Paris next week to represent the English group and to meet M. Bénac and M. Raffalovitch to settle the statutes.

Lord Errington was going over to the India Office to see Sir A. Hirtzel, but he said that before he went to Paris he would, if possible, like to know whether we or the India Office would be the principal department concerned in this matter.

March 1, 1912. O.

Enclosure in No. 474.

M. Bénac to Lord Revelstoke.

Milord, *Paris, le 28 février*, 1912.

COMME suite à ma lettre du 21 février courant, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que les établissements constituant le groupe français pour l'étude du chemin de fer transpersan se sont réunis la semaine dernière. Ils ont accepté les modifications que vous et le groupe russe aviez proposé d'apporter au protocole du 11 janvier, ainsi que les modifications au projet de statuts de la société d'études qui en étaient la conséquence. Dans cette réunion les établissements ont examiné l'ensemble de ce projet de statuts et y ont apporté certaines modifications qui ne touchent en rien l'ensemble de leurs dispositions.

Je suis avisé que M. Raffalovitch viendra la semaine prochaine à Paris, pour nous proposer, au nom du groupe russe, un certain nombre d'observations sur ce même projet. Dans ces conditions, je crois préférable d'attendre que nous soyons en possession de ses observations pour vous envoyer un projet des statuts avec un texte rectifié définitif. Je pense que la présence à Paris de M. Raffalovitch nous permettra d'arriver rapidement à la constitution de la société d'études. Il serait bien désirable que vous pussiez être présent à la constitution de cette société, qui sera suivie immédiatement d'une réunion du conseil d'administration dans laquelle devra être étudié, sinon arrêté, le programme général de la marche de l'affaire.

J'aurai donc soin de vous prévenir quelques jours à l'avance de la date à laquelle votre présence sera nécessaire; s'il vous était impossible de venir, vous voudrez bien avoir l'obligeance de déléguer un représentant.

Le groupe russe nous a fait connaître les noms des huit administrateurs qui doivent le représenter dans le conseil de la future société d'études, ainsi que les noms des membres de leur groupe dans le comité d'administration. Vous en trouverez ci-incluse la liste. Nous nous occupons du choix des personnes qui seront désignées par le groupe français pour le représenter dans le conseil d'administration et dans le comité de direction. Je vous serais obligé de vouloir bien penser aux choix que vous aurez à faire pour le compte du groupe anglais: ce choix doit porter sur huit administrateurs et sur trois membres du comité de direction.

Je me permets de vous rappeler que chaque administrateur devra être souscripteur d'au moins une action dans le capital de la société d'études.

Ainsi que vous le savez, le projet de statuts de la société d'études prévoit la nomination pour le conseil d'administration d'un président et de deux vice-présidents. La désignation de l'un des vice-présidents appartiendra au groupe anglais, celle de l'autre vice-président au groupe russe. Quant au président, je pense que vous serez d'accord, ainsi que l'est déjà le groupe russe, pour qu'il soit désigné par le groupe français. Je dois vous dire, à cet égard, que le nom de M. Raindre, ancien Ambassadeur, a été mis en avant pour ces fonctions. J'espère que vous n'aurez pas d'objection à cette désignation.

Ainsi que je vous le faisais pressentir dans ma lettre du 21 février courant, il n'est pas possible, étant données les dispositions de la loi française, d'insérer dans les statuts de la société d'études les modifications que vous avez proposées en vue d'accentuer le caractère international de la société et la nécessité de la représentation proportionnelle de chaque groupe dans le conseil d'administration et dans le comité de direction; mais ces stipulations pourront être reproduites dans un protocole additionnel.

J'aurai soin de vous tenir au courant du résultat de nos conversations avec M. Raffalovitch, dont, ainsi que je vous le dis plus haut, l'arrivée à Paris m'est annoncée pour la semaine prochaine.

Veuillez, &c.
A. BENAC.

[9199] No. 475.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received March 2.)

Sir, 25, *Abchurch Lane, London, March* 1, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, to hand this morning, and to inform you that we have telegraphed to the chief manager of the bank in Tehran in the terms of your letter.

I am requested to enclose, for your information, a translation of the telegram we have dispatched to Mr. Wood.

I am, &c.
G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

Enclosure in No. 475.

Translation of a Telegram dispatched by the Imperial Bank of Persia, London, to the Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran, March 1, 1912.

REFERRING to our telegram of yesterday, after consulting Foreign Office we agreed to advance Persian Government 1,000,000 krans, which will be repayable from joint advance of 200,000*l*. Foreign Office inform us that they have asked Russian Government whether they prefer join to the extent of one-half this sum, or that Imperial Bank of Persia advance the whole, and you are authorised hold the 1,000,000 krans in readiness for latter eventuality. Foreign Office wish us omit conditions your letter 3rd February, and state that treasurer-general doing utmost secure Persian Government recognition 3,500,000 krans; we agree.

[9213] No. 476.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March* 2, 1912.

MY telegram No. 142 of 26th February.

Ex-Shah has gone to Russian naval station of Ashurada, leaving his brother, Shoa-es-Sultaneh, at Asterabad to settle with His Majesty's Turkomans and Caucasian followers in concert with Russian consul.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburgh.)

[9276] No. 477.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, March* 2, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from Shiraz, 2nd March:—

"Major Kettlewell and Captain Pitcher were exercising one squadron of Indian cavalry about 6 miles from town. Inhabitants of village called Sultanabad and riflemen in sangar on hill above village fired at our cavalry about forty shots in all, some falling right amongst our men. Major Kettlewell restrained his men from returning fire, and managed to get into communication with riflemen on hill, who said they had taken our sowars for surkhis who had been plundering villages in the neighbourhood. They expressed regret for mistake. I made necessary representations to Kavam, who brought in Kadkhoda of Sultanabad and sent him to consulate. As incident really seems to be result of a mistake, I, with Douglas's concurrence, reproved kadkhoda in suitable terms and warned him of danger he and his village would incur if such mistake were repeated. I am informing local authorities that I cannot be responsible for results of action our troops may have to take if fired on again."

I have approved acting consul's attitude.

[9279] No. 478.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 29th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs considers no further advance ought to be made to Persian Government until the latter have accepted the proposals contained in joint note.

When once these proposals are accepted the Russian Bank would be instructed to advance half, viz., 50,000 tomans.

[9199] No. 479.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 149 of 28th February: Advance to Persian Government.

Imperial Bank of Persia are holding 100,000 tomans in readiness in case Russian Government prefer Imperial Bank to advance whole sum. Bank agree to omit Mr Wood's conditions.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 191.)

[8437] No. 480.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 79. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 118 of the 7th ultimo, I transmit to you a memorandum,* which has been prepared in this Office, relative to the proposed submission of the Turco-Persian frontier dispute to The Hague Tribunal.

Your Excellency will observe that the conclusion is reached in this memorandum that an attempt should be made, before the expiration of the time limit specified in article 4 of the protocol of the 21st December, 1911, to induce the Turkish Government to agree to the settlement of the frontier dispute by reference to a mixed commission at Constantinople.

I concur generally in this conclusion, and I am of opinion—principally because British interests in the Mohammerah region might be affected by an adverse arbitral award which might also prove inconsistent with assurances extended by His Majesty's Government to the Sheikh of Mohammerah—that it would, if possible, be desirable for the dispute to be settled without reference to The Hague Tribunal.

I propose shortly to furnish you with a copy of a detailed memorandum which is now being prepared, on the basis of important correspondence which has recently been procured from the Record Office, on the subject of the frontier at Mohammerah, and I shall then request your Excellency's observations on certain aspects of that question.

The points upon which I now desire an expression of opinion from your Excellency are two:—

1. Do you consider that there is any prospect of the Ottoman Government being induced to submit the frontier dispute to a mixed commission at Constantinople in the event of the impending Turco-Persian negotiations proving abortive?

2. Do you consider that an attempt to persuade the Ottoman Government to adopt such a course would, if it were confined to friendly and informal representations, be open to serious objection from the point of view of Anglo-Turkish relations?

In relation to the first point, I would draw your Excellency's attention to section (*b*) of the accompanying memorandum, and I would also ask you to bear in mind that, even if the dispute is brought before The Hague Tribunal, the Persian Government is likely to request Great Britain and Russia to furnish certain information which the two Powers could not equitably refuse to communicate, and which, being the joint and reasoned conclusions of two Great Powers who, during a long period of mediation, made careful enquiries into the merits of the dispute, will incontestably exercise a profound influence upon the terms of the arbitral award. If, then, Turkey is not in a position in any case to preclude the evidence of Great Britain and Russia, there would seem to be no *primâ facie* reason why she should object to the substitution of a mixed commission at Constantinople for the more formal method of a reference to The Hague Tribunal, especially as the procedure proposed would be considerably less costly.

The constitution of the proposed mixed commission would be a matter for agreement between the Ottoman and Persian Governments, and it might be desirable for the British and Russian delegates not to sit upon the commission, but merely to act as assessors, or in some other capacity to be determined later. The proposal might be more palatable to Turkey if some British subject enjoying Turkish confidence in a special degree were appointed to serve in the capacity in question.

The ground upon which His Majesty's Government would prefer the question to be decided at Constantinople rather than at The Hague is that it would seem to be impracticable to bring to bear on the strictly judicial proceedings at The Hague Tribunal any considerations based upon political expediency, such as that of the importance of the territorial *status quo* at Mohammerah, whereas at Constantinople it might be more feasible to control in some measure the ultimate issue.

Should your Excellency answer the first-named point in the affirmative, I should then be glad of your observations as to the constitution of the proposed mixed commission.

In view of the fact that the Turco-Persian negotiations are apparently about to begin, I should be glad to receive a reply to this despatch by telegraph.

I do not wish the point raised in this despatch to be mentioned for the present to your Russian colleague, but on receipt of your Excellency's reply I propose to approach the Russian Government with a view to deciding the general and concerted line of action to be adopted by the two Powers during the negotiations of the next few months.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* No 416.

[9117] No. 481.

Sir A. Nicolson to Lord Errington.

My dear Errington, *Foreign Office, March 2, 1912.*

WE have considered the papers you left two days ago about the Trans-Persian Railway, and although it has not been possible for the matter to go before Sir E. Grey, I think it well to write you these few lines before you go to Paris early next week.

We have no objection to any percentage of distribution or representation, of which Lord Revelstoke may approve, in so far as the interests of Great Britain, Russia, France, and ourselves are concerned in the Société d'Étude.

But we must be understood to reserve full freedom of action when it comes to the actual construction and subsequent management and control of the lines which may be built. We shall expect, if the scheme is to be carried out with our approval, to be consulted about the alignment, constitution of the board, representation of British interests, percentage of construction orders to be placed on the British market, and, in general outline, about freight and passenger rates.

Our object is not to raise difficulties, but to reserve our freedom of action in regard to such matters, and I need not say that, when the Société d'Étude furnishes its report, we shall take into full consideration any recommendations which you may lay before us.

As regards the conseil of the Société d'Étude, I would suggest that Colonel Sir W. Bisset, K.C.I.E., might be invited to sit in the place of Sir David Rees, and that, as we know nothing of Colonel Beddoes except through Seligman, you may think it worth while to get Colonel Napier to act with the two engineers in his place on the comité; he is, I believe, now with his regiment in Persia, but I understand privately that he is anxious to get some other work, and he has experience both of Persia and Russia, and speaks both languages. Mr. George Lloyd, if you want an M.P., might not be a bad choice. These matters are, however, primarily for you to decide.

You ask if you should correspond with us or the India Office: we are the principal department concerned, and it would be better to write to us.

I am, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

[8437] No. 482.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 2, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a memorandum,* relative to the proposed submission of the Turco-Persian frontier dispute to The Hague Tribunal.

A copy of a despatch, dated the 2nd March, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, dealing with the same subject, is also enclosed.†

I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be furnished with the views of the Marquess of Crewe regarding the expediency, from the point of view of British interests, of making an attempt to settle the Turco-Persian frontier dispute without reference to The Hague Tribunal.

I am to state, with reference to your letter of the 3rd June, 1911, that a further communication will shortly be made to you regarding the boundary in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9318] No. 483.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 172.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 27, 1912.

IN my despatch No. 69 of the 22nd January, I reported that Assim Bey had stated to me that he would like to obtain from Russia some guarantee that, in the event of The Hague Tribunal deciding that the districts on the Turco-Persian frontier now occupied by Russia, that is, the Khoi-Urmia district, really belonged to Turkey, Russia would evacuate them.

His Excellency yesterday told me that he had now received the Russian reply, which he considered far from satisfactory.

His Excellency read it to me, and it was, as far as my memory serves me, to the following effect:—

Russia never had any intention of occupying Turkish territory, but it was now premature to discuss questions which had arisen between Turkey and Persia which were about to become a matter of investigation by the Mixed Commission.

Moreover, the Turkish Government could not deny that places where Russian troops were now stationed were outside the sphere which was to be submitted to the Joint Commission.

Assim Bey went on to speak generally of the situation in Persia, and said he could not consider that the Russian Government were behaving well towards this country. He, being the son and grandson of Sheikh-ul-Islams, had been able to bring pressure to bear on the Mujtehids to prevent them leaving Bagdad for Persia, where they would have been a source of trouble to the Russian Government, but, in return, Russia had done nothing, and in spite of repeated promises to the contrary they allowed Abdur Rezzack, their agent, to stir up the Kurds.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* No. 416. † No. 480.

[9507] No. 484.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received March 4.)

Sir, *Manchester, March* 2, 1912.

WE have still to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 20th ultimo relative to our complaint of the non-fulfilment of the assurances of protection given by His Majesty's Government to Muin-ut-Tujjar.

In reply to Sir Edward Grey's enquiry as to which of the statements made to us on the 18th January, 1908, we refer to when we state that the assurances of His Majesty's Government to the Muin-ut-Tujjar have not been fulfilled, we beg to inform you that we cannot find in any of our letters complaining of His Majesty's Government's inaction in this matter any specific reference to the statements made to us on the 18th January, 1908, but that we stated at length in our letter of the 4th November last the promises of support which have been given from time to time to the Muin-ut-Tujjar and to us as his agents.

Relying upon these promises and the good faith of His Majesty's Government, we did, in compliance with the wish expressed by His Majesty's Government, procure from the Muin-ut-Tujjar, at a pecuniary sacrifice to himself, a contract which in the absence of the promised support of His Majesty's Government and the legation at Tehran has resulted in such disastrous loss to him.

We beg to remind you that our letter of the 22nd January last still remains unanswered, and that, in common justice to the Muin-ut-Tujjar, a reply either in the affirmative or negative should be given without delay, so that he may know where he stands.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND Co.

[9478] No. 485.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March* 4, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 159 of 1st March.

I advanced on 2nd March 35,000 tomans to Persian Government in connection with ex-Shah's departure. This sum is to be repaid out of joint advance of 200,000*l.*, if made. If the latter is not made, 35,000 tomans will be secured on the southern customs receipts in the same manner as proposed in joint note of 18th February for British share in joint advance.

The same sum is also being advanced by Russian Bank on similar terms.

[9577] No. 486.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 155.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March* 4, 1912.

MY telegram No. 92 of 5th February.

Swedish colonel of gendarmerie desires to engage two more Swedish officers as well as a Swedish veterinary surgeon.

I presume there is no objection; Russian Minister sees none.

This will bring total of Swedes in gendarmerie up to twenty.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[8094] No. 487.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 4, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7, Africa, of the 29th July, 1910, regarding wireless telegraphy in the Persian Gulf, I transmit to you herewith copy of

a letter from the India Office, together with its enclosures, which show the recent negotiations between that Office, the Treasury, and this department on the subject.*

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the time has now arrived for their intentions to be brought to the knowledge of the Persian Government, but before addressing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note to that effect, you should consult His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire on the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7684] No. 488.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 4, 1912.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 148 of the 18th ultimo, stating your opinion, which is shared by your Russian colleague, that in present circumstances the protest which you were instructed to make on the 27th January against the further advance of Ottoman troops on the Turco-Persian frontier does not seem to be necessary.

After perusing the report on this subject jointly drawn up by the military attachés to His Majesty's and the Russian Embassies, I concur in the view held by your Excellency and M. Tcharykof.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9123] No. 489.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to the second paragraph of the letter from this Office of the 29th ultimo, relative to the possible necessity of placing at the disposal of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran a further sum of 35,000 tomans, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that this advance will not now be required.

I am at the same time to convey to you an expression of Sir E. Grey's thanks for your courtesy in the matter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9671] No. 490.

Messrs. David's Sons and Co. to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

Sir, *Lloyd's House, Manchester, March 4, 1912.*

WE beg to bring to your notice that telegrams were received to-day addressed to us and other shippers to Central Persia from their several agents, stating that the town of Kermanshah was raided by insurgents, who pillaged and set fire to warehouses and shops, and that British-owned goods were destroyed or carried away, and that life and property are still in great danger. We take this opportunity of stating that fully three-quarters of British and British Indian trade with Persia is carried on through Kermanshah, and we beg His Majesty's Government to do whatever is possible to afford immediate protection.

Your obedient servants,
E. S. DAVID'S SONS AND Co.

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* No. 418.

[9682] No. 491.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 134 of 24th February.

Acting treasurer-general has furnished a statement to the two legations showing that apart from maliat the Persian revenue, on the basis of average of the last five years, is 4,000,000 tomans from customs, mint, telegraphs, passports, Crown lands, opium, and alcohol excise. Of this sum the present fixed charges absorb about 2,800,000 tomans, which would be reduced to 2,150,000 tomans by the liquidation of the Persian Government's debt to the Russian Bank.

He deduces from these figures that there is sufficient security for a loan of 33,000,000 tomans at 5 per cent., which, after the liquidation in question, would, if issue price were 85, give the Persian Government a balance of 22,000,000 tomans, out of which there would remain to be paid a floating debt of about 2,000,000 tomans and foreign claims, of which I hazard estimate of about 3,000,000 tomans.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[9696] No. 492.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 5, 1912.*

FOLLOWING telegram, No. 34, received to-day from Tabreez :—

"During last week meetings of notables and of clergy, at which elders of the Quarter [*sic*] were made to attend, have taken place, and the return of ex-Shah strongly advocated. To-day white flags with inscription 'Long life to Mohammed Ali Shah!' have been hoisted over a considerable number of shops in the bazaars. It is of course evident that instigator is Shuja-ed-Dowleh, with, it is to be presumed, the tacit consent and approval of Russian consul-general. The same thing is said to have taken place at Ardebil, Urmia, and Khoi."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[9697] No. 493.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, March 5, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from acting consul Shiraz to-day :—

"Ilkhani arrived at Kazerun 1st March. Kashkuli and Farsimeidan Khans came in to greet him. He is counting for certain on the Shishbulukis, whose chief, Ahmed Khan, is his father-in-law. Soulet-ed-Dowleh is said to be intriguing and bribing to detach khans from ilkhani. Soulet-es-Sultaneh has not yet come in to ilkhani, and is apparently reluctant to support either side, being desirous of becoming ilkhani himself. Hadji Mohammed Kerim Khan is intriguing actively in Soulet-ed-Dowleh's favour with Soulet-es-Sultaneh and other khans. It seems unlikely that any of the three brothers can for the present establish himself properly over the whole tribe. Kashgais will perhaps sway from side to side, generally inclining to the chief who offers them best guarantees for liberty to pay no taxes and rob with impunity.

"(Repeated to Bushire.)"

[9698] No. 494.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 5, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from acting consul, Shiraz, to-day :—

"Large consignment of cases for Indian troops, after long delay on Bushire road, has at last arrived here. Many cases had been opened and sundry effects stolen. Muleteers

state that tufangchis all along road, having been wrongly informed from Bushire that consignment contained arms and ammunition for Indian troops, made dead set for our cases, which were frequently opened and searched. Khan of Kamarej, who also opened cases, appropriated sundry articles. Sardar Ihtesham, on his way to Kazerun, also opened one case in search of arms near Khanehzinian. We are about to make necessary representations in competent quarters, and will put in claim when loss accurately determined. All reports indicate bad feeling along road against us, and much exultation among tribesmen at what they consider their victories over Indian troops.

"Dixon's Armenian mirza coming up road at first tried to pass himself off as European, as was often done formerly, but soon found it much more prudent to feign to be Persian Mussulman.

"(Repeated to Bushire.)"

[9694] No 495.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 5, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 155 of 4th March.

Russian Government have no objection to engagement of two more Swedish officers.

[9691] No. 496.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 5, 1912.*

IN consequence of disturbed condition of Kermanshah, where Ottoman subjects have been killed and goods plundered, Ottoman Government has decided to reinforce consular guard there by 100 men.

[9279] No. 497.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 149 of 28th February: Advance to Persian Government.

When may we expect reply of the Persian Government?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 203.)

[8943] No. 498.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 124 of 19th February: Attack on Mr. Smart.

Penultimate paragraph. I concur.

Nothing further should be done at present stage, and punishment of persons not really responsible would be inadvisable.

[8954] No. 499.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.*

INDIA OFFICE propose to sanction recommendation of Government of India that infantry detachment of sixteen men at present at Bunder Abbas be retained there for further period of two years.

I am informing the Treasury that I consider it desirable to concur in the proposal of the India Office.

[9577] No. 500.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 155 of 4th March: Swedish officers.

I have no objection if Russian Government instruct your Russian colleague to raise none.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 206, and Stockholm, No. 8.)

[9117] No. 501.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 28th ultimo and previous correspondence relative to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of two further letters from the India Office on the subject.*

Sir E. Grey is disposed to defer for the present further consideration of the questions of the alignment of the railway and of the financial guarantee, which are dealt with in the letter marked "P. 42," and on these points I am merely to observe that he sees as yet no reason for modifying the views which he has already expressed, viz., that the line should enter the British sphere of interest in Persia at Bunder Abbas and follow the coast to Kurrachee, and that His Majesty's Government would not be justified in assuming any financial liability in connection with the project.

With respect, however, to the question of the constitution of the "société d'étude," dealt with in the letter marked "P. 434," I am to state that Viscount Errington called at this Office on the 1st instant, on behalf of Lord Revelstoke, and stated that, in view of the activity of the French and Russian groups interested, there was a necessity for immediate action in the matter of the formation of a British group. The financial consequence, his Lordship stated, was of no great immediate consequence, only 30,000*l.* being required, of which only one-half need be paid up, but Lord Revelstoke was anxious to constitute a "conseil d'administration," for which the following names were suggested:—

Sir W. Garstin;
Sir J. D. Rees;
The Honourable Hugo Baring (representing Paris Bank);
Mr. C. F. Campbell (representing Messrs. Forbes, Forbes, Campbell and Co.);
General Sir Bindon Blood;
A representative of Messrs. Sassoon;
A representative of the Imperial Bank of Persia; and
Viscount Errington.

None of the persons in question had yet been approached, and if Sir E. Grey had any observations to make as to the suitability of any one of them, Messrs. Baring would be glad to hear them before rather than after that was done.

With regard to the technical part of the committee's work, it had been suggested that the services of two engineers and of Lieutenant-Colonel Beddoes should be engaged. Messrs. Baring had no special prepossession in favour of the latter, but had selected him tentatively on account of his knowledge of Persia, and Messrs. Seligman had offered to lend him for the purpose, if his employment was desired.

Lord Errington left at the same time a letter, copy of which is enclosed,† from M. Bénac, a member of the French group, to Lord Revelstoke, and stated that he was starting immediately for Paris to represent the British group at a conference with that gentleman and M. Raffalovitch, with a view to draft the statutes of the "société." He further enquired whether letters on the subject should be addressed to this department or the India Office.

In view of Lord Errington's imminent departure, it was necessary to send an

* India Office, "P. 42," February 21; ditto, "P. 434," February 21, 1912.
† See Enclosure in No. 474.

immediate reply to the proposals of which he had been the bearer, and I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter, giving the views of this department which has now been addressed to him.*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any observations which the Board of Trade may have to offer on the attitude adopted in this letter with regard to the constitution of the "société d'étude," and in particular to learn whether, in their opinion, the freedom of action of His Majesty's Government and British interests generally are sufficiently safeguarded by the language employed to Lord Errington and to Count d'Arnoux in the letter addressed to him on the 27th December last (copy of which is also enclosed for convenience of reference),† or whether it is considered that the exact proportion of British representation in the "société" should be defined and its maintenance insisted on.

I am to add that, as it appears, Messrs. Baring are not anxious to secure the co-operation of Mr. A. G. Barry.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9798] No. 502.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received March 6.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, March 5, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd February, transmitting copy of correspondence relative to the complaint of Messrs. Ellinger and Co., in connection with the shipment of red oxide from Hormuz.

In reply, I am to state, for Sir E. Grey's information, that the Board see no objection to the confirmation in writing of the assurance which has been given verbally to Mr. Martin Ellinger, and that they concur in the tenor of the communication which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[9829] No. 503.

Messrs. Isaacs Brothers and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received March 6.)

Dear Sir, 61, *George Street, Manchester, March 5, 1912.*

WE regret to inform you that we have received a telegram from one of our agents at Kermanshah stating that the rebellious tribes have recaptured the town and set fire to the houses and bazaars, and also pillaged goods belonging to ourselves to the extent of 1,000*l.* (details of which we intend forwarding to you on arrival of same), furthermore, life and property are still unsafe. As the bulk of British trade with Persia passes through Kermanshah, we earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government will grant every facility to our agents on our behalf, for the safeguarding of property belonging to ourselves as British subjects.

Yours faithfully,
ISAACS BROS. AND Co.

Our agents in Kermanshah are Mir Abdul Bagi and Sons, Joseph Meir, and Agha Ahmed Hamadani, as mentioned in our letter to you on the 9th August, 1911.

[10358] No. 504.

Note communicated by French Embassy, March 6, 1912.

D'APRÈS un télégramme de Téhéran, dont le Ministre de Perse a donné connaissance à M. Poincaré : " Certains représentants étrangers en Perse auraient déclaré, le 28 février dernier, au Ministre persan des Affaires Étrangères que la reconnaissance

* No. 481. † To Count d'Arnoux, December 27, 1911.

par la Perse du traité anglo-russe de 1907 est en contradiction avec les conventions qui lient actuellement la Perse à d'autres États. Le Gouvernement persan devrait donc aviser de ses intentions toutes les Puissances intéressées avant de s'entendre avec les Gouvernements russe et anglais. Lesdites Puissances, en vue de sauvegarder leurs intérêts, interviendraient pour souligner les obligations contractées par l'Angleterre et la Russie dans le préambule du traité de 1907, qui consacre l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Perse."

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 6 mars, 1912.

[9717] No. 505.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 158 of 5th March.

My Russian colleague is instructing Russian consul-general to concert with acting British consul with a view to a joint warning to Shuja against instigating demonstrations in favour of the ex-Shah.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[9866] No. 506.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 165 of 5th March : Joint note to Persian Government.

Cabinet have convened several meetings of leading Persians to consider our amended formula. So far there has been no decisive result, though Russian Minister and I are led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to expect answer in two or three days.

Possibly Persian Government may be awaiting the result of a circular telegram which we hear they have sent to their representatives abroad informing them of our note, of the formulas suggested by the Cabinet touching the Anglo-Russian convention, and of the amended formula proposed by the two Governments.

[9867] No. 507.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 166 of 5th March : Attack on Mr. Smart.

In my note demanding compensation I also demanded punishment of those responsible for incidents.

I did this as a matter of form only (see my telegram No. 70 of 26th January, penultimate paragraph), and shall not press it for the moment.

[9671] No. 508.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 144 of 26th February : Kermanshah.

Have you and your Russian colleague acted as proposed in your telegram No. 98 of 7th February?

British merchants are complaining of great danger to life and property.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 210.)

[10065] No. 509.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 4.)

Sir, *Batoum, February 27, 1912.*

I LEARN on good authority that all the troops in the Caucasus, and especially those stationed between points nearest the Western Caucasian frontier, have received orders to accelerate training of recruits.

An important move in the near future must be in contemplation, as the officers are openly talking of the orders received to prepare for hostile action against Turkey.

I have communicated this information to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
P. STEVENS.

[9873] No. 510.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 164.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 7, 1912.*

FROM conversation with Regent I find that motives of the Persian Government in telegraphing our formula to their representatives were not those I suggested in my telegram No. 162 of 6th March.

It appears that German and other representatives here had evidently apprehension as to how what we are asking for would affect their treaty rights. Circular telegram to Persian representatives abroad was intended to reassure foreign Powers.

[9874] No. 511.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 165.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 171 of 6th March: Kermanshah.

We have instructed consuls in the sense indicated. They were to inform Salar-ed-Dowleh of the negotiations with the ex-Shah, and that His Majesty was about to leave, and to advise Salar-ed-Dowleh strongly to leave on conditions offered by Persian Government.

Our instructions were sent on 1st March through the managers of the Imperial Bank of Persia and Russian Bank at Hamadan for conveyance to consuls by messenger, telegraphic communication between Hamadan and Kermanshah being still interrupted.

[9875] No. 512.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 166.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 7, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 161 of 6th March.

Acting consul at Tabreez reports that Russian consul has requested Shuja to stop agitation on behalf of ex-Shah, and that demonstrations in favour of His Majesty have now ceased.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10071] No. 513.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 167.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 7, 1912.*

MY telegrams Nos. 162 and 164 of 6th and 7th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me and Russian Minister confidentially that, in telegraphing our pourparlers to the Persian representatives abroad, he did not instruct

them to make any communication to the Governments. Representatives were kept *au courant* merely in case the Governments should make enquiries indicating the same anxiety as had been shown by their representatives at Tehran. So far, no Government but the German Government have done so. Latter reminded the Persian Minister that Germany had most-favoured-nation treatment, and that any arrangement in conflict with this would not be recognised. Persian Minister replied in similar language to that used by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the foreign representatives here, that the preamble of the Anglo-Russian convention recognised the freedom of international commerce, and that therefore convention did not conflict with other Powers' treaty rights, and that Persian Government had no intention of violating these.

German Government replied that they must study "the agreement"—what agreement is not clear—to assure themselves that their treaty rights were not injured.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked our advice in case other Governments made enquiries. We replied that we thought answer which he had given was the proper one.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10072] No. 514.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 168.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 7, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 162 of 6th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning visited Russian Legation by appointment to discuss with my Russian colleague and me terms of answer to joint note. He brought with him a draft which was unsatisfactory as regards certain points mentioned below, though after discussion he modified objectionable passages subject to approval of the Cabinet. He promised to submit it to us in a revised form before signing it to-morrow:—

1. [?] In draft Minister for Foreign Affairs said nothing about approval of two legations for programme of expenditure of advance.
2. Draft stated that Persian Government would carefully conform to principles of the Anglo-Russian convention, but the remainder of formula was vague, and appeared again in some measure to place principles of convention in opposition to those of preamble.
3. Paragraph regarding army said nothing about discussion with two legations, but merely stated that Persian Government would look to their effective assistance in choice of foreign officers from minor Powers, and for armament of force.

After discussion we agreed as regards these three points as follows:—

1. Programme of expenditure is to be described as a programme of which two legations have already had cognisance.
2. Latter part of formula is to run as proposed by two Powers except that "takes official cognisance of" is substituted for "takes act of," there being in Persian no exact equivalent for latter, and that word "gladly" is omitted.
3. Wording is as follows: Persian Government will inform two legations of their programme for formation of an army, in order that an exchange of views may be effected on necessary points.

Draft deals very briefly with question of ex-Shah's pension and expresses the hope that the two Governments will lend their help to the Persian Government to prevent His Majesty from ever returning. Details of pension arrangements are to be embodied in a separate note. These are to be as already reported, except that in addition to ex-Shah's pension (1) 6,000 tomans is to be given to a son of His Majesty who lives in Tehran, and [?(2)] a pension of 25,000 tomans is to be continued to ex-Shah's family on His Majesty's decease. These two last points were not dealt with in our joint note, but they are reasonable, and Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to submit them to Cabinet.

Draft concludes with hope that two Governments will now facilitate a loan without other conditions than those regarding security, &c., and that question of presence of foreign troops will soon be decided in accordance with hopes of Persian Government.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10146] No. 515.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 172.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 7, 1912.*

MR. GREENWAY enquires whether in my opinion the present would be a good moment for applying for the Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway concession. He thinks that M. Mornard might be desirous of showing that he is not biassed against British enterprise, and therefore better disposed than later on.

I should like to have your opinion. The position of Russia must not be forgotten, and Mr. Mallet, who saw Mr. Greenway, reminded him of previous suggestions that an understanding should be arrived at with the Russian Government before the application was renewed.

[9682] No. 516.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 7, 1912.*

MR. SELIGMAN called at this Office on the 5th instant and was received by Mr. Mallet.

He stated that since Mr. Shuster's departure from Persia things had changed, and that it would no longer be possible for his own firm or for any other house to issue a loan to Persia without a guarantee by the British and Russian Governments. He had let it be known that he had not retired from the enterprise, but that he was still ready to lend money to Persia provided that there was some kind of guarantee.

I have to observe that if the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas consent to lend without a guarantee, His Majesty's Government will no longer be morally bound to support Messrs. Seligman. If the bank do not consent, the obligation on His Majesty's Government towards Messrs. Seligman remains, provided always that the Russian Government agree to continue the negotiations on the basis of a guarantee.

Mr. Mallet urged Mr. Seligman to clear up the question with the Russian Government, and he replied that he had already explained everything to the Russian Ambassador.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8946] No. 517.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 7, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo regarding the enquiry made by the Persian Railways Syndicate as to assurances given by His Majesty's Government in connection with the Trans-Persian or other railway schemes in Persia.

Sir E. Grey has had under consideration the amended draft to the Persian Railways Syndicate as suggested in your letter, but he is somewhat doubtful as to whether the wording proposed could be sustained. He is disposed to think that it could not be fairly argued that preferring the Persian Railways Syndicate—and the various other interests compendiously represented within that syndicate—to the Persian Transport Company is paying "due regard" to the claims of that company to "preferential treatment" in respect of proposals for the construction of railways in districts traversed by the roads belonging to the company.

On the other hand, the Transport Company's preferential claim as regards railways in particular districts does not give them a right to more than a share in a larger scheme of railways embracing more than those districts, and Sir E. Grey considers that, if His Majesty's Government asked that a fair share in the larger scheme should be given to shareholders in the Transport Company, they then would have dealt reasonably with that company. As Mr. Lynch is so largely interested in the Transport Company, his presence on the board of the Railways Syndicate must, however, in

Sir E. Grey's opinion, be regarded as some recognition already granted of the claims of the Transport Company, since, but for those claims, Mr. Lynch would not be on the board of the Railways Syndicate at all.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be furnished with the views of the Marquess of Crewe on this aspect of the question.

Sir E. Grey concurs that it would be advisable to act in the manner suggested in the penultimate paragraph of your letter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9697] No. 518.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to recent correspondence regarding the situation in Southern Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, copies of two telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* from which it appears that the situation around Shiraz is developing unfavourably, and that an early decision as to the policy to be pursued is desirable.

Sir E. Grey has not yet been favoured with Lord Crewe's views on the scheme outlined in the Viceroy's telegram of the 5th ultimo, but is of opinion that no useful purpose would be served by making his Excellency's scheme dependent on the establishment of a gendarmerie under Swedish officers, which, in any case, cannot be in working order for six months.

He is, therefore, inclined to the view that Lord Hardinge's scheme should be proceeded with forthwith. If it is proved to be insufficient, the withdrawal of His Majesty's consul and military forces from Shiraz appears to be the only alternative.

Subject to Lord Crewe's concurrence, Sir E. Grey thinks that it must be left to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the local officers to decide how best to put the scheme of subsidies into operation, but he trusts that he may receive his Lordship's views as soon as is convenient, in order that Sir G. Barclay may receive instructions.

If it is decided to proceed with this proposal, Sir E. Grey presumes that Indian and British revenues will bear the charges in equal moieties, in which case it will be necessary to obtain the sanction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10197] No. 519.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 8.)

Sir, *India Office, March 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my letter dated the 6th December, 1911, as to the alleged violation by the British authorities in Baluchistan of the Perso-Baluch frontier near Piran, I am directed to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report on the subject from the Government of India.†

The Marquess of Crewe is not aware what authority the Government of India have for describing the red line on the map as roughly representing the limits of our occupation in 1905. Colonel MacMahon's memorandum dated the 5th November, 1904 (in which the red line is advocated on grounds of convenience and the district between the two lines is said to be "absolutely barren and uninhabited"), does not appear to support this description, while Mr. Tucker's letter dated the 15th March, 1907 (enclosed in this Office letter of the 22nd June, 1907), states that there were no British levies west of the blue line in the spring of 1905, and that "the status was one of intermittent Zarezai occupation." The Zarezais are neither Persian nor British subjects, and since they divide their time between British and Afghan territory, Sir E. Grey may be disposed to regard their intermittent occupation in 1905 as justifying the contention that

* Nos. 493 and 494.

† Not printed.

the Persian Government has no right to the territory east of the red line, which is the true watershed. On the other hand, it may be admitted that we have made no formal claim to the territory, and difficulties may arise in carrying out the instructions given by the Government of India to the local authorities in their letter dated the 14th October, 1911, that "any trespass between the red and blue lines . . . . should not be permitted."

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[10199] No. 520.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 8.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 7, 1912.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your letter dated the 13th December, 1911, as to the provision of house accommodation for the resident at Bushire and his staff, I am directed to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 3rd February, 1912, reporting that the temporary retention, pending the completion of the new residency buildings, of the appointment of second assistant to the resident in the Persian Gulf has been provisionally sanctioned. This appointment, it will be remembered, was one of the posts to be eliminated from the cadre of the Indian Political Department under the reorganisation scheme sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Council in May last, though the likelihood of its being necessary to continue it pending the construction of new residency buildings was at the time brought to notice (see correspondence forwarded with my letter dated the 27th June, 1911).

Subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Crewe proposes to approve the Government of India's action.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 520.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

February 3, 1912.

OUR financial despatch dated the 1st December 1910, paragraph 15. Cox strongly represents that until new residency buildings are constructed it will not be possible for him to dispense with services of second assistant. Considerable increase of work due to present state of affairs in Persia affords additional reason for postponing contemplated reduction of this appointment. We agree, and have provisionally sanctioned retention of second assistant to political resident for the present, together with the local allowance of 100 rupees per mensem formerly attached to that post. We trust our action will be approved.

[10195] No. 521.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 8.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 7, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 2nd instant, on the subject of the Turco-Persian frontier, and, in reply, to say that he entirely concurs in the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as indicated in his despatch No. 79 of the 2nd instant to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[10132] No. 522.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 8.)

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Tehran, March* 8, 1912.

MY telegram No. 163 of 6th March.

I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday about compensation for the attacks on Smart's escort.

He agreed with me that our claim was a very moderate one. He was about to submit it to the Cabinet. I told him that I should be satisfied with an undertaking that the claim should be a first charge on the next loan, and he led me to believe that there would be no difficulty about this.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[10139] No. 523.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 8.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March* 8, 1912.

MY telegram No. 150 of 29th February: Insult to Turkish Ambassador.

New Turkish Ambassador is still at Resht.

British vice-consul understands that he will not proceed to Tehran until an apology is tendered—from whom it is not clear. Russian consul, however, reports that he refuses to leave until the Russian consul is dismissed.

I understand that Russian consular and military authorities throw the blame for the incident on each other. Russian colonel at Resht is said to have been recalled.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10158] No. 524.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 8.)

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March* 8, 1912.

MY telegram No. 140 of 26th February.

(Confidential.)

Russian Minister informs me that, in consequence of the express desire of the Emperor, arrangements for the withdrawal of the Kazvin force have been left to him.

He tells me that he proposes to leave two battalions—1,300 men—at Kazvin for the present, and a similar force divided between Resht and Enzeli.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10217] No. 525.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 8.)

(No. 172.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, March* 8, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from British consul-general, Bushire, 8th March:—

"On 10th February navy captured dhow attempting smuggle large consignment arms from Arab coast to point on coast 80 miles to the west of Lingah. Arms proved belong to inhabitants of hinterland district of Tarakumah. Latter have been sinec endeavouring to raise force for attack on Lingah generally, and customs and British vice-consul in particular.

"British vice-consul now telegraphs force hold Tangi Khirjal pass, 30 miles to the north of Charak, which pass is key of the road to Lingah, and that general advance on town may be expected forthwith. Inhabitants uneasy, and local authorities express inability to offer any assistance. Sheikhs of Shibkuh ports have taken sides, as in October year before last. Mirghu and Mukani are endeavouring to oppose raising force, while Charak and Chiru are in collusion with it."

[10218] No. 526.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 8, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 8th March.

British consul-general at Bushire reports that senior naval officer is moving up 150 men to Lingah from Jask, and that senior naval officer and British vice-consul, Lingah, advocate demolition of Sheikh of Chirus's towers by His Majesty's ship, considering that this measure will have a salutary effect, and probably check further advance on Lingah altogether.

Action recommended by British consul-general at Bushire is that Sheikhs of Chirus and Charak should be warned by British vice-consul, Lingah, through His Majesty's ship, that if they allow raid on Lingah to take shape their complicity will be assumed and punitive action taken against them by His Majesty's ship without further discussion.

Sheikh of Chirus has for a long time been giving trouble. His attitude was unsatisfactory in October 1910, and in connection with recent case of firing on a dhow laden with British goods when passing the island of Hind Arabi in his jurisdiction. He has just sent British vice-consul at Lingah an impertinent reply to a letter asking for redress. British consul-general at Bushire recommends that the opportunity should be taken to exact reparation for this incident, and that Sheikh of Chirus should be called upon to deposit immediately on board of His Majesty's ship 5,000 rupees or satisfactory hostage as security for the settlement of case, and be warned that, failing compliance in forty-eight hours, his towers will be demolished forthwith.

I have approved bringing up of the 150 men from Jask, and have authorised their landing if British consul-general considers that protection of British lives and property demands it. I have also concurred in his recommendations as to treatment of the two sheikhs.

[10219] No. 527.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 170 of 8th March: Insult to Turkish Ambassador.

Russian Minister tells me that Russian general at Kazvin has made it clear that consul at Resht was more to blame for what happened than colonel, who will therefore only be reprimanded.

[10071] No. 528.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 167 of 7th March: Joint note.

I approve.

As it is stated in the preamble to the 1907 agreement that the British and Russian Governments sincerely desire the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations, it is difficult to see how the interests of Germany are affected by recognition of the agreement by Persia.

(Repeated St. Petersburgh, No. 216.)

[10072] No. 529.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 8, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 168 of 7th March: Joint proposals.

The three points as amended by the two Ministers appear to be satisfactory.

I should like to receive views of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 173.)

[10233] No. 530.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 8th March, 1912, regarding the situation in Southern Persia.

India Office, March 8, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 530.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March 8, 1912.*

AFFAIRS of Southern Persia. See your telegram dated the 5th ultimo.

The Foreign Office, whose previous inclination was to suspend action and to wait till Swedish gendarmerie was organised, now propose, in view of deterioration of situation near Shiraz, that negotiations on lines recommended by you should be begun. Please say whether it is still, in your opinion, an essential preliminary that troops should be sent. I suppose that commencement of negotiations would be considerably delayed by dispatch of troops, which I sincerely hope may be avoided. Foreign Office are disposed to deprecate dispatch, in view of opinion expressed in telegram dated the 20th ultimo from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Please say, with reference to extension of blockade, if you have considered whether tribesmen may not be irritated, and insecurity be increased, if supply of ammunition is cut off. A reply by telegram as soon as possible is requested.

[10245] No. 531.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received March 9.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, March 8, 1912.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 17th ultimo respecting the cost of certain local enquiries in Persia by a member of the Indian Political Department in connection with the proposed reorganisation of that department and the contemplated reduction in the cost of maintaining consular posts in Persia.

In reply, I am to request you to inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that, in the circumstances represented, my Lords agree that half of the cost of these enquiries may be charged upon Imperial funds.

They note that the charge involved is estimated at 198*l.* 10s., exclusive of travelling expenses.

I am, &c.
T. L. HEATH.

[10357] No. 532.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 172 of 7th March.

The Regent sent me a message on 6th March to the effect that it would embarrass the Persian Government if, immediately after the recognition of the Anglo-Russian convention, the two Powers were to come forward with demands for concessions. Regent evidently had in mind railway concession, for he said particularly that his remark did not apply to such an unimportant concession as that of the Russian motor-cars, but he also said that if, in the case of Mohammerah line, international considerations compelled an immediate application the matter would be different, and he gave me to understand that, in these circumstances, an application would be considered.

In view of Regent's message I should be inclined to advise postponing of reopening negotiations for the present unless you consider that political considerations render delay unadvisable. There is another consideration which must not be lost sight of, viz., that to attempt to push through a concession of the kind might be construed as a recognition of extinction of the Medjliss (this is, however, perhaps of no great importance, seeing that impending loan negotiations while Medjliss is in abeyance will bear the same construction).

On the other hand, I gather from conversation with Russian Minister that the question of trans-Persian railway is likely to be raised when loan proposals are made to Persian Government. I do not know how far it will be feasible to negotiate for the two railways concurrently, and it may be thought desirable to get on with the Mohammerah line negotiations before all securities are taken for the loan.

As regards Mornard, I think that he can be depended on at any rate to judge Mohammerah railway scheme on its merits.

[10362] No. 533.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 168 of 7th March.

It appears that our insisting on the Persian Government's undertaking to discuss with the two legations the formation of an army has aroused suspicion of the Cabinet.

Minister for Foreign Affairs visited us yesterday and entreated us to accept the omission of any mention of an exchange of views, intimating that the Cabinet might resign sooner than record this in an official note, though they were quite prepared in practice to discuss their army scheme with us. He said that our objection to his original formula, which mentioned engagement of foreign officers from minor Powers, lent itself to the construction that we should insist on Russian officers in the north and British officers in the south. He pressed us to state what were the points we wished to discuss, and, in particular, he wished to know whether our intentions were really what might be suspected from our objections to his formula. We said we could not specify points to be discussed until the Persian Government had communicated to us their scheme for organisation of an army. My Russian colleague reminded the Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Excellency was well aware that the Russian Government desired an increase in the Cossack brigade, but he had no instructions regarding their precise requirements. I said that I also was without instructions, but what I knew my Government desired was the organisation of a force capable of restoring order. We assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs that our reason for desiring a discussion was that we wished to ensure that the force organised should be really effective, and that if in course of discussion we gave advice which the Persian Government considered inacceptable, the mere words of formula which we had induced him on 7th March to submit to the Cabinet would not commit the Persian Government to accepting such advice. We strongly urged his Excellency to bring the Cabinet to accept this formula.

His Excellency promised to submit what we had said to the Cabinet.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10355] No. 534.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 140 of 26th February, last paragraph.

Acting consul at Tabreez reports that 1,500 Russian troops have left, but that 1,000 arrived a few days ago.

There are now 3,000 troops in Tabreez, and 500 on the road between that town and Julfa.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10373] No. 535.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 215 of 8th March: Note to Persian Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees with you in thinking three points satisfactory. He at first took exception to the concluding sentence of draft reply respecting the presence of foreign troops, but eventually withdrew objection on the ground that as we also had troops in Persia it need not be interpreted as specially directed against Russia

He is ready to make advance on receipt of Persian reply as amended.

[10374] No. 536.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1912.*

TEHRAN telegram No. 167 of 7th March.

Minister of Foreign Affairs thinks that Germany imagines we are concluding a new agreement respecting Persia and that this is the agreement she wishes to study.

He contemplates telegraphing to Berlin to explain that this is not the case.

He remarked that Russia is safeguarded in her sphere against the acquisition by Germany of concessions prejudicial to Russian interests by the Russo-German agreement.

[10358] No. 537.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 167 of 7th March: Joint note.

Which Powers made representations at Tehran?

[10158] No. 538.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No 171 of 8th March: Russian troops.

When the situation appears to you to justify it, and removal of fedais has been accomplished, you will doubtless urge your Russian colleague to reduce still further the number of troops at Kazvin (see my telegram No. 144 of the 25th February).

(Repeated St. Petersburgh, No. 217.)

[10218] No. 539.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, March* 9, 1912.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 172 and 173 of 8th March : Lingah.
I approve.

[10369] No. 540.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 10, 1912.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.
My despatch No. 118 of 7th February.
Persian delegates have arrived, and sittings are expected to begin next week.

[10455] No. 541.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Tehran, February* 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the question of the indemnity to be paid to Mr. Shuster's American assistants on vacating their appointments, which has been engaging the attention of the Persian Government for some time past, has now been settled.

Mr. Shuster had been requested by the Persian Government to hand over the office of treasurer-general to a committee appointed *ad hoc*, which it was intended should in its turn hand over to M. Mornard, the acting treasurer-general, the idea being that it would be easier for Mr. Shuster's *amour-propre* if the committee acted as an intermediary than if he had to hand over direct to M. Mornard. There was, however, some delay in the committee's getting to work, and as the date on which Mr. Shuster had arranged to leave—the 11th January—was approaching, he handed over to Mr. Cairns, the American next in seniority, leaving it to the latter to hand over either to the buffer committee or to M. Mornard. Mr. Shuster having left on the 11th January the *raison d'être* of the buffer committee had disappeared, and it therefore dissolved, and Mr. Cairns handed over the office of treasurer-general to M. Mornard on the 12th January. On this occasion Mr. Cairns, on behalf of his American colleagues, made it clear that they would not consent to continue to serve under any foreigner but an American citizen, and shortly afterwards a claim was presented to the Persian Government by the fourteen American assistants for payment of the emoluments to which they would have been entitled, provided they had served the full three years for which they had contracted. These emoluments included not only the salaries to the end of the three years, but also a bonus of one half-year's salary and travelling expenses back to America—amounting in all to upwards of 25,000*l.*

Mr. Cairns invoked my support and that of my Russian colleague, urging that he and his collaborators had given up lucrative posts in America, and that it was doubtful whether they could be reinstated. After consultation with M. Poklewsky, who had learned from his Government that they thought the Americans on vacating their appointments should receive their full salaries up to the termination of their contracts, and that they were willing to advance to the Persian Government the sum required for the purpose, we agreed to advise the Persian Goverrment to pay the sum claimed. Before, however, we took any action I received a visit from my American colleague, who begged me to hold my hand until he had referred the matter to his Government. Mr. Russell, who was evidently very desirous to compel the Americans to remain and serve out their contracts, said he considered the claim altogether exorbitant. In view of this my Russian colleague and I informed Mr. Cairns that we must wait until Mr. Russell had received a reply from Washington, as we clearly could not support a claim on behalf of American citizens which their own Minister regarded as inequitable.

I understand that Mr. Cairns and his colleagues then put themselves in communication with the State Department, and sent a very uncomplimentary telegram in regard to Mr. Russell's attitude, which they described as being that of a man demented. They asked that Mr. Russell might be instructed either to support their claim or to stand aside altogether, and to leave the settlement of their case in the hands of the British and Russian Legations. The result of all this was that Mr. Russell was instructed not to oppose an equitable settlement.

When Mr. Russell informed me of this reply he again urged upon me that the claim which had been presented was excessive, and I replied that M. Mornard was considering the question and was about to propose an arrangement to the Persian Government, and that arrangement would have my support. I promised, however, not to support any demand in excess of M. Mornard's proposals.

These proposals were that the three Americans who had arrived in Tehran at the same time as Mr. Shuster, and had done eight months' useful work, should receive their talaries in full up to the expiry of the term of their three years' contract, as well as travelling expenses back to America, and that the others who had recently arrived should be paid only travelling expenses and one year's salary from the date of their vacating their posts. To this the Persian Government agreed except as regards the travelling expenses, which they refused to pay, and they made an offer to Mr. Cairns in writing to settle on these lines. On receiving this offer Mr. Cairns asked me to arrange for him to meet M. Poklewsky and M. Mornard, and at this meeting (which took place at this legation) Mr. Cairns strongly urged the case of his compatriots. He said he had had great difficulty with them, but that he had at last succeeded in inducing them to be content with something less than they had originally claimed. They would now accept a settlement on the lines proposed by M. Mornard plus the bonus of a half-year's salary provided for in the contract. I explained that I could not support anything more than M. Mornard had originally proposed, but M. Poklewsky persuaded M. Mornard to consent to recommend a settlement on the more generous lines which Mr. Cairns had just indicated as being satisfactory to him and his colleagues.

To this arrangement the Persian Government finally agreed. It involved an indemnity for the American assistants amounting in all to some 15,000*l.*, as against the sum of about 25,000*l.* originally claimed.

I should mention that since this settlement was agreed upon it has transpired that, before vacating his post, Mr. Shuster had drawn a sum sufficient not only for an indemnity for himself, but also for an indemnity for his American colleagues, on the lines of their original claim, and that Mr. Cairns's activity on behalf of his colleagues has been due only to his desire to obtain the Persian Government's sanction for what was really an accomplished fact, the money drawn by Mr. Shuster being already in the possession of the Americans. I understand that Mr. Cairns had considerable difficulty in obtaining a refund from those of his compatriots who, under the arrangement sanctioned by the Persian Government, were not entitled to the full sum paid them by Mr. Shuster.

Neither M. Mornard nor the Persian Government were aware of the fact that the money had already been paid, and they looked to the Russian Government to advance the sum needed. It must therefore have been an agreeable surprise to them when Mr. Cairns handed yesterday to M. Mornard a sum of some 50,000 tomans, this sum being the difference between the amount drawn by Mr. Shuster for a settlement as originally claimed and the amount required for the arrangement sanctioned by the Persian Government.

In this despatch I have throughout spoken in general terms of the "American assistants." As a matter of fact, two of these have agreed, with the consent of the two legations, to continue to serve. They are Colonel Merrill and Major Preuss, who were engaged by Mr. Shuster for the Treasury gendarmerie, and are now serving under the Swedish colonel of gendarmerie. Colonel Merrill had done much valuable gendarmerie service in the Philippines, and Colonel Hjalmarsen is glad to have him. Major Preuss was originally in the German army. He afterwards fought on the Boer side in the Boer war, but as I am assured that before joining the Boers he sought to fight on our side, but was refused, I have not thought it necessary to raise any objection to his continuance in Persian service.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[10456] No. 542.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 28. Secret.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 210 of the 31st October last, I have the honour to report that on the disappearance of the Medjliss I thought the moment a favourable one for approaching the Persian Government in regard to the lighthouse on the island of Sheikh Shuaib, and on the 17th ultimo I mentioned the scheme to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting the Persian Government to authorise Sheikh Ahmad Hamadi of Mugam, the chieftain of the island, to grant the site for the lighthouse. His Excellency promised to consult his colleagues in the Cabinet and to give me an answer shortly.

On the 31st ultimo I enquired as to the decision of the Persian Government, and his Excellency replied that no definite decision had been taken, but that he thought that there would be no difficulty about the lighthouse provided that it were constructed and worked by Persia. I pointed out that this was not what was desired. The buoyage and lighting of the Persian Gulf had for many years been in British hands, and it would be undesirable to make an exception in the case of the lighthouse on Sheikh Shuaib, besides which, if the lighthouse were worked by the Persian Government, which had no experience of such matters, there could be no guarantee that it would be efficiently done. His Excellency appeared to be under the impression that the cost of the erection of the lighthouse would be 4,000*l.*, and I therefore told him that we estimated the initial cost at 8,000*l.* and the running expenses at 400*l.* a-year. His Excellency took note of what I said, and promised to give me a definite answer in a few days. He added that in any case the lighthouse would have to fly the Persian flag, and I told him that personally I thought there would be no objection to this.

Yesterday I received a visit from the "chef de cabinet" of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who handed me the accompanying memorandum of the terms on which the Persian Government were prepared to consent to the construction of the lighthouse.

I do not know how far His Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept these terms. I explained to Moin-el-Vezareh, the "chef de cabinet," that the question of light dues in the Persian Gulf was a large one and had not yet been considered. It would, I presume, be difficult to levy separate dues for one particular lighthouse, and, should His Majesty's Government consent to the Persian Government's bearing the cost of the construction and running of the lighthouse, some arrangement would have to be made whereby a certain proportion of the total dues eventually collected in the Gulf would be paid to the Persian Government.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY

Enclosure in No. 542.

Memorandum.

THE Persian Government authorises the erection, at their own cost, of a lighthouse on the coast of Sheikh Shuaib Island for the convenience of navigation in the Gulf.

2. Prior to the work being put in hand, the contractors will submit to the Persian Government the rough estimate of the outlay (the "cahier des charges") and the plan of the structure.

3. The upkeep and superintendence of the lighthouse, as well as the working of the apparatus, is temporarily delegated by the Persian Government, for convenience sake, to the Anglo-Indian naval officers.

4. The cost of such maintenance will be borne by the Persian Government, who will be previously furnished with an approximate statement of the annual expense.

5. The Anglo-Indian naval officers will be requested to collect the tolls (beaconage) on behalf of the Persian Government and keep the accounts.

6. In each year, two months after the 1st of Hemal (21st or March), a statement of account showing the receipts and expenses of the previous year will be handed to the Persian Government.

7. The receipts will serve to cover the expenses of administration, and will, moreover, constitute a sinking fund for the capital expended in building the lighthouse.

8. The regulations concerning the working of the lighthouse, the manner in which the tolls will be collected, and the amount of such dues will be submitted to the Persian Government, who will have the right of inspection.

9. The Persian flag will permanently fly over the lighthouse.

[10457] No. 543.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 84 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith the proposed scheme of organisation for the Persian Government gendarmerie, together with an estimate of cost for the first twenty-one months.

The estimate for the first twelve months amounts to 55,000*l.*, and for the succeeding nine months to 70,000*l.*

The budget only provides for the establishment of permanent posts along the following main roads:—

In the north, (*a*) Enzeli–Kazvin–Tehran–Kum; (*b*) Kazvin–Zinjan–Serehend.
In the south, Bushire–Shiraz–Yezdikhast.

In Fars it is proposed to raise a battalion, 1,500 strong, with head-quarters at Shiraz, for the protection of the Bushire–Shiraz–Yezdikhast road. It is hoped that by the end of the first twelve months posts will have been established from Shiraz as far as Kinartakhte (35 miles south-west of Kazerun) to the south, and Bagh-i-Khan (12 miles north of Shiraz) to the north.

During the succeeding nine months the intention is to extend these posts southward to Bushire and northward to Yezdikhast.

The sums allotted for the gendarmerie in Fars are, approximately, for the first twelve months, 20,700*l.*; for the second period of nine months, 25,000*l.*

Major Petersen, an officer of the Swedish gendarmerie mission, left Tehran for Shiraz early in February to commence the organisation of the Fars battalion.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—The documents mentioned in Colonel Hjalmarson's letter are sent in original. Colonel Hjalmarson is having them printed in Tehran, and has promised me copies, which I shall not fail to forward to you in due course in that form.

G. B.

Enclosure 1 in No. 543.

Colonel Hjalmarson to Sir G. Barclay.

LE bureau de l'organisation de la gendarmerie de Perse a élaboré quelques projets pour commencer l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale. J'ai l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence ces projets ci-inclus:—

1. Principes de l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale.
2. Projet du budget de l'Administration centrale.
3. Projet 1 et budgets 2, 3 de l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale du district de Téhéran.
4. Do. de la province de Gilen (Rescht).
5. Do. de la province de Khamsé (Zendjen).
6. Do. de la province of Fars.
7. Résumé des dépenses de la gendarmerie gouvernementale pour la première année (1er au 12e mois) et pour la deuxième année (1er au 9e mois).

Selon les principes, la gendarmerie doit organiser un réseau fixe et des corps mobiles.

Les projets mentionnés ci-dessus ne visent qu'au réseau fixe; ils ne visent pas non plus à l'ancienne gendarmerie du Trésorier, qui a été réunie avec la gendarmerie gouvernementale.

Le résumé des dépenses finit le neuvième mois de la deuxième année, parce que les organisations proposées doivent être achevées dès la fin de ce mois.

Veuillez, &c.

H. HJALMARSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 543.

Proposed Scheme of Organisation for Persian Government Gendarmerie.

ARTICLE 1er. La gendarmerie gouvernementale sera organisée—

(*a.*) En groupes formant un réseau fixe de gendarmerie, et
(*b.*) En corps mobiles.

Art. 2. La gendarmerie s'attache aux provinces et à leurs subdivisions. Dans quelques provinces toute la gendarmerie à pied et à cheval constitue un seul régiment; dans d'autres provinces il y en a plusieurs. Dans les petites provinces la gendarmerie ne constitue qu'un bataillon.

(Même dans les grandes provinces la gendarmerie ne constitue qu'un bataillon au commencement, mais, plus tard, elle formera un réginent.)

Art. 3. Le réseau fixe se compose des groupes plus grands ou plus petits des gendarmes, distribués le long des routes et étant en correspondance permanente l'un avec l'autre. Pour l'organisation de ce réseau les routes sont divisées en secteurs.

Chaque secteur sera surveillé par une section ou par une demi-section, dont la force se partage parmi un chef-lieu et un certain nombre de petits postes.

La force de la section (demi-section) a trois degrés. En considérant les difficultés que l'on s'attend dans les différentes provinces, on emploie de différents degrés.

Plusieurs sections et demi-sections sont réunies à un district de compagnie; un des chefs-lieux de section, habituellement celui de la section centrale, est en même temps le chef-lieu de la compagnie. Plusieurs districts de compagnie établissent un district de bataillon ayant un chef-lieu de bataillon.

Des districts de bataillons forment des régiments mentionnés ci-dessus. Lorsque tous les bataillons d'une province forment un seul régiment le chef-lieu du régiment se trouve habituellement dans la ville de résidence du gouverneur de la province.

Lorsque les bataillons de la province forment plusieurs régiments, les chefs-lieux des régiments seront répartis dans la province.

Art. 4. Le nombre des sections et demi-sections est variable, et dépend de l'importance de la compagnie, de l'étendue de son territoire, &c.

Le nombre des compagnies d'un bataillon, de même que celui des bataillons, est aussi variable, et dépend des mêmes conditions que celles qui décident le nombre des sections et demi-sections d'une compagnie.

La disposition des sections et demi-sections en petits postes est la base même de toute l'organisation du réseau fixe, puisque c'est sur l'institution de ces postes que repose tout le service d'une bonne gendarmerie.

Art. 5. Les corps mobiles seront employés pour faire des expéditions dans les endroits où le réseau fixe ne peut produire l'ordre et la tranquillité. Les corps mobiles se composent—

(*a.*) Des gendarmes (y compris des officiers et des gradés) d'un district ou de plusieurs districts réunis en corps mobiles provisoires; ou
(*b.*) Des corps mobiles permanents de gendarmerie, organisés et exercés tout à fait militairement.

Les corps mobiles provisoires ne peuvent sortir de leur province qu'en cas exceptionnels et sur l'ordre du Gouvernement de l'Empire. En organisant ces corps provisoires, on laissera toujours une force suffisante pour que le service ordinaire puisse continuer passablement; ainsi ni les chefs-lieux ni les petits postes ne doivent être tout à fait dépourvus de toute leur force de gendarmerie.

Les corps mobiles permanents de la gendarmerie seront garnisonnés aux points centraux. Ils ne sortent de leurs provinces que sur l'ordre du Gouvernement de l'Empire.

Il dépend des circonstances (l'étendue de l'entreprise, le but de l'expédition, les distances, &c.) si l'on doit employer les corps provisoires ou les corps permanents. Or, tant que possible le réseau fixe doit rester intact.

[10458] No. 544.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 17, 1912.*

SUBSEQUENTLY to my despatch No. 10 of the 17th ultimo, the insurrection seemed for a time to have taken a more serious turn.

From telegrams tapped by the Persian Government, it appeared that Shuja-ed-Dowleh from Tabreez and other agents of the ex-Shah in Azerbaijan were planning the dispatch along the Tehran road of a combined force to attack Mianeh. Russian reports from the provinces of Astrabad and Mazanderan showed that these provinces were entirely in Mohamed Ali's hands. His Majesty himself was in Astrabad, and his forces were said to number 3,000 men, including a large contingent of Caucasians. The reports added that his forces were contemplating an attack on Shahrud, and that they were confident of victory. At the same time, a serious agitation on behalf of Mohamed Ali was reported from Meshed. There seemed no doubt from information in the hands of the Persian Government and from the reports of His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed, that in all these centres the rebel activities had the encouragement of the Russian consular officers and of the Russian Turcoman Commissioner at Gombad Kabuz. It was therefore high time for making the pronouncement against the ex-Shah upon which the two Governments had agreed, as suggested in the identic telegram from the two legations (see my telegram No. 29 of the 10th January). As will be noticed in a subsequent despatch, the Russian consul at Astrabad was instructed on the 8th February to convey this pronouncement to Mohamed Ali. The final result of the ensuing negotiations with His Majesty is not known at the moment of writing.

Instructions had already been sent to the Russian consul-general at Tabreez to warn Shuja-ed-Dowleh that as Russia had declared that so long as Russian troops were near Tehran the ex-Shah would not be recognised His Majesty's cause was hopeless, and expeditions in his name were aimless and were disapproved by the Russian Government. The Russian consul-general at Meshed also was given peremptory orders to do his best to still the agitation in that town. These instructions have so far borne fruit that Meshed is reported calmer, and nothing more has been heard of the advance of Shuja-ed-Dowleh's forces on Mianeh.

Telegraphic communication with the west is still interrupted, and the intelligence which reached me of Salar-ed-Dowleh's movements is fragmentary. When last heard of on the 8th February, the Prince had been driven out of Kermanshah by a Government force under a certain Yar Mohamed Khan, a prominent Mujtahid.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[10459] No. 545.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 31. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 18, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on the foreign representatives in Tehran.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No 545.

Report on Diplomatic Representatives in Tehran.

Hassib Bey, the Turkish Ambassador, presented his credentials in September 1909. He is a kindly, elderly gentleman, but I have not seen very much of him, partly owing to his frequent illnesses and partly because I do not find his conversation profitable. He speaks excellent French, but talks with such extreme volubility as hardly to admit of any but monosyllabic replies, and his verbosity often makes it difficult to understand his meaning, though in his protestations of friendship for England, in which he is very lavish, he is clear enough.

He is on the eve of departure, having been recalled, and it seems probable that Tehran will be his last diplomatic post.

M. de Rosthorn, who presented his credentials as Austrian Minister in October 1906, left last spring, transferred to the legation at Peking. He was succeeded by M. Otto, whom I had known as councillor at the Austrian Embassy at Constantinople. M. Otto arrived in May, but his health broke down, his heart not being able to stand the high altitude of Tehran, and he left after an acute attack of heart disease in June, since which the Austrian Legation has been in the charge of Count Firmian, a young official in the consular service. I know little of Count Firmian, but what little I do know is in his favour.

Count Albert de Quadt Wykradt Isny, who presented his credentials as German Minister in March 1908, went on leave last October, and is not expected to return. Both he and the Countess are much missed in social circles in Tehran. My own relations with Count Quadt have always been excellent. The German Legation is now in the charge of Herr von Schmidthals, who was a secretary under Count Quadt, but had been sent last year to Lisbon to take charge. He has returned to Tehran disgusted with Portugal and the Portuguese. He is amiable, though somewhat pompous in manner. He has sporting tastes, and takes a prominent part in the annual Tehran races. He has a good cellar and gives an excellent dinner. He has shown no signs of political activity during his charge.

M. Raymond Lecomte, French Minister, presented his credentials in June 1908. He is not a favourite of mine, and I regard him as a mischief-maker and a dangerous colleague, though many people find him a witty and agreeable talker. From my past reports on the chiefs of missions at Tehran it must be apparent that I had on occasions found his efforts to prevent any friction between the British and Russian Legations had done more harm than good. I had in my mind at the time the poisonous stories he used to tell M. Poklewsky of Major Stokes, and his endeavours to bring about the recall of that officer. Events have proved that it would have been better had M. Lecomte succeeded in his object; it would have created a scandal—and this is what I had always sought to avoid—but it would have saved us from the Shuster-Stokes incident, which has had such serious importance.

M. Havenith, who presented his credentials as Belgian Minister in 1908, left last autumn, transferred to Washington. His successor, M. de Borchgrave, comes from Rome, where he was secretary of legation. He is married, and has five children. He has not been here long enough to enable me to express any definite opinion about him, but I notice a tendency on his part to make the most of his position as representative of the country which supplies Persia with so many of her foreign assistants.

M. Poklewsky-Koziell, the Russian Minister, presented his credentials at the end of September 1909. M. Poklewsky is so well known in London that he calls for little notice from me. I have always found him a loyal and charming colleague. He has borne two years of banishment from European capitals with praiseworthy equanimity, but his disavowal by his Government in the matter of his consul-general's action in regard to Shoa-es-Sultaneh's estates last October, and the orgy of indiscipline amongst the Russian consular officers in Persia which followed the disavowal of the Minister, has soured him against Persia, and he is now most anxious to leave.

Mr. Charles Wells Russell, the American Minister, presented his credentials in March 1910. This is his first diplomatic post. He was formerly assistant attorney-general at Washington, in which capacity I am told he was most helpful in adjusting contentious questions between the State Department and the foreign legations. For three months Mr. Russell was the only foreign representative with whom Mr. Shuster had any dealings. Were it not that I believe that Mr. Shuster would not have listened to counsels, even from a messenger direct from heaven, I should say that Mr. Russell was greatly to blame for not coaching Mr. Shuster as to the special position of the two Powers in Persia. At any rate, Mr. Russell fell short of the task that should have been his. Mr. Russell has incurred the resentment of Mr. Shuster's American assistants. In the hope of starving these into continuing to serve under M. Mornard, he has refrained from supporting their claim to an indemnity from the Persian Government. So bitterly did the fourteen American assistants feel regarding his attitude that they telegraphed direct to the State Department, stating that his attitude was one of a man demented.

M. Oudendyck, the Dutch Minister, presented his credentials in the spring of 1910. He is a pleasant colleague, married to an English wife. I have seen nothing of him lately as he was not in Gulahek last summer, and in the autumn he went on leave.

M. Montagna was raised to the rank of Italian Minister last summer. I believe he is a capable man, but he takes himself so seriously as to be somewhat of a bore.

M. de Romero Dusmet, Spanish chargé d'affaires, arrived last autumn to open diplomatic relations between Spain and Persia. Spanish interests here are nil, and he finds time hang heavy on his hands. He is a clever and agreeable colleague, who was with me at my first post in Washington.

[10460] No. 546.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 19, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 741 and 750 of the 25th and 26th December respectively, and to subsequent correspondence, I have the honour to forward to you herewith, a despatch and its enclosures which I have received from Colonel Douglas reporting on the attacks on our escorts on the Bushire-Shiraz road.

I should be grateful if, in the event of this despatch, which is sent in original, being printed, I might be furnished with several copies in that form.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 546.

Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Shiraz, January 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of a report which I have addressed to the Chief of the General Staff in India, concerning the fighting in which a detachment of this regiment was engaged on the 24th and 26th December, and the events immediately preceding and following it.

I have, &c.

J. A. DOUGLAS,

Commander, 39th (K.G.O.) Central India Horse.

Enclosure 2 in No. 546.

Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas to Chief of the General Staff, Simla.

Sir, *Shiraz, January 9, 1912.*

IN forwarding the attached reports from Major Birdwood of this regiment on the fighting in which he was engaged on the 24th and 26th December last, I have the honour to give the following account of the circumstances under which the attacks took place and the events immediately following them.

On the 20th December, Major Birdwood left here with a party of fifty men for Kazerun, where he was to meet a detachment of similar strength from Bushire under Lieutenant D. de M. Fraser escorting Mr. Consul Smart and a convoy of 128 mules; the intention being that Lieutenant Fraser should return from Kazerun and Major Birdwood bring Mr. Smart and the convoy on to here. Major Birdwood reached Mian Kotal on the 23rd December without incident, but on the 24th, while marching through the defile leading up to the Kotal-i-Dukhtar, was attacked by the local road-guards, as narrated in his first report. This attack was reported to me by telegraph on the evening of the 24th; it appeared at first to be a purely local affair, and I did not attach any serious importance to it, but as I feared a repetition of the incident on his return journey, I sent off a further detachment of fifty men under Captain Pitcher with orders

to go to Mian Kotal, whence on the day of his return journey they were to descend and hold the pass for him after clearing the heights if necessary. I may mention here that though the Kotal-i-Dukhtar is comparatively easy to clear and hold on its northern side, the ascent from the south is extremely steep and difficult, and the ground is such that a very few men could inflict serious loss on a small party of cavalry encumbered by a large convoy.

Meanwhile, the detachment from Bushire had been delayed at Borasjun and was not due to arrive at Kazerun till the 26th December. The last march into Kazerun passes through a very difficult defile—the Tang-i-Turkan—the north end of which is held by the Kashgulis. Fearing that there might be trouble here, I instructed Major Birdwood to move out from Kazerun on the 26th to meet, and if necessary co-operate with, the Bushire detachment. The two detachments met without incident, but were attacked while returning to Kazerun, as narrated in Major Birdwood's second report.

News of this second attack reached me on the evening of the 26th. The situation at that time was very uncertain; the section of the road which includes the Kotal-i-Dukhtar and the Tang-i-Turkan is held by the Kashguli section of the Kashgai tribe, whose chief, Mohammad Ali Khan, is deputy governor of Kazerun, and the fact that these two attacks on our troops by his men followed closely one on the other, suggested to me the probability that, if not directly instigated, they were at least connived at by him. There was, therefore, the possibility that the detachment, even if not actually attacked, might have its supplies cut of.

Considering it of the first importance to withdraw the troops from their isolated position, I moved from here on the 27th December with all remaining available men, amounting to 100 lances. At this time Mr. Smart's fate was uncertain, but on my arrival at Khaneh Zinian on the 28th, the rumour that he was wounded and with Mohammad Ali Khan was confirmed, and the following day I learnt at Dasht-i-Arjin that he had been brought into Kazerun, but could not be moved immediately. By this time the situation was easier, as the inhabitants of Kazerun showed no hostility, and the detachment had no difficulty in getting the necessary supplies, but it was thought probable that they might be attacked when leaving. I accordingly remained two days at Dasht-i-Arjin, where in telegraphic communication with Kazerun, I arranged that the whole detachment, including the fifty men under Lieutenant Fraser from Bushire, and bringing with them all the wounded, should move out on the 2nd January, when I would advance to and hold the Kotal-i-Dukhtar for them.

On the 1st January I moved to Mian Kotal, a caravanserai about half-way down the steep pass known as the Kotal-i-Pir-i-Zan, my total strength, including the detachment sent forward under Captain Pitcher, which I had stopped at Dasht-i-Arjin, being now 150 lances. As the ground between that place and the Kotal-i-Dukhtar is quite unsuited for cavalry, I left all horses under a guard of thirty men in the caravanserai, and with the remaining 120 moved on foot to the Kotal, and occupied the hills on both sides of the pass. All the road-guards had either been removed or gone away, no opposition was met with, and by 1 P.M. a junction had been effected with Major Birdwood's force, which was also unmolested, and the whole party reached Mian Kotal that night. A report was received that evening from Shiraz that a party of Kashgais had left Firuzabad with the intention of attacking us on our way back to Shiraz, but we reached there unopposed late on the night of the 5th, a portion of the troops and the convoy remaining that night in the casavanserai of Chinar Rahdar, about 8 miles from Shiraz, and coming in the following morning.

These operations were carried out in almost continual rain, and the roads, always very bad, were often knee-deep in mud. The return march from Mian Kotal to Dasht-i-Arjin, and the long march of 28 miles from Khaneh Zinian into here were especially trying. The former was made in continual heavy rain, changing to snow on the pass, and encumbered as we were with the wounded and a large convoy, it took over nine hours to cover the distance of 12 miles; the last march was through a succession of thunderstorms, with driving rain all day and heavy hail on the high ground, and it war thirteen and a-half hours after we had started before the rear-guard reached Shiraz. Questions of accommodation and supplies prevented all possibility of a halt. Possibly our immunity from attack was due to the inclemency of the weather.

Our total losses in both these actions amounted to—

Killed: 1 sowar, 1 syce, 1 bheestie.
Wounded: 1 hospital assistant, 8 sowars, 1 syce.
Horses: killed or destroyed on account of wounds, 11; wounded, 4; missing, 2.
Mules: killed, 1; missing, 9.

In addition to the above a considerable amount of the men's kits were lost, partly on horses and partly on mules killed, and two horses and two mules died from the effects of the hard marching between Kazarun and here.

In conclusion, I would bring to your notice and to that of his Excellency the commander-in-chief the extremely good work done by Major Birdwood in both affairs. In the affray of the 24th December on the Kotal-i-Dukhtar, I consider that his prompt and vigorous action in rushing the tower not only saved the lives of the two sowars, who had been overpowered and were being dragged into it, but also so demoralised its occupants as to render the subsequent operations much easier than they would otherwise have been.

During the fighting of the 26th he had the difficult task of escorting a convoy, mainly consisting of hired mules, for 8 miles under a heavy fire from his rear and both flanks, and it was perhaps inevitable that a certain number of loads should have been lost. I must add my own to Major Birdwood's expression of regret that Mr. Smart should have been the only wounded man who was not brought in. Mr. Smart informs me that at the time he was hit he was with a few men who were retiring at a gallop at the extreme rear of the column; the bullet, after passing through the thigh, struck his horse and brought it down, winding him so that for a time he was unable to move, and no one appears to have seen him fall. It was only when his wounded horse galloped past that Major Birdwood knew he was not in front, and it was then impossible to go back to look for him.

I have, &c.
J. A. DOUGLAS,
Commander, 39th (K.G.O.) Central India Horse.

Enclosure 3 in No. 546.

Major Birdwood to Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas.

Sir, *Kazerun, December* 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report the affray which took place at the top of the Kotal-Dakhtar on the 24th December, 1911.

I had left Mian-Kotal on the morning of the 24th December, with fifty men of "C" squadron and my convoy, to proceed to Kazerun, a distance of 21 miles. About 8 miles from Mian-Kotal, as I was entering the gorge before reaching the tower at the top of the Kotal-Dakhtar, I heard shots fired in front. I will now relate the story of my advanced guard.

It appears that my three advanced scouts had reached the tower and were in conversation with some apparently friendly "tofangchis" (riflemen), who were the road guards, when about twenty tofangchis rushed out, surrounded them, and tried to snatch their rifles away. On my men resisting, one of them was shot through the face and fell from his horse, but he held on to his rifle and began firing at the tofangchis, who in the meantime had overpowered the other two men and taken their rifles by slashing them over the hands with knives. They then tried to drag the two men into the tower, but the wounded man (Nazar Mahomed) continued firing, and prevented them till he was again shot and hit in the lungs.

As soon as I heard the shots I galloped up with my main body of about sixteen men, sent most of them up a spur of a hill commanding the tower, and with remainder, including Captain McCowan, Indian Medical Service, galloped on to rush the tower, where I saw my two men (still struggling with the tofangchis, who were trying to drag them in) and the wounded man lying about 15 yards from the tower. On our approach the tofangchis at foot of tower let my men go and got into the tower, while the tofangchis in the upper storey fired on us as we galloped up. My trumpeter's horse was shot dead under him during the rush on the tower.

As we had to dismount under fire at 10 yards' range we were compelled to let our horses go, and they galloped off, but, with the exception of my own charger and one other horse, were subsequently recovered. We then tried to rush the door, but found it blocked with a big tree-trunk. Our position was thus both useless and untenable. We were, so to speak, flattened up against the lower wall of the tower, and could only fire up at the loopholes, which did no damage, while the tofangchis in the tower above us were only prevented from leaning over and firing down by the covering fire of my men on the spur of the hill. Captain McCowan pluckily got out to the wounded man

twice and started tending him, but was driven back under the tower each time by fire from the loopholes.

At this time tofangchis appeared on the surrounding hills (which covered within easy range the tower and the road), and began firing on my led horses and convoy. I determined, therefore, to get them back, and we, who had rushed the tower, had to retreat from it. That we did so without further casualties can only be accounted for by the probable fact that the tofangchis inside had been thoroughly alarmed by our rush, and would not stand up to the covering fire of my men from the spur, especially as I found afterwards that the walls of the upper storey were rotten and probably not bullet-proof.

I retired my led horses and convoy back about three-quarters of a mile out of the gorge under a desultory fire from the hills which did us no damage, and after leaving pickets and guards over them, returned with all available men (only about twenty) on foot. We first scaled the heights on each side of the road, driving the tofungchis off before us; in fact they hardly waited to let us get within close range; then we managed to secure the hills immediately behind and overlooking the tower on the north side of the road, and thus were enabled to fire right down into the top of the tower. This effectually cleared out the tofungchis, who must have all escaped down a small mullah immediately opposite the door of the tower. We were too high up to get within effectual range of them, and could get no position covering their exit, which is to be regretted, and so I can report no known casualties on their side. We worked our way down, and again rushed the tower, to find it empty, but were fired on, evidently by its late occupants, from a hill 300 yards south of it, where they had a sangar. We got the wounded man into the tower, where I regret to say he died shortly afterwards. We then cleared the hill south of the tower and those overlooking the Kotal-Dakhtar where the tofungchis on the hills had first retreated to. They did not put up any determined resistance and cleared before our approach. I then sent back for the convoy and led horses and got down the Dakhtar safely, though I expected to have to fight my way down. We reached the village of Pul-ab-Gineh by dark, and the headman offered us shelter for the night, but as the village was wholly commanded by a strong tower (which the headman would not let us occupy), and also by a spur of a hill, I considered the place too much of a trap. My horses and convoy would have been in the open—so we proceeded on to Kazarun (another 8 miles) and reached a caravanserai at 10 P.M., thanks to the assistance of Telegraph Gholam Mohammed Hussein who had come all the way from Mian-Kotal (20 miles) on foot when he heard of the fighting. I had sent two men back to Mian-Kotal with a message to Mr. Christmas (telegraph department) to be forwarded on to you at Shiraz, but they found that Christmas had gone on to Dasht-i-Arjin. On returning to me they were fired on heavily at the bottom of the Mian Kotal hill, and one man, Abdul Razak, shot in the leg and his horse shot too. As his horse fell on his rifle, and he was under close fire, he could not recover it. He came on all the way to Kazerun on foot.

My casualties: One man, Nazar Mahomed, killed; two men, Abdul Razak and Hidayat Ali, wounded; three rifles lost (through treachery), and one lost by messenger shot in the leg; one horse killed during rush on tower, and my own charger and one horse missing. The horse reported killed, belonging to Abdul Razak, was returned to-day, also, three rifles; so still missing two horses and one rifle. The tofungchis are estimated at about twenty-five in the tower and about the same number on the hills.

The object of their attack may have been a premeditated one to capture my convoy, the fact that they held the hills as well as the tower rather points to this, but if so they defeated their own ends in their eagerness to seize the rifles of my advanced scouts, thereby enabling me to stop my convoy before it got within range of the tower. Or, their object may have been to stop my advance to Kazarun. I could certainly not have got my convoy past the tower while it was held, and it was not till we had driven them out that I was enabled to do so. The men were under fire at close range for some considerable time and behaved very well. I would mention the names of Jemadars Abdul Rahman and Amar Ali, and Kot Defterdar Sulieman (who commanded the covering party during the rush on the tower), and also Sowars Walli Mahomed, Wajid Ali, and Abdul Razak, who went back with the message to Mian-Kotal.

The troops were marching for fourteen hours with the exception of some three hours' fighting.

I have, &c.

H. B. BIRDWOOD,

39th Central India Horse.

Enclosure 4 in No. 546.

Major Birdwood to Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas.

Sir, *Kazerun, December* 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward a report of the fighting which took place in the Kazerun plain on the 26th December, 1911.

In the morning, leaving twenty men in charge of the caravanserai at Kazerun, I left with thirty men of "C" squadron to meet Mr. Consul Smart and Lieutenant D. de M. Fraser, who, with fifty men of "D" squadron and a large convoy, had left Kamarij that morning for Kazerun. We joined forces without incident at about 11 A.M.; watered and fed the horses at the river below Radar caravanserai, 10 miles north-west of Kazerun. Just as we were leaving Mr. Smart said to me:—

"I think the tofangchis in the caravanserai are beginning to be troublesome.

"They say we must stop here another hour, as they have not received permission from Mahomed Ali Khan to let us through.

"I think we had better be getting on."

Mr. Smart's intention was to have a talk with the tofangchis, but almost as soon as the column began to move the tofangchis opened fire from the caravanserai, and he had no chance of doing so. We replied to the fire and took up positions to cover the retreat of the convoy. I sent on one troop under Jemadar Abdul Rahman Khan as advanced guard and one troop "D" squadron under Jemadar Bhagat Singh as baggage guard, and with the remainder, about fifteen of "C" squadron and one troop "D," and the Maxim under Lieutenant D. de M. Fraser, I formed a rear-guard. For the first mile and a-half the rear-guard action was not a serious one. There were only about twelve tofangchis in the caravanserai, who slowly followed us up, but who did no damage at the time, though later on they got up in the hills on our left flank, and, as I subsequently learnt, were responsible for the death of one syce and the wounding of Mr. Smart and the hospital assistant.

But as we retired, more tofangchis began to appear on our right flank from the direction of Shapur, and matters became more serious. As there was no suitable ground for rear-guard action on the road, I took a line of retreat on the south-west side of it (parallel to the convoy which was on the road itself) and along a succession of hills. We retired like this for 3 or 4 miles, receiving the hottest fire from our right flank and a good deal also from the enemy on the hills on our left. The fire from our right seemed chiefly to come from men who had turned out of villages and towers to join in the fight, and was most trying, as we could get no cover for our horses, which, though protected from our immediate rear, were fully exposed to these flanking attacks. Here many men and horses especially were hit.

The normal rear-guard formation changed to a retirement in the form of a semi-circle, and as the Maxim gun horses formed such a large target when the gun was dismounted, I had to discontinue its use altogether. It was at this point, about 5 miles from the caravanserai, that Mr. Smart's horse was first discovered, wounded, and I knew that he must have come to grief. To enquiries as to his previous whereabouts I could get no answer. It was generally supposed that he must have gone on in advance of us until his horse was found. I learnt afterwards from Mr. Smart himself when he was brought in that he had been wounded rather early in the fight and unnoticed by anybody. However, at the time I, of course, considered the possibility of making a dash back for him, but gave it up as quite impracticable. We did not know when or at what place his horse had been hit, and at the time were so pressed from all sides that a delay in the retirement might well have meant our being cut off from Kazerun and our convoy. In fact a short time later about twenty tofangchis did get across our line of retirement. The rear-guard was composed of only thirty-five men and the Maxim, and we had with us seven or eight wounded men to get along, and also a number of "D" squadron mules and followers which proved a great hindrance.

These latter had not been able to keep up with the Persian mules on the road, and so had to be brought along with us. Many mules were shot or stampeded and their loads lost, and the syces, as well as the wounded men, had to be eventually mounted behind sowars. Deducting men to hold horses, act as flankers, &c., we hardly had twenty men for actual use in the firing line.

Meanwhile the two troops under Jemadars Abdul Rahman and Bhagat Singh had done very well indeed, and had hurried the convoy along, keeping parallel to it on the

north-west side of the road as we were on the south-west. They did their best to see the convoy through, but several of the Persian mules threw their loads in stampeding, and a few of them were shot. The most serious loss was that of twelve boxes of ammunition.

My total loss in killed and wounded was two followers killed, one hospital assistant and six sowars wounded, three followers wounded, ten horses killed and five wounded. Of "D" squadron mules ten are either shot or missing.

As regards the casualties among the tofangchis it is impossible to give an accurate estimate. Mahomed Ali Khan states 1 killed and 7 wounded. The current rumour in Kazerun places them at 5 killed and 6 wounded. Mr. Fraser, my native officers, and myself only actually saw about 4 to 6 either killed or wounded.

It is difficult to estimate the numbers of the tofangchis who attacked us.

I do not think that the attack was entirely premeditated. The tofangchis in the caravanserai having started the fight, every village and tower on or off the road seemed to produce men anxious to participate. The fighting began at Rahdar caravanserai, 10 miles from Kazerun, and fire on us was kept up continuously for 8 miles without any cessation, so the numbers engaged must have been considerable, especially as I do not think that the same men who started the fight followed us up far. We were, so to speak, handed on to fresh assailants as we retired down the valley. Mahomed Ali Khan states that he sent out his men to stop the fighting, but I think it is far more likely that they joined in too, and were responsible for the heavy fire we received from the road. The enemy never gave us a chance of getting them out in the open, but kept well within running distance of the hills on our left and the various towers and villages, through which we eventually had to zigzag back.

I wish to bring to notice excellent work done by Lieutenant D. de M. Fraser, who was the whole time with the rear party, and also by Captain McCowan, Indian Medical Service, who tended the wounded under fire very successfully. Ressaidar Ibrahim Khan, Jemadars Bhagat Singh and Abdul Rahman Khan, Lance Duffadar Pal Singh, and Sowar Laxman Singh, who worked the Maxim, and Ward Orderly Pritam Singh are also brought to notice for good work done.

At about 1½ miles from Kazerun, I connected up the rear-guard with the convoy and the two troops under Jamadars Abdul Rahman Khan and Bhagat Singh, and got into Kazerun about 5 P.M.

It pelted with rain for the last two hours of the fighting.

Fortunately the inhabitants of Kazerun, who apparently are not on very friendly terms with the Kashgais, did not oppose our entry, and I was enabled to get in supplies almost at once for six days.

The most regrettable incident, and one which I cannot deplore too much, was that Mr. Smart should have been left wounded. I need hardly say that had any of us known of it we should not have left him.

On arrival at Kazerun, I sent for the Nasir-i-Duvan (governor) to institute immediate enquiries about Mr. Smart, and late that evening I heard that he had been found wounded and taken to Mahomed Ali Khan's camp, who was going to bring him into Kazerun. I am glad to say that he was brought in on the 29th.

I am, &c.

H. B. BIRDWOOD,
39th Central India Horse.

[10461] No. 547.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 19, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 123 of last night, I have the honour to transmit copy of the joint note which my Russian colleague and I handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, embodying the proposals of the two Governments with a view to assisting the Persian Government to restore order and to placing the relations of the Government with the two Powers on a friendly and stable footing.

You will notice that the proposal regarding the treatment of the ex-Shah is recorded, although the negotiations with His Majesty which are involved have already been begun. I should mention that the style given in the note to the ex-Shah—Mohammad Ali Shah—was due to the insistence of my colleague, who urged that his Government had always given him this style. As the question appeared to me to be one of sentiment and not one of material importance, I made little demur.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 547.

Sir G. Barclay and M. Poklewsky to Persian Government.

M. le Ministre, *Téhéran, le 18 février, 1912.*

ANIMÉES du désir de mettre les relations entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie et le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse sur une base solide d'amitié et de confiance et désireuses d'aider autant que possible le Gouvernement persan dans sa tâche de rétablir et de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans le pays. Les Légations de Russie et d'Angleterre, d'ordre de leurs Gouvernements, ont l'honneur de faire au Gouvernement persan les propositions suivantes :—

1. Les deux Gouvernements sont prêts à avancer pour faire face aux dépenses urgentes au Gouvernement persan une somme de 100,000*l.* chacun. La Banque Impériale et la Banque d'Escompte ouvriront chacune un crédit pour cette somme aussitôt que les deux légations auront reçu une réponse favorable à la présente note, et il est entendu que le crédit de la Banque d'Escompte sera mis à la disposition du Gouvernement persan en roubles s'élevant à la somme de 945,750 roubles.

2. Les sommes susindiquées seront prêtées à un taux d'intérêt de 7 pour cent par an, et devront être remboursées du premier produit du prochain emprunt du Gouvernement persan et jusqu'alors les excédents des revenus des douanes du nord et du sud qui jusqu'ici ont été mis par les deux banques à la disposition du Gouvernement persan, devront être employés intégralement et respectivement pour le service de l'amortissement et des intérêts des parties russes et anglaises de la présente avance.

3. L'avance doit être dépensée sous le contrôle du trésorier général et d'après un programme élaboré par ce dernier d'accord avec le Cabinet et approuvé par les deux légations. Il est entendu qu'une partie considérable sera affectée à l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale avec l'aide des officiers suédois. En faisant cette proposition et pour atteindre les buts indiqués au commencement de cette note, les deux légations espèrent que le Gouvernement persan s'engagera :

(1.) A conformer dorénavant sa politique aux principes de la convention anglo-russe de 1907 ;

(2.) A licencier, aussitôt que Mohammad Ali Schah et Salar-ed-Dowleh auront quitté la Perse, les fédaïs et les forces irrégulières qui se trouvent actuellement au service persan ;

(3.) A discuter avec les deux légations un projet d'organisation d'une petite armée régulière et effective ;

(4.) A arriver à un accord avec Mohammad Ali Schah au sujet de son départ de la Perse, de sa pension et d'une amnistie générale à ses partisans.

En espérant une réponse favorable, nous saisissons, &c.

G. BARCLAY.
POKLEWSKY-KOZIELL.

[10462] No. 548.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of the *aide-mémoire* which my Russian colleague and I left with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of our representations respecting the ex-Shah, reported in my telegram No. 98 of the 7th instant.

As reported in that telegram, the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted the intervention of the Russian consul at Astrabad for the conduct of the negotiations with the ex-Shah with a view to His Majesty's leaving the country, on condition that he should receive a pension of 50,000 tomans and that a complete amnesty should be accorded to his adherents.

On the following day, the 8th February, the Russian Minister telegraphed to his consul at Astrabad the necessary instructions with a view to negotiations on these lines. The consul was to point out to the ex-Shah the hopelessness of his case, as he would never be recognised by His Majesty's Government. He was also to inform His Majesty that the two Powers would give their moral and material support to the Persian Government. If these arguments failed, the consul was to do his best to remove the Caucasians who had recently come to Astrabad in the ex-Shah's cause.

On the 9th instant the consul reported having carried out his instructions. Mohammed Ali seems to have been greatly surprised by the communication made to him. He said he had hoped for Russian sympathy, and intimated that if he had regained the throne he would have been guided in his actions by the requirements of Russia. Nevertheless, he expressed his willingness to leave Persia if the Emperor desired it, and said he would await orders from the Emperor and an adjustment by his Imperial Majesty of the question of the pension, as he considered the amount offered by the Persian Government inconsistent with his dignity.

On the 15th February the Russian consul was instructed to tell the ex-Shah that the Russian Government's decision was final, and that he had better seize the present opportunity to secure a pension and amnesty, and that he could hope for nothing better. To this message the ex-Shah replied that he was willing to leave, but he repeated that the pension named was insufficient, and that he must have the same sum as was granted to him at the time of the revolution, *i.e.*, 100,000 tomans a-year. He further demanded a sum down of 100,000 tomans in order to pay off his Turcomans and Caucasians, who would otherwise create disorders.

Before we make further definite proposals to the Persian Government my Russian colleague is enquiring of the Russian consul at Astrabad whether he considers this latter sum necessary, and whether he could himself ensure its employment for the purpose indicated.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 548.

Aide-mémoire.

NOUS sommes venus ce matin, le Ministre de Russie et moi, pour suggérer au Gouvernement persan, par ordre de nos Gouvernements, que le Gouvernement persan entre maintenant en négociations avec Mohammad Ali Mirza afin de lui persuader de quitter la Perse à condition que sa pension, dont le montant serait déterminé par le Gouvernement persan d'accord avec l'ex-Schah, soit renouvelé et qu'une amnistie complète soit accordée à ses partisans. Nous sommes chargés d'ajouter que dans le cas où le Gouvernement persan désirerait que les négociations pour le départ de Mohammad Ali Mirza fussent conduites par l'intermédiaire du consul russe à Astrabad, le Ministre de Russie enverra des instructions au consul d'appuyer sur la nécessité qu'il y a pour l'ex-Schah d'accedter l'offre du Gouvernement persan.

Téhéran, le 6 février, 1912.

[10465] No 549.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 549.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending February 20, 1912.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—On the 14th of February it was announced that Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh, who was Foreign Minister in the Sipahdar Cabinet which resigned on the 24th July, 1911, has succeeded Hakim-ul-Mulk as Minister of Finance. Other Cabinet changes are said to be in contemplation.

American Officials.—Mr. Cairns left Tehran suddenly on the 10th February, and most of the other American Treasury officials have also left. The question of their indemnification has been settled, as reported in a separate despatch.

Anglo-Russian Proposals.—On the 7th February the British and Russian Ministers called together on the Regent and Foreign Minister and made proposals with a view to the eventual departure of the ex-Shah from Persia. The proposals having been favourably received, the Russian consul at Astrabad made the necessary communication to the ex-Shah regarding the hopelessness of his attempt to regain the throne, and the pension the Persian Government is willing to allow him if he leaves the country.

On the 18th February the two Ministers again called on the Regent and Foreign Minister to present a joint note laying down the terms on which the two Governments are prepared to advance 100,000*l.* each to the Persian Government.

General Situation.—There has been almost complete calm at Tehran during the past four weeks. The Government continues to maintain order and the democratic party has shown no activity. Some excitement was caused by the action of Amir Mufakham, the Bakhtiari Khan, who on the 18th February caused the Minister of the Interior to come to his house, and there detained him for four hours and threatened to have him beaten, in consequence of the arrest of certain persons who were accused of making a demonstration in favour of the ex-Shah.

The Press.—At the end of January an official organ called the "Aftab" ("Sun") commenced to appear, and has since published a series of political articles, evidently inspired by the Government, which display moderation and a true sense of Persia's real interests.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

Tabreez.

There have been no further disturbances in Tabreez during the last four weeks.

Zia-ed-Dowleh, who has been a refugee in the British consulate since the 26th December, 1911, committed suicide on the 5th February.

Mr. Consul Shipley left on the 9th February, and Mr. Stevens is acting for him during his absence.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who has been acting as governor of the town since the 2nd January, led Mr. Stevens to understand, in an interview he had with him on the 14th February, that he was opposed to the present Government unless Sipahdar was Prime Minister.

It is reported that secret meetings, attended by the clergy and leading local Persians, are being held to discuss the possibility of re-establishing the ex-Shah.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

Of the Persian notables who were deported to Russia and sent back to Resht by the Russian authorities to be tried by court martial, four were found guilty and hanged on the 31st January. Two other persons were executed at Enzeli by the Russians on the 2nd February.

General Genikh, commanding at Baku, has been placed in command of the Russian troops in Ghilan. The Russian garrison at Resht was reinforced by 400 infantry from Baku on the 30th January.

In consequence of alarmist reports received by the Russian Government regarding the alleged danger to Russian subjects and trade in Mazanderan and Astrabad, it was

decided at St. Petersburgh at the beginning of February to send two companies of infantry with two mountain guns to Astrabad, one company to Barfrush, and one company to Meshedisser.

Meshed.

Major-General Redko, who is in command of the Russian troops in Khorassan, arrived in Meshed with 400 infantry on the 12th January.

Early in February Prince Dabija, the Russian consul-general, organised an agitation in favour of the ex-Shah. On the 5th February the situation became most serious, as a large mob, headed by agents of the Russian consul and by Russian subjects, commenced parading the streets and defying the police. However, on representations being made to the Russian Minister at Tehran, instructions were sent to Prince Dabija to desist, with the result that the mob dispersed.

In the opinion of His Majesty's consul-general, Prince Dabija's intention was to create disturbances in the town, and so provide an excuse for taking over the administration.

The province is generally disturbed, owing to the presence of large raiding parties of Turcomans and Kurds.

The consular agent in Herat has reported that the Russians are constructing a number of fortified posts along the frontier in the neighbourhood of Kushk, and that the Afghan officials are much exercised at this new scheme.

Ispahan.

The town has remained quiet, but the environs continue to be subject to burglaries.

The boycott of foreign goods is ended.

Owing to the severity of the weather there has been a decrease in the number of robberies in the province.

M. Mornard has confirmed Mr. Haycock in his appointment as local agent to the treasurer-general.

Sardar Zafar, the newly-appointed governor, has left Tehran for Ispahan.

Naib Hussein, the notorious brigand, has now come to terms with the Persian Government, and his son, who was a prisoner at Tehran, joined him at Kashan on the 8th February.

Yezd.

The town is reported quiet, but the financial situation continues unsatisfactory.

Shahab-ed-Dowleh, the governor (Assadullah Mirza, the former deputy and Cabinet Minister), is reported to be displaying more energy in meeting the unrest than most of his predecessors, although complaints of his avarice and pan-Islamism are rife.

Seistan.

The acceptance of the Russian demands caused general satisfaction.

The news of recent events in Tabreez has reached Seistan, but His Majesty's consul considers that disturbances are improbable, as the principal mullahs are well disposed towards us, and as Hashmat-ul-Mulk, the governor, is opposed to any anti-foreign demonstration.

Kerman.

The news of Russian action in northern Persia caused considerable excitement in Kerman. The bazaars were closed, inflammatory speeches were made, and the drilling of "national volunteers" was commenced.

However, on the arrival of Amir Azam, the new Governor-General, on the 15th December, the bazaars were opened, the drilling of the "national volunteers" ceased, and the town resumed its normal state.

Sardar Nasret (the former acting governor of Kerman) left on the 6th February for Tehran, where he had been summoned to give an account of himself and of the money supplied to him for the troops.

Kermanshah.

On the night of the 16th January shots were fired at the British consulate, where a considerable number of persons have taken refuge, including Azam-ed-Dowleh, the former acting governor. On representations being made to the Persian Government,

the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Salar-ed-Dowleh was responsible for the firing, and that he had done this in consequence of the continued presence of the refugees at the consulate. He added that the Persian Government were unable to take any steps against Salar-ed-Dowleh beyond pressing Farman Farma, the newly-appointed governor, to proceed to Kermanshah as soon as possible.

Telegraphic communication with Kermanshah is interrupted, and various conflicting reports have reached the legation as to the situation there. It was reported on the 8th February that Salar-ed-Dowleh had fled, and that the refugees had left the consulate, but it has been subsequently reported that Salar-ed-Dowleh has re-entered the town.

W. M. FORDHAM, *Major*,
Military Attaché.

[10466]

No. 550.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 38.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of the 23rd January respecting the state of the southern roads, I have the honour to report that, as usual in the depth of the winter, few if any robberies have been reported.

A telegram from His Majesty's acting-consul at Shiraz states, as regards the Bushire–Shiraz road, that one caravan reports from Rahdar that it is delayed owing to the insecurity of the road, while muleteers who have reached Kazerun refuse to proceed owing to excessive blackmail at the hands of the Kashgais. Two bales for British officers are reported to have been robbed by Kashgais at Tangi-Turkan, where the muleteers complain that Kashgai road guards are continually pilfering from caravans, and two further bales were robbed in Tangi Bulaki. Mr. Smart adds that he is arranging for the dispatch of a special "memur" to treat for the protection, and if possible for the transport to Shiraz, of British goods scattered along the road.

A camel caravan travelling from Shiraz to Ispahan was attacked and sixty camels with loads were carried off, but on the whole, according to reports from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan, from the middle of January up to the 3rd February, caravans seem to have been passing freely along the Shiraz–Ispahan road. The danger point is in the neighbourhood of Abadeh, but Major Petersen, the Swedish gendarmerie officer, on his way to Shiraz has passed that locality unescorted in safety. Near Dehbid Major Petersen fell in with a donkey caravan which had just been looted, and he and his three or four companions followed up the robbers, who fired upon him, but he wounded and secured two of them.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[10467]

No. 551.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 39.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 79 of the 3rd February, I have the honour to report that my Russian colleague and I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 21st instant copies of the sketch map annexed to the joint report of the British and Russian delegates on their recent tour in the Turco-Persian frontier district. We also informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it would be left to the discretion of the two embassies at Constantinople which portions of the other documents desired by the Persian Government might be commmunicated to the Persian delegate at the forthcoming Turco-Persian Commission.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs begged M. Poklewsky and me to convey to our Governments the expression of the Persian Government's thanks for this communication.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[10389] No. 552.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 180.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, reporting on the amount of Turkish and Russian troops at present stationed on the Persian frontier, and on the present situation in those districts.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 552.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Van, February 19, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that no appreciable change in the military situation on the Persian frontier appears to have taken place lately. Authentic news is very difficult to obtain, and the Turkish intelligence system appears to be very defective.

The Russians appear to have now 1,000 infantry, three batteries of mountain artillery and some Cossacks at Khoi, a similar number of infantry and also some artillery (the number of which I have been unable to ascertain) at Urmi. At Dilman there are 300 infantry, at Kossova eighty men of 7th Chasseurs with three officers. A wireless telegraph post has been established there on the roof of the Chaldean bishops church. The troops at Kossova are, according to the statements of Russian officers (5th February), to be shortly increased by another hundred. At Kwenashaber (?) there are eighty Cossacks and three officers.

There appears to be no change in the positions of the Turkish troops, but 100 Turkish soldiers are at Dilman presumably as guard to the Turkish consular agency.

The battalions on the frontier between Serai and Ushnu have been strengthened by about 200 men each. These reinforcements comprise both Ihtiats and recruits, but the majority of the former have not previously performed any military service. The battalions at Bayezid and Kara Kilise have not been reinforced.

Third battalions for 97th, 100th and 101st regiments have been formed, but as the method adopted has been to divide existing regiments into three parts instead of two, it does not in itself constitute any increase in strength of this army corps. A total of 2,000 Ihtiats and recruits have been called up however, and distributed among all the battalions of the army corps except those at Bayezid and Kara Kilise.

I estimate the total strength of Turkish troops in the Nevahi-i-Shar kie between Serai and Ushnu at 1,700 men. In addition the total of the Frontier Company Guards between Bayezid and Ushnu amounts to 1,200 men.

In the whole section between Bayezid and Ushnu (Bashkala and Gavar being included), I estimate the total number of the Ottoman troops together with the Frontier Company Guards to amount to 3,700 men.

The number of fedai refugees from Persia at Van is now about 150. "General" Sertib, who directed the operations of the fedai at Tabreez, arrived here with a suite of twenty men a few days ago. It appears that efforts were made to induce all these fedai to remain in the neighbourhood of Bashkala, but practically all the leaders have now come to Van. The Ottoman Government is said to have made a grant of £T. 2 to each of the Persian refugees on arrival on Ottoman soil.

Jevdet Bey, who was recently appointed Mutessarif of Bashkala on account of his influence over the frontier Kurds, recently paid a visit to Kotur with the object of inducing Simko, the chief of Kotur, to enter with his men into Turkish territory. Vacant lands in the neighbourhood of Bashkala were offered him. Up to the present Simko has not been persuaded to accept this proposition owing, according to the Turks, to Russian influence being exerted to induce him to remain in Persian territory. Jevdet Bey in company with the frontier commissary has now proceeded to Ushnu, and thence will go to Soujboulak. It would appear that their mission is to gain the sympathies of the Kurds in the contested territories and to counteract the effect of the Russian efforts to alienate them from the Turks.

At Kossova until lately there was a Russian political agent who was engaged in

gaining over the Chaldeans to orthodoxy, a by no means difficult matter provided the funds available be sufficient. His appointment was recently revoked, and I am unaware whether or not he has since been replaced.

The Turks are uneasy about the doings of Abdul Rezzak among the Kurds and his relations with the Russians. They have no knowledge as to his whereabouts at the present moment, but are prepared to purchase his goodwill by offering him some post which will satisfy him. This they were not prepared to do some months ago.

I have, &c.

V. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[10536] No. 553.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 11, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 174 of 8th March.

Russian Minister tells me that the Russian Government are proposing to the Porte, in order to close the incident, that the Russian consul at Resht should call on the Turkish Ambassador and explain that the Persian Government could not salute as their guns had been seized and spoilt, and that the Turkish Ambassador should then return the consul's call.

Following is the British vice-consul's report of the incident :—

Governor-General ordered two old Enzeli-made muzzle-loaders to be taken from the arsenal and prepared for firing salute, but Russian troops pounced on them, smashed the gun-carriage, and all that was to be found in the arsenal removed to the Russian vice-consulate at Enzeli [*sic*].

I understand that the Russian consul at Resht was aware of the purpose for which the guns were to be used, but nevertheless instigated the military authorities to make the seizure.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10632] No. 554.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 179.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 11, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 176 of 9th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday submitted to me through his "chef de cabinet" a further draft of the Persian Government's reply to our joint note.

It differs in many respects from his previous draft as modified at our discussion on 7th March (see my telegram No. 168 of 7th March), and, in particular, as regards the formula for the engagement to discuss with the two legations formation of an army, which is now so worded as to engage the Persian Government only to discuss [?] choice of officers (which they are already bound to do) and to restrict choice to subjects of minor Powers.

Russian Minister is naturally unwilling to commit himself to the extent of excluding Russian officers, and, although in handing me Minister for Foreign Affairs' draft [he] stated that it was Persian Government's last word, I have, after consultation with my Russian colleague, told the "chef de cabinet" that the draft differs so much from that discussed and amended 7th March that we could not accept it.

Persian Government do not seem altogether averse to a moderate increase in the Cossack brigade, but not only the Cabinet but also the Regent are strongly opposed to assume responsibility of giving an undertaking which they now suspect to be only a step towards introduction of Russian and perhaps British officers to the main army and its employment in the defined spheres.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10452] No. 555.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 11, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 154 of 4th March.

Russian consul at Astrabad reports that paying off of the Caucasians has proceeded smoothly, and that these have now left Astrabad.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburgh.)

[10649] No. 556

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, March 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 175 of the 9th March.

I cannot say for certain which representatives moved in Tehran as the Minister for Foreign Affairs declines to tell me.

The Regent would probably tell me, but unless you instruct me to approach him on the subject I hardly like to press the point.

It is possible that, in addition to the German representative, the American Minister made enquiries, for he approached me recently on the subject. I read to him the preamble of the Anglo-Russian Convention and our formula for obtaining the adhesion of the Persian Government. I thought I had thereby reassured him.

Great care has been shown by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to impress on us that the foreign representatives who moved had informed him that they were doing so without instructions from their respective Governments.

[10658] No. 557.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 11, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 151 of 1st March.

I have received note from the Persian Government repeating their regrets at the incidents, and agreeing to 4,744*l.* to be paid as compensation as proposed by me.

[10650] No. 558.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, March 11, 1912.*

LAST fortnight has shown a recrudescence of robberies on southern roads. Between Shiraz and Ispahan, caravan attacked to the south of Dehbid, Messrs. Ziegler losing goods to the value of nearly 2,000*l.*, a second caravan robbed in the same place a few days later, another caravan attacked to the north of Abadeh, sixty camel-loads belonging to Ziegler carried off. Large caravan attacked near Kumisheh by 300 robbers, details of losses unknown. Band of 400 Kuhgeluis occupied Orehini Pass, and 8th March robbed post and travellers.

Consul-general at Bagdad reports all routes from Bagdad to Tehran closed, two European travellers having just returned from Khanikin unable to proceed further.

His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas reports caravan roberry, Hindus losing 250*l.* value of goods.

[10158] No. 559.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 171 of 8th March: Russian troops.

Am I to understand that 1,400 men have now been sent from Kazvin to Russia, or were some of them sent to Tabreez?

Your telegram No. 140 of 26th February.

Does the "considerable reduction" promised at Tabreez amount merely to the 500 men who recently left that place?

If so, it is disappointing.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 219.)

[10373] No. 560.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) Confidential. *Foreign Office, March 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 168 of 7th March and telegrams to and from Sir G. Buchanan repeated to you: Joint note.

Is it, in your opinion, necessary to take any notice of the hope expressed by the Persian Government that no conditions other than those regarding security will be attached to a loan? As M. Sazonof has not raised this point, we do not want to suggest objections, but if, when the loan is discussed, other conditions are made, would the Persian Government have cause to complain that we had left them under a false impression?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 220.)

[10627] No. 561.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 221.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 11, 1912.*

THE representative in England of the Société d'Étude, formed in connection with the Trans-Persian Railway project, has enquired if we desire the société to take up the joint loan to Persian Government.

I have replied that I am discussing the question with the Russian Government, and I should be glad to learn Minister for Foreign Affairs' views.

(Confidential.)

I am inclined to think there may be some advantage in keeping the two matters separate, and we should in any case have to be careful not to abandon our freedom of action in regard to railway project on account of being committed to the same group in regard to the proposed loan; if, therefore, the société did arrange for loan it would be well that it should do so in a distinctive capacity.

[10795] No. 562.

Lord Errington to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received March 12.)

(Private and Confidential.)
My dear Sir Arthur, 8, *Bishopsgate, London, March 5, 1912.*

PLEASE allow me to express to you my best thanks for the letter you were kind enough to write to me on the 2nd instant about the trans-Persian Railway.

Lord Revelstoke asks me to say how greatly obliged he is for the indications you have been good enough to give me of the Foreign Office attitude towards this project. These indications will be of the greatest value in affording some idea of the attitude it will be desirable to take when this matter assumes a definite shape. He notes that

in so far as the interests of Great Britain, Russia, and France are concerned in the Société d'Études, you have no objection to any percentage of distribution or representation to which his approval is given, and hopes to arrange that such distribution and representation should be on an equal basis as far as these three countries are concerned.

We have further noted that the British Government must be understood to reserve full freedom to action when it comes to the actual construction and subsequent management, as well as the control of the lines which may be built. We also understand that the Foreign Office would wish to be consulted about the alignment, constitution of the board, representation of British interests, percentage of construction orders to be placed on the British market, as well as in general outline about the freight and passenger rates.

Lord Revelstoke greatly appreciates the suggestions you have so usefully made in regard to the nomination of Colonel Sir William Bisset and Mr. George Lloyd, and he will endeavour to secure the services of these gentlemen on the "conseil d'administration," as also of Colonel Napier on the "comité de direction."

We have duly noted that the Foreign Office is the principal department concerned, and we will address future communications accordingly.

Thanking you again for the expression of your views, which will be of the greatest service to me in view of my forthcoming visit to Paris, yours sincerely,

ERRINGTON.

[10770] No. 563.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received March 12.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, March 9, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th March, with enclosures, relative to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, and the constitution of the Société d'Etude in connection therewith.

In reply, I am to state for Sir E. Grey's information, that, as it is not possible to determine what extent of British participation in the railway company will ultimately be regarded as essential if the enterprise is to receive the approval of His Majesty's Government, the Board are of opinion that it is advisable for His Majesty's Government to refrain from any expression of opinion as to the constitution of the Société which might possibly be construed as implying approval of any particular distribution of interests. The language employed in the Foreign Office letters to Lord Errington and the Count d'Arnoux would appear to safeguard sufficiently the freedom of action of His Majesty's Government with regard to future developments.

I am to add that the Board concur in Sir E. Grey's opinion that no sufficient reason has yet been shown for any modification of the views expressed by him as to the alignment of the railway and the impossibility of a financial guarantee by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[10716] No. 564.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 12.)

Sir, *India Office, March 11, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, regarding the assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Transport Company in connection with railway construction in Persia.

The Marquess of Crewe will of course defer to Sir E. Grey's views. But it appears to him that the objection taken in paragraph 2 of your letter logically amounts to an admission that the Persian Transport Company is, in fact, entitled to preferential treatment, and this he is not prepared to admit. It appears to him that what the pledge means is that, other things being equal, the Persian Transport Company's application would receive prior consideration. But he contends that as between Persian Transport Company and Persian Railways Syndicate other things are not

equal; and that, in these circumstances, while His Majesty's Government are bound in the general interest to give their support to whatever body establishes its claim to be financially and administratively the most efficient, the status of Messrs. Lynch's companies, and their past record, does not in fact entitle the Persian Transport Company, in competition with the Persian Railways Syndicate, to be selected to carry out work of such magnitude and complexity as the construction of a railway in any part of Persia in its present condition.

On the other hand, his Lordship agrees that it would not be fair not only to decline to give the Persian Transport Company a separate concession, but also to exclude them from any share in the construction of railways, and he therefore concurs with Sir E. Grey that His Majesty's Government might well use their good offices with the Persian Railways Syndicate to secure the company some participation in it. It will not be overlooked that Mr. Lynch may claim that he sits on the board as representing the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company which, it is observed, has subscribed at least 5,000*l.* out of the syndicate's capital of 14,500*l.*

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[10713] No. 565.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 12.)

Sir, *India Office, March 11, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to invite reference to this Office letter of the 8th August last, enclosing copy of a letter from the political resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 28th June, 1911, and to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams exchanged with the Government of India regarding a proposal to establish a coal depôt on Henjam Island.

It will be seen that the Government of India propose to deposit 5,000 tons of coal on the island—presumably within the limits of the British concession—apparently without previous reference to the Persian Government; and they recommend that, if later on that Government raise the question of the nature and extent of British rights on the island, negotiations should be opened with them on the basis of our old rights, and that, in certain circumstances, it should be explained that the occupation is temporary.

The rights to which the Government of India refer are those conferred by the late Shah on the 29th March, 1868, for the construction of a telegraph station; and it will be remembered that not only have the limits of the land then conveyed never been defined, but the Persian Government have maintained, as recently as 1906, that no land was conveyed at all. It is true that they were then informed that His Majesty's Government considered that their acquiescence in the actual facts of the British occupation from 1868 to 1880 must be regarded as equivalent to a formal concession of the land occupied. But they have never accepted that view, and, from the previous history of the question, it appears very probable that the action proposed by the Government of India will be followed by an immediate protest from the Persian Government. And even if the nature of the concession were undisputed, the Marquess of Crewe thinks it probable that they would protest against an interpretation of the minute of the 29th March, 1868, which should involve the conversion of a telegraph station into a coaling station without previous reference to themselves.

While, therefore, Lord Crewe agrees with the Government of India as to the desirability of securing a coaling station in that region, and as to the superiority of Henjam (which he believes to be undisputed) to Basidu for that purpose, he feels that the proposal must be considered in the light of our general relations with Persia at the present moment, and he would not be disposed to press it if Sir E. Grey thinks the moment unfavourable. And he would suggest, as an alternative to the course proposed by the Government of India, that the Persian Government should be informed that we intend, as part of the blockade operations undertaken in their interest, to store coal temporarily in the precincts of the telegraph station on Henjam; and that when the store has been in existence for a few months, negotiations should be opened with them for its permanent retention, if necessary, in exchange for Basidu.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 565.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 25, 1912.

PLEASE see letter of the 28th June, 1911, from resident, Persian Gulf, enclosed in letter of the 20th July from secretary, Foreign Department, regarding Henjam. Desirability of storing 5,000 tons of coal at Henjam, which on the installation of wireless telegraph station will become best base for His Majesty's ships, is strongly urged by naval commander-in-chief. Owing to shifting of blockade to Tangistan and Shibkuh coasts, Henjam is more important than before; it also has natural advantages. Basidu is unsuitable. We propose to authorise the admiral to act as he proposes, and to leave Persian Government, if they see fit, to make objections. We do not consider it expedient to raise question of right with them. Instructions at a very early date are solicited. Measure can always be called a temporary one, due to area of blockade, which is being carried out by us on Persian Government's behalf, having been shifted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 565.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, February* 27, 1912.

HENJAM.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 25th February, 1912. Please say whether I am to understand that you contemplate permanent naval base at Henjam in addition to station at Basidu, or whether your object is to obtain Henjam instead of Basidu, as resident, Persian Gulf, proposes.

Enclosure 3 in No. 565.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 1, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 27th instant regarding Henjam. For the present our proposal is that, in addition to retention of Basidu, Henjam should be used as a coaling station and coal stored there. We recommend that later on negotiations should be opened on basis of our old rights, in the event of the question of nature and extent of our rights on the island being raised by Persian Government. We are now inclined to deprecate surrender of Basidu, which need not necessarily be involved in the above.

[10665] No. 566.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) Most Confidential. *Constantinople, March* 11, 1912.

YOUR despatch No. 79 of 2nd March: Turco-Persian frontier.

Point 1. Turkish Government will, I think, much prefer reference to Hague Tribunal, for which Minister for Foreign Affairs has great admiration, as in the event of adverse decision by the proposed joint commission of arbitration they will be very much exposed to attack, especially on the point of British and Russian participation in the commission, which will be regarded with the same suspicion as in the past. It is possible that after the elections Ministers might find themselves strong enough to disregard such attacks, but I do not see what inducement proposal can be represented as offering; they will not be influenced by considerations of expense.

Point 2. I think proposal might be placed before the Porte in such a manner as not to affect our relations unfavourably.

Turkish Government seem not indisposed to invoke assistance of such expert legal opinion as Mandelstam, first dragoman at Russian Embassy, in drawing up case for reference to Hague Tribunal. This might, perhaps, present opportunity to secure exclusion of Mohammerah frontier from discussion at Hague Tribunal.

[10791] No. 567.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March* 12, 1912.

[?] FROM reports from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed, situation appears to be still disquieting.

Ex-Shah's party is now very strong, with plenty of arms and ammunition, and local authorities are hardly able to cope with situation.

Russian Minister has offered the co-operation of Russian troops to assist local authorities to deal with the situation.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10794] No. 568.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic) *Tehran, March* 12, 1912.

SIR P. COX'S telegram No. 202 of 10th March to Government of India.

I concur generally in Cox's recommendations, and would submit that present moment, when Persian Government have just undertaken to pay compensation demanded, is especially opportune for a declaration regarding the reduction of our escorts, which should be, of course, made to depend on the arrival of a Governor-General at Shiraz.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh was appointed a week ago as Governor-General, but has not been able to proceed for lack of funds. I believe him to be as good a man as any available here.

It would be better, I think, to postpone giving any advice as to disposal of Kawam until the Governor-General has taken up his post, but on this point I am consulting Cox and acting consul at Shiraz.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[10792] No. 569.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March* 12, 1912

YOUR telegram No. 181 of 11th March.

Draft mentioned in my telegram No. 179 of 11th March differs so much from that mentioned in my telegram No. 168 of 7th March that an agreement seems impossible without further discussion, when I will bear in mind points you raise.

[10793] No. 570.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 187.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March* 12, 1912.

MY telegram No. 144 of 26th February.

British consul at Kermanshah, telegraphing 29th February, confirms the capture of town by Salar-ed-Dowleh, and reports much plundering, and execution of late acting governor and other officials. He also reported that one or more sowars of the consular escort have been wounded, under what circumstances is not stated.

British consul adds that Salar-ed-Dowleh is incensed against consulate, ascribing his defeat to the presence of bastis, and also against the Imperial Bank of Persia.

Five of the Government force appear to be in bast at the consulate.

[10805] No. 571.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, March 12, 1912.*

EX-SHAH left Ashurada 10th March for Baku

[10806] No. 572.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 178 of 11th March.

Turkish Embassy tell me that incident is closed. Russian consul called on new Turkish Ambassador at Resht and explained matter, and his Excellency left this morning for Tehran.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[10807] No. 573.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 180 of 11th March.

So far as I can ascertain, no troops have yet left Kazvin for Russia, and there is no question of sending any of Kazvin force to Tabreez.

Position, as the Russian Minister explains it to me, is as follows:—

If his proposal mentioned in my telegram No. 171 of 8th March, which he made after consulting the general at Kazvin, is accepted by the Russian Government, force now to be withdrawn to Russia will amount to two regiments from Resht and three battalions and two batteries from Kazvin.

If it is not accepted, and the evacuation of Kazvin is to be completed at once, the impending withdrawal will amount to two regiments, two batteries, and five battalions in all.

As regards Tabreez, Russian Minister cannot give exact figures. Some battalions, he says, have been withdrawn to Russia. These are evidently the 1,500 men mentioned in my telegram No. 177 of 9th March. The 1,000 new-comers are recruits joining the two regiments which now remain at Tabreez.

[10647] No. 574.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 181 of 11th March: Enquiries by foreign representatives at Tehran as to Anglo-Russian Agreement.

In the circumstances you need not enquire.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 224.)

[10369] No. 575.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 12, 1912.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 52 of 9th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

Inform Russian Government that we propose that Mr. Shipley should leave here for Constantinople about 21st March, but that we do not consider that two embassies should communicate to litigants for the present more documents than are essential; by this I mean that I do not wish to contribute to the breakdown of negotiations at

Constantinople by rigidly withholding documents, but I think that the time for affording such assistance as we can will be later rather than at the present stage, and I should like to arrive at a full agreement with Russian Government before taking action. A full statement on the question is being prepared here, and early next month will be communicated to Russian Government, our desire being to agree with the Russian Government as to the evidence the two Powers should jointly furnish at a later stage.

As recent Turkish encroachments have not extended to the frontier south of Khanikin, we presume that discussions at Constantinople will relate more particularly to the more northerly districts; this will obviate for the present necessity of communicating any documents relating to Mohammerah, and I trust that, pending communication of the above-mentioned statement, Russian Government will at once instruct their Ambassador at Constantinople to withhold such documents.

For your confidential information I would add that His Majesty's Government are anxious that the frontier as locally observed at Mohammerah should not be disturbed. That frontier differs, to the advantage of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, from the one recommended by the Mediating Commissioners in 1850. Your Excellency should not now mention this to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as we should prefer to apprise him of our views in a reasoned statement.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 184, and Constantinople, No. 124.)

[10362] No. 576.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 226.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 12, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 176 of 9th March: Joint note.

I presume that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would have no objection to informing the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs unofficially that the interpretation which they put upon our rejection of the first formula is erroneous, and that we contemplate the employment in the army of officers of minor Powers, and not that of subjects of Russia and Great Britain.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 187.)

[10357] No. 577.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of telegrams exchanged with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the advisability of an immediate application to the Persian Government for a concession to construct a railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad.*

I am to state that, in view of the considerations advanced in Sir G. Barclay's telegram, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that an immediate step of the kind indicated is inadvisable, as being likely to be regarded with suspicion both by the Russian and the Persian Governments, while it is unlikely that the former would consent to it unless His Majesty's Government were in control of some means of inducing them to do so.

I am to observe that if, as may be expected from the statement made to Sir G. Barclay by his Russian colleague, the question of the construction of the trans-Persian Railway is raised by the Russian Government in connection with the proposals for a loan to Persia, it might be possible for His Majesty's Government to make their acquiescence in this procedure conditional on a promise of support from the Russian Government to an application for a concession to build the Mohammerah–Khoremabad line being presented simultaneously with that connected with the larger scheme.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn the views of the Marquess of Crewe on the subject, and that, if they agree with those outlined above, he would propose to inform Mr. Greenway accordingly.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Nos. 515 and 532.

[10851] No. 578.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 13.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, March 12, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 12th instant from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station relative to a threatened raid on Lingah and the landing of 150 sepoys.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 578.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bombay, March 12, 1912.*

PROPOSALS in my telegram No. 31 approved by Government of India, to whom I have telegraphed to-day as follows:—

Senior naval officer reports that raiders, numbering about 2,400 men, intend undoubtedly advancing on Lingah. The landing of sepoys having been recommended by the senior naval officer and the vice-consul at Lingah for defence of consulate, I have ordered reinforcement of 150 troops to land, and have ordered Naval Brigade to be held in readiness to land should further reinforcement of consular guards be required.

[10953] No. 579.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th March, 1912, on the situation in Fars.

India Office, March 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 579.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March 12, 1912.*

SITUATION in Fars.

Telegram dated the 10th instant to following effect has been addressed to us and repeated to Sir G. Barclay by resident, Persian Gulf:—

"Two precious months have elapsed since attempt to achieve solution by direct negotiation with chiefs, as an alternative to evacuation, was recommended by Government of India. There is no longer time for the series of negotiations contemplated in January to be carried through by this residency, the season being now imminent at which tribes migrate from coast district. No instructions having been received, I can but conjecture in the meantime that it was possibly decided by His Majesty's Government not to take any action of their own locally in connection with restoring order on roads or with the attack on Mr. Smart, and that they proposed to rest content with such redress as could be afforded us by Persian Government themselves.

"But the third problem, viz., that of discounting the contingency, which consul, Shiraz, apprehended, of fighting near Shiraz in the spring on an extensive scale, which may endanger safety of foreigners and consulate, still remains with us. I think it likely in this connection that Kashgais, in view of their unpleasant experience in Shiraz last summer, will, unless specific provocation is given them, be chary of renewing close acquaintance with the town; and it is still possible for a good deal to

be done by Persian Government both to promote a quiet tribal migration and to improve attitude of headmen on road, even if no steps are taken by ourselves to discount contingency, by bringing influence to bear direct upon the leaders concerned. The following are the specific measures which I consider could be taken by Persian Government:—

"1. Extremists of Tehran and Nejef clergy could be induced to telegraph on lines already advocated to the chiefs of the tribes.

"2. A responsible Governor-General, not committed to a partisan policy either by his present patrons or his record in the past, could be appointed and dispatched at once to Fars.

"3. Recent offer of a governorship elsewhere could be renewed to Kawam, and his immediate departure to take it up could be insisted upon.

"I strongly recommend, moreover, that, if it was really decided by His Majesty's Government that no active measures for protection of our interests should be taken locally, the fact should without further delay be announced through the press as well as to the Viceregal Council and the House of Commons, and that in general as much capital as possible should be made out of it. If a climax of inaction is merely drifted into, besides unnecessary loss of prestige locally, all the fruits of our forbearance *vis-à-vis* the Mahommedan world will be lost.

"I would go to the length even of recommending that, when this last manifestation of our friendly forbearance is announced, we should declare that, in the event of practical proof being forthcoming in the next two months of friendly attitude of local headmen and tribal chiefs along the road, we should be ready to reduce consular guard to normal strength, it being added that orderly migration of Fars tribes in spring would be the first test of such an improvement.

"Detachment of 79th Carnatics, which is now here, might be sent back to India simultaneously with this announcement."

On receipt of reply from resident to further enquiry from me my views will be elegraphed.

[10965] No. 580.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 221 of 11th March.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is all in favour of société taking up Persian loan. He remarked that it would be impossible for us to find a better syndicate, as the business was not a very tempting one. They would not, moreover, encourage participation of too much German capital.

I pointed out that it might be more advantageous to treat the two questions as separate financial operations, as otherwise we might find that we had abandoned our freedom of action with regard to railway.

His Excellency replied that it would be difficult for us to separate them altogether, as we must give syndicate reason to hope that railway project would be confided to them.

I suggested that if we did this we should have to make it quite clear to them that we reserved to ourselves full liberty to approve or to veto railway project. So far two Governments had approved it only in principle, and it would be necessary to study very carefully recommendations which société might submit for its construction.

His Excellency agreed, saying that we might tell them that they should have first option, subject to some such reserve as I had suggested. There would, he added, be many questions for two Governments to consider before finally approving it, more especially that of its *tracé*.

[10966] No. 581.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 13, 1912*

YOUR telegram No. 226 of 12th March: Joint note.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to our informing the Persian Government as you suggest that their interpretation is erroneous. He reserves, however, his right to demand increase of Cossack brigade, and I gather that he contemplates its eventual employment in the north when Russian troops are recalled.

I have said nothing to him as to the points raised in your telegram to Tehran No. 181, Confidential, of 11th March, as when I spoke to him on the subject of draft Persian reply he only took exception to the passage referring to foreign troops (see my telegram No. 97 of 9th March). He then treated concluding sentence of that reply as a pious wish, to which no great importance need be attached. There can be no doubt, however, that he will, as he has repeatedly declared, put forward other conditions when the large loan comes up for discussion.

[10967] No. 582.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 222 of 12th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

I spoke as instructed to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and his Excellency agreed to withhold all documents relating to Mohammerah until he receives your statement.

He told me, however, that, according to his information, commission is to meet in a few days, and that M. Minorsky will consequently start at the beginning of next week. Unless you have information to the contrary, he earnestly hopes that Mr. Shipley will be sent at once, and that your statement will be communicated to him as soon as possible. He fears that commission will break up in a very short time, as Turkey is sure to put forward impossible pretensions.

His Excellency then spoke to me very seriously of the situation. He had, he said, good reason to know that Turks had been collecting documents such as deeds of sale for a long time past, whereas Persians had no legal documents wherewith to support their case. If the question went to The Hague it would be judged solely on its legal merits, and the Turks would win the case on the strength of documents they could produce. On my reminding him that he had formerly taken exactly the opposite view, his Excellency said that information which he had recently received had forced him to change his opinion.

His Excellency then said that when we concluded our agreement of 1907 we had signed it in the belief that all Azerbaijan belonged to Persia. He had ever since protested vigorously against Turkey's encroachments, which he regarded as acts of aggression. If The Hague Tribunal were now to recognise Turkey's claim to all the territory coloured rose in Minorsky's map, Russia would not be able to abide by that award, but would be obliged to occupy permanently in self-defence certain strategical points such as Khoi, Khotur, &c.

[10665] No. 583.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 56 of 11th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

Your reply to my enquiry makes it the more important that the Turco-Persian Commission should arrange as many points in dispute as possible, and every encouragement should be given to both sides in the pursuit of this object, subject to limitations stated in my telegram No. 222 of 12th March to St. Petersburgh.

[9866] No. 584.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 13, 1912.*

THE Persian Minister called here on the 6th instant and was received by Mr. Mallet.

He enquired whether His Majesty's Government would not accept the formula proposed by the Persian Government on the subject of the recognition by them of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 (see your telegram No. 130 of the 22nd ultimo), and abstain from pressing for the acceptance of the amended version as put forward by us.

Mr. Mallet pointed out, in reply, that the formula of the Persian Government appeared to His Majesty's Government to be objectionable because it placed in opposition the principles of the convention and those of the preamble of that incident, a distinction which the two signatory Powers could hardly admit. Moreover, the principles of the preamble of the agreement were summarised incompletely in the Persian formula, which omitted all reference to the "maintenance of order." He accordingly urged Mirza Mehdi Khan to advise his Government to accept the version proposed by the two representatives without further delay.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10948] No. 585.

Extract from "The Morning Post" of January 9, 1912.—(Received at Foreign Office March 13.)

RUSSO-TURKISH RELATIONS.

A SITUATION which may be fraught with the gravest international consequences has been gradually but steadily developing for several years past in North-West Persia. Partly owing to the absence of definite mention in Blue Books, but chiefly owing to the prepossession of the public mind by Persian affairs of infinitely less real importance, this menace to the peace of Europe has entirely escaped notice. By comparison the happenings of Tehran, the presence of Russian troops at Kazvin or of British at Bushire, the question whether an Oriental despot or a "constitution" shall obtain recognition as a Government in Persia—where, in fact, only anarchy prevails—all these things matter very little to the world at large. Sentiment apart, Persia has long been merely the cypher which becomes a significant number only by the juxtaposition of the units—England and Russia. Nothing whatever that might happen among the Persians themselves could conceivably, thanks to the Anglo-Russian accord, have much effect upon the world at large. But the situation in North-West Persia is one of those which have in the past brought nations to war, and may again. The region has always been one of the recognised danger-foci, and was so dealt with by the Berlin Congress in 1878.

Turkey began in 1905, when Russia was weakened by war and internal troubles, a forward movement into Persia. At first she sent small bodies of troops from the Mesopotamian command into Lahijan, the Persian frontier district south-east of Lake Urmia. This movement escaping notice altogether, Turkey was naturally emboldened to continue and enlarge her schemes. The Turkish troops proceeded cautiously northwards, utilising the wild Kurdish tribes of the mountain region along the Turco-Persian frontier as their advance guard and cover. The same manœuvre was repeated by the troops of the Erzeroum command 100 miles north of the point at which the Mesopotamian troops crossed the frontier. Beginning with Lahijan, there followed the seizure of Mergever and Chahrik. At Pasve alone, in 1907, Turkey had eighteen battalions with artillery.

These movements did not, of course, escape the vigilance of the Government most nearly interested, that of Russia, who made urgent representations in Constantinople on several occasions. Turkey gave positive assurances to England and to Russia, the mediating Powers, that her troops did not hold this or that post, as reported in consular despatches, and alleged the old claims of Turkey to a strip of land on the Persian side

of the natural frontier, a mountain range running southwards from Mount Ararat, which has been in dispute between Persia and Turkey ever since the seventeenth century at least. Little or no satisfaction was obtained by the joint representations at Constantinople of the mediating Powers, Russia and England, the Turkish Ministry confining itself to blank denials. Eventually the Russian Foreign Office became seriously concerned about the Turkish movements in Western Azerbaijan.

There is, naturally, no authentic information obtainable on one point, which will occur to everyone on reading of Turkish movements and the manner of them in this region. How far has Turkey been playing the cat's paw for Germany? How far did the Teutonic aggressive policy depend upon being able to open an ancient and very nasty sore on an unguarded frontier of Russia? We all remember some very insistent efforts of Germany to secure for her nominees the rights of navigation on Lake Urmia. The demand came under the heading of economic interests of course, and caused no little trouble to those concerned. We shall probably be well within the mark in saying that this forward policy of Turkey rests upon and is stiffened by the benevolent patronage of Germany for the leading Mussulman nation; there can be no doubt whatever that in the execution of it the Turkish Ministry of War has had the benefit of the best expert knowledge of the leading military nation; it is impossible to prove that Germany in any way inspired the policy, and there is no sufficient ground for suspecting it. For all practical purposes it is enough to recognise that by the proposed branch of the German Bagdad Railway to Khanikin and the forward policy further north of Germany's friend Turkey, the entire frontier line of the Russian sphere of influence in Persia, according to the Anglo-Russian Convention, stands seriously threatened, economically and politically.

Whether these or other considerations at last alarmed the Russian Foreign Office, the fact is that early in the present year England and Russia decided to send a special joint commission to ascertain on the spot precisely what had been and was being done by Turkey in territory belonging to Persia, including also the disputed strip along the frontier. For Great Britain, Mr. Shipley, our consul at Tabreez, who has spent 30 years of official life in the Middle East, and for Russia, M. Minorsky, a member of the Foreign Office staff, who had spent several years of service in the Province of Azerbaijan, both men thoroughly conversant with the people, the country, and the languages of Persia, started last June to carry out this highly-important and arduous mission. Mr. Shipley had an escort provided by the Indian army, and M. Minorsky an escort of Cossacks. The result of their investigations amply confirmed all previous fragmentary consular reports about the forward policy of Turkey, and revealed a state of things very much more serious than had been suspected. So complete was the agreement between the two commissioners as to the scope and significance of what they saw on their two months' journey, that on its conclusion the exceptional course was taken of presenting a single identical report, signed by both commissioners, to their respective Governments. A more signal proof of the close relations between England and Russia in Persia could hardly be conceived.

To understand the plans Turkey has been so ably developing for half-a-dozen years past it is necessary to consult a large scale map of the Turco-Persian frontier and Central Kurdistan. The frontier is a natural demarcation of formidable mountain range running south from Mount Ararat. On the east side all the rivers run to Persia; on the west to Turkey, the latter feeding the Turkish Lake Van, and, through valleys in an exceptionally mountainous country, finding their way to the Tigris to swell its flow. The rivers on the east side of the great watershed form the Lake of Urmia, which is from 30 to 40 miles distant from the Turco-Persian frontier line. The great mountain range is passable at certain points. The Khotur Pass is protected by article 60 of the Berlin Treaty, and any interference with its status is a risky undertaking for any single Power. But every other pass has been seized in succession by Turkish regular troops, which now hold them with an adequate force, including artillery. The difficulty about the exceedingly important Kotur Pass has been circumvented by outflanking it, which commits a breach of the spirit of the stipulation in article 60 of the Berlin Treaty. Turkey has pushed her posts up to Yezdikan, situated nearer to Khoi than is the outlet of the Kotur Pass, and has thus secured greater advantages than by the possession of Kotur itself. Some 12,000 square kilom. of territory hitherto administered by Persia have been gradually occupied by Turkey during the past six years. Her outposts reach Lake Urmia at three points, enabling her to cut caravan routes at any moment. Indeed, west of Lake Urmia, Persia now only possesses odd patches of territory. They are the most fertile and valuable localities of Western Azerbaijan, and they lie wholly at the mercy of the Turkish troops and

artillery on the heights, and the wild Kurdish tribes who act as Turkish irregulars, and even now nightly descend upon the plains to make their characteristic raids, thus giving vent to their rapacious instincts, which the Turks boast of having checked in the zone occupied by them.

The Turkish move, as a glance at a large scale map suffices to show, is purely strategic, and is directed against Russia at her most vulnerable point along the undefended Russo-Persian frontier. While the Russo-Turkish frontier is adequately guarded there has never been any necessity for expenditure on defensive works on the Russo-Persian frontier, which may be crossed as easily as one passes from one room to another through a wide, open doorway. What Turkey has now secured is technically known as a *place d'armes* for attack upon the Erivan Province of Russian Transcaucasia. In Turkish territory the Sixth Army Corps, that of Mesopotamia, is for all practical purposes entirely cut off from any possibility of co-operation with the Fourth Army Corps. The only communication in Turkish territory between the two armies lies over Seert in Central Kurdistan, across formidable mountains, by roads regarded as execrable even by natives. The Fourth Army Corps can now, by marching south-east into Persian territory, effect a junction with the Sixth Army Corps marching north-east into Persia, the junction taking place in the rich valley of the Gadir-chai, of which the Fourth Army Corps troops are now holding the plain of Ushnu, while the troops of the Sixth Army Corps hold the lower reaches of the river, the still more fertile district of Sulduz.

The 107th and 108th Turkish Regiments belonging to the Sixth, or Mesopotamian, Army Corps, in all three battalions and a cadre company, with a battery of artillery and quick-firers, gendarmes and cavalry details, are now posted at Bané, Nagadé, Serdesht, and Rahdané. The 98th and 101st Regiments of the Fourth Army Corps, four battalions in all, with guns and cavalry, are at Mavana and Chahrik. In all about 3,000 men. As the possession of the country depends upon possession of the mountain passes, both those of the frontier range and those of the subsidiary ranges on Persian territory, Turkey is now master of Azerbaijan west of Lake Urmia. By holding the Karatepe Pass, Khoi is cut off from Salmas; Salmas from Urmia by the Kushchi Pass; Urmia from Dal by Turkish posts on the Baranduz River; and Dol from Suj-Bulak by the occupied district of Sulduz. This last district, which is rich and important, was taken only in 1910. Russia cannot, of course, remain inactive under so direct and unmistakable a menace to her undefended Russo-Persian frontier. The mediating Powers, England and Russia, have from the forties of last century taken a part in the delimitation of frontiers in this region now occupied by Turkey. They cannot but resent this summary settlement in her own exclusive favour by Turkey of a question in which they are both concerned. The Commission of 1911, the latest of a long series of similar commissions, has now ascertained the facts for future discussion. The peculiar position of Russia cannot but be acknowledged in view of this direct menace to her undefended frontier, which lies open to attacks directed from this region at the Russian province of Erivan. Furthermore, there exists the pressing necessity to protect trade caravans along the roads not only from Transcaucasia into Persia, but also the great trade route from Trebizonde which passes through Khoi, the route by which goods of all countries enter Persia from the West. Russia this year established a consulate at Khoi, and a strong escort is now conveying caravans on the way to Urmia, past Turkish outposts. Though no cases of hostile collision have yet been reported, the circumstances are such that at any moment an "incident" might occur which would precipitate a crisis. Turkey, under cover of the din raised in Europe about "constitutions" in Persia, has quietly secured in admirable *place d'armes* for attack on Russia in case of war—and a valuable lever in the negotiations of peace time—while at the same time effecting an arbitrary seizure of territory comparable in area roughly to Alsace-Lorraine.

St. Petersburgh, December 30.

[11058] No. 586.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Tehran, February* 28, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 30 of the 17th instant I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul at

Kermanshah, reporting the recapture of the town by the Government forces and the consequent flight of Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 586.

Consul McDouall to Sir G. Barclay.

(No 12.)
Sir, *Kermanshah, February* 9, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the evening of the 7th, reports were received that Yar Mohammed Khan, commanding the Government forces, had occupied Mount Bisitun. During the night there was a skirmish at the Karasu Bridge, four miles from town, and the Kalhurs from there passed behind the consulate in flight towards Mahidasht. About ten mujteheds were killed at the bridge, one an officer, Hussein Khan Kermanshahi. At 5 A.M. on the 8th there was some firing, and soon after Yar Mohammed Khan came alone to consulate and asked permission to see Azem-ed-Dowleh, who might have some plan to prevent bloodshed. I agreed, and he came in for a few minutes only.

Fighting continued all day, the Government forces gradually advancing, and by sunset they held nearly all the town up to the gates of the palace, which is an extensive block of buildings. They sent twice to ask Azem-ed-Dowleh to join them, and two officers called with the same message. I held him and his associates in bast to their promise not to go to the town until it was in the occupation of Government, in accordance with what I had told Salar-ed-Dowleh. After dark the palace was entered, but Salar-ed-Dowleh and Dawood Khan, Sardar Mozaffir, and others had fled. They had left by a gate on the outskirts of the town, and are reported to have gone to Darband, on the Kurdistan-Kermanshah border. Their further movements have not yet been reported.

The majority of the prince's forces do not appear to have ventured outside to withstand the soldiers. Sharaf-el-Mulk Kurdistani is known to have been killed, but there were not many casualties on either side as far as I have yet heard.

This morning a guard of honour with a flag came to the consulate and conducted the bastis to the palace, after formally thanking me.

Azem-ed-Dowleh is now acting governor, and has issued a proclamation that any looting will be punished by death.

Owing to the advance of the Government forces the Russian Cossacks were detained, but leave to-morrow, and I send this by favour of my Russian colleague.

I have, &c.
W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 586.

Consul McDouall to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Kermanshah, February* 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour, in continuation of my No. 12 dated the 9th February, to inform you that Sharaf-el-Mulk Kurdistani was not killed in the fighting. He was at the house of Aga Mahmud, brother of Aga Mohammed Mehdi Mujtehed, and the morning after the fighting was shot, with his nephew and two servants, by mujteheds. The Kurdistanis in Kermanshah have written a deposition stating that he was killed by mujteheds and the townspeople are innocent, and sent it to the tribe to prevent them killing any Kermanshahis.

Aga Mahmud was arrested, also Aga Rahim, Haji Aga Wali, Aga Seyyid Reza Qumi, and Sheikh-el-Islam of Hersin, all mujteheds. The whole of Salar-ed-Dowleh's correspondence was found in the palace and Aga Mahmud's despatch-case was brought from his house. The extraordinary commission of Government enquired into the case against them. There was no doubt of his (Aga Mahmud's) guilt. The commission decided that he must pay 4,000 tomans and be sent to Tehran with the others.

During the night Yar Mohammed Khan Sardar ordered his execution, and he was hanged at daylight on the 12th. Yar Mohammed informed the commission that he acted on orders from Tehran. The others will probably be sent to Tehran, but there is some doubt if Aga Rahim will escape death.

On morning of the 9th two officers of the Zangineh regiment, two executioners, and one or two others were shot.

Salar-ed-Dowleh took his wife, a local princess, with him. On the 9th they were at Mahidasht and looted neighbouring villages for supplies. Salar Mas'ud (Hussein Khan Guran) and Samsam-el-Mamalek Sinjabi went to their homes and refused to assist Salar-ed-Dowleh further. He has with him Sardar Mozaffir and Salar Humayun and their followers, amounting to about 300 men and one gun. From Mahidasht they have moved to the Crown lands, about 12 miles from Kermanshah to the north-north-west, and are said to have sent to the Kalhurs, to Kurdistan, and Luristan for reinforcements.

The Government forces consist of about 200 mujteheds, 100 Kuliaii horse, and local soldiers and volunteers—perhaps 1,000 in all. They are well supplied with ammunition. They have telegraphed to Farman Farma for reinforcements.

The town is quiet and people in terror. Two akhunds have taken bast at the consulate, named Seyyid Mohammed Rauza-khan and Naïb-Sadr. They are accused of political offences, but say they can prove their innocence.

I have, &c.
W. McDOUALL.

[11022] No. 587.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 8th March, 1912, regarding the situation in Southern Persia.

India Office, March 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 587.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March* 8, 1912

AFFAIRS of Southern Persia.

See your telegram dated the 5th ultimo. The Foreign Office, whose previous inclination was to suspend action and to wait till Swedish gendarmerie was organised, now propose, in view of deterioration of situation near Shiraz, that negotiations on lines recommended by you should be begun. Please say whether it is still, in your opinion, an essential preliminary that troops should be sent. I suppose that commencement of negotiations would be considerably delayed by dispatch of troops, which I sincerely hope may be avoided. Foreign Office are disposed to deprecate dispatch, in view of opinion expressed in telegram dated the 20th ultimo from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Please say, with reference to extension of blockade, if you have considered whether tribesmen may not be irritated and insecurity be increased if supply of ammunition is cut off. A reply by telegram as soon as possible is requested.

[11120] No. 588.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March* 14, 1912.

I AM informed by His Majesty's consul at Batoum that instructions to accelerate the training of recruits have been sent to the military authorities in the Caucasus, especially to the troops stationed nearest the western frontier. The consul states that he has this information on good authority.

I also hear from the French chargé d'affaires that news of military preparations at Tiflis, Baku, and Batoum has reached the French Embassy.

From this intelligence and from the language used to me by M. Sazonof and reported in my telegram No. 104 of 13th March, it looks as if the Russian Government

were anxious to be in a position to meet all eventualities, and were making preparations accordingly.

Yesterday was M. Sazonof's reception day, and our conversation was consequently hurried, but I hope to see him again to-morrow, and will endeavour to get further information as to his present attitude.

[11119] No. 589.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 14.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 14, 1912.

MY telegram No. 56 of 11th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

Persian Minister yesterday asked me for personal advice as to attitude he should assume when commission meets. He said that Russian Ambassador had advised him to be very stiff. He declared himself to be in favour of compromise.

I told him that I feared that reference to Hague Tribunal might be very costly, and advised him to come to terms on as many points as possible, and, if eventually reference to Hague Tribunal became obligatory, to leave as few points as possible for that tribunal. He volunteered the statement that south of Khanikin he did not think anything would be in dispute.

[10793] No. 590.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 187 of 12th March: Kermanshah.

You should, if possible, convey a serious warning to Salar-ed-Dowleh.

[11176] No. 591.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 14, 1912.

RUSSIAN Ambassador here states that Russian Minister at Tehran has been instructed to inform Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the fact of Persia having introduced other Powers into the negotiations conducted jointly by England and Russia with the Persian Government has not made a good impression on the Russian Government.

This fact seems to indicate that the Persian Government have not abandoned the attempt to find outside support against the policy of the two Powers—an attempt which cannot contribute to the establishment between them and Persia of the relations of reciprocal confidence and friendship which form the object of their endeavours.

I leave it to your discretion whether to join with M. Poklewsky in making this communication or not.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 232.)

[11251] No. 592.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 15.)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March* 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 183 of 12th March.

Cox, consulted by Government of India on the India Office's telegram of 8th March, telegraphed his observations 13th March. His telegram contains the following passage:—

"I have received no information to justify the view that the situation has lately deteriorated.* On the contrary, the fact that a German merchant from Shiraz has just come down to get married and returns in a few days with his bride indicates that there is little apprehension of imminent danger to foreign community as a whole, and that it

* See Sir G. Barclay's No. 160, Telegraphic, reporting robbery of cases for Indian troops between Bushire and Shiraz, and his No. 159, Telegraphic.

is mainly the safety of Smart and the consulate for which special provision has to be contemplated.

"I should have thought, especially having regard to the present attitude of the Persian Government, that the present British force at Shiraz would have been strong enough to protect the consulate against the type of hostilities likely to be met with; but if Smart thinks differently, and is persuaded that the presence of Indian troops is in itself a menace to his safety, then it would still seem to be possible to withdraw them without great risk by one route or another before tribal migration. But such a course would involve an enormous loss of prestige in Southern Persia, which could only be partially mitigated by our making it an item in a pronouncement announcing our intention as an act of forbearance and good-will to Persia as a Mahommedan State of withdrawing immediately all extra guards and giving another specific period in which to put their house in order. If this action is taken it should be given publicity by every possible means in London, Calcutta, Persia, Mesopotamia."

I invited observations on this passage from the acting consul at Shiraz.
Following is his reply, No. 52:—

"Your telegram No 64.

"Situation at Shiraz has not deteriorated, and I presume the Foreign Office are referring to recent series of robberies on Ispahan road.*

"I have no fear for my personal safety, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will in considering the situation leave me entirely out of the question, because with or without the presence of troops I can look after myself. Of course the presence of troops greatly increases my difficulties, but the menace to my personal safety is negligible. I do not think that any attack against the troops in their positions around the consulate would succeed even if it were seriously attempted.

"The possibility to be considered is danger for His Majesty's troops in spasmodic hostile assaults on individual sowars or other such incidents for which we could not presumably obtain reparation. Kawam has been taking extraordinary precautions to prevent incidents, but during the migration of the tribes his task will be much more difficult unless he and ilkhani have by then succeeded in securing their position.

"Withdrawal of troops would of course be generally considered as flight after defeat, and Persians, especially the tribesmen, would not take seriously the pronouncement suggested. Destruction of our influence through withdrawal would put us in a poor position for subsequent negotiations. With regard to our 'prestige,' it is already in a bad way and will be disastrously affected if we remain inactive much longer. Already over two months have passed since attacks on His Majesty's troops, and I am continually being importuned by astonished Persians enquiring what we were doing in the matter. I have no knowledge of the presumably temporary measures proposed by Cox, but 'conciliatory' measures would seem, in view of exultation of the natives at what they consider their victories over His Majesty's troops, hardly to meet the case. It would rather seem urgent we should without further delay take steps to exact reparation. Government of India, in their telegram of 5th February, state that our first object should be to call to account those responsible for the attacks on His Majesty's troops, and only afterwards to subsidise them. Those persons are quite accessible. Lateness of the season would not therefore seem to affect, at any rate, this preliminary essential part of the negotiations, and I am strongly of opinion that it should not be delayed any longer. Knowledge that we were taking more than passive interest in prosecution of the offenders would help to obviate incidents by keeping the tribesmen vaguely apprehensive, and would do something to ease the humiliating situation in which the troops and I have been placed by their dispatch to Shiraz, and our long inaction after they have been twice attacked and, in the eyes of Persian vanity, defeated.

"With regard to suspension of action until the organisation of the Swedish gendarmerie, this contribution, if the initial difficulties are ever surmounted, may take years to organise effectively."

Acting consul has not been informed of the suggestion in Cox's telegram of 10th March (see my telegram No. 185 of 12th March) to the Government of India that the reduction of consular guard should be conditional on practical proof of friendly

* See Sir G. Barclay, No. 160, Telegraphic, reporting robbery of cases for Indian troops between Bushire and Shiraz, and his No. 159, Telegraphic.

attitude of tribal chiefs and local headmen along the road in the next two months, and his observations regarding loss of prestige obviously do not apply with such weight to this suggestion.

[11252] No. 593.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Kermanshah, dated 8th March, received 14th March :—

"Prince Salar-ed-Dowleh's bag on deposit at the Imperial Bank of Persia was by official request of karguzar opened and inventoried by me. On his return Salar-ed-Dowleh falsely declared that 95,000 tomans taken from it. After my informing him of the facts Prince repeated his statement and said that Imperial Bank of Persia must pay the amount. I have demanded apology. No answer yet. I think there may be danger to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

"Details by post."

[11253] No. 594.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 188 of 14th March.

Bank at Hamadan reports that there are no means of communication with Kermanshah. Messengers refuse to undertake the journey. In any case, short of a threat, which it would be awkward to have to carry out, I doubt whether anything would be of more avail than our joint communication, which should by this time have been made, as the bank managers at Hamadan forwarded our instructions on 2nd March by two Russian Cossacks who were proceeding to Kermanshah.

[11259] No. 595.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Bushire, No. 65 of 15th March :—

"Consul at Bussorah, in letter, dated 9th March, to the Embassy, states that he is informed that the Turkish military authorities have decided to create three military posts on the southern Turco-Persian frontier consisting of seventy men each. Of these one will be at point between Kurna and Hawizeh [? and another] on the river opposite the Sheikh of Mohammerah's palace at Failia.

"For these measures there would appear to be no conceivable military necessity at this juncture, while they cannot fail to provoke a renewal of friction between the [?] excise authorities and the sheikh and bring into acute issue the question of the Turco-Persian frontier in this region.

"In the same communication consul reports several visits by the vali to the [?] outpost and bar in company with commodore or inspector-general commandant of the 13th army corps.

"In the above connection, I beg to recall India Office letter of 3rd June, 1911, to the Foreign Office, and the express determination of His Majesty's Government to use their best endeavours to prevent this question being raised by the Turks at all (*vide* despatch No. 143 of 30th August, 1910, from Foreign Office to Minister at Tehran)."

(Addressed to the Government of India.)

[11262] No. 596.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 197.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 193 of 15th March.

Following from consul at Bushire :—

"I would point out following apparent [misconception in Smart's telegram No. 52 of 14th March :—

"Government of India telegram of 11th January, referring to the headmen in question, suggested that we should simultaneously 'offer them the opportunity to give us satisfaction, and to enter into a direct compact with us,' &c.

"And again Government of India telegram of 5th February spoke of 'getting them to settle accounts with us.'

"Smart seems to have understood that the intention was 'firstly to call to account' those responsible as a preliminary measure, 'and afterwards to subsidise them.'

"This is quite a different matter, and was clearly not intended by the Government of India."

[11265] No. 597.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 15, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 14th March.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon to explain reasons for his extreme pessimism with regard to Turco-Persian frontier question.

His Excellency admitted that he had not studied the question himself, but said that all that he had been told by M. Minorsky and others showed that the Turks could make out a very strong case and prove that their authorities had been registering deeds of sale and administering districts in considerable part of the territory they claimed. Their eagerness to go to The Hague and the communication made to him by Turkish Ambassador reported in my despatch No. 59, in which they declared points in question would undoubtedly be adjudicated to them by that tribunal, proved their confidence.

His Excellency then said that if Turkey was to obtain all she was claiming Russia would be obliged to reconsider her whole policy with regard to regions adjacent to her frontier. So long as Persia held those regions she had nothing to fear, but she could not have her frontier exposed to the attacks of Turkish troops under German officers.

I pointed out that there was documentary evidence to show that Turkey was in illegal possession of the greater part of the territory now occupied by her, and asked if he agreed with what M. Nératof had said to me in conversation reported in my telegram No. 99 of 6th May last year.

His Excellency replied in the affirmative, and said that we must make the Persians understand that they must consult us before they took any steps with regard to proposed arbitration, and that one of the arbitrators to be named by them must be a Russian or an Englishman.

On my enquiring what truth there was in reports of military preparations in Caucasus, his Excellency said that two years ago there had been a question of reinforcing the Russian troops there, and that he had insisted at a recent meeting of the Council of Ministers that this should be done at once. The 41st division would therefore be sent there from Kazan, so that, should necessity arise, flying columns could be sent to any point where they were required.

On my expressing the hope that his Excellency did not contemplate any immediate action, and that he would not forestall decision of Hague Tribunal, Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had no such intention, and only trusted that decision referred to would be such as would render any such step unnecessary.

His Excellency referred to a telegram published in the "Temps" to the effect that Italian and Russian fleets were to make simultaneous attacks on Dardanelles and Bosphorus respectively as ridiculous.

[10966] No. 598.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 103 of 13th March: Joint note.

When your Russian colleague is similarly instructed, you may inform Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of first sentence.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 235.)

[10967] No. 599.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 236.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 104 of 13th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

Please convey to Minister for Foreign Affairs my thanks for agreeing to withhold all documents relating to Mohammerah. The statement with which I propose to furnish Russian Government does not relate exclusively to Mohammerah, but has reference to the whole frontier. It will be expedited as much as possible. Mr. Shipley will be at Constantinople next week.

With regard to paragraph 3, I am aware that the Turks have been collecting such documents. We are in a position to furnish Persia with some documents of great legal weight, such as the map (see Foreign Office memorandum 8800) of 1843, furnished by Turkey as illustrating her claims at that time, which did not embrace her recent aggressions. Moreover, we have a map showing the frontier according to the best authorities in 1848.

With regard to final paragraph of your telegram you should tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that I am quite prepared to consider with him situation which will arise if the direct Turco-Persian negotiations break down, and should be glad to consider any suggestions which the Minister for Foreign Affairs may have to make, more especially as the maintenance of the *status quo* at Mohammerah is a matter of great importance.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 134, and Tehran, No. 195.)

[11119] No. 600.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office. March* 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 57 of 14th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

I approve your reply We certainly had not contemplated any reopening of the southern frontier question.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 237, and Tehran, No. 196.)

[11260] No. 601.

Sir Edward Grey to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1912.

MOHAMMERAH.

In a memorandum dated 1844 Major Rawlinson stated that Chaab tribe had continued almost uninterruptedly for long period to pay to Government of Bussorah rent for lands of Haffar, above Mohammerah and Tamar, as they had obtained them by grant from Suleiman Pasha of Bagdad. Since they had long ceased all other payments, he concluded that in those lands they regarded themselves in the light of foreigners holding Turkish property.

On the other hand, he states that extensive districts of Boojidee, between Haffar and Tamar, had been forcibly seized, and was held as Chaab territory.

Tamar is about 12 miles above Mohammerah, on left bank of Shatt-el-Arab.

Please telegraph whether these lands, in so far as situated between line of 1850 and boundary as locally observed, are now regarded as Chaab territory or as being held in farm or otherwise from Turkey.

[11438] No. 602.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March* 16, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 193 of 15th March.

Russian Minister and I have to-day informed Minister for Foreign Affairs verbally that the two Powers are not opposed to engagement of officers for army from the subjects of minor Powers, and also that there was no question of limiting the size of the army.

This latter point had been raised by Persian Minister in St. Petersburgh, though we had already in our conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs disclaimed any intention of limiting the army.

Russian Minister made it clear that our communication did not apply to the Cossack brigade, which, if increased, would be organised on the same lines as at present.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[12044] No. 603.

Notes on the Treaties between Turkey and Persia relating to the Frontier Question from 1639 *to* 1822, *as given in Sir H. Rawlinson's Memorandum forwarded in Sir S. Canning's Despatch No.* 155 *of July* 18, 1844.

Preliminary.

SIR S. CANNING, in writing of the conferences held at Erzeroum previous to the signature of the Treaty of 1848, and after stating that the territorial claims of both parties were founded upon the treaty of Sultan Murad IV, the provisions of which were confirmed by the treaties of Nadir Shah (1746) and of Erzeroum (1822), but that no authentic copy of this treaty had been produced at the conferences in question, goes on to say that the Turkish plenipotentiary produced a document,* purporting to be a copy from an official register, and an extract from a Turkish work called the "Annals of Naeemau" ("Naimeh," Rawlinson); on his part the Persian plenipotentiary exhibited an extract from this treaty published in a Turkish geographical work called the "Jehan Numa" ("Jehan Nama," Rawlinson). Both plenipotentiaries, Sir S. Canning states, admit the authenticity of the treaties of Nadir Shah (1746) and Erzeroum (1822) produced at the conferences. I am not aware that since the date of Sir S. Canning's despatch above referred to the original text signed by both contracting parties of the Treaty of 1639 has been brought to light or any evidence produced to show that it is extant.

Sir S. Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen, No. 70, April 27, 1844.

Versions of the Treaty of 1639.

The following versions of the treaty are given by Sir H. Rawlinson in his memorandum above referred to, viz.:—

1. The "Jehan Nama" (or "Numa").
2. The "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" (or "Naeemau").
3. Summary from a translation (full text at the Foreign Office) of the Turkish treaty, of which a copy is preserved in the museum at Vienna.

In addition to the above there are also attached to Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum—

* Presumably the version marked in Rawlinson's memorandum "Communicated by the Porte," and which I refer to later as version No. 4.

4. A summary (communicated in Sir S. Canning's despatch of the 19th December 1848)* marked—

"Communicated from Home,"
"Originally received from Persia," and

5. Same treaty (1639) marked—

"Communicated by Porte."

The Five Versions.

Before proceeding to a comparison of these five versions it is important to bear in mind that, as above stated, the versions produced by the Turkish and Persian plenipotentiaries at the conferences at Erzeroum, and presumably relied upon by them, were the extracts from the "Jehan Numa" and "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" respectively. The late Sir H. Rawlinson, in his detailed examination of these two extracts, while remarking on their great similarity, points out that "a strange discrepancy, nevertheless, is found in the general tenor of the frontier demarcation," and finds that this discrepancy arises from the "omission by the author of the 'Jehan Numa'† of one or two lines of the original treaty, the second and third territorial clauses being blended into one, and a totally different limitation of territory from that which was intended being thus assigned to the two Empires." The one or two lines of the original treaty, referred to by Sir H. Rawlinson as having been omitted by the author of the "Jehan Numa," and which are found in the "Tarikh-i-Naimeh," are :—

"No interference, moreover, to be admitted on the part of Persia with any of the fortresses, or villages, or lands, or districts, or mountains, or coasts lying within the several acknowledged territories of Akheshkeh, Kars, Van, Shahrizal (Shahrizor), Bagdad and Bussorah."

These lines, it is to be noted, follow immediately after the first clause, concluding in both versions with the words "as well as the fort of Kizildjeh and its dependencies, &c." The "Jehan Numa," on the other hand, immediately after this first clause, and omitting all reference to the words "No interference, moreover, to be admitted, &c.," goes on to say : "Moreover, with regard to Akheshkeh, Kars, and Rawan (Van), the dependencies of Shahrizor, Derah, and Zarudi or Zardiya (Zardeh), &c. These to be given up to Persia, &c." This, if correct, would of course give Akheshkeh, Kars, Van, and the dependencies of Shahrizor to the latter country,‡ and would amply justify Sir H. Rawlinson's comment. At the present day, however, the point seems to me to have lost much if not all of its importance, as Akheshkeh and Kars have been otherwise disposed of, no pretension, as far as I know, having been put forward by Persia to Van since the Erzeroum Treaty of 1848, while as to Shahrizor, both versions in the immediately preceding first clause assign the districts of that place to Turkey. The author of "Jehan Numa" is thus, as regards Shahrizor, apparently in contradiction with himself, and this point is not without importance in estimating the trustworthiness of the respective versions. But if the "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" thus disposes of the pretensions to Akheshkeh, &c., of Persia it gives to the latter country "the fortresses lying between Mendallijin (Mendalli) and Dartang." If this is correct—and the "Tarikh-i-Naimeh," it must be remembered, was the version produced by the Turkish plenipotentiaries—it is clear that the plains of Ghilan Derah and Kileh Shahin, which are between Mendalli and Dartang, would remain to Persia, and this is the opinion of Sir H. Rawlinson, who states (Memorandum, p. 4) that he is "inclined to consider this expression vague, though, as it certainly is to apply to the respective positions of Ghilan, Derah, and Kileh Shahin," and, further (p. 5), after remarking, however, that "if the grand geographical distinction between the mountains and the plains be attended to, Ghilan, Derah, and Kileh Shahin will belong to Turkey, and the frontier will be the great range immediately to the east of them, but that if, on the other hand, it is our object to disturb as little as possible the principles of distribution thereto obtained at present, the districts in question may be judicially allowed to follow the rule of dependency that must be determined in regard to Zohab."

My own impression was that it was intended in the treaty to assign these lands to Persia, but that they remained, nevertheless, in the occupation of the Turks until

* A note is attached to this summary as follows: "Kara Ali Tchelebi gives the same version."
† Produced by the Persian plenipotentiary, *vide supra*.
‡ Bussorah is not mentioned in the "Jehan Numa."

within the last fifty years. On the other hand, neither the Vienna copy nor the Turkish version (No. 5) make any mention of the fortresses in question, while the "Jehan Numah"* contains an acknowledgment of the right of Turkey to the plains between Mendalli and Dartang, as do the Vienna copy and the Turkish version (No. 5).† This apparent contradiction, *i.e.*, the attribution, on the one hand, to Turkey of the "plains between Mendalli and Dartang," and, on the other, to Persia of the fortresses between the same places, would seem to be an obscure point in the treaty, nor does the subsequent treaty of 1822, or that of 1848, help to clear it up. In the sketch map, however, to illustrate the ancient and modern frontiers of Zohab and Suleimanieh (Turkey 57 A), the ancient frontier, "as defined by treaty," gives the plains of Ghilan, Derah, and Kileh Shahin to Persia, while in the identic map of 1869 the plains in question are merely placed within the limit of the neutral zone, the question being thus left open. The other points in the treaty do not seem to me to call for much comment, Darneh and Dertent in all five versions being given to the Sultan; while there can be no doubt as to the attribution to Persia of Derah‡ and Zardeh, Mihriban and its dependencies, and Avroman and its dependencies, though it is somewhat singular that in the "Jehan Numa" no mention is made of the latter place. Similarly, the general tenor of the treaty unquestionably leaves Shahrizor to the Sultan, while the stipulations regarding the demolition of the fortresses of Kileh Zanjir, Kotoor Makow, and Magazberd§ (on the side of Kars) are practically the same in all five versions. Only, however, in the Turkish version (No. 5) is Sirmil itself expressly attributed to Turkey, and only in this version is it to be found that Azerbaijan belongs to that country.

Enclosure in Sir S. Canning's No. 155 of 1844.

Of the five versions of the treaty, the three which make mention of Bussorah are—

The "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" (2).
The Vienna copy (3).
The Persian version (4).

The "Jehan Numa" (1) and, singularly enough, the Turkish version (5) being silent as to this particular place.

The Vienna copy (3) and the Persian version (4) are identical in their references, which are as follows :—

"The Shah is to commit no aggression, nor meddle with the fortresses, burghs, provinces, countries, mountains or hills lying between (*i.e.*, on the side of) Akhattzihs, Kars, Van, Cherizoul, Bagdad, and Bussorah.

In the "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" the reference is :—

"No interference, moreover, to be admitted on the part of Persia with any of the fortresses, or villages, or coasts lying within the several acknowledged territories of Akheshkeh, Kars, Van, Shahrizoul, Bagdad, and Bussorah."

Beyond the references above given, the treaty contains nothing further as regards Bussorah, and it will be noticed that only the "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" mentions the "coasts" in connection with the latter place.

The Omissions in the Treaty.

1. No mention of any place between Bussorah and Jestan (Jessan, about 12 miles to the south or south-west of Bedrai) which could serve to fix the limits of the two Empires between those two places.

2. No mention of the line between Bedrai and Mendalli, or of that from Mendalli northwards.

3. Shahrizor to Van (*i.e.*, to Kotur, east of Van), treaty also entirely blank.

H. S. SHIPLEY.

Foreign Office, March 16, 1912.

* The "Jehan Numa" was produced by the Persian plenipotentiaries.
† The "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" has no mention of the "plains between Mendalli and Dartang," the reference in this connection being "Darneh and Dartang, extending as far as the place called Ser Mil and to all the territory lying in and between these districts." The Persian version (No. 4) "Mendalli, Derne, Dertent (Dartang), up to Sermail (Sermeel), with the countries therein contained, the plains situated between these two last towns."
‡ According to a footnote to Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum (p. 2), this Derah would not apparently be the plain of that name, but is the Bireh and Pezai (Direh) of the "Tarikh-i-Naimeh" and the Vienna copy respectively, and is (Sir H. Rawlinson suspects) the modern Piran below the fort of Zardah.
§ Near the ruins of Ani.

[10457] No. 604.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my letter of the 6th instant respecting the situation in South Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran enclosing the scheme, elaborated by Colonel Hjalmarson, for the organisation of a national gendarmerie in Persia.*

It will be seen that, so far as the province of Fars is dealt with, the idea is to establish the head-quarters of the force at Shiraz, and it is hoped that by the end of the first year posts will be stationed southwards as far as Kinartakhte, some 120 miles south of Shiraz, and northwards as far as Baghi Khan, 12 miles north of that town.

During the succeeding 9 months posts would be extended to Bushire in the south and to Yezdikhast in the north.

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the arrangement at present in contemplation is open to a grave objection in that it leaves unguarded for at least 12 months a broad stretch of country—some 55 miles, in fact—between Bushire and Kinartakhte, at the mouth of the main channel of British trade into the interior, while no such omission is contemplated on the northern road from Tehran to the coast.

While this stretch remains unguarded the fact that the section between Kinartakhte is safe will be of no benefit to British trade, since goods will be liable to robbery as soon as they leave Bushire, and I am accordingly to enquire whether, in Lord Crewe's opinion, it would not be desirable to instruct Sir G. Barclay to urge the Persian Government to pay attention in the first instance to the whole road south of Shiraz rather than to any part of it, such as that leading to Baghi Khan, to the north of that place.

It may, however, be argued that any such representation is exposed to the reply that the work must be directed from the centre of the province, which, in the case of Fars, must be at Shiraz.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9798] No. 605.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, relative to the question of the shipment of red oxide from the island of Hormuz, and to transmit to you herewith a draft of a communication which, subject to the concurrence of the Board of Trade, he would propose to address to Messrs. Ellinger and Co. this question.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any observations which the Board may wish to offer on this draft, and to add that, on further consideration, Sir E. Grey is disposed not to address Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co. on the subject, at any rate for the present.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[11439] No. 606.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 200.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March* 17, 1912.

MY telegram No. 181 of 11th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day informed my Russian colleague and me that German and Austrian chargés d'affaires made official representations to him on 13th March, by order of their Governments, reminding the Persian Government of the most-favoured-nation clauses in their treaties, and warning them that their Governments would not recognise the consequences of any arrangement concluded by Persia which would injure their treaty rights.

The two representatives endeavoured to enter into a discussion and to show that the recognition of the convention as proposed might injure their rights, but Minister for Foreign Affairs succeeded in evading a discussion. He reiterated his former assurances that freedom of commerce with Persia would be retained by all Powers, and drew their attention to passage to this effect in the preamble of the convention.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

* No. 543.

[11435] No. 607.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March* 17, 1912.

PERSIAN Minister called to-day and asked whether I could do anything to hasten negotiations for large loan.

I told him that it was useless for me to press Minister for Foreign Affairs till reply had been received from the Persian Government to our joint note. He assured me that reply would not now be delayed, and begged me to represent to you urgent necessity of arranging loan as soon as reply was received.

[11436] No. 608.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March* 17, 1912.

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day substance of your telegram No. 236 of 15th March. He was much pleased with assurance contained in last paragraph.

He told me that the Turkish Ambassador had complained of Russian mobilisation at Kars, and had said that Turkey would have to take precautionary measures on her side.

His Excellency declared that there was no truth in this report, and that all that Russia was doing was to send the 45th—not 41st—division to the Caucasus as reported in my telegram No. 106 of 15th March. He also denied reports of military preparations in Kiev and Odessa districts to which I had called his attention. On the other hand, he had heard that the Turks were calling out redifs, and he had, he said, sent for the Turkish Ambassador to enquire whether it was a fact. He did not know whether the two Governments were both suspecting each other without cause, but the situation was becoming unpleasant.

[11433] No. 609.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 17, 1912.

MY telegram No. 59 of 15th March.

M. Swetchine, recently Russian Councillor of Embassy here, but appointed to The Hague, has been ordered to return to Constantinople to take charge of the embassy. He is generally considered as violently anti-Turkish.

In Government circles considerable anxiety is felt as to Russian warlike preparations, which it is thought may mean that Russia intends to impose peace conditions by force, and that she is about to demand evacuation by Turkish troops of contested territories on the Persian frontier.

[11631] No. 610.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Batoum, March 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the rumours relative to warlike preparations and movements of troops towards the Turkish frontier, reported in my despatches Nos. 1, 2, and 4, continue to be widely circulated, and the possibility of developments of some importance in the very near future are being seriously viewed by the military authorities of the Caucasus.

It is now further reported that preparations are being made for a general mobilisation of the army of the Caucasus on the 15th (28th) instant; that the commanders of all units have received orders to push on the training of recruits with utmost speed; that all railway and Government officers have been invited to send in applications as to the inland places to which they wish their families removed in the event of an early outbreak of hostilities; and that an army corps from Russia is already being moved to the northern Caucasus to relieve the Third Caucasian Army Corps, which is under orders for transfer to the trans-Caucasus.

About fifteen cart-loads of artillery stores were sent away by rail from the artillery depôts at this port yesterday; the cases, apparently containing artillery ammunition, &c., were all marked "Sarikamish."

I have, &c.
P. STEVENS.

[11455] No. 611.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 203.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 12, 1912.*

ASSIM BEY yesterday expressed some anxiety as to Russian action in the Caucasus. He said that recently at Batoum, Tiflis, and Kars there had been a considerable increase of troops, and the usual measures preparatory to military activity had been taking place.

The Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to enquire of M. Sozonof the reasons for these measures, but the Minister replied with a laugh that he knew nothing of it, but would enquire. He had subsequently been informed that there was no truth in the report, but Assim Bey said that he was sure of his information, in spite of the denial of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[11682] No. 612.

Mr. Barry to Mr. Mallet.—(Received March 18.)

2, Queen Anne's Gate, Westminster, March 15, 1912.

Dear Mr. Mallet,

I AM sending you a copy of a memorandum by M. de P. Webb. You will see it is made after his personal inspection of the ports of the South-Eastern Persian littoral. I think it might, perhaps, be of interest to you.

Yours, &c.
A. J. BARRY.

Enclosure in No. 612.

Note on certain of the Ports of the Mekran Coast and South-Eastern Persia through which the Trans-Persian Railway may be carried.

IN view of the facts that—

(1.) The Indian Government desire the Trans-Persian Railway to approach India by way of the Mekran coast line, and

(2.) At whatever point the railway first debouches on the sea board, an important port will probably spring up,

I decided that it would be advisable at once personally to inspect all the points on the Mekran and South-Eastern Persian littoral at which the railway might touch, and record the result of my investigation. I have accordingly just visited Pasni, Gwadar, Charbar, Jask, and Bunder Abbas by coasting steamer. I have also discussed local affairs in these parts with several local authorities—official and unofficial.

Bunder Abbas is an open roadstead (steamers lie from 2 to 3 miles away from the shore) that offers no facilities or attractions of any kind for the creation of an efficient harbour or seaport. At present, goods are shipped and landed by large native sailing-boats, which, for an hour or two at high water, are able to get alongside a diminutive and very old stone pier. In bad weather the sea, though not actually rough, is sufficiently disturbed to make shipping and landing very difficult—at times, I believe, impossible. (As it is, goods are frequently lost between ship and shore.) The construction of great breakwaters and piers, together with a regular course of dredging, would enable landing and shipping work from ocean-going steamers to be carried on more quickly, but everything would be artificial. The spot offers no natural advantages or attractions at the present day. On the contrary, the facts that (1) fresh water is now very difficult to obtain, and (2) the climate during the hot months is so bad (a very moist heat with a high temperature and no sea breeze) as to drive any European and most of the native residents away, render Bunder Abbas an unsuitable spot at which to bring the Trans-Persian Railway to the seaboard.

The only point in Bunder Abbas favour at the present moment is that it is the nearest sea-port to Kirman. At the same time, caravans take twenty-five to thirty-five days to travel between Bunder Abbas and Kirman, and goods are exposed to all weathers and to very rough handling. There can be no doubt that if Kirman were served by rail from some other point on the seaboard, the caravan trade would quickly disappear, and with it the insignificant collection of dirty mud houses on the beach, now called Bunder Abbas.

A proposal has been made that the Trans-Persian Railway should debouch on the Persian Gulf at Bunder Abbas and thereafter follow the coast line to Kurrachee. Such a detour would, whilst depriving promising island districts of the economic stimulus which the presence of railway always creates, add very materially to the cost and length of the trunk line to India. These disadvantages, combined with lack of natural facilities and attractions at Bunder Abbas itself, raise the question: Would it not be best to abandon Bunder Abbas altogether and concentrate attention on some other point on the seaboard? I am inclined to think it would. And for reasons which will appear a little later.

Pasni, "an evil-smelling hamlet of Ichthyophagi," so Major P. M. Sykes describes Pasni in his "Ten Thousand Miles in Persia." The description is correct. Lord Curzon, in his "Persia and the Persian Question," calls Pasni an "excellent harbour." This is more than Pasni deserves. It is merely an open roadstead protected but very slightly, if at all, by a headland. It happens to be the point at which Alexander the Great is supposed to have struck the coast line. It is also known here a little because one of the land lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Company is watched at this point. The telegraph bungalow is the only substantial building in Pasni. Because the Government of India are anxious to encourage the growth of Pasni in competition with Gwadur (which is recognised as belonging to the Sultan of Muscat), arrangements have been made for the slow (fortnightly) gulf mail steamer of the British India Steam Navigation Company to stop at Pasni. It is an extremely poor harbour, however, and, being so close to Kurrachee, has no likelihood of being converted into a modern port.

Considered from the point of view of the railway, *quâ* railway, the sooner the line strikes inland from the Indian Ocean the better. If, then, the military department of the Government of India will accept Pasni to Kurrachee as being a sufficiently lengthy and vulnerable stretch of coast railway, I would recommend that Pasni be made the first sea terminus of the Trans-Persian Railway. The advantages are:—

1. A shortening of the trunk line as compared with an alignment touching the coast for the first time further westward.
2. A greater prospect of greater local traffic from Kej-Mekran and the districts to the westward to Kasrkund.
3. A sea terminus in British territory instead of in the Sultan of Muscat's or Persian territory.

4. No necessity to attempt the construction of a modern port or harbour at a point so close to Kurrachee.

The disadvantages of Pasni are :—

(*a.*) The great cost of making a harbour if such be considered absolutely essential for political purposes.

(*b.*) The unhealthiness—at present—of the locality.

(*c.*) Persia would have no sea port served by the railway unless a branch line were constructed.

Assuming the military authorities successfully establish the necessity of a longer length of line on the sea coast, then the selection should, in my opinion, rest upon either Gwadur or Charbar.

Jask need not be considered. It is a tiny village, and a telegraph station on a low-lying shore from which steamers lie off some 2 miles. Submarine cables and land lines all unite at Jask. A wireless installation is also in use for communication with vessels of the Indian Marine engaged in the suppression of the arms traffic. There is but little trade, and were it not for the importance of the telegraph junction, Jask would never be heard of. I see no reason for the railway to touch Jask under any circumstances.

Gwadur is an open roadstead—ships lie off 2 miles. The anchorage is fairly well protected by a hammer-head shaped headland. Gwadur, which is moderately healthy, has the largest trade of any port on the Mekran coast. That it does not lend itself to harbour works except at great expense may not be an objection to it as the first sea terminus of the Trans-Persian Railway. It is under the Sultan of Muscat. This may possibly prove a stumbling-block.

Charbar Bay, as far as I can judge, affords by far the best natural advantages of any port on the Mekran coast if the creation of a new port be taken into consideration. If a railway is to be carried across Persia from north-west to south-east, Persia will be able to adduce very good grounds why that railway should run to the coast line within Persian territory. There is absolutely no reason why the line—if it is to be a trunk line to India—should touch the coast at any point west of Charbar Bay, and if the creation of a port be the inevitable consequence of the coming of the railway to the coast—and I think it is—then Charbar affords the best natural advantages.

Charbar Bay is very large, with deep water all over it and impressive mountain ranges away to the north-west. The present telegraph buildings and village are on a little patch of rising ground at the south-east corner, somewhat protected by a small headland and by a spit of sand running out in a west south-westerly direction. Ships lie a mile and a-half off the shore. Good fresh water is available, and the place seems quite healthy.

Inside the bay, a little to the north-west of Charbar village, is a bold headland stretching westward, behind which stood the old and famous port of Tiz. I did not get as far as Tiz, but I am inclined to think that this is where harbour works, wharves, and railway terminus would be located. The whole of the British fleet could easily find anchorages in Charbar Bay, and although the entrance is some 5 miles broad, good shelter can be obtained from all winds and weathers, I believe.

Summary.

The conclusions I come to are that—

1. If the British section of the Trans-Persian Railway could commence to climb to the higher inland tracts from Pasni, and be carried thence in the direction of Bampur, it would be the best (*a*) for the railway and (*b*) for Kurrachee from a purely commercial point of view.

2. If the military department successfully insists upon a longer lead along the coast line, then the railway might well be carried inland from Gwadur.

3. If the possibility of creating a good harbour and shipping and landing port be a paramount consideration, then Charbar Bay affords the best natural advantages. Next in order of natural advantages comes Gwadur.

4. If Persia demands, and is able to obtain, a railway terminus on her own south-eastern coast line, then Charbar Bay is, in my opinion, the best spot for such a port and terminus. All thought of serving Bunder Abbas should be put aside. Indeed, notwithstanding its past history, I would recommend the entire abandonment of

Bunder Abbas, so far as the Trans-Persian Railway is concerned. Bam, Kerman, and the regions beyond would be well within twenty-four hours of the sea coast at Charbar as compared with twenty-four (thirty-five) days by caravan at present. There is nothing whatever in Bunder Abbas to make it worth even a branch line to serve it.

5. A possible alternative for consideration would be to carry the main line inland from Pasni, and construct (if Persia must have a port in her own territory) a small branch to Tiz in Charbar on Charbar Bay.

Kurrachee, February 17, 1912. M. DE P. WEBB.

[11856]

No. 613.

Paper communicated by Lord Errington, March 18, 1912.

SOCIÉTÉ D'ÉTUDE.—TRANS-PERSIAN RAILWAY PROJECT.

Conseil d'Administration.

1. (?) Sir William Garstin, G.C.M.G.
2. Colonel Sir W. Bisset, K.C.I.E.
3. Parr's Bank (Hon. Hugo Baring).
4. E. D. Sassoon and Co. (Mr. J. E. Haskell).
5. Forbes, Forbes, Campbell and Co. (Mr. C. F. Campbell).
6. Imperial Bank of Persia (Mr. V. A. C. Hawkins).
7. (?) Mr. G. Lloyd, M.P.
8. Lord Errington.

Comité de Direction.

1. (?) Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. H. D. Napier, C.M.G.
2. (?) First engineer.
3 (?) Second engineer.

[11259]

No. 614.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 18, 1912.

REPEAT my telegram No. 140 of 18th March to Constantinople to Bushire, and inform consul-general, with reference to the last paragraph of your telegram No. 196 of 15th March, that the subject is being carefully examined here.

It is important to examine clearly with reference to each district what the exact position of the sheikh is. He appears clearly not to have any territorial, but merely proprietary, rights on the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, and such rights, if claimed now, could not be sustained, since Persia did not claim them at time of, nor are they recorded in, Treaty of Erzeroum.

If, however, Turkey persists in altering the *status quo* by military posts or other measures, we should have to intimate that such a disturbance would involve British interests and obligations, and could not be permitted. We are, however, anxious to avoid such a step, since it might precipitate Russian action in the north.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 142, and St. Petersburgh, No. 248.)

[10713]

No. 615.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 203.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 18, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of India propose to deposit 5,000 tons of coal on Henjam Island without previous reference to Persian Government, and recommend that, if the latter later on raise question of nature and extent of our rights on the island, negotiations

should be opened with them on the basis of our rights conferred by the Shah on 29th March, 1868, and that in certain circumstances it should be explained that the occupation is temporary.

I am inclined to concur in authorising temporary storing of a certain amount of coal at the telegraph station, so long as it can be done without attracting attention. If Persian Government complain, we could explain that it was done for purposes of the blockade, and that we had no intention of annexing the island. We might offer to pay a small rent for right to store coal or give up Basidu in exchange, while retaining the old cemetery. (Government of India deprecate surrender of Basidu.)

Please telegraph your views respecting best method of procedure.

[11259] No. 616.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 18, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 196 of 15th March: Mohammerah.

Enquire if there is any intention to establish these posts, and, if so, you should strongly urge the Turkish Government not to raise this question by a disturbance of the *status quo* at the very moment when Persian Gulf questions are on the point of being discussed here, even if the posts proposed are on Turkish territory. The land on the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, opposite the sheikh's palace, is presumably Turkish territory, though the private property of the Sheikh of Mohammerah. It is therefore quite unnecessary for the Turkish Government to adopt precautionary measures there, which, by interfering with local arrangements, may lead to disturbances with regrettable consequences. His Majesty's Government could not view with indifference the disturbance of the *status quo* in the Mohammerah regions.

Please telegraph substance of letter of 9th March from Bussorah as soon as received, and instruct consul to keep you informed by telegraph of any further Turkish moves. He should also telegraph precise position of three Turkish posts if they have already arrived.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 199, and St. Petersburgh, No. 247.)

[11436] No. 617.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 18, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 109 of 17th March

Your Excellency should instruct consuls at Mosul and Van to report by telegraph any abnormal movements of Turkish troops towards the Persian frontier.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 205, and St. Petersburgh, No. 252.)

[11176] No. 618.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 54. Very Confidential.)
Sir. *Foreign Office, March* 18, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 167 of the 7th instant and my telegram No. 189 of the 14th instant regarding the recognition by Persia of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, I transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum on the subject left here by the Russian Ambassador on the 13th instant.

It appears to be certain, in spite of the assurance which the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs gave you, as mentioned in your telegram referred to, that the Persian representatives in Europe were instructed to communicate with the Powers, for I have been informed by the French Ambassador that the Persian Minister in Paris has done so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 618.

Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff.

Très Confidentiel.)

D'APRES nos informations, le Gouvernement persan aurait entamé tant à Téhéran qu'à Berlin des pourparlers avec le Gouvernement allemand.

Ce dernier aurait répondu "n'avoir pas d'objections à élever contre la reconnaissance par la Perse de la convention de 1907 à la condition d'égalité de droits pour l'Allemagne.

"Une pareille égalité de droits serait enfreinte si la Perse s'obligeait à n'accorder des concessions d'un caractère politique et commercial qu'à l'Angleterre et la Russie seulement dans leurs sphères d'influence respectives. L'arrangement intervenu entre la Russie et l'Allemagne pour la sphère d'influence russe ne modifie pas les rapports à ce sujet entre l'Allemagne et la Perse. L'Allemagne ne peut pas consentir à la reconnaissance d'une influence exclusive russe dans le nord et d'une influence exclusive anglaise dans le midi de la Perse."

M. Poklewsky est chargé de dire au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Perse que le fait d'avoir ingéré d'autres Puissances dans les négociations menées en commun par l'Angleterre et la Russie avec le Gouvernement persan, n'a pas fait une bonne impression sur le Gouvernement russe. Ce fait semble indiquer que le Gouvernement persan n'a pas renoncé à rechercher un appui au dehors contre la politique des deux Puissances—une tentative qui ne peut pas contribuer à établir entre elles et la Perse les rapports de confiance et d'amitié réciproques qui sont le but de leurs efforts.

M. Sazonof désirerait que Sir G. Barclay fût chargé de tenir un langage analogue.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 13 *mars*, 1912.

[11228] No. 619.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 18, 1912.

The Russian Ambassador told Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th instant that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had telegraphed to say that the situation at Kermanshah was calming down, and that, therefore, he would suggest that the Porte should be approached with the view of deterring them from dispatching one hundred men to reinforce the Turkish consulate guard.

Sir A. Nicolson observed to his Excellency that he believed that there were certain Turkish interests at Kermanshah, and that perhaps a proposal to the Turkish Government not to accord adequate protection might be considered as coming with somewhat ill-grace from the two Powers both of whom had not hesitated to protect their own interests. The two Governments might perhaps, on the other hand, tell the Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government had refrained from adopting really serious measures in the south, and that Russia was reducing her troops in the north, and that consequently Turkey might abstain from sending men to Kermanshah. She only proposes to send one hundred men and has only thirty at Kermanshah. Sir A. Nicolson added that it seemed a small matter and on the whole he thought that we might leave the question alone.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11259] No. 620.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Turkish Ambassador, and has the honour to inform his Highness that a report, as yet unconfirmed, has reached His Majesty's Government, to the effect that the Turkish military authorities have decided to create three military posts in the vicinity of Mohammerah.

Sir E. Grey earnestly trusts that this report is without foundation, as he would regard such a measure with regret at a moment when a friendly discussion is about to

TURKO-PERSIAN Boundary

From Basreh 7½ m.

Diaji

Saiyid Ghalib

Kharnúbiyeh

BARINI.

BOAT CHANNEL

Umm-ut-Tuwaileh

Aqáwat

Sabeh Gusbeh

Turkish Police Station

Shamshamiyeh

MAIN CHANNEL

N. Abul Khasib

N. Abul Flús

DABBEH
(Name obsolete)

From Basreh

Ottoman Wire

Balyániyeh

Kumaileh

NAUFLI
(Khazal Owner)

Umm-ul-Khassasif (Khazal Owner)

Bait Haji Athbi

Umm-ul-Ibabi

Z A I N

Zain Shaikh (Khazal Owner)

Bait Haji GulFidan

Mir Abul Hasanain

Nahr Robal

Bait Muhd Chanan

ROBÁL

Shaikh Mubarak Owner

Old Fort

Police Stn

Umm-ul-Gharb

Umm-ur-Ruwais

Sabeh Nakhlát

Umm-ur-Rassás (Khazal Owner)

Custom Post

Custom House

British Consulate

HIZAM

Haji Faisal

Quarantine

Tuwaijat

Shaikh Jumeh

Ferry

Kút-i-Shaikh

Púzeh

Mahairzi

MUHAMMAREH

Ferry

Umm-ut-Tullul

Cherid

KHUMBEH

OMANIKH

To Ahwáz

To Marid

N. Araith

Ruins

Garden

Abudíyeh

Muftiyeh

Manduwán

N. Abu Jidiyeh

KHAIYIN

Yusuf

Yusuf

Qasr Khazáliyeh

Bir Shaweh

Jadid

Shakhúreh

Machari

Shakúreh

Qasr Khazáliyeh

N. Khaiyin

Khaiyin

Qasr Khazáliyeh

Falliyeh

Sureh

N. Daarband

Sarhapiyeh

N. Khazáliyeh

N. Arbiyeh

N. Saneh

N. Mirza Hamzeh

N. Mamuri

N. Barhaneh

N

Frontier "defined" by Commissioners in 1850

Boundary as locally recognised

(56. 3|12. 1973) F. O. Persia Vol. 1536

upon Howeizah, or upon Fellahiah. And Tamar, El Jadeed, Khomeisah, Shakhura, Nahr Yussef, Darband, El Khayin, and El Haffar are under the immediate surveillance of the chief of Kut-el-Sheikh, acting as the deputy of the Sheikh of Fellahiah, and are subject to the payment of 300 tons of dates yearly for land rent to the Government of Bussorah.

[11251]

No. 622.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 18, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, copies of two telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Teheran, offering certain observations on Colonel Cox's telegram to the Government of India of the 10th instant, regarding the situation in Southern Persia.*

In the former of these telegrams Sir G. Barclay expresses his concurrence in Sir P. Cox's recommendations, which in Sir E. Grey's opinion are eminently practical, and suggests that the present moment is opportune for telling the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government will reduce the escorts now at Shiraz after the arrival at that town of a Governor-General, and if practical proof of a friendly attitude on the part of the tribal chiefs is shown within the next two months.

I am to state that on the information now before him, Sir E. Grey is disposed to share the views expressed by Sir G. Barclay and Sir P. Cox, although he realises that no definite decision can be arrived at until the views of the Viceroy have been received by Lord Crewe.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[11835]

No. 623.

Mr. Greenway to Mr. Mallet.—(Received March 19.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
March 18, 1912.

Dear Mr. Mallet,

WITH reference to my conversation with you a short time ago, I enclose copies of telegrams exchanged with our agent at Tehran.

Apparently, the first step to be taken is to secure the co-operation of the Russian Government, and if you think any further action can advantageously be taken at the present time by our syndicate, I shall be glad to see you and discuss the matter at your convenience.

Lord Errington asked to see me a few days ago with a view to securing co-operation between our syndicate and the Trans-Persian Société d'Étude. I explained that we shall at all times be pleased to co-operate with them on the basis that the railways of more pressing importance from the points of view of both British and Russian interests were given prior consideration, and he seemed to recognise that this was essential, at any rate so far as regards the proposed Mohammerah and (or Khor Musa) Khorremabad line. In fact, he appeared to be under the impression that the concession for this line had already been obtained by our syndicate, and expressed surprise that we had not already begun construction!

Yours truly,
C. GREENWAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 623.

Mr. Brown (Tehran) to Persian Railways Syndicate.

(Translation.)

REFERRING to your telegram of the 6th, British Minister, Tehran, informed me he had received on the 6th March message from the Regent, requesting that Persian Government should not be asked for any concession for a considerable time. Apparently, message outcome terms and conditions 200,000 advance; British Minister,

* Nos. 568 and 592.

Tehran, thinks it advisable to delay about two months. I had interview with the Regent the 9th March; he repeated several times that he had very great hope for the future; he looked forward to the opening up of the country by railways, most important line being Khormusa–Mohammerah north; that it was essential this line to be of value should be extended to Hamadan by agreement between England–Russia. He looked forward to great benefit from the Trans-Persian Railway; he said Russia in a few years would have to construct Tehran–Khanikin line, and beforehand they will have to construct other railways in the north; he considered present time favourable for opening negotiations, but he said there are two difficulties in the way—first, the Cabinet may not be willing to grant concession so soon after the Medjliss dissolved, he will ascertain attitude Cabinet if I approach Foreign Minister; second, there will be great difficulties in the way to railway concession until Great Britain and Russia come to some definite agreement as to what railways are to be constructed in Persia; he could not understand why such agreement had not been come to already; England and Russia, he said, have made a declaration that any concession granted without their consent will be regarded as unfriendly act. I do not consider prospects favourable at present, and propose to take leave of absence home. Wood offers to take charge all your interests.

Enclosure 2 in No. 623.

Persian Railways Syndicate to Mr. Brown (Tehran).

(Translation.)

WE are of opinion treasurer-general may now be disposed to sanction railway concession in order to disprove accusation anti-British tendency. We have spoken to Foreign Office; they are asking British Minister, Tehran, his opinion; see him, telegraph your views and his.

[11805] No. 624.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 19.)

India Office, March 18, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 12th instant, and, in reply, to say that he concurs with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the inadvisability of an immediate application to the Persian Government for a concession to construct a railway from Mohammerah to Khorremabad.

The Marquess of Crewe also concurs generally in the proposal made in paragraph 3 of your letter, but it is for consideration whether it would not be better to obtain from the Russian Government an undertaking not to oppose the concession, since it seems doubtful whether Russian support will eventually serve to commend the application to the Persian Government.

In connection with this scheme, I am to call attention to the last paragraph of Mr. Mallet's secret letter of the 25th November last, and to express the hope that the importance of Khor Musa will be borne in mind.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[11726] No. 625.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 61 of 17th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that, although the Russian Government had commenced by denying that there was any movement of troops in the Caucasus, they eventually admitted it, and put forward complaints of presence of two Turkish revolutionaries at Khoi. Turkish Government had now after some correspondence sent orders for them to be immediately arrested and sent back into Turkey. That orders had been also sent to Governors of Mosul and Van to undertake no census operations nor to allow elections in contested districts That orders had been given that

no troops whatever should be moved east beyond their present position, and that guard of Khoi consulate should not be increased.

His Excellency said that he hoped that these measures would satisfy Russia that Turkey had no intention of encroaching, but would abide by decision of commission or Hague Tribunal, and that mobilisation in the Caucasus would now cease. Russian Ambassador had said that his Government would no doubt consider these measures as satisfactory, and that incident might be considered as closed.

[11867] No. 626.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, March 19, 1912.*

MR. MOIR, British vice-consul and Ziegler's manager at Sultanabad, has been robbed by Bakhtiaris on the way to his post between here and Kum.

[11900] No. 627.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 140 of yesterday.

Letter from consul at Bussorah, dated 9th March, was as follows:—

"I am informed that three new military posts are to be created of one officer and seventy men each on Turco-Persian frontier: first, opposite Failieh, Sheikh of Mohammerah's residence, on Turkish side; second, on boundary between Gurtrans and Howeiza; third, behind Amara, on Persian boundary."

[11902] No. 628.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 146 of 18th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

Consuls named and consul at Erzeroum have permanent instructions to that effect.

St. Petersburgh telegram No. 109 of 17th March.

No redif troops have been embodied and no military measures taken beyond those reported from here in the joint report of the military attachés (see my despatch No. 148 of 18th February).

[11907] No. 629.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 140 of 18th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of War have no knowledge of these new posts, but latter thinks that their establishment may be connected with a general measure along the whole frontier of breaking up larger posts into small detachments.

Orders will be immediately sent to that district not to establish any posts where such have not hitherto existed.

Consul at Bussorah informed.

[12018] No. 630.

Messrs. Dixon and Co. to Sir Edward Greg.—(*Received March* 20.)

Whitworth House, Princess Street,
Sir, *Manchester, March* 19, 1912.

WE beg to draw your attention to the state of affairs on the caravan route between Shiraz and Ispahan.

We are just in receipt of advices from our Ispahan house to the effect that the forwarding of goods on that route is a matter of extreme difficulty, and that rates of mule hire are from 400 to 500 per cent. above the normal rate.

They inform us that a caravan which left Ispahan to go to Shiraz turned back again on reaching Abadeh on the 9th February and returned to Ispahan. The reason given by the muleteers for not carrying out their contracts and conveying the goods to Shiraz was that the local khans' and governors' exactions, under the plea of providing road guards, were so exorbitant that it was impossible for them to continue the journey.

On the 21st February it was reported that muleteers, who were due in Ispahan during the course of the next few days, had been compelled to pay no less than 8,000 khrans under the plea of providing road guards.

We understand that in Shiraz and Ispahan there is a considerable body of British Indian troops, and we trust it will be possible for the presence of these troops to be made use of in order to put pressure on the local governors and khans to discontinue these extortionate exactions from the muleteers.

We have, &c.
H. C. DIXON AND Co.

[12083] No. 631.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, March* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 15th March.

Copy of Rawlinson's memorandum of 1844, as supplied to me under India Office endorsement of January 1907, does not contain passages quoted in your telegram. I should be obliged for complete copy of momorandum in question.

From the Bussorah council reports, quoted at p. 3 of Wilson's précis regarding Aribistan, 1911 (p. 215 and onwards, Saldanhas Bombay Government Selections, 1908), it appears that from 1747 (death of Nadir Shah) onwards the Kaab paid no revenue to the Turks, and by 1769 had become subjects of Persia as a result of pressure applied by Karim Khan of Zend.

Rawlinson's statement cannot therefore be accepted without reserve.

For survey of the districts referred to see map accompanying enclosures to my letter No. 1536 of 4th July to Government of India, copy of which is being sent by next mail.

The place "Tamar" is not now identifiable locally nor on any map; word means "dates" in Arabic, and it probably refers to some date-garden near Diaji, where the boundary locally observed since 1837 turns northwards.

"Boojidee," or "Abu Jidiyeh," is the name of an irrigation creek taking off from the Shatt-el-Arab 2 [?] miles west of Mohammerah and just east of Failiyeh.

No rentals have been paid to the Government of Bussorah for lands on Persian side of the locally observed boundary for the last seventy years or so, nor, so far as is known, since Nadir Shah's death in 1747.

Lands in question are not regarded as "Kaab territory," as the sheikhs of the Kaab were finally superseded by Haji Jabir, of the Muhaisan tribe, in 1862, whose son, Khazal, now rules over both Kaab and Muhaisan tribes.

My despatches No. 60, to Minister, of 4th July, 1909; No. 2 of 8th May, 1910; and No. 5 of 7th July, 1910, are with you.

A map of whole Mohammerah district, on the scale of 1 mile to 1 inch, was sent to the Foreign Office by consul at Mohammerah September 1909.

[10199] No. 634*.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th July last regarding the cost of maintaining His Majesty's consular establishments in Persia, in connection with the proposed reorganisation of the Indian Political Department, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey, to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copy of a letter from the India Office,* recommending the temporary retention of a second assistant to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire.

In view of the reasons given in favour of this course, Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to their Lordship's concurrence, to inform the Marquess of Crew that he agrees in His Lordship's proposal to approve the action of the Government of India in this matter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* No. 520.

[11867] No. 632.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 201 of 19th March : Robbery of vice-consul at Sultanabad.

Can any pressure be brought to bear on Samsam-es-Sultaneh to restrain the Bakhtiaris ?

[10716] No. 633.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, containing observations on the communication which it is proposed to address to the Persian Railways Syndicate relative to the assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Transport Company in connection with railway construction in Persia.

I am to transmit to you herewith a further draft of a letter,* amended in the light of the Marquess of Crewe's observations, which Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to his Lordship's concurrence, to address to the syndicate.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10965] No. 634.

Foreign Office to India Office.†

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to recent correspondence relative to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh,‡ discussing the question of whether the Société d'Étude, which has been formed to carry out the preliminary arrangements in connection with that scheme, should be encouraged to undertake the flotation of the projected large loan to the Persian Government.

I am to inform you that, subject to any observations which the Marquess of Crewe may have to offer, Sir E. Grey is disposed to instruct Sir G. Buchanan to inform the Russian Government that His Majesty's Government will consent to the issue of the loan by the Société d'Étude, but must reserve to themselves complete freedom with regard to such questions as the representation of Great Britain on the board of directors of the railway company, the scale of freight and passenger rates to be adopted, the alignment of the railway, the break of gangs, the proportion of orders for construction to be placed in this country, the system of management, &c., as to which they can only reach a conclusion after the société's report has been received and examined, and that they must not be held to have bound themselves in any way to adopt a particular attitude with regard to any of the above or kindred questions by the mere fact that they have now agreed to the société either taking up the loan or undertaking preliminary studies in connection with the railway.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Not printed.

† Also to Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis*.

‡ Nos. 561 and 580.

[12100] No. 635.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 90.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March 17, 1912.*

IN a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th instant, I communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram No. 222 of the preceding day, and expressed the hope that he would instruct the Russian representative at Constantinople to withold the communication to the Persian Government of any documents relating to Mohammerah until he received the statement which you were having drawn up on the subject of the Turco-Persian frontier.

His Excellency, while agreeing to do so, said that according to the information which he had received from Constantinople, the Turco-Persian commission was to commence its sittings in a few days, and that he had consequently instructed M. Minorsky to start at the beginning of next week. Unless, therefore, you had received information to the contrary, he would beg me to impress on you the importance of allowing Mr. Shipley to start at once, as otherwise he might arrive too late. The commission was almost certain to break up after a few sittings, as the pretensions of the Turks were so preposterous that there was no possibility of an agreement being arrived at.

M. Sazonof then said that he wished to speak to me very seriously on the whole situation. The Turks, he had reason to know, had for a long time past been collecting a mass of documents in support of their case, among which his Excellency mentioned certain deeds of sale. The Persians, on the other hand, could produce no evidence whatsoever to show that they had any legal right to the territory which they claimed. It was, however, precisely on legal grounds that the question would be decided by The Hague Tribunal, and there consequently could be no doubt but that the decision would be given in favour of the Turks.

I reminded his Excellency that only a few weeks ago he had taken a diametrically opposite view of the case, and had even suggested that we should have to bring pressure to bear at Constantinople to force the Ottoman Government to refer the question to arbitration.

His Excellency replied that the information which had reached him in the meanwhile had caused him to change the views which he had then expressed. What, however, he wished to explain to me now had regard to the grave situation which would be created were the Turkish claims to be confirmed by a court of arbitration. Turkey's encroachments on Persian territory had commenced in 1905, and when Russia and England had signed the agreement of 1907 they had done so in the firm belief that the whole of Azerbaijan belonged to Persia. Russia had from the outset protested against those encroachments, which she had always qualified as acts of aggression; but if The Hague Tribunal were to adjudge to Turkey all the territory now occupied by her, which according to the Minorsky-Shipley map went far beyond the disputed zone, Russia would be obliged in self-defence to occupy permanently certain strategic points such as Khoi and Kotur.

Our conversation was here interrupted; but on my resuming it two days later I asked his Excellency to explain to me the reasons which caused him to take so pessimistic a view of the question.

His Excellency replied that the information furnished him by M. Minorsky and by M. Mandelstam, dragoman to the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, tended to show that the Turks would be able to make out a very strong case, as they could prove that their authorities had for some time past been registering deeds of sale and performing other administrative acts within the districts to which they laid claim. It was clear, moreover, that they had implicit confidence in their case, or they would not now be so eager to go to The Hague, nor would they have asked the Russian Government to engage to withdraw their troops from those points which would, "undoubtedly," be assigned to Turkey by that tribunal. Were these expectations to be realised Russia would, as he had already informed Turkhan Pasha, be obliged to reconsider her whole policy with regard to the regions adjacent to her frontiers. She had hitherto regulated that policy on the presumption that the territory in question belonged to Persia—a weak country, from whom she had nothing to fear. But the situation would be entirely different were Turkey to enter into possession of it, as she could not leave the frontier exposed to the danger of an attack by Turkish troops under German officers.

I remarked that if we could prove that Turkey was in illegal possession of the territory in dispute, the fact that she could produce evidence to show that she had during recent years been performing certain administrative acts within it would carry no weight with the arbitrators. The documentary evidence in our possession, such as Kurshid Effendi's diary and the map communicated to the Erzeroum commission by the Ottoman commissioner in 1843, strongly supported the Persian case. I then repeated to his Excellency the language which M. Nératof had held to me last year, as reported in my telegram No. 99 of the 6th May, on the subject of the reference of the whole frontier dispute to The Hague, and asked whether his Excellency shared M. Nératof's views.

M. Sazonof said that he must confess that he personally knew nothing about the history of the dispute, and that, therefore, he could only go by what was told to him by those who had made a study of the question. The Persians, his Excellency continued, were as helpless as children; and we must, therefore, make them clearly understand that they must consult us in all matters connected with the projected arbitration, and that they must designate as one of their arbitrators either a Russian or a British jurist.

On my communicating to his Excellency yesterday the substance of your telegram No. 236 of the 15th instant, his Excellency expressed much satisfaction with the assurance that you would be prepared to consider with him the situation which would arise, were the negotiations at present proceeding between the Persian and the Ottoman Governments to break down.

In the course of our conversations, M. Sazonof told me that Turkhan Pasha had complained to him of a supposed mobilisation of the Russian troops at Kars, and had said that Turkey would be compelled to take precautionary measures on her side. There was not, his Excellency assured me, any truth in this report, any more than in those which had reference to military preparations at Kieff, Odessa, and other places. Some two years ago there had been a question of reinforcing the Russian troops in the Caucasus, and in view of the uncertainty of the present situation he had insisted in a recent council of Ministers on this being done at once. The 45th Division would, consequently, now be dispatched from Kazan to the Caucasus, so that should necessity arise flying columns could be sent to any points where their presence might be required. He had, however, no intention of forestalling the decision of The Hague Tribunal. The situation was, nevertheless, somewhat disquieting, as according to reports which had reached him the Turks were about to call out the redifs. The two Governments were thus apparently imputing to each other aggressive designs which, so far as Russia at any rate was concerned, were entirely unwarranted.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[12105] No. 636.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 95.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March 18, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" of the 17th March publishes a leading article under the title of "The Integrity of Persia." The article is founded on a telegram stating that the Christians of Urmia have petitioned the Russian Emperor, the Duma, and the legislatures of France, England, and the United States of America against the withdrawal of the Russian troops. It points out the inconsistency of the Turkish authorities in talking of an appeal to The Hague Tribunal while they continue in occupation of the disputed territory, and are now even sending an army corps from Anatolia to reinforce their troops already there. The "Novoe Vremya" says that it has already so often pointed out the strategic importance of the province of Urmia to the safety of the Caucasus that it need not refer again to this point, but the reinforcement of the Turkish troops along the Russian frontier confirms the apprehensions already expressed. Owing to lack of foresight and neglect of common-sense precautions, incidents arose in Persia which necessitated the dispatch to that country of thousands of Russian troops. The military forces in the Caucasus, always insufficient, have thus been still further weakened. Meanwhile, England and Russia are frittering away their diplomatic efforts on trifles, and are neglecting the active policy of Turkey, who is quietly occupying with her troops a whole slice of foreign territory. Russia, always jealous for her own interests, raises a hue and cry about Major Stokes, but takes no notice of the occupation by Turkey of a strategic

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point of vital interest to Russia. England, on the other hand, watches with jealous eyes every move on the part of Russia which might give the latter country any predominance in the land of the Shah, but at the same time turns a blind eye on Turkey's seizure of Persian territory. The notorious Anglo-Persian Committee in London watches feverishly over Persian independence, and worries the British Government with everlasting questions on every step that Russia takes, but as yet has not said a single word about Turkey and Urmia. Neither M. Sazonof nor Sir E. Grey has noted the fact that Turkey has seized a huge tract of Persian territory, and yet the Anglo-Russian understanding is based on the principle of the integrity of Persia.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[12154] No. 637.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et en réponse à sa note du 18 mars, 1912, il a l'honneur de l'informer qu'il résulte des renseignements reçus de la Sublime Porte que par suite de la réorganisation qui s'effectue actuellement en vue de la formation et répartition de détachements sur le long de toutes les frontières de l'Empire, les autorités militaires de Bagdad ont probablement procédé à l'exécution des mesures selon les appréciations et besoins locaux.

Tevfik Pacha s'empresse de faire savoir à son Excellence M. le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères que des ordres télégraphiques ont été cependant donnés aux autorités compétentes pour ne point créer les postes en question dans le voisinage de Mohammerah, et il est heureux d'ajouter à cette occasion que le Gouvernement Impérial n'a nullement eu l'intention de soulever une question au moment où il engage avec un esprit de conciliation des plus manifestes des pourparlers à Londres sur les questions de Bagdad–Golfe Persique.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 20 mars, 1912.

[12192] No. 638.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 21.)

Sir, *India Office, March 20*, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 16th instant, regarding the scheme prepared by Colonel Hjalmarson for the organisation of a national gendarmerie in Persia.

The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it would be preferable that provision should be made first for the protection of the whole road between Shiraz and Bushire. But Kunar Takhteh is apparently the last stage in the hilly country, in which caravans are most likely to be attacked, and shortly after it the road crosses the Kotal-i-Malu and drops to the plain; and it is probably Colonel Hjalmarson's view that with a post at Kunar Takhteh the road as far as Dalaki, at the foot of the hills, would be sufficiently protected, and that the plain might be left to such a force as the Governor of Bushire may possess. Lord Crewe would deprecate any avoidable interference with the Swedish officer's discretion, and he would suggest that His Majesty's Government might acquiesce in the proposal on the understanding: (1) that the post at Kunar Takhteh patrols as far as Dalaki; (2) that the Governor of Bushire is made personally responsible for the safety of the rest of the road to Bushire. It will be remembered that in this last section is the village of Borasjun, a dangerous place, the khan of which is a notorious evildoer.

Sir E. Grey may like to consult the political resident, Persian Gulf, before arriving at a decision.

Lord Crewe observes that no provision is apparently made for the protection of the Bunder Abbas–Kerman road, which, already disturbed, is likely to become more so as raiding ceases to be profitable between Bushire and Shiraz. Representations have repeatedly been made by His Majesty's consul, Kerman, and by the firms whose

property has suffered, and his Lordship would suggest that the Persian Government should be pressed to take measures for the restoration of order on this road as well.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[12164] No. 639.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received March 21.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
Sir, *March 20*, 1912.

WITH reference to my recent letters to you about the disturbed condition of the country in the neighbourhood of Kasr-i-Shirin, and the serious position in which our representative, Mr. E. B. Soane, is now placed, I beg to enclose an extract from a letter from Mr. Soane which has come to hand to-day.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

Enclosure in No. 639.

Mr. Soane to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

(Extract.) *Chiah Sourkh, February 22*, 1912.

Local News.—It is apparently true that Salar-ed-Dowleh has been expelled from Kermanshah, and is with Daud Khan Kalhur somewhere west of that place. Since his expulsion the road to Persia has become finally and totally stopped. The Bakhtiari tribe are looting villages and destroying property from Sar-i-Pul to the frontier, and unless the parliamentary forces put in an appearance down here very shortly things will become worse, the only restraining force being Ali Akbar Khan Senjabi, Salar-i-Mugtadir (proprietor of our land at Kasr), who is openly for the Government.

In our immediate vicinity things are not too peaceable, and almost nightly attempts are made to draw off our guards, while robbery may occur at the workshop and stores. So persistent and menacing have these annoyances become that I have increased the guard by two men, as the few we had did not suffice to patrol adequately, and as the shop and stores are in a very exposed position I am erecting a watch-tower which commands the whole camp, and with the guard stationed therein we shall have some prospect of being able to protect our property, which we have not at present; also, in any case, the guards being lodged in a ruin, I should have had, sooner or later, to build them a place. You can judge the position by the fact that a cart sent daily to a spot two miles distant for gypsum has to carry three guards, as an attack was made upon it with the hope of carrying off the mules before I put on the guard. I trust, however, that now the Medjliss has asserted itself at Kermanshah, its influence may extend here very shortly.

[12187] No. 640.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tehran, March 21*, 1912.

FOLLOWING is Persian Government's reply, dated 20th March, to our joint proposals:—

M. le Ministre,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 29 safar (18 février) dernier, d'accord avec son Excellence le Ministre de Russie, au sujet de certaines propositions tendant à établir sur une base solide de confiante amitié les relations existantes entre les Gouvernements persan, anglais et russe, ainsi qu'à faciliter au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah le soin de rétablir et de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans le pays. Le Gouvernement Impérial très touché des bonnes intentions des deux Puissances voisines et animé du désir de

donner à l'ensemble desdites propositions la suite la plus favorable, a l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit :—

A.—1. Sur la question du crédit de 200,000*l.* que les Banques Impériale et d'Escompte ouvriront au profit du Gouvernement persan, à titre d'avance sur le premier emprunt que la Perse va conclure, mon Gouvernement consent à ce que cette somme soit remboursée par le premier produit dudit emprunt. En attendant, les intérêts seront calculés à raison de 7 pour cent par an ; et les excédents des recettes douanières du nord et du sud seront affectés intégralement et respectivement pour le service de l'amortissement et des intérêts de la présente avance.

2. Pour assurer l'emploi intégral de cette somme aux dépenses déjà fixées par le Gouvernement, et connues des deux légations, le gérant de la Trésorerie générale sera chargé par le Gouvernement Impérial de contrôler les dépenses imputées sur ce crédit. Il est entendu qu'une partie considérable de l'avance sera affectée à l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale avec l'aide des officiers suédois.

B. En ce qui concerne les quatre points de la partie *in fine* de la note collective, le Gouvernement persan, convaincu que le respect de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de la Perse ainsi que son développement pacifique forment l'objet de la sollicitude sincère des deux Gouvernements amis, accueille avec plaisir ces bonnes dispositions en y répondant dans les termes suivants :—

1. En vue de témoigner son vif désir d'établir sur une base solide d'amitié et de confiance les relations entre la Perse, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie, le Gouvernement persan se montrera soucieux de conformer sa politique aux principes de la convention de 1907, et il prend acte des assurances contenues dans le préambule de ladite convention.

2. Conformément à ce qui a été arrêté dans le programme de mon Gouvernement, après le départ définitif de Mohamed Ali Mirza et de Salar-ed-Dowleh du territoire persan, les mujahids seront licenciés et les autres forces irrégulières seront disciplinées et incorporées dans le cadre des forces régulières au fur et à mesure du développement de l'organisation militaire.

3. En vue du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans le pays, l'organisation d'une armée régulière et effective constitue un des points fondamentaux du programme ministériel. Il est évident que l'armée à organiser sera proportionnée aux besoins du pays.

Dans le but de faire partager aux deux Puissances voisines la conviction qu'il considère comme son devoir des plus impérieux de procéder à l'organisation de cette armée, le Gouvernement persan informera les deux légations du programme de ladite organisation afin qu'un échange de vues amical puisse avoir lieu sur les points nécessaires.

4. En ce qui concerne le départ de Mohamed Ali Mirza et l'octroi d'une pension en sa faveur, par déférence pour les propositions des Gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et de Russie, un accord qui fera l'objet d'une note à part est déjà intervenu à ce sujet.

Pour enlever tout obstacle à l'apaisement du pays et au rétablissement de l'ordre et pour assurer l'efficacité des mesures prises par l'État pour le maintien de la sécurité publique, le Gouvernement persan a le ferme espoir que les deux Puissances voisines ne manqueront pas de lui prêter tout leur concours, de façon à écarter tout danger d'une nouvelle tentative de rentrée en Perse par l'ex-Schah. Désirant donner suite à la proposition formulée par les Gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et de Russie, le Gouvernement Impérial accordera une amnistie générale aux partisans de Mohamed Ali Mirza. Cette mesure ne concernera bien entendu que les faits et agissements antérieurs et ne pourra être étendue aux faits postérieurs à la date de l'amnistie.

C. Ayant donné dans ce qui précède les preuves de ses intentions amicales à l'égard des deux Puissances et de son désir sincère de rétablir l'ordre et la sécurité dans le pays, le Gouvernement persan tient à obtenir le concours efficace des deux pays voisins sur les deux points suivants :—

1. Pour la conclusion urgente de l'emprunt nécessaire à la réalisation des réformes, et dont les conditions se rapporteraient exclusivement aux taux d'intérêt, à l'amortissement et à la garantie.

2. Pour que l'évacuation du territoire de la Perse par les troupes étrangères s'accomplisse dans le plus bref délai possible conformément aux souhaits du Gouvernement persan.

[12096]

No. 641.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 203.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 21, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 21st March and my telegram No. 186 of 12th March : Persian reply to joint note.

My despatch No. 52, by bag yesterday, will show that the point raised in your telegram No. 181 of 11th March has not been lost sight of. Our language to the Minister for Foreign Affairs can have left him under no illusion.

[12201]

No. 642.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.)

Odessa, March 21, 1912.

VICE-CONSUL at Rostov telegraphs military trains passing daily bound for the Persian-Turkish frontier.

Rostov house-owners warned for billeting 1,500 men.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, Constantinople, and Batoum.)

[12083]

No. 643.

Sir Edward Grey to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 20th March : Mohammerah.

Rawlinson's memorandum on Mohammerah is a different document from the memorandum you have ; it is being printed, and copy, with other important documents being prepared here, will be sent to you. Rawlinson states categorically that El Jadid, Shakura, Nahr Yussef, Darband, El Khaiyin, El Haffar were all subject to annual payment of rent to Government of Bussorah ; all places are shown on Wilson's map, and some between 1850 line and frontier as locally observed. He also says that some of these lands were held under patents passed under the Sultan's seal. As the Turks may produce such documents if, under the protocol of last December, they persist in bringing the question before The Hague Tribunal—a contingency which we shall try to prevent—it may influence an award in their favour. Chaab tribe did not, according to Rawlinson, pay tribute to Turkey after 1740, but they did pay rent for land on left bank of Shatt-el-Arab uninterruptedly up to 1844.

[12259]

No. 644.

Messrs. Seligman Brothers to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 22.)

Dear Sir,

18, *Austin Friars, London, March* 21, 1912.

IN reply to your letter of the 20th March, we have to inform you that our Mr. Charles Seligman, who had the pleasure of seeing you on the 5th March, is at present in Biarritz, and that we have not yet received any answer from the Russian Government concerning the Persian loan.

In the meantime we learn that the Société d'Études, formed to investigate the prospects of the trans-Persian railway, has expressed a desire to undertake the issue of the proposed Persian loan, making it an international operation to be carried out in England, Russia, and France.

Should this proposal be approved by the British Government we are anxious to meet its views, and are prepared to facilitate the operation, if the conditions are satisfactory, on the understanding that the portion of the loan which is reserved for the English market shall be assigned to us, in view of the various interviews that have taken place in St. Petersburgh as well as in London, and the many months of hard work that we have already devoted to the business.

We have, &c.

SELIGMAN BROTHERS.

[12238] No. 645.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 204.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 209 of 20th March.

I have, of course, made representations both to the Persian Government and to Bakhtiaris, and I do not doubt that Samsam-es-Sultaneh will do his best to restrain his men. I fear, however, that the Bakhtiaris' predatory tastes have so thrived on disorders of the past few years that they are not easy to control.

I have now received particulars of the goods stolen from the vice-consul, and shall present claim.

[12270] No. 646.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 203 of 18th March: Coal depôt, Henjam Island.

After consultation with Cox, I see no objection to storing the coal at the telegraph station. Coal should be, of course, deposited as unostentatiously as possible. If the governor of the Gulf ports raises objections, Cox proposes, and I concur, to reply that the step was taken as a matter of emergency in connection with arms traffic blockade on the coast above Lingah, reason being that larger ships such as the "Hood" cannot coal at Basidu.

We could consider question as to a rent or other compensation if the Persian Government raise objection. Meanwhile I shall say nothing about the step we are taking, but, at Cox's suggestion, I propose to prepare the ground for the contingency of a complaint by remonstrating with the Persian Government regarding wholesale arms smuggling and the great trouble and expense it is causing us.

[12290] No. 647.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 206.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 201 of 18th March.

Following from consul at Bushire, 21st March:—

"Sheikh only claims proprietary rights, but owns very extensive properties on the Turkish bank, and is tribal chief of about 75,000 Kaab and Muhaisin Arabs resident on the right bank (see page 57 and onwards of Wilson's Arabistan précis, a copy of which is in possession of the Foreign Office)."

[12421] No 648.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 207.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 5th January.

Persian Government have consented to the renewal of Persian Transport Company's road concession for a period of seven years, and for further period of three years in the event of the state of the country making construction of work impossible during the seven years.

[12187] No. 649.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 267.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 22, 1912.*

PERSIAN reply to joint note.

I regard the terms as satisfactory, and would propose, subject to concurrence at Russian Government, to authorise Sir G. Barclay to advance our share of 100,000*l.* of once (see my telegram No. 128 of 16th February).

Text of Persian reply goes to you by post to-night.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 210.)

[12156] No. 650.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 97. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 22, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador called at this Office on the 15th instant, and informed Sir Arthur Nicolson that he had been instructed to communicate to me the following statement made by M. Sazonof to the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh:—

That the question of the Turco-Persian frontier was of great importance to Russia, in consequence of the proximity to the Caucasus of the disputed localities; that the Russian relations with Azerbaijan are based on the fact that Persia has been for centuries in occupation of that province. If Turkey, by any means, were to extend her sovereignty to localities having a real importance to the Russian-Caucasian frontier, then, in that case, the whole policy of Russia in regard to Azerbaijan would have to be reconsidered according to the exigencies of the case, and might have to be radically changed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12429] No. 651.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 137.)
Sir, *Berlin, March 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the "Kölnische Zeitung" yesterday devoted a short article, bearing a distinctly official stamp, to discussing the recent negotiations between Great Britain and Russia on the one side and Persia on the other. After recapitulating the Anglo-Russian conditions agreed upon by Persia, the article proceeds to comment upon them as follows:—

"The object of these conditions is obvious: the military power goes into the hands of the Russians, whose Cossack brigade is not only to be maintained, but to be still further considerably increased. The gendarmerie remains under the command of Europeans, that is to say, of Swedish officers. The English men-of-war stationed in the Persian Gulf can, if necessary, at any time land expeditions. Persia's financial dependence on her neighbours is increased. The Persians receive, it is true, a loan, but European cunning is already seeing to it that no obstacle is placed in the way of the ruin of the State finances. What is given by one hand is taken away by the other. The high ratio of interest is to be paid, and then Mohammed Ali's pension is to be paid, together with an indemnification to his army (?), whom, in accordance with tradition, he had omitted to pay. The crowning point of the whole would be the recognition of the Anglo-Russian agreement, by which step Persia renounced her own independence; for the specious preamble, 'the Governments of Great Britain and of Russia mutually engage to respect the integrity and the independence of Persia,' has long ago been ruthlessly superseded.

"The last point constitutes at the same time a grave danger to German economic interests. Whereas the Persian Government have hitherto reserved to themselves the right of granting concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport or

insurance undertakings, &c., any application for a concession on the part of Germany will now depend on the consent either of England or of Russia, according as to the district in which the concession is required—that is to say, it will be refused. This renders illusory the German-Persian commercial treaty, which contains the most-favoured-nation clause in its most important paragraphs. Moreover, its denunciation is not out of the question; it can be made at any time, and comes into force on the expiration of twelve months. It is true that the Potsdam agreement with Russia assures equal treatment to German goods, and it ought to be possible to attain a similar understanding with England; but between paper treaties and actual practice there is a great difference; and that is why it is urgently necessary for Germany to ensure for herself, under all circumstances, the open door in Persia so as not suddenly to be shut out by a separate agreement between England and Russia."

I have, &c.
E. GOSCHEN.

[12502] No. 652.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 189 of 14th March.

In view of the satisfactory nature of the Persian Government's reply to our joint proposals, I think that the proposed communication would be inopportune.

Russian Minister, when he first got wind of the circular telegram to the Persian representatives, took the Minister for Foreign Affairs to task, and it was in response to this that the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave us such an elaborate explanation.

Russian Minister had thus anticipated his instructions, and is not disposed to raise the question again unless his Government reminds him.

[12530] No. 653.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 24, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Van yesterday, No. 2:—

"Military authorities have received telegram from Ottoman Government stating that Russian Government [? made] complaint of Ottoman troops on the Persian frontier having advanced beyond limits occupied by them last summer, and of census of population being made in the contested zone for purposes of the elections, and that the Russian military concentration at Alexandropol was being made with a view to being prepared for eventualities. Officer commanding army corps is ordered to proceed on tour of inspection with a view to arranging affairs to the satisfaction of Russia, and will start on 25th instant.

"Local authorities state that only forward movement has been the dispatch of fifty soldiers from the consular guard at Khoi to Dilman."

[12534] No. 654.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 267 of 22nd March: Advance to Persian Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs, and will instruct Russian Minister accordingly.

[12535] No. 655.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 106 of 15th March: Turco-Persian frontier.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent one of his private secretaries to St. Petersburgh with the most categorical assurances of Turkey's friendly disposition to Russia.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his satisfaction at receiving these assurances, which he trusted would be confirmed by deeds, and declared that Russia harboured no aggressive designs whatever against Turkey.

[12658] No. 656.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Stockholm, March 19, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 9 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to state that I called on the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs with the chargé d'affaires of Russia, and informed his Excellency that the two Governments had no objection to the employment of two more officers and a veterinary surgeon in the Persian gendarmerie.

Count Ehrensvärd thanked us, and stated that he had not as yet received any information on the subject of the application made by the Swedish colonel, which would no doubt reach the Minister of War in due time.

I have, &c.
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[12677] No. 657.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 210.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 25, 1912.*

BRITISH consul-general at Meshed reports that situation has become much worse, and that there is constant fighting.

Russian consul-general has announced his intention of proclaiming martial law.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[12814] No. 658.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 209 of 26th March.

My Russian colleague and I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday of Salar-ed-Dowleh's reply to the communication of the two consuls.

His Excellency said that Salar's pretensions were clearly inadmissible. They violated the integrity of Persia, and were thus contrary to the interests not only of Persia, but also of the two Powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured us that the Government were preparing an effective expedition against Salar, and he begged us to repeat our representations in a stronger form and to instruct the consuls to make these representations widely known.

We propose, subject to the approval of the two Governments, to comply with Minister for Foreign Affairs' request and to instruct the consuls to urge Salar most strongly to leave Persia, pointing out to him that his present attitude is contrary to the interests of the two Powers, that the Persian Government are assured of our full

sympathy and of our support in the action they are taking against him, and that if he does not leave Persia the two Powers will take no further action to secure for him a pension nor will they afford him any protection.

The two consuls would be instructed to make their communication as public as possible.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[12502] No. 659.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 208 of 23rd March: Communication to Persian Government.

I concur.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 274.)

[12534] No. 660.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 114 of 24th March: Advance.

You may advance our share immediately.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 275.)

[12192] No. 661.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1912.

YOUR despatch No. 29 of 14th February: Swedish gendarmerie scheme.

Whilst approving the scheme generally, the Secretary of State for India shares my view that it would be preferable that, if possible, provision should be made at the outset for protection of whole road between Shiraz and Bushire, whereby trade would not be compelled to traverse broad unprotected zone on leaving Bushire. As delay and any avoidable interference with Swedish colonel's discretion are to be deprecated, we are prepared to acquiesce in his proposal if (1) post at Kunar Takhteh patrols as far as Dalaki; and (2) Governor of Bushire is made personally responsible for safety of remainder of road to Bushire, including Borasjun, where there has twice been trouble.

India Office fear that the Kerman–Bunder Abbas road, already disturbed, will suffer more as Shiraz road improves, and suggest that Persian Government be pressed to take measures for restoring order on that road too. I fear, however, that this is beyond their resources until the large loan is arranged.

Please telegraph your views and those of Sir P. Cox on above points.

If you think it advisable please consult Sir P. Cox before making any communication to Persian Government.

[12270] No. 662.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, relative to the proposal to establish a coal depôt on Henjam Island, and to transmit to you herewith copies of telegraphic correspondence exchanged with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject,* from which it will be seen that neither Sir G. Barclay nor Sir P. Cox sees any objection to the scheme.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey approves the course proposed, which Sir G. Barclay

* Nos. 615 and 646.

proposes to follow in the event of receiving complaints from the Persian Government with reference to this matter, and that he is disposed, subject to the assent of the Marquess of Crewe, to authorise him to adopt it.

I am to call attention to the advisability, alluded to in Sir G. Barclay's telegram, of depositing the coal as unostentatiously as possible.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10770] No. 663.

Foreign Office to Lord Revelstoke.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1912.

WITH reference to Sir A. Nicolson's letter to Viscount Errington of the 2nd instant, relative to the proposed ~~Franco~~-Persian Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to suggest to your Lordship that it would obviate redundant correspondence and minimise the risk of misunderstanding if the "société d'étude" were to appoint a secretary to whom letters from this Office could be addressed, with the consequent certainty that the views of His Majesty's Government would, through that official channel, reach all the members of that body—British, French, and Russian—and that the proposals of the latter would be accurately transmitted to this Office.

I am to add that, amongst the questions as to which His Majesty's Government desire to retain their freedom of action with regard to this railway, should be included that of the gauge to be adopted.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[12845] No. 664.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 240.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 21, 1912.

THE reports of Russian mobilisation which have been current during the past few days here have not failed to arouse considerable anxiety in the columns of the Turkish press. The general pessimism with which such mobilisation would be regarded here is reflected in the "Tanin" of yesterday in a leading article by Ismail Hakki Babanzadé. In this article Russia's sudden change of attitude towards this country is commented on, and the writer wonders what can be the inducement for Russia to champion Italy, who is at this moment weakened both at home and abroad. Surely Russia has enough difficulties on her hands at present in Persia and China without wishing to embark on new adventures whose issue must be very uncertain.

What is the meaning, Ismail Hakki asks, of Russia's pretended and groundless fears of Turkish aggression in the Caucacus? The only question between the two countries in that region could be relative to certain contested boundary points, and the assurances given by M. Tcharykof already have sufficed to settle these amicably. As regards the Persian boundary question, it is being submitted to a friendly commission, and may eventually go to The Hague. Turkey is Persia's best friend, and desires to see the preservation of her integrity. Why then this Russian concentration? It is only to be hoped that, being inexplicable, it will cease. Thus inconclusively the article ends, and, like several others published within the last few days, by its despondent tone re-echoes the feeling of nervousness which the recall of M. Tcharykof and the movement of Russian troops on the frontier have awakened here.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[12886] No. 665.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received March 26.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, March 25, 1912.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, advising that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the effect that he made representations to the Bakhtiari khans in Tehran in respect of the trouble referred to in my letter of the 14th instant, and that the khans have in consequence sent the strongest instructions to their representative in Arabistan to afford compensation to the cultivators who are causing the trouble.

I am desired by my board to thank you for the assistance given in this matter. I am at the same time requested to inform you that we are advised by our agent in Tehran that the political resident in the Persian Gulf has been requested by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to advise the representatives of the khans in Arabistan to apply to us for an advance to enable them to settle with the cultivators.

As the company has already paid to the khans, as you are aware, a very large sum, far more than will ever be paid to the cultivators, for this pacific purpose, my board regret that they cannot see their way to making them any further advances in this connection, and they would feel obliged if you could cause a telegram to this effect to be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

[12873] No. 666.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, March 26, 1912.

APRÈS que Mr. Shuster eut quitté Téhéran, il s'est trouvé qu'en novembre il avait conclu avec la Banque Impériale de Perse un contrat de dix ans pour la fourniture de l'argent en lingots destiné à la Monnaie persane.

Ce contrat, qui n'a reçu la sanction ni du Gouvernement persan, ni du Medjlsis, et qui empiète sur le droit de la Banque d'Escompte, ne saurait être reconnu comme régulier.

En vue de ce qui précède, notre banque s'est déjà déclarée disposée à faire, de son côté, des offres pour la livraison de l'argent.

L'ancien contrat à ce sujet avec la Banque Impériale s'est trouvé échu le 8 (21) mars dernier.

Jusqu'ici le Gouvernement persan n'a pas manifesté l'intention de confirmer l'affaire conclue par Mr. Shuster. D'un autre côté, notre banque se montre disposée à laisser la Banque Impériale en jouissance de cette opération encore pour l'année courante.

Le Gouvernement Impérial russe n'y voit pas d'objection, mais il pense qu'il serait nécessaire d'établir dès maintenant que dorénavant la livraison du métal soit assurée à celle des deux banques qui proposerait au Gouvernement persan les conditions les plus avantageuses.

M. Poklevsky est chargé de conférer à ce sujet avec Sir George Barclay.

Il paraîtrait très désirable que la Banque Impériale de Perse renonce de sa propre initiative à une affaire qui, dans notre opinion, n'est ni légale, ni de justice.

M. Sazonof exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir Sir George Barclay d'instructions qui lui permettent d'user de son influence sur cette banque pour l'induire à agir dans le sens indiqué.

[12866] No. 665*.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received March 26.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Board of Trade, March 25, 1912.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to refer to your letter of the 24th February, with its enclosures, relative to the proposed railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad, and in particular to the suggestion made by the Government of India as to a line from Mohammerah to Dizful, and to offer the following observations thereon for Sir E. Grey's consideration :—

The Board have no information sufficiently detailed to enable them to form any estimate as to the probable cost of construction of a line from Mohammerah to Dizful, but they see no reason to doubt the correctness of the opinion expressed by the Government of India that its construction would be relatively easy and cheap. Such a line would presumably follow approximately the route of the Karun River, and, as Sir E. Grey is aware, there is a considerable volume of traffic on that river, both to Ahwaz and further north to Shuster, by the steamers of Messrs. Lynch and of the Nasiri Company. This trade has recently increased owing to the insecurity of the Bushire–Ispahan route.

But though the route is of importance, and the construction of a railway would be likely to facilitate trade with Ispahan viâ Ahwaz, and with Khoremabad and Sultanabad viâ Dizful (in the latter case the present necessity for transhipment at Ahwaz would be obviated), the absence of any substantial amount of local traffic would militate against the commercial success of the undertaking. From Mr. Maclean's "Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia" (1904), it appears that "the regions of Dizful, Shuster, Bakhtiaraland, and the lower plains of the Karun, in which trade should naturally converge on the Karun, have a population of only about 300,000." The chief products are grain and wool, but the exports are quite small. The Arab tribes are not industrious by nature, and though the country is fertile and capable of great improvement by means of irrigation, and there are some possibilities of trade development, the economic progress of the region cannot be expected to be otherwise than very slow. For these reasons, whilst recognising that the suggested Mohammerah–Dizful Railway line would probably be less unremunerative than a longer railway, the Board are still disposed to doubt the likelihood of the undertaking being commercially successful.

In this connection I am to enclose, for Sir E. Grey's information, copy of a confidential report made to the Board of Trade by Mr. Maclean in 1904, and to direct attention especially to the marked passages on pp. 3, 4, and 6.

As regards the possibility of the proposed line competing successfully with the Bagdad Railway, I am to observe that, in the opinion of the Board, it would not be likely to do more than divert some portion of that trade from the Gulf into Persia, which at present follows the Bagdad–Khanikin route, and as even the whole of that trade would be only a comparatively small part of the traffic which may reasonably be expected to accrue to the Gulf–Bagdad Railway, the Board have no reason to think that this undertaking would be seriously affected by the construction of the line now under consideration.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

Enclosure in No. 665*.

Report to the Board of Trade by Mr. H. W. Maclean, Special Commissioner of the Commercial Intelligence Committee to Persia, on certain matters connected with Persian Trade.

(Very Confidential.)

RUSSIAN trade, pressed forward by the Russian Government for political purposes, has encroached on Persian markets hitherto supplied by the British Empire. Commercial interests are less important than political interests in Persia, therefore British commerce will continue to recede under pressure of Russian political needs unless the British Government finds cause to intervene.

Many ways of strengthening our commercial position in Persia have been proposed. I think our most pressing needs are—better roads, with greater security for wayfarers and merchandise, and an organised transport service; a stronger consular office in Tehran; reform of Persian commercial law.

Trade, industry, and enterprise in Persia struggle to expand under corrupt administration of vague and ill-defined laws. The people are exceedingly poor, and the market for most commodities very limited; the standard of commercial morality amongst Persians is low, and is certainly not improving; the means of communication within the country are primitive, and many districts are unsafe for traveller or merchandise. In fact, Persia does not offer convenient scope for great trading enterprises, and foreign traders settling in it have seldom secured brilliant profits. It must not be imagined, therefore, that the trade of the British Empire with Persia is so robust as to be able to defy all attacks upon it. So far, it has been seriously assailed from only one quarter—the Russian Empire, which has secured to its commerce advantages in Persia not enjoyed by other commerce.

The Russian Government has secured to its subjects a certain immunity from foreign competition in Khorassan and the Caspian provinces of Persia by refusing transit to foreign imports over the Batoum–Tiflis route. It has promoted, and to a great extent financed, the construction of a carriage road from Enzeli to Tehran, and has made preparation to construct similar roads from Julfa through Tabreez to Kazvin, and from Kazvin to Hamadan. It has subventioned a line of merchant steamers between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf. It holds, for some years to come, a veto on railway construction or anything of the nature of a rail or tramway (except urban) in Persia, and has obtained from the Persian Government an undertaking not to impose taxes, or tolls, on roads (except carriage roads) which may be constructed in future, thus practically denuding that Government of power to encourage improvement of trade routes in the mountainous regions of Southern Persia, where carriage roads are hardly practicable.

It allows drawback of duty on a number of commodities suited to the Persian market, and, as regards sugar and certain printed and dyed cotton tissues, these drawbacks appear to involve distinct bounty. Import to Russia of certain Persian products, such as raw cotton, rice, and fruits, is encouraged by partial exemption from the protective duties levied in Russia on the same products from other countries. It has established and controls a bank in Tehran, with branches at Meshed, Resht, and Tabreez; and this bank has been utilised to push Russian trade with Persia by means of large advances to traders dealing in Russian commodities, and such favourable terms and prices as seem incompatible with business profits, and suggest a form of bounty on trade, through the bank with Russia. It has secured, under the recent Customs Convention of 1902, favourable rates of duty in Persia on the commodities of greatest interest to Russian commerce.

It has increased the number of its consulates and consular staff in Persia. I think trade routes are, on the whole, safer for merchandise and wayfarer, and the remoter districts more accessible for sojourn and residence of foreign subjects in Northern than in Southern Persia, and that this is attributable, in part, to continued diplomatic pressure and consular energy.

I do not think that these measures taken by the Russian Government have all been equally successful in giving a permanent advantage to Russian commerce in Persia, but on the whole they have sufficed to drive many British commodities out of those markets of Northern Persia lying under the shadow of the great Elburz range, and have enabled Russian commodities to compete with ours in Hamadan, Ispahan, and Yezd, commercial centres equally accessible from the Caspian and the Persian Gulf. Our commerce

has not yet been seriously crippled, but if the Russian Government continues, unopposed, this energetic commercial policy in Persia, our traders will gradually be beaten out of the central markets also, and Russian commercial supremacy be assured in Persia.

Our commerce, unaided, can hardly oppose a combined front to this organised Russian aggression, for the traders engaged in that commerce, and the home manufacturers with whom they deal, are all competing with each other, as well as with the foreign rival, and few of them have a vital interest in Persian trade. Indeed, it appears to me that the determination evinced by the Russian State to aid Russian commerce with Persia has produced a distinct moral effect on foreign enterprises, in that it has been equally an incentive to enterprise on the part of the private Russian trader, and a deterrent to enterprise (especially where large outlay of capital is involved) on the part of British traders; for the former feel their Government to be behind them, and the latter have to apprehend, not only the competition of Russian traders, whose manufacturing and trading resources they can gauge, but also the interposition of the Russian Government to counteract, for political purposes, any success attending their efforts to extend trade detrimental to Russian influence in Persia. Commercial influence is a useful political weapon, and the extension, or decline, of trade with Persia has a deeper interest to the Russian and the British Empires than the simple gain or loss of profitable markets. The Russian Government has intervened in Russian trade with Persia to confer benefits, which the conflicting and limited interest of private traders could not combine to achieve. British commercial enterprise, in certain respects, awaits the indication, and must follow the lead, of the British Government, which is alone able to oppose the Russian Government in efforts directed, through commerce, towards political ends.

Our contribution to trade interests in Persia at present consists in some small aid to trade routes in the Karun and Seristan regions, and that part of our consular service which might be expected to disappear along with our trade. A simple commercial trader seldom hesitates to venture one year's income of a sound business to safeguard future dividends. I make little doubt that the amount of imperial and local taxation for one year, in the British Empire, on the capital and labour representing an annual trade of 3 millions, must exceed the capitalised value of the contribution above mentioned.

The most pressing cry of our traders is for quicker and cheaper transport of commodities between the frontier and inland markets in Persia than at present exists.

I think it essential to consider only routes based on the Persian Gulf and India, for our trade through Trebizond is not now of first importance. The markets open to that route have been gradually limited to Tabreez and the southern parts of Azerbaijan, not from Russian competition only, but also from our own competition by the superior Gulf routes. Moreover, trade by the Trebizond route is largely conducted through Constantinople, as an intermediate market, and the Persian traders dealing there are brought more in contact with rival commodities of other nations than those dealing in Bagdad, Bombay, and Manchester, by the southern routes. Merchandise consigned to Trebizond is carried by continental steamers, while nearly all merchandise (except Russian) consigned to the Persian Gulf pays freight to British shipping.

We still deliver our merchandise more cheaply at the Persian frontier than Russia does. Cotton goods, which form to us the most important subject of competition in Persian trade, pay freight from Manchester to any port in the Persian Gulf of about $2\frac{1}{4}l.$ per ton weight, and from Moscow to Persian Caspian ports of about $5\frac{3}{8}l.$ per ton weight. (The average value of cotton goods consigned to the Persian Gulf is roughly $100l.$ per ton weight.)

As regards inland transport to certain important commercial centres the position is reversed. Transport on our bale goods from Bushire to Ispahan is about $10\frac{3}{4}l.$ per ton, to Tehran about $17\frac{7}{8}l.$ per ton, from Bussorah, viâ Bagdad, to Hamadan about $13l.$ per ton, and from Bunder Abbas to Meshed over $25\frac{1}{2}l.$ per ton. Transport on Russian goods from Enzeli or Ispahan is about $11\frac{3}{4}l.$ per ton, to Tehran about $7\frac{1}{2}l.$ per ton, to Hamadan about $8\frac{3}{4}l.$ per ton, and from Askabad to Meshed about $7l.$ per ton.

It has been suggested that railway construction is the remedy we need. Statistics available to estimate the quantity of freight and passenger traffic, with which railways in Southern Persia might hope to deal, are scant.

Persian customs returns show that foreign commerce with Persia by Persian Gulf routes (including Kermanshah) is somewhat less than 3,500,000*l.* annually, of a gross weight of perhaps 60,000 to 70,000 tons; of which 2,500,000*l.* are imports (the moiety cotton textiles). The total imports and exports for the year to the 20th March, 1902,

at Bushire and Bunder Abbas are given as 1,640,000*l.*, weighing 35,000 tons; at Kermanshah as 1,040,000*l.*, weighing less than 16,000 tons. Consular returns for the Karun River for 1901 show a trade of 127,000*l.*, weighing 4,000 tons.

I can make little more than a guess at the distribution of this trade. Perhaps commodities of 500,000*l.* in value, weighing, say, 10,000 to 12,000 tons, are produced or consumed on the Gulf littoral, and therefore would not be subject for railway freight; possibly 1,000,000*l.* in value, weighing, say, 15,000 to 20,000 tons, are produced or consumed in such centres as Kerman, Shiraz, and Kermanshah, involving land transport of some 200 to 300 miles; and the remaining 2,000,000*l.* in value, weighing 30,000 to 40,000 tons, have to be transported 400 to 600 miles to or from Ispahan, Hamadan, and Yezd, the chief markets from which our commerce deals with Central and Northern Persia.

I cannot furnish statistics with regard to the existing traffic derived from internal trade. Persia is a mountainous country without navigable rivers (except one corner traversed by the lower Karun), and has never possessed good roads; consequently the growth of industrial centres has been restricted to the needs of limited areas, for neither raw material nor food can bear the cost of transport over great distances. Therefore I should guard against too high an estimate of the probable home traffic between distant centres in Persia, such as would provide matter for railway freight.

Again, in estimating the volume of new freight which would be created by railway facilities, it must be remembered that Persia supplies chiefly raw animal and vegetable products, and her capacity to increase these supplies does not depend, altogether, on the area of fertile land available. That, in great measure, is governed by the amount of rain and irrigation water. The supply and efficiency of irrigation water can doubtless be increased, but not to an indefinite extent, for a fairly skilful and elaborate system of irrigation already exists. In a great part of the vast grazing regions, the herbage—dependent, in the plains, on scant winter rains—is burnt up by the sun during summer; and, in the mountains, is available only after the snows which give it life are melted by the summer sun. Proprietors in some of the grazing regions informed me that, in their opinion, their lands could not carry a much greater stock than at present.

I have also failed to obtain statistics regarding passenger traffic. The most frequented route in Southern Persia is probably that through Kermanshah to Bagdad, over which 150,000 pilgrims are said to pass annually to visit Kerbela. There is also a constant flow of pilgrims to Meshed, and to Kom from all parts of Persia; and to Persian Gulf ports from all parts of Persia, and Transcaspia, for passage to Mecca.

All the important commercial centres of Persia cannot be connected with each other and the Gulf by any one railway. A line from Bushire to Tehran would not greatly benefit the districts of Kerman, Yezd, Kermanshah, or Hamadan, and would pass through a tangled mass of mountains before gaining Shiraz. The Karun forms a sufficient highway for development of the Arabistan plains, but affords a restricted waterway in summer for a railway base at Ahwaz; and Mohammerah is in a lesser degree open to the objection of being only a river port within the difficult Euphrates bar. A railway in this region would hardly attempt to pierce the Bakhtiari mountains, but would attain Sultanabad, Hamadan, and Tehran with comparative ease. In that case our markets in Shiraz, Ispahan, Kerman, and Yezd would not benefit. Bunder Abbas has a poor water supply, the summer air is often tainted by a spume cast upon the sandy beach, and shallow waters forbid steamers to approach within 2 miles of the present pier. It possesses, however, a magnificent roadstead, and a glance at the chart of the Clarence Strait suggests that a suitable site for a port might be found 20 or 30 miles west of the present town. Comparative coolness and good water are found in the hills 40 or 50 miles inland. A railway from Bunder Abbas through Kerman, Yezd, or Abadeh, and Ispahan to Sultanabad, branching there to Tehran on the one side, and to Kermanshah and Bagdad on the other, would have a longer mileage from that port to some of these places than might be necessary from other ports, but would omit only the Fars district from its scope; and, eventually linked to other systems at Bagdad and Nushki, would become part of a great overland route to India.

On the whole I do not apprehend that railway construction in Persia offers, at present, any certain promise of traffic receipts proportionate to the expenditure involved; and it is more than questionable whether Persia, which would undoubtedly derive most benefit from such exploits, has the means to offer adequate guarantees to foreign capital.

Moreover, I do not foresee that railway construction in Southern Persia would necessarily favour us in commercial competition with Russia, unless we are assured that Russia would not reply by railway construction in the north, for if they did, then

Russian goods, already competing inland with ours, would also be delivered just as much cheaper and quicker than hitherto. I believe, unless Russia takes the initiative in the north, it suffices for us to secure that we shall have freedom to deal with such projects in Southern Persia when more obvious need for them arises.

(It is not probable that the Bagdad Railway, if, or when, completed, will affect the course of trade with Persia. British and continental goods now arrive at Bagdad, by sea and river, at something less than 5*l.* per ton weight, and it seems improbable that the railway can compete on these terms. A small quantity of British cotton goods find their way into Azerbaijan through Mosul and Sonjbulak, but no saving in freight the railway might offer would enable that route to compete in Central Persia.)

The construction of roads for wheel traffic in Persia has not hitherto conferred great benefit either on the companies constructing, or on the communities using them. The Russian road from Enzeli to Tehran has been built at enormous cost; it is reported the heavy tolls levied on it do not suffice for any margin of profit, and certainly the cost of transport over it is not less than over the previous mule track. The Ahwaz–Tehran road, conceived in the interests of British commerce, has been even less successful, and the only part which has been completed is that between Tehran and Sultanabad, thus permitting of continuous wheel traffic from Enzeli to Kom and Sultanabad. Consequently, if any benefit has been conferred by it on commerce, it has been conferred on Russia, not on British, trade. Any road in Persia, useful to foreign commerce, must negotiate steep gradients, its surface must be sodden by snow in winter, and disintegrated by drought in summer, and results, so far have not shown that such roads can be maintained in a state to render waggon traffic more economical than pack transport.

Communications between Central Persia and the southern seaboard, by existing caravan tracks, leave much to be desired; and I think the Bushire–Shiraz and Bunder Abbas–Kerman routes deserve attention equally with the Shuster–Burujird route.

The Bushire–Shiraz–Ispahan route is a highway to important regions which cannot be served by Karun routes. Nearly a 1,000,000*l.* value of merchandise, chiefly British, is yearly shot on to the open beach at the caravan terminus of Shief, which boasts neither shelter nor water. The horrors of the Bushire–Shiraz track have been skilfully pictured by many writers. It is, I imagine, the worst under heaven of any trunk route carrying an equally important traffic, but the difficulties of it, as a caravan route, are due as much to long use as to nature. From wear of constant traffic the road bed has become in parts a mass of pebbles, rolling stones, and boulders, and has been worn at confined places into deep trenches, through which animals loaded with bulky packages can hardly pass singly, and are completely blocked if traffic in the other direction is encountered. The surface is so bad that camel caravans, the most economical form of transport, do not frequent it. The gradients are undoubtedly severe, but that is not nearly so bad for pack transport as for wagon traffic. There are few places, perhaps not half a-mile in all, where the road overhangs dangerous precipices. From Shief to Shiraz may be 150 miles, and of that distance, I calculate, 120 miles are flat or undulating ground, of which only one-third, clay or stony soil, needs attention. The remaining 30 miles are steep passes and ravines, one-third rock and two-thirds loose stones and boulders, and require heavy repairs.

From Shiraz to Ispahan the existing caravan track offers no serious obstacle to any form of pack transport, and probably before long it will be so far improved, under the ægis of the Persian Administration of Posts, as to permit of a fourgon service for passengers.

It is not desirable in the interests of our trade that all improvements in communications should creep downward from the north, whilst access from the south becomes more difficult year by year, and it can hardly be impossible to improve the Bushire–Shiraz route, at reasonable cost, so far as to give pack animals fair foothold, and to provide inward and outward tracks at confined places. But this is not an enterprise for private capital, since no direct return, such as tolls or road taxes, can be obtained from it.

The Bunder Abbas–Kerman route is reported to be feasible for all forms of pack transport, and needs little if any, repair. It carries our commerce with Kerman, Yezd, and parts of Khorassan which cannot be tapped by any other route.

But the policing of these routes is at present extremely unsatisfactory. Theft and robbery of merchandise is frequent, even European travellers are occasionally held up, and native travellers pass in dread of blackmail, robbery, and open violence by the Persian road guards or robbers in collusion with them. The Persian Government

appears unwilling or powerless to correct these abuses, and we should either undertake to officer and discipline these guards ourselves, or maintain an independent road guard to protect our travellers and commerce.

I advocate, therefore, the formation of a company or companies to be subsidised by the British and Indian Governments to the extent of the expenditure necessary to make these routes into fair caravan tracks, and of the cost of private policing of them under Government guidance, and to establish on purely commercial lines a landing, clearing, forwarding, warehousing, and delivery business in the chief commercial centres of Persia. I think a well-organised business of this kind has every prospect of success. In northern Persia several Russian transport agencies have been established, and are reported to be securing business. I calculate that at Bushire alone quite 4,000*l.* to 5,000*l.* per annum are now spent in landing, shipping, clearing, and delivering merchandise in a most perfunctory manner, which could be more cheaply and efficiently effected by an organised company possessing a few barges and a tug. Merchandise for transport inland is now confided to individual muleteers, whose responsibility in respect of these goods is of the vaguest description. They are usually persons of small means, and purchase their fodder and provisions at exorbitant prices from caravanserai lessees, who themselves pay high rents and cannot lay in large supplies on the most favourable terms. Merchandise landed in Bushire is seldom delivered at Ispahan within two months, or at a less cost than 1*l.* 16*s.* per mule load. A loaded mule can easily travel that distance, about 470 miles, in one month (with a system of relays, goods could easily be delivered in a fortnight), and the cost of its forage, attendance, and allowance for depreciation need not amount to 1*l.* per month.

Commerce in general, and particularly traders with limited capital, would derive great benefit from a quicker despatch of merchandise, forwarded at more uniform rate of transport, and represented by a way-bill available as a transferable security for banking or other advances. A company commencing simply as an organiser and contractor of transport would be able to offer all these advantages, and could gradually extend its operations, through control, to ownership of caravans, stations, and forage, in order to secure the fullest economy and expedition in transport.

I have pointed out that the concession from the Persian Government for such a purpose could not confer rights of levying tolls or taxes. It should, at least, convey to us an option (like that now held by Russia in regard to railways), over any projects in the Gulf which may appear probable subjects of subsequent enterprise, such as dock or harbour works, tramways, or the irrigation of the Karun plains. This latter project is already a matter to which the attention of British enterprise might well be directed, by collating and arranging all information extant on the subject.

An effort is now being made to re-open and improve the Karun route through Shuster and Burujird to Sultanabad, and I hope it will be prosecuted with vig ur and determination, for this route promises much benefit to our commerce. A fair caravan track can be constructed at moderate expense, transport on it will be cheap, as part of the region traversed is a mule-breeding district, and forage and grain are abundant. Our imports should be delivered in Sultanabad, Hamadan, and Kermanshah on better terms than by the Bagdad route, and, what is most desirable, an export trade will be encouraged in carpets, opium, skins, leather, gums, wool, and other products of these regions, some of which are at present exported only by northern routes. The wagon route from Sultanabad will be brought in touch with the Persian Gulf, and will facilitate transport of our imports to Tehran.

I have stated elsewhere the grounds for my opinion that the Nushki–Seistan route will not serve to retrieve our commercial position in Khorassan. But if it is desired to foster trade by that route, I think the Indian Government would best serve that end by establishing a transport service to undertake the carriage of merchandise, at stated intervals, and at a uniform rate of freight, based on the approximate cost of maintenance and attendance of a caravan for the time occupied on the journey from Nushki to Meshed. The uncertainty in obtaining transport, and the heavy cost resulting from freight being all in one direction, is severely felt by Meshed importers. The establishment would not be very costly, and the loss on animals earning no freight would disappear if a well-balanced import and export trade can be established. But Meshed, the commercial centre of all Khorassan, lies too near the Transcaspian railway to permit of competition with Russia on equal terms, and I think more fruitful results might perhaps be obtained by studying the means to secure a market in India for export products such as carpets, shawls, wool, mohair, ghi, dried fruits, and nuts, at present sent to Meshed from Turbat, Birjand, Herat, and neighbouring parts of Afghanistan, but which could with equal facility be sent to such a centre as Birjand,

it buyers could be found there for them. These products would then be exchanged for British goods in Birjand, instead of for Russian goods in Meshed.

The Russian consular service in Persia is generally believed by Persians to have shown greater energy and determination in supporting mercantile claims than other consular services have shown. In consequence of this reputation Russian traders may have been encouraged to deal more freely with Persians than other traders have, as debtors are perhaps more careful to avoid entanglement with Russian than with other creditors, but I have not myself found clear ground for this assertion. Nor have I discovered, on enquiry into such instances as came to my notice, that the ultimate results obtained by Russian methods have been markedly satisfactory. There is no code of mercantile law which can be appealed to, and the consul can exercise only official and personal influence to secure settlement of claims, for unseasonable pressure only results in a reference by the local Persian official to the Central Government, with certainty of further delay and complication. Nearly all disputes of any importance are therefore ultimately referred to the capital, and settlement there, in the present corrupt state of administration, must often await diplomatic opportunity. We need a stronger consular office in Tehran, well versed in commercial affairs, to keep record of, arrange, and constantly push forward the cases sent in by the provincial consulates, up to the point where diplomatic intervention may become necessary. That consulate might also record much useful information on many subjects—Persian commercial law and procedure, especially precedents already established in commercial cases, trade usages, routes, products and manufactures—collected and tabulated from the reports of the provincial consulates.

It is perhaps hopeless to expect any early reform in the present corrupt administration of justice in Persia. But if our diplomacy can induce the Persian Government to make a code of commercial law, and institute a registration of real property, our merchants and consuls would at least secure a base from which to battle against unjust decisions and a check on fraudulent transfers of houses and lands, so often resorted to by debtors to render awards abortive.

H. W. MACLEAN.

[12832] No. 667.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 165 of 7th March.

British consul at Kermanshah reports 15th March that Salar has rejected the advice of the two consuls. He refuses terms offered by the Persian Government, and claims dominion over the whole of the west of Persia under the suzerainty of the Shah.

[12951] No. 668.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 26, 1912.*

YOUR despatches No. 61 of 21st February and No. 74 of 4th March.

Working map with pencil lines cannot be found at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Do you want copy of ordinary map with green lines?

Ministry for Foreign Affairs has supplied copy of Russian translation of political report, and offers to let us copy French translation of memorandum. The latter runs to about ninety pages of manuscript. Minorsky will take copy to Constantinople. In these circumstances, would you wish us to make copy here?

I have secured Chirikof's book, but cannot find that of Khurshid Effendi, which is very rare. Geographical or Asiatic Society or British Museum might have a copy.

[12886] No. 669.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 220.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 198 of 16th March: Oil Company.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company learn from their Tehran agent that Sir P. Cox has been requested by you to advise khans' representatives in Arabistan to apply to company for an advance to enable them to settle with the cultivators.

Company point out that they have already paid to the khans for this specific purpose a sum far larger than will ever be paid to the cultivators, and cannot see their way to make any further advances in this connection.

[11805] No. 670.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 172 to Sir G. Barclay of 7th March and his telegram No. 175 of 9th March: Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway (see telegram sections).

In view of considerations advanced by Sir G. Barclay, immediate application seems inadvisable as being likely to be regarded with suspicion by both Russian and Persian Governments, while consent of former is improbable unless we have some means of putting pressure on them.

If, however, as Sir G. Barclay gathers from his Russian colleague, Russian Government are likely to raise question of Trans-Persian Railway in connection with loan proposals, we might make acquiescence in this procedure conditional on Russian Government undertaking not to oppose presentation of application for concession to build Mohammerah line at same time as that for trans-Persian scheme, but I should like you to consider this and to have your observations before answering Mr. Greenway.

British group of "Société d'Étude" for Trans-Persian Railway have asked Persian Railways Syndicate for their co-operation, and this has been promised on basis that

railways of more pressing importance from points of view of both British and Russian interests shall be given prior consideration.

Mr. Greenway also asks whether syndicate can advantageously take any action at present to secure co-operation of Russian Government as to continuation of Mohammerah line into Russian sphere.

Would it be any use, in your opinion, for syndicate to send representative to St. Petersburgh at present?

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 217.)

[12814] No. 671.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 283.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 26, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 211 of 25th March: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I approve proposal, and should be glad to learn views of the Russian Government.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 218.)

[13040] No. 672.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 26, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 20th March, 1912, enclosing a further draft of a communication to the Persian Railways Syndicate regarding the position of the Persian Transport Company.

In reply, I am to say that the Marquess of Crewe, while concurring generally in its terms, would prefer, if Secretary Sir E. Grey sees no objection, that the wording of the last two paragraphs should be slightly modified so as to read as follows:—

"This assurance was not overlooked by His Majesty's Government when they entered into communication with your syndicate as to approaching the Persian Government; but no such claim as the Transport Company may possess to preferential treatment in regard to railways in particular districts could, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be held, if conceded, to do more than entitle them on equitable grounds to a share in a larger scheme of railways embracing more than those districts.

"On a full consideration of all the circumstances, Sir E. Grey therefore desires me to say that, if the Transport Company are successful in obtaining from the Persian Government any extension of their concession, he is in favour of some share in your undertaking being offered to them as a company by your syndicate, unless it can fairly be held that that share is already sufficiently assured to them by the presence of Mr. Lynch on the Board. In order to enable him to consider this point Sir E. Grey would be glad to have further information as to the reasons for which Mr. Lynch was invited to go on your Board."

The draft as so modified would accord somewhat more closely with Lord Crewe's views, and it is understood that, if some share is assured to the Persian Transport Company in the syndicate's undertaking in the manner explained in the draft, His Majesty's Government are to be considered to have fully discharged the obligations towards the company laid upon them by the language used by Lord Lansdowne in 1903.

It is observed that the draft enclosed in your letter does not embody the final paragraph previously proposed, to the effect that no assurances have been given to other persons or syndicates. So far as Lord Crewe is aware, there would be no objection to its reinstatement.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[13015] No. 672*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 26, 1912.

IN reply to your letter, dated the 20th March, 1912, regarding the encouragement of the "Société d'Etude" of the Trans-Persian Railway to undertake the flotation of a loan for the Persian Government, I am directed to say that the Marquess of Crewe shares the view of Secretary Sir E. Grey that the proposal may be accepted by His Majesty's Government.

At the same time he regards it as essential to emphasise the fact that the flotation of a loan for the Persian Government, and the raising of capital for the construction of an eventual Trans-Persian Railway, are distinct and separate transactions, and that the second will follow the first if, and only if, agreement is reached between all the parties concerned, including the British and Russian Governments, on the various points referred to in the second paragraph of your letter. While agreeing therefore to the reply proposed to be made to the Russian Government, his Lordship would suggest that the words, "or even to the construction of the Trans-Persian Railway itself, unless agreement with regard to them is reached," might be inserted after the words "kindred questions."

This will make it clear that the flotation of the loan does not necessarily carry with it the construction of the railway.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[13101] No. 673.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, March* 27, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 26th instant from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies statio n relative the situation on the Persian Gulf.

Copy has been sent to India Office.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 673.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bombay, March* 26, 1912.

SENIOR naval officer reports to-day:—

Movement against Lingah seems to be assuming nature of a Holy War, but according to latest news attack is being delayed owing to son of Governor of Shiraz, whose movements in Jahrum are doubtful. It is most probable that Lingah will be attacked by much larger force than originally estimated, including most of Laristan tribes, unless the movement is checked at Lar by the son of the Governor of Shiraz.

[13132] No. 674.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, March 27, 1912.

D'APRÈS nos dernières informations, le Gouvernement turc paraît se montrer plus conciliant que jusqu'ici dans la question de frontière pendant entre la Perse et la Turquie.

M. Sazonof pense qu'il serait opportun de s'efforcer que la Porte accepte comme base de ses négociations avec la Perse la carte identique de la zone neutre des commissaires anglais et russe remise par les deux Gouvernements au Gouvernement

turc en 1871 et acceptée par ce Gouvernement en 1876, comme il appert d'un mémorandum en date du 12 (25) juin, 1876, signé par Dervich Pacha, qui débute ainsi :—

"La Sublime Porte ayant décidé la démarcation de la frontière turco-persane prenant pour base la carte élaborée par les commissaires des Puissances, j'avais reçu à ce sujet des instructions spéciales, &c."

Sur la carte identique en question les commissaires anglais et russe avaient, comme le Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères voudra bien s'en souvenir, indiqué une zone par laquelle devait être tracée la frontière turco-persane. Comme il vient d'être dit, le Gouvernement turc avait accepté cette carte comme base, avec la réserve, toutefois, que le différend reçût une solution définitive à l'époque même.

Il semble à M. Sazonof qu'il serait extrêmement utile de décider la Porte à revenir à la décision prise par le Gouvernement turc en 1876, cette façon de poser la question répondant le mieux possible aux intérêts persans, ainsi qu'au but que se proposent les Gouvernements anglais et russe.

M. Sazonof espère que les démarches à cet effet de M. Tcharykof à Constantinople recevront l'appui de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

M. Sazonof désirerait être renseigné au plus tôt sur l'opinion et la décision à ce sujet de Sir Edward Grey.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 27 mars, 1912.

[13089] No. 675.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 212.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 27, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister called on me this morning to ask that part of the joint advance might be used to reduce the Persian Government's debt to Creuzot, and seemed disappointed when I told him that the advance was intended to enable Persian Government to tide over the period until a loan was concluded, and that the programme of expenditure which we had approved contemplated mainly expenditure required in the interests of order.

French Minister told me that his Government had approached you in the matter.

[13106] No. 676.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 220 of 26th March.

It is quite untrue that I requested Cox to advise the khans to apply for an advance, and as the agent of the oil company, who has now gone on leave, was fully cognisant of all that I did, I do not understand how he can have sent such a misleading report.

On 12th March I telegraphed to British consul at Ahwaz that the Tehran khans had promised to telegraph to local khans to compensate peasants, that Tehran khans had suggested that the company should advance one year's guarding money to facilitate this, and that I had replied that the company had already refused to advance.

I at the same time suggested to British consul that if he could satisfy himself that the money would really be used for the purpose indicated he might possibly induce the company to accede to the khans' request.

On 18th March I telegraphed to British consul at Ahwaz, after receipt of your telegram No. 197 of 15th March, that I had made a further strong communication to the Tehran khans, with the result that they no longer asked for an advance, and had telegraphed ordering local khans to compensate peasants at once. Tehran agent was present when these last representations were made, and the khans' telegram was handed to him for transmission.

[13121] No. 677.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 219 of 26th March.

Persian Government have repeatedly assured me that they are doing their best to dispatch effective force as soon as possible. I asked for particulars to-day, and, as I found force contemplated ridiculously insufficient—indeed, it was intended to leave to the governor designate, Farman Farma, task of collecting the greater part of it—I pressed Minister for Foreign Affairs hard to send some of fedais, Yprem's men, who have done such good work before. These men are too energetic for Farman Farma's taste, but I hope to succeed in getting them sent.

[13122] No. 678.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 210 of 25th March.

Following from British consul-general, Meshed :—

"Police disarmed and detained under a Russian guard 26th March.

"Band of 150 men declared holy war 26th March, but have done nothing. Religious leaders of the agitation now in despair, as they realise that they have been deceived by my Russian colleague, and are anxious to withdraw. My Russian colleague has not co-operated in any way, and has issued proclamation affecting British subjects without communicating with me."

I am asking the Russian Minister to instruct consul-general that no British subjects must be molested without the co-operation of the British consul-general.

[13116] No. 679.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 283 of 26th March : Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also approves, and is sending Russian Minister at Tehran necessary instructions.

[13120] No. 680.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 279 of 26th March.

In the course of conversation to-day, I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs about the Persian loan, and asked whether it was his intention to raise question of Trans-Persian Railway in connection with it. His Excellency replied that we must certainly not lose so good an opportunity for obtaining the concession.

On my observing that British interests were more concerned with Mohammerah line, and that pressure might therefore be brought to bear on His Majesty's Government to obtain concession for it, his Excellency repeated all the objections which the Russian Government have to that railway whilst I recapitulated all our former arguments in support of it. His Excellency said that Minister of Finance would be sure to oppose it, but finally seemed to take more favourable view that it might stop construction of Gulf section of Bagdad line and perhaps replace Khanikin line.

After the *aide-mémoire* enclosed in my despatch No. 78 of last year, I do not see how the Russian Government can object to our asking for concession if our present purpose is only to earmark the railway. We should, however, inform them of our intention beforehand. If, on the other hand, we propose to proceed with construction

we must, in accordance with assurances we gave in March of last year, discuss the whole question with them so as to see how Russian interests can best be safeguarded.

If construction is contemplated at an early date, it might be well for the syndicate to send a representative, but I had perhaps better first be instructed to approach Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs officially on the subject. There is certain to be strong opposition to the line in commercial circles, and I am not in a position to judge whether the view taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to its possible effect on the Bagdad lines can be pressed.

[11682] No. 681.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1912.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 5th ultimo relative to the trans-Persian railway scheme, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a further communication from Mr. A. J. Barry,* forwarding a memorandum drawn up by Mr. M. de P. Webb, C.I.E., on the ports of the South-Eastern Persian littoral as the result of a recent visit to that coast.

It appears from this paper that Bunder Abbas, which has been selected as the place at which the railway shall enter the British sphere of interest in Persia, is unsuitable as a port from every point of view in its present state, while each of the other towns on the coast has something to recommend it.

I am to suggest that if the Marquess of Crewe has no objection, the Government of India should be asked to furnish their observations on Mr. Webb's memorandum.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[13268] No. 682.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 28.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 27, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 18th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward copy of a telegram received from the Government of India regarding the situation in Fars.

There have from the beginning been two difficulties in dealing with that situation—(1) the difficulty of gauging the extent of the danger at Shiraz; (2) the fact adverted to in my letter of the 25th January that measures, taken by His Majesty's Government to impress the Persian Government do not necessarily impress the tribes.

As regards the first difficulty, the fear of a general attack on Shiraz which was entertained by Colonel Douglas on the authority of His Majesty's consul, may now apparently be put aside, since His Majesty's consul himself no longer entertains it. But the fact remains that, as pointed out by Colonel Douglas in his letter dated the 12th January, it would be very difficult to withdraw the cavalry regiment from Shiraz in the present state of feeling, and yet the regiment cannot be retained there indefinitely; while Sir P. Cox has observed in his telegram of the 13th March that its withdrawal "would involve an enormous loss of prestige in Southern Persia." Here, however, the second difficulty arises, since the various pronouncements devised by Sir P. Cox to cover the regiment's retreat would not, in Mr. Smart's opinion, be taken seriously by the tribesmen. It seems essential, therefore, that some action should be taken locally that will, as far as possible, restore the prestige which has been lost during the last three months.

Accordingly, while the Marquess of Crewe concurs with Sir E. Grey generally in the proposals made in your letter under reply, he desires to lay great stress on the necessity of requiring from the Persian Government—since His Majesty's Government cannot undertake it themselves—the summary punishment of those who are well known locally to have been responsible for the attack on Mr. Smart's escort. The evidence of a friendly attitude to be required on the part of the tribal chiefs should, in his opinion, necessarily include the surrender of these persons, and their punishment should be a necessary preliminary to the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment.

* No 612.

His Lordship would also suggest that a condition of ultimate withdrawal should be an undertaking by the Persian Government to support the Swedish officers by all means in their power in organising the force of gendarmerie.

As regards the extension of the blockade, Lord Crewe is unwilling, in view of the opinion expressed by the Government of India, to press the objection suggested in my letter of the 25th January; but he would point to the recent threatened attack by tribesmen on Lingah in consequence of the capture of a cargo of arms as an example of the sort of danger to which Shiraz may be exposed.

Subject to these remarks, his Lordship agrees that negotiations should be begun with the least possible delay, and he will be glad to know if Sir E. Grey wishes any statement to be made by the Governor-General of India as suggested by Sir P. Cox.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 682.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 23, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 8th instant.

It is not the case, according to our information, that there is deterioration in situation near Shiraz; situation is, on the contrary, improving in Sir P. Cox's opinion. We consider that Sir P. Cox, although he reports season to be too far advanced, should be authorised at any rate to negotiate without further delay, in conjunction with consul, Shiraz, with resident headmen of tribes on road. It is not, in our opinion, still essential to preliminaries that troops should be sent to Basidu. Despatch of troops is rendered inopportune at present by improved attitude of Persian Government. Curtailment of supplies of ammunition will contribute to security, and there is no reason to think that extension of blockade will cause more irritation than in the past among tribesmen.

We consider that we should continue to press Persian Government to inflict punishment on those responsible for attacks, and that payment of compensation by them should not relieve them of duty of doing so.

We agree with Sir G. Barclay, in regard to question of retaining Shiraz and Ispahan consular escorts, that practical proof in near future of friendly attitude on part of tribal headmen along road should be the condition of reductions of consular guards.

Presence of our cavalry escorts at Shiraz and Ispahan, who will be unable under present conditions to reach coast without danger of attack, is the one weak spot in our position. Until greater security prevails on roads they will clearly have to stay where they are.

[13277] No. 683.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, March* 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 215 of 25th March.

I have to-day handed to the Persian Government a cheque for 100,000*l*., British share of joint advance, and have requested acting treasurer-general to arrange with Imperial Bank of Persia for repayment of 35,000 tomans already advanced in connection with departure of ex-Shah.

As you are aware, surpluses of northern and southern customs receipts are to be employed respectively in their entirety for interest and repayment of Russian and British shares in joint advance of 200,000*l*.

After consultation with manager of Imperial Bank of Persia, I would suggest, subject to your approval, that surplus of southern customs should be remitted monthly, beginning 1st May, by bank to London, on account of His Majesty's Government, until British share is paid off.

[13116] No. 684.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 225.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 118 of 27th March: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

You are authorised to act as proposed in your telegram No. 211 of 25th March.

(Repeatedto St. Petersburgh, No. 289.)

[12951] No. 685.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 285.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 116 of 26th March.

We do not require copy of ordinary map.

If you can send home French translation of memorandum it can be printed here, but otherwise copy should be made, as we require all documents in view of possible reference to Hague Tribunal.

A translation should also be made by embassy translator of political report, in so far as it relates to frontier, as distinct from other subjects in dispute.

Please send home Chirikof's book.

[13132] No. 686.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 288.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1912.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier. See p. 13 of Foreign Office memorandum No. 8800.

Russian Ambassador informs me that his Government are anxious to induce Turkey to accept, as the basis of negotiations, the frontier zone, which she did accept conditionally in 1875, and he has asked that Russian Ambassador's steps to this effect at Constantinople may receive support of Sir G. Lowther.

I have agreed in principle, but have informed Count Benckendorff that I should be glad to see the text of proposed Russian communication before sending final instructions to Sir G. Lowther.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 161, and Tehran, No. 222.)

[13132] No. 687.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador, and has the honour to refer to his Excellency's private communication of yesterday addressed to Sir A. Nicolson relative to a proposal made by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's and the Russian Governments should make a joint representation to the Sublime Porte, with a view to induce them to accept as the basis of the negotiations for the settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier question the identic map of the neutral zone handed to them by the two Governments in 1871.

Sir E. Grey has the honour to inform Count Benckendorff in reply that His Majesty's Government agree in principle to the proposed representation, but that, before sending final instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject, he would be glad to have the opportunity of perusing the text of the communication which the Russian Government would propose to make.

Foreign Office, March 28, 1912.

[13424] No. 689*.

Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received March 29.)

Sir, 8, *Bishopsgate, London, March* 27, 1912.

SOCIÉTÉ internationale d'Études du Chemin de Fer transpersan.

In the absence of Lord Revelstoke, who left to-day for the Continent, we have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 25th March relative to the scheme for the study of railway construction across Persia from the Russian frontier in a south-easterly direction to a point on the frontier of Baluchistan and thence to Kurrachee.

This scheme, as the Foreign Office is aware, has for its ultimate purpose the establishment of direct railway communication between Western Europe and India by the link which it is hoped to form between the British-Indian and Russian railway systems. The discussions which have taken place in financial circles in Russia and France as well as in this country have now resulted in the formation of an international body, to be styled the "Société internationale d'Études du Chemin de Fer transpersan."

It is proposed to hold the first meeting constituting this société in Paris during the course of next month; in the meantime, we venture to communicate (in duplicate), for the information of the Foreign Office and India Office, the text of the statutes of the société, together with the text of the supplementary protocole governing the relative proportions in which representation has been allotted to the Russian, British, and French groups.*

On the final nomination of the administrators and on the actual constitution of the société we shall have pleasure in conforming with the suggestion made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a representative of the British section of the société should be nominated to act as the medium for communication between the Foreign Office and the British, French, and Russian groups of the Société d'Études.

Meanwhile, we have duly noted the desire of His Majesty's Government to retain their freedom of action in regard to the question of gauge, in addition to the other reservations specified in Sir A. Nicolson's letter of the 3rd March.

We are, &c.

(For Baring Brothers and Co., Limited),
CECIL BARING, *Director.*

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* Not printed.

[10197] No. 688.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant regarding an alleged violation by the British authorities in Baluchistan of the Perso-Baluch frontier near Piran.

Sir E. Grey is unable, from the material at present in his possession, to form an opinion as regards true position of the boundary and the status of the Zarezais, and would suggest, for the consideration of the Marquess of Crewe, that the Government of India should be asked to state their authority, of which his Lordship is unaware, for describing the red line on the map as roughly representing the limits of British occupation in 1905.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[12421] No. 689.

Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to the effect that the Persian Government have consented to the renewal of your company's road concession for a period of seven years, and for a further period of three years in the event of the state of the country rendering it impossible to carry on the construction work during the seven years.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[13330] No. 690.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 217.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March* 29, 1912.

FOLLOWING from British consul-general at Meshed, 28th March:—

"As it is proved beyond a doubt that my Russian colleague originated the agitation and has now declared martial law apparently on his own responsibility, and as the leaders of the party of the ex-Shah now realise that they have been deceived by him, if he could be instructed to take leave, which [?] his mental state requires, and the consulate-general be placed in charge of first secretary [at] Meshed, order would be restored in a few days. So long as my colleague is permitted both to create and quell disturbances at pleasure the situation is hopeless and serious outbreak of fanaticism probable. Thousands of villagers have entered the shrine to join holy war."

(Very Confidential.)

It would be useless to make this suggestion to the Russian Minister. Some weeks ago British consul-general reported that the agency surgeon considered that the Russian consul-general was suffering from incipient senile decay. I informed my Russian colleague, who asked authority from his Government to enquire of a member of the consulate-general by telegraph as to Russian consul-general's health; his Government retorted with reflections on Major Sykes.

(Sent to India.)

[13356] No. 691.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 218.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 29, 1912.*

PERSIAN Government have got wind of the contemplated negotiations with the tribal chiefs from a report of a speech of the Viceroy in Council. From a private letter from the "chef de cabinet," it would seem that the news has produced great consternation. Letter, which is clearly inspired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, says that the logical consequences of such negotiations can only be to deal a fatal blow in the south to the Central Government's prestige and authority, which it has been ostensible aim of the recent negotiations to strengthen and enhance.

Regent, whom I saw this afternoon and who had not, I think, heard of the Viceroy's speech, laid very special stress on the inopportuneness, immediately after the recent arrangement with the two Powers, of any demand which might embarrass the Persian Government.

I had hoped that, after Cox's telegram of 10th March, and after the Persian Government's consenting to our demand for compensation, and after the Persian Government's satisfactory response to our joint proposals, negotiations with the tribal chiefs would be postponed at least until time had been given for the Swedish gendarmerie to get to work, especially as both Cox and acting consul at Shiraz had reported situation had not deteriorated.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and Bushire.)

[13423] No. 692.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 219.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, March 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 218 of 28th March.

Following is extract from telegram from acting consul at Shiraz 24th March, and seems to show that there is good chance of tribal migration passing off quietly:—

"Bushire road has been slightly disturbed owing to tension between Kazerunis and Kashgais, and there have been several petty robberies from caravans, and one total robbery of post from Bushire. Governorship of Kazerun has, in deference to Kazerunis' determined objections to Kashgai Governor, been transferred from Mohammed Ali Khan to Muntesir-ul-Mulk, commander of Malayer regiment. Kashgais are deflecting traffic after Kamarij to Shapur, and thence to Dastarjin viâ Nandan, leaving out Kazerun altogether. Kawam and merchants have been forced to acquiesce, but Kawam assures me at first *détente* he will strike for reversion to high road. Ilkhani is at Jirreh with Government force, 250 horse and foot and 2 guns and flints and Kashgai riflemen, said to number about 2,000. Kashgai, Shishbuluki, Farsimedan, Sefikhani, and Namadi chiefs are with them. Soulet-es-Sultaneh has been hitherto maintaining neutral attitude, but by latest reports from Kazerun he is now expected to come into Tekhani; Soulet-ed-Dowleh has left his family behind, has moved up with one section of Darashoolis, and is about 20 miles distant from ilkhani; other sections of Darashoolis are said to be for ilkhani. Chiefs and Mohammed Kerimi Khan, who are with ilkhani, have been talking for some time of arranging peaceful compromise between two brothers. Chiefs apparently are not keen on shedding blood for any ilkhani, their growing independence rendering ilkhaniship no longer matter of vital importance to them. Talk of peace has not yet assumed any practical shape. Nasr-ed-Dowleh is at Fesa, where Arabs are collecting; tribes are now all in motion, and should be entering Shiraz Valley in fortnight. Kawam, who has been hitherto maintaining excellent order in Shiraz and environs, is anxious, mainly owing to entire lack of money, and for some time has been telling me that, unless Persian Government send him money, he cannot carry on. Is it desirable [*sic*] that Persian Government should send Fars Government some money immediately to pay police in town and guards in vicinity of Shiraz? With money local authorities think they can tide over safely critical moment of tribal passage and prevent incidents."

Acting treasurer-general has promised to remit 30,000 tomans from joint advacne to Shiraz for payment police and guards.

[13363] No. 693.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 220.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 217 of 29th March.

I understand that Major Sykes's proof of the Russian consul-general's delinquencies consists in telephone messages which have been overheard between the latter and a prominent agitator, which Major Sykes says establishes fully that Russian consul-general was plotting disturbances in order to take over the administration of Meshed.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and Meshed.)

[13599] No. 694.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 29, 1912.*

TURCO-PERSIAN Commission.

Question has arisen as to interpretation of article 2 of Treaty of Erzeroum. Turkish delegates have quoted explanatory note, but have so far not produced copy requested by Persian delegates. Latter have asked my advice. I have confined myself to suggesting that they should continue to press for it. I gather from the delegates who called on me that the Persians are expecting that they may lose something near Mohammerah, but gain something in the north if they can come to terms by carrying out the arrangement proposed by the mediating Powers.

It is most important that I should have the memorandum, which is in course of preparation, without delay.

[13873] No. 695.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 29, 1912.*

COUNT METTERNICH spoke to me to-day about the German claims in Persia.

I said that there was no question of meeting any claims out of the very small advance which was at present being made to the Persian Government. This advance was the first half of a total loan of 400,000*l.* which had been contemplated years ago by Russia and ourselves, but had not been made till now. We were taking part in this loan chiefly in order to get money spent to secure the southern roads. The conditions of a larger loan had not yet been considered. As we were not putting forward claims of our own, we could not urge that German claims should be satisfied out of this small loan. The French Government had made a similar request with regard to their Persian claims, and we had replied to them in the same sense.

Count Metternich said that a question had been asked in the House of Commons the other day as to a claim of ours, and from the reply it appeared that we were considering the payment of this claim out of loan.

I replied that I thought the reference in this case must have been to a small claim for 4,000*l.* as compensation for a direct attack upon a British consul and a British force. This claim was of a different character from ordinary commercial claims; but even this claim was, I thought, not being met out of the small loan.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13555] No. 696.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, March 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 216 of 25th March.

Cox thinks it essential that the whole of the Bushire-Shiraz section should be dealt with from the outset, and is convinced that any scheme which left any section of

the road to the care of the Persian authorities without being both financed and patrolled under Swedish supervision would be useless, and should not be accepted. He thinks that the idea that improvement on the Bushire–Shiraz section would react on Kerman–Bunder Abbas road is based on misapprehension. It is rather the improvement of the Shiraz–Yezd-i-Kasht section which might conceivably have this effect. Tribes of Fars who raid towards Kerman are from among the five Arab tribes whose activities do not extend south of the Yezd-i-Kasht section. Kashgais do not operate towards Kerman roads. In any case he thinks that the contingencies adumbrated in this connection are quite problematic, though he sees no harm in warning the Persian Government as suggested.

Swedish colonel, to whom I have explained our wishes in regard to Shiraz–Bushire section, says that he is quite alive to the advantage of extending the initial part of his scheme to Bushire and not stopping short at Kunar-Takhti. This had been his original idea, but he had been much impressed by the consideration which had been urged upon him that, if he devoted his attention on the Bushire–Ispahan road solely to the Bushire–Shiraz section, the hostility of the Kashgais would be accentuated when they saw that the tribes whose raiding ground is north of Shiraz were not interfered with, and that the prevention of the Kashgai depredations was the first object of the gendarmerie. He says that he can come to no definite decision until the officers now on their way to Shiraz have reported. I am reluctant to interfere further with the Swedish colonel's discretion without authorisation, and shall not press him further unless instructed.

It would, in my opinion, be quite useless to press the Persian Government at this stage to take serious measures to restore order on the Kerman–Bunder Abbas road. Until they obtain a loan, the utmost that we can hope for is that gendarmerie organisation on the limited lines of the Swedish colonel's scheme should be proceeded with.

I should add that Cox has not yet seen Swedish colonel's scheme, and he says that he can of course not express an opinion as to its prospects of success. He, however, enters a caveat that the scheme has been formulated without any Swedish officer having traversed the road, and also that those parties whose vested interests will be injuriously affected by a successful Swedish-Persian scheme will view that measure with only comparatively less hostility than they would an Anglo-Persian scheme.

[13602]

No. 697.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 223.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 31, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Meshed, 31st March :—

"Deeply regret to report that Russian troops bombarded and entered shrine last night. There are numerous casualties. As agitation was decreasing, there was no adequate reason for action.

"Shrine considerably damaged.

"(Sent to India.)"

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[13601]

No. 698.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburgh, March 31, 1912.

SHUA-ES-SULTANEH has arrived here. Object of his visit is not stated, but Persian Minister believes it is connected with his private affairs.